distance on either flank. Their front thenceforward for some
weeks ran almost in a straight line from where it quitted the
line held on June 6, opposite the village of Frelinghien at the
southern end, to Observatory ridge, situated a mile E. of
Zillebeke, where it joined the line held on the earlier date.
This represented a length of about nine miles. In depth, the
ground wrested from the Germans opposite the centre of the
old enemy salient was nearly three miles.
Some very important re-arrangements in the general dis-
tribution of the Allied forces N. of the Lys were being carried
into effect about the date of the battle of Messines and during
the immediately following weeks, in preparation for the Flanders
offensive that was to follow. The actual composition of the
different British armies also underwent considerable change.
Portions of the old IV. Army were moved N. from Artois, under
command of Sir H. Rawlinson, to the extreme left of the Allies'
line about Nieuport on the coast; this comparatively small IV.
Army was to be expanded at a later date and was to play an
important part in the operations, should the earlier stages
prove as successful as was hoped. On its right were placed the
Belgian forces. On the right of these again, and linking them up
with General Cough's British V. Army, was brought in the
French I. Army under command of General Antoine, which was
to act under the orders of Sir D. Haig. Its right was a little N.
of Boesinghe, where it was in contact with the Guards Div.
which formed Cough's left; the V. Army front extended from
thence to near the Ypres-Comines canal where it joined up with
the left of the II. Army.
A pause of some weeks in active operations now took place
in Flanders, the time being devoted on the side of the Allies to
making the elaborate preparations that were necessary before
the contemplated offensive could be launched. The lull was
however interrupted by an unfortunate incident on the extreme
left of the line. In the coast region, the front between Dixmude
and the shore followed a line in rear of the Yser river and canal
except quite close to the sea. There it crossed over the enemy's
side of the waterway, thereby creating a somewhat isolated
patch of territory, occupied by troops whose communications
with the rear and with their reserves were dependent upon a few
floating bridges. This patch consisted near the sea of sand-
dunes which from their nature were particularly difficult to
entrench. It had been taken over as it stood by the British ist
and 32nd Divs. of the IV. Army and the ist Div. was on the
left next the sea. Perplexed by the arrival of British troops on
the coast and anticipating serious developments in this quarter,
the Germans determined to strike a blow against the extremely
vulnerable sector of the Allies' front lying on the right bank of
the Yser, and they delivered their attack on July 10. The front
of the ist Div. beyond the river was on that day occupied by the
ist Northamptons and the 2nd K.R.R.C. battalions which
had been brigaded together since quitting Aldershot in July
1914. Early in the morning the isolated sector was subjected
to an intense bombardment by a great number of guns which
had been especially concentrated for the purpose. The bridges
in rear were destroyed by shell. Dugouts and shelters were
flattened out, and the difficulties of the two battalions were
much aggravated by the explosions choking their machine-guns
and rifles with sand. When the hostile infantry advanced to the
attack the small British force was overwhelmed, only a few
small parties eventually escaping by swimming the river. But
although the enemy by this stroke gained possession of the left
of the isolated sector, their effort against its right portion,
held by the 32nd Div., failed. No evil result followed to the
Allies, apart from the disaster to the Northamptons and Rifles.
Although the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge and
of most of the high ground on either side of Ypres-Comines
canal gap had put an end to the enemy overlooking Ypres from
the S., and tended to limit hostile observation of the place from
the S.E., the Germans still dominated it, in a measure, from the
E., from the N.E. and from the N. This circumstance exercised
a very important influence over the arrangements that were
being carried out for the offensive about to be undertaken, the
first stage of which was to be directed in the main against the
invader's defences sited on the high ground lying in a quadrant
round the ruined town.
" The various problems inseparable from the mounting of a
great offensive," writes Sir D. Haig in his despatch of Dec. 25
1917, " the improvement and construction of roads and railways,
the provision of an adequate water supply and of accommoda-
tion for troops, the formations of dumps, the digging of dugouts,
subways and trenches, and the assembling and registering of
guns, had all to be met and overcome in the new theatre of
battle under conditions of more than ordinary disadvantage.
