the Allies. The French military authorities complained to the
War Office that German propaganda appeared to be entering
France in large quantities through England. They sent exam-
ples, and asked that precautions should be taken. On enquiry
it was found that the incriminated documents were the product
of one of the British civilian propagandist agencies. Doubtless
it was a matter of opinion whether the French or English judg-
ment of the efficacy of the leaflets was the more correct, but
the real fault was the absence of harmonious effort. In 1918,
the fifth year of the war, it became of vital importance that the
Allied peace aims should be explained with a clear and unan-
imous voice to the war-weary enemy. It was to this purpose
that Lord Northcliffe addressed himself. He used his influence
first to extract from the British Government the broad lines
of a definite policy, in order that the propaganda of his Depart- 1
ment might not be in conflict with the casual and sporadic
utterances of ministers, next to secure unity of purpose among
the British and Allied propagandist agencies.

The first campaign was against Austria-Hungary. The British
Government, hampered by the secret Treaty of London, hesi-



182



PROPAGANDA



tated between the policy of working for a separate peace with
the Habsburg dynasty, leaving its territory almost untouched,
and the alternative of trying to support and encourage all the
anti-German and pro-Ally elements in the Austria-Hungarian
Empire. The objective selected by Crewe House was to support
the national desires of the Czechs, Southern Slavs, Rumanes,
Poles and Italians for independence, so as to form a strong non-
German chain of Central European and Danubian States, and
thus to encourage the disinclination of these peoples to fight
for their German masters.

The chief obstacle to the policy of the British propaganda
was the pledge given to Italy in 1915, to give her certain Austrian
territories inhabited by Southern Slavs. In 1917, the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes had assembled in Corfu, and under the
leadership of Dr. Trumbitch, president of the Southern Slav
Committee, and M. Pashitch, prime minister of Serbia, had
proclaimed the unity of the three Southern Slav peoples. Early
in 1918, after recovery from the disaster of Caporetto had
begun, the united Southern Slavs, on the initiation of Mr.
Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton Watson, came into conference
with leading Italians and agreed to settle amicably the ter-
ritorial controversies in dispute. Lord Northcliffe took up the
position at that point, and almost the first step of his campaign
was to send Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton Watson to the Congress
of Oppressed Habsburg Nationalities which took place at Rome
with the consent of the Italian Government. Meantime he
urged on the War Cabinet the need of coming to a decision be-
tween the alternative policies and of obtaining the agreement of
the French, Italians and Americans to the choice. He got only a
dubious and halting opinion from the British Foreign Secretary,
who urged that the same propaganda could be adapted at least
to the earlier stages of either polity. This indecision, main-
tained through the war and through the peace negotiations, led
to the disastrous adventure of D'Annunzio, for the Italians, like
other peoples, flushed with the unexpected joy of complete
victory, forgot the wise concessions to which they had been
willing when the issue was doubtful. But Lord Northcliffe's
mission achieved a temporary and successful unity of purpose.
A joint commission consisting of representatives of Italy, Great
Britain and France, was established at the Italian general
headquarters, with the special object of conducting propaganda
directed to the oppressed nationalities in the Austrian armies.
Representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nation-
alities were attached to the commission. A polyglot printing
press was acquired, and large quantities of propaganda of all
kinds were distributed by aeroplane, rockets, grenades and
contact patrols. The latter consisted of deserters of Czecho-
slovak, Southern Slav, Polish and Rumanian nationalities, who
volunteered for this service against their former oppressors.
The effect was soon apparent. Deserters belonging to the subject
races came over to the Italian armies in large numbers, so that
the attack planned by the Austrians had to be postponed. Un-
fortunately, the complete success of the effort, apparently
assured early in May, was prevented by the reactionary tend-
encies within the Italian Government, supported by the un-
certain attitude of the Governments of France, Great Britain
and the United States. But even in the face of this difficulty,
the success was so great that, after the battle of the Piave, mem-
bers of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission were received
and thanked by the Italian commander-in-chief.