On no previous occasion, not excepting the attack on the Mes-
sines-Wytschaete ridge, had the whole of the ground from which
we had to attack been so completely exposed to the enemy's
observation. . . . Nothing existed at Ypres to correspond with
the vast caves and cellars which proved of such value in the
days prior to the Arras battle, and the provision of shelter
for troops presented a very serious problem. The work of the
Tunnelling Companies of the Royal Engineers deserves special
mention in this connexion. It was carried on under great
difficulties, both from the unreliable nature of the ground and
from hostile artillery, which paid particular attention to all
indications of mining activity on our part."
Preparations for the offensive could not in fact be concealed.
The forces with which it was proposed to break out from Ypres
and to gain possession of the high ground to the E., further out
to the N.E., and still further out to the N., were assembled
openly during the latter part of the month of July. The Ger-
mans were perfectly well aware that they were going to be
subjected to a very formidable attack in this region.
The portions of the coming battle-field that lay nearest to
Ypres had already been the scene of fierce combats, which have
been dealt with in Parts I. and II. of this article. But certain
points in connexion with their topography call for some refer-
ence, while the arrangements which the Germans had made for
defence must also be described. The little river Steenbeke (or
Jansbeke as it is called in its lowest reaches) joining the Yser near
Merckem, creates together with its tributary streams, nearly all
of which join it on the right bank, a feature that proved of con-
siderable tactical importance during the prolonged operations
that followed. The main stream and also the watercourses
joining it flow northwestward or westward from their sources on
the crest of the high ground between the Ypres-Menin road and
the village of Passchendaele, with gentle spurs jutting out be-
tween them. The most extensive of these spurs is that between
the valley of the Steenbeke itself and the low-lying flats of the
Yser immediately N. of Ypres, which had come to be known as
1 106
YPRES AND THE YSER, BATTLES OF
the Pilckem ridge; it was from this spur that the town was over-
looked from the N. But the general direction of streams and
spurs alike being that they run from S.E. to N.W., it followed
that an offensive directed north-eastward had to cross them
successively and that they tended to provide the defenders with
a succession of minor positions. Seeing also that, from about
the point where the V. Army was in contact with the II. Army,
the main ridge ran in a generally northerly direction, while
the front occupied by the V. Army before the attack was
launched ran from S.E. to N.W., General Cough's forces which
were to carry the operation out, with the French I. Army
cooperating on their left, necessarily pivoted on their right and
in throwing their left forward were confronted by this succession
of minor positions. The shallow depressions representing the
valleys of the Steenbeke and its affluents tended to be marshy
and to flood and become almost impassable in wet weather.
Anticipating that the Allies would embark on a great offensive
in this quarter sooner or later, and becoming aware during the
spring that such an offensive was actually in preparation, the
Germans had taken steps to meet the eventuality with charac-
teristic thoroughness and ingenuity. Experiences on the Somme,
on the Ancre and at Arras, as well as on battle-fronts in Cham-
pagne where they had been attacked by the French, had taught
them that a continuous system of trenches did not proffer an
altogether satisfactory form of defence against the terrific bom-
bardments which the Allies could bring to bear, unless abundant
underground cover could be provided; and the nature of the soil
in Flanders, with water always near the surface, militated
against the creation of subterranean galleries. A continuous line
in any case offered a favourable target for guns and was objection-
able on that account. They were therefore holding the ground
over which attack was expected by a system of numerous dis-
connected trenches and strong points which were arranged in
depth rather than in breadth and which permitted of the for-
ward defences being held by relatively small forces, with the
idea of gradually absorbing attack rather than of giving no
ground at all. Scattered about were small concrete blockhouses
with walls of great thickness which could not be harmed by
shell of less than about 6-in. calibre, and which contained garri-
sons of about twenty men each, with two or three machine-guns;
the British soldiers when they came to make acquaintance with
them called them " pill-boxes." A defensive system designed
after this fashion was more difficult to map by aerial photog-
raphy than were continuous lines, and a preliminary bom-
bardment directed against it was in consequence necessarily so
much the less effective. As their front line near Ypres had
been in existence since 1915 and as much labour had been ex-
pended upon it the Germans were, however, trusting to the old
system to meet the first shock in the event of attack. It was
rather in the later offensive operations that the Allies found
themselves confronted with the new devices.
The front which Sir D. Haig had decided to extend his initial
advance along stretched from opposite Deulemont on the right,
to beyond Steenstraat on the left a distance of over 15 miles.
But the most important blow was to be delivered by the V.
Army in the middle on a front of approximately 7? m. between
the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road and the village of Boesinghe
(inclusive) on the left. The task of the II. Army to the S. was
limited to that of increasing the area threatened, so as to occupy
the enemy's attention, only a trifling advance being intended.
The French I. Army on the British left was to push forward its
right in close touch with the left of the V. Army, with the primary
object of securing this against counter-attack from the N.
The start of the offensive had originally been fixed for July 25.
It was however postponed for various reasons until the 3ist.
Owing to the enemy having retired out of his foremost trenches
along the northern portion of the V. Army front, British and
French troops on the 27th crossed the Yser canal (which had
hitherto formed an awkward obstacle at this point) about
Boesinghe; this enabled bridges to be thrown and it greatly
facilitated the attack in the left sector when this took place
four days later.
The order of battle of the V. Army (II., XIX., XVIII. and
XIV. Corps), enumerating the divisions from right to left, was
as follows: 24th, 3oth, 8th, isth, 55th, 3gth, sist, 38th and
Guards Div., with two divisions to each corps in support. The
French ist Div. was next to the Guards beyond Boesinghe.
Starting at 3:50 A.M. on the 3ist, the Allied infantry generally
experienced little resistance at first and only began to meet with
serious loss when advancing towards their second objectives.
This was particularly the case on the right, where the 24th and
3oth Divs. were endeavouring to gain possession of all the com-
manding ground about and beyond Shrewsbury forest and
Sanctuary wood to the S. of the Menin road; they failed to push
forward more than a few hundred yards. But further to the
left the assailants were successful at almost all points, reaching
the line of the Steenbeke and capturing St. Julien. The French
stormed Bixschoote, which was beyond the furthest objective
given them. Even if the check to Cough's right discounted the
completeness of the victory, the third battle of Ypres had
opened most encouragingly for the Allies. The Pilckem ridge had
been wrested from the enemy so that the town of Ypres was no
longer overlooked by hostile forces to the N. and N.E., the front
had been pushed forward along its full extent, and over 6,100
prisoners (including 135 officers) and 25 guns had been taken
by the British alone.
But the weather had broken. July had up till the 3ist been
an almost consistently fine month, but that morning opened
threatening, and rain came on during the course of the day. It
fell steadily all that night and continued without cessation for
four days, while for several days following the weather remained
unsettled. The low-lying clayey soil, pitted with shell-holes,
became a succession of muddy pools. The valleys became almost
impassable except at a few points. The delay that ensued gave
the German troops time to recover from their defeat of the 3ist
and also to bring up reinforcements before there could be any
question of continuing the offensive; it was not indeed until Aug.
1 6 that improving weather had sufficiently dried the ground to
justify the launching of a fresh general attack. This was again
undertaken by the V. Army and by portions of the French I.
Army on its left, the Menin road marking about the southern
limit of the offensive operations. The four corps of the V. Army
(II., XIX., XVIII. and XIV.) were disposed in line in the same
order as on the opening day, but on this occasion the divisions
in front line were in most cases those that had been in support
before. The advance was timed for 4:45 A.M., and the operations
were quite successful on the left, but the result on the right was
even more disappointing than it had been on the 3ist and on
this occasion comparative failure extended further along the
line toward the left. Except for some trifling local gains of ground
the II. and XIX. Corps improved their position very little,
suffering repulse at most points; nor was the resistance of the
enemy purely of the passive kind, for the Germans delivered
some determined counter-attacks, and as a result of several
hours of fluctuating fighting the troops in front line in the right
half of Cough's Army lost heavily. The XVIII. Corps on the
other hand did much better, its left division indeed gaining all
its objectives, while the XIV. Corps, still further to the left,
was entirely successful. Langemarck was taken, the Steenbeke
passed along a front of two or three miles, and a large gap made
in the German third line of defence. The French advanced
their line all along their front and occupied Drie Drachten on
the extreme left, on the borders of the inundation area. Still,
if the Allies were entitled, upon the whole, to claim victory in
view of what had been accomplished along the left half of the
battle-front and of their having secured 2,000 prisoners and 30
guns, their arms had met with reverse in the other half. Nor
was there reason to suppose that the enemy losses had been more
severe than those of the assailants.
The Flanders offensive, unavoidably started late, had now
been in full swing for more than a fortnight, and little improve-
ment in the position had been effected in what represented the
really vital sector of the front the ground about the crest of
the ridge stretching away from the uplands won at the battle
YPRES AND THE YSER, BATTLES OF
1107
of Messines toward Passchendaele. Up there the line had only
been advanced a few hundred yards as a result of two regularly
prepared attacks. Unles% progress could be expedited at this
critical point, there was little prospect of achieving the object
for which the offensive had been undertaken. It was clear that
a fresh force was needed to deal with the enemy in this portion
of the sphere of operations, and the British commander-in-chief
therefore decided to extend the left of the II. Army northward
and to entrust the attacks against the higher ground to General
Plumer, who was to work in conjunction with the V. Army
farther to the left. Experiences gained on July 31 and Aug. 16
had moreover shown that new methods of attack were called
for. The enemy's elastic system of defence forward trenches
weakly held while formidable reserves were kept in hand to
counter-attack before assailants could consolidate such ground
as they had won suggested limitation in the depth of objectives,
and it called for special artillery concentrations to deal with the
hostile counter-strokes when they were delivered. The requisite
measures took some time to carry out and the weather moreover
continued unfavourable during the latter part of Aug., rendering
the ground so waterlogged that a long interval became necessary
to permit of its drying to some extent. In Flanders it may be
remarked, as in England, humidity of the atmosphere increases
rapidly from about the middle of Aug. onward, so that periods
of fine weather have less and less effect in absorbing the moisture
of the ground as the season advances. The first half of Sept.
however, proved bright and dry and the date of the next attack
was fixed for the 2oth of that month.
The plan of operations for this day was that the II. Army
(consisting from right to left of the ipth, 39th, 4ist, 23rd,
Australian ist and 2nd Divs.) was to push forward between the
Ypres-Comines canal and a point a few hundreds yards S. of
the Ypres-Roulers railway, while the V. Army (consisting from
right to left of the gth, 55th, 58th, 5ist and zoth Divs.) was to
press forward on its left to as far N. as the Ypres-Staden railway.
At no point was it proposed to gain more than a mile of ground
in depth, and, except about the Ypres-Menin road and im-
mediately to the N. of this, the furthest objectives given to the
various divisions were not more than half a mile in advance of
the existing line. The weather unfortunately broke during the
night of the igth-2oth; but in spite of this the attacks achieved
their object all along the front and the efforts of the II. Army
were crowned with brilliant success 1 in a sector where previous
attempts had to a great extent failed, the crest of the main
ridge on either side of the Ypres-Menin road being wrested from
the enemy. The V. Army likewise appreciably improved its
position. The losses of the attacking side on this day were
relatively small, in view of the importance of what had been
achieved, and 3,243 prisoners and several guns were taken.
Sir D. Haig followed up the success of the 2oth without delay.
A fresh thrust took place along a more restricted length of front
on the 26th, from about half a mile S. of the Menin road to a
point about a mile and a half N. of the Ypres-Roulers railway.
The forces detailed for the enterprise, enumerating them from
right to left, were the sgth, 33rd, Australian 5th and 4th Divs.
of the II. Army, and the 3rd, sgth and s8th Divs. of the V. Army.
The Germans had in the meantime been making desperate
attempts to recover some of the ground which they had lost
about the Menin road and Polygon wood, but without success;
and in spite of their resolute opposition they were unable to pre-
vent the British troops from attaining practically the whole of
their objectives on the 26th. The rest of Polygon wood was
captured, the British position was improved all along the line,
and i, 600 prisoners were taken. That the losses should have
been by no means heavy on this day as on the 2oth showed how
effective an answer the method of the shallow objective provided
to the enemy's new plan of defence by depth. The combats of
Sept. 20 and 26 having given almost the entire crest of the main
ridge into British hands to a depth of a mile and a half in advance
of the line taken up on July 31, Sir D. Haig arranged for a
very important operation to take place on Oct. 4, the front this
time extending from Polygon wood to the Ypres-Staden rail-
way, although a minor advance was also to take place S. of
Polygon wood and S. of the Menin road.
There was a severe gale accompanied by torrents of rain
during the night of the 3rd, and the weather conditions on the
following morning were so unfavourable that the ground was in
most parts of the battle-field little better than a morass. The
enemy moreover was in great strength, especially in the centre;
two fresh divisions had been brought up into the German line
and, as it happened, these together with the troops already on
the spot were drawn up ready to deliver an assault which was
timed to start ten minutes later than the hour that had been
fixed for the British advance. The consequence was that when
the British artillery barrage opened it caught hostile forces that
were gathered in mass and it did great execution. The order of
battle of the II. and V. Armies was as follows: 37th Div. of
the IX. Corps on the extreme right, athwart the Menin road,
then the X. Corps (5th, 2ist, 7th Divs.) covering the front up to
in front of Polygon wood, then the I. Anzac Corps (ist and 2nd
Australian Divs.) reaching as far as the Ypres-Roulers railway,
and, on their left again and forming the left of the II. Army, the
II. Anzac Corps (Australian 3rd Div. and New Zealand Div.) ;
the V. Army was represented by the XVIII. Corps (48th and
nth Divs.) next to the II. Anzac Corps, with the XIV. Corps
(4th and 2gth Divs.) on the extreme left. The attacking side
gained a signal victory this day. Nearly all its objectives were
secured, and the gains were especially important in the centre
where a firm footing was won along the main ridge about the
villages of Molenaarelsthoek and Broodesinde for a length of a
mile and a half; a gentle spur stretching back north-westward
from this and known as the Gravenstafel ridge was also wholly
secured. A hold was gained further to the left on the important
village of Poelkapelle on the Ypres-Roulers road; and along all
the central part of the zone of operations the assailants pushed
their line forward several hundred yards, thereby taking pos-
session of ground of great tactical importance. 5,200 prisoners
were taken, including 138 officers, and, besides a few guns, a
large number of machine-guns and trench mortars were amongst
the day's captures. Following as it did rapidly upon the suc-
cesses of Sept. 20 and 26, the combat of Oct. 4 represented
a highly satisfactory achievement, which had moreover been
accomplished without very heavy sacrifice. It was not in-
deed the losses encountered in these well-defined actions that
gave grounds for anxiety so much as the casualties which
occurred day after day to troops that were clinging to exposed
positions, where owing to the condition of the ground it was
almost impossible to create effective cover.
A good defensive line had however now been secured. As a
result of the offensive operations begun by General Plumer on
June 7 and continued intermittently for four months, the crest
of the long belt of high ground had been occupied from Messines
to within a very few hundred yards of the Ypres-Roulers railway
and the situation of the Allies in Flanders had been vastly
improved in consequence. Possession of the Gravenstafel ridge
would moreover enable Sir D. Haig to establish a strong flanking
position, which would render it difficult for the Germans to
recover the high ground they had lost by a turning movement
from the N. But, regarding the Allied offensive in this part
of the theatre of war as a whole, the work was in reality only
begun. The Houthulst forest, with the long line of high ground
forming the quadrant of a circle beyond it, was still in the
enemy's hands. Until the ridge had been secured as far as the
vicinity of Staden, it would be premature to embark on the
second part of the general scheme of operations attack on the
German positions along the coast between Nicuport and Ostend.