While this great campaign was taking place on the Italian
front, the propaganda addressed to Germany was being in-
tensified. On assuming office, Lord Northcliffe found the
War Office propaganda department, described above, in full
operation. Except that he at once began to press the Govern-
ment to renew the original permission for the use of aeroplanes,
he suggested no change in the War Office work. His committee
at Crewe House, however, first with the assistance of Mr. H. G.
Wells and after a few weeks with that of Mr. H. Hamilton Fyfe,
set to work to frame a general propaganda policy directed against
Germany, and to produce leaflets and other matter. Some of
this material was given to the War Office Department; much of



it was distributed by special means chiefly through neutral
countries. In July, when the work in Italy had been estab-
lished on permanent lines, and Mr. Steed had returned to London,
it was decided to concentrate all the production of propaganda
at Crewe House, with the object of bringing it more into line
with a concerted policy. Accordingly, the writer of this article
was transferred from the War Office to Crewe House, but kept in
touch with the War Office as liaison officer, the army remaining
the agent for distribution.

The General Committee met daily at Crewe House, receiving
the reports of the different branches, collecting information
from all possible sources, and stimulating the propagandist work
against Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany. It became
more and more obvious during the summer of 1918 that the spirit
of the enemy was breaking on every front, that they were alert
to every suggestion as to the approach of peace, and that the
supreme necessity was a clear statement of the intentions of the
Allies. Lord Northcliffe, with varying success, continued to
press the Government for such a definition of policy as would
serve as a true basis for propaganda. The fundamental principle
on which he wished to act was that when a line of policy had
been sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Govern-
ments should be asked for their assent to it, so that their propa-
ganda departments might act in concert. Failing to obtain a
clear lead from the British Government, who at that time
appeared to have no definite policy with regard to any issue of
the war, Lord Northcliffe convened an inter-Allied propaganda
conference at Crewe House. It was attended by Lord Beaver-
brook, Minister of Information, representatives of the British
Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry, and by
delegates from France, Italy and the United States, the U.S.A.
delegation, however, being instructed to attend only as ob-
servers. The conference, after a plenary session, divided into
committees to discuss details of policy, methods of publicity
and methods of distribution. At a final plenary session the
reports of the committees were adopted, and it was agreed that
they should be submitted by the heads of the four missions to
their respective Governments for approval. The conference
then constituted a permanent Inter-Allied Body for the conduct
of propaganda in enemy countries. Steps were at once taken to
secure the permanency of contact between the propagandist
agencies which had been established at the conference, and these
became increasingly effective until, when the Armistice came,
there was almost complete unity of action amongst the Allies.

As the possibility of peace drew nearer, it became still more
urgent that propaganda should be kept free from any trace of
confusion. To secure this, a Central Body, called the Policy
Committee of the British War Mission, was formed at Crewe
House; it consisted of representatives of Lord Northcliffe's
department and of the War Cabinet, the Admiralty, War Office,
Foreign Office, Treasury, Ministry of Information, Air Ministry,
Colonial Office, India Office, War Aims Committee and Official
Press Bureau. It decided to undertake the following activities:
Study of peace terms, study of utterances by important enemy
representatives, their real significance and the nature of the
response to be made to them. It had to take action almost at
once, since the German Peace Note, with its reference to the
publication of President Wilson's " fourteen points," required
immediate attention from British propagandists. Lord North-
cliffe's committee had been studying the fourteen points with a
very close attention. It was plain that they could not be under-
stood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace, and that it
was therefore a matter of honesty and of prudence to define the
interpretation put on them by Great Britain before accepting
the surrender of Germany. This view was accepted by the
Policy Committee, and, after detailed discussion, a statement
drafted by the Crewe House Committee was adopted in prin-
ciple. It was approved, by a representative of the Government
designated for the purpose, for unofficial use as propaganda
policy. Each department henceforward made it the text of its
productions. As this document is of historical interest, it is here
printed in full.



PROPAGANDA



183



Confidential.



PROPAGANDA PEACE POLICY



The following conditions are indisputable:

In no sense shall restoration or reparation in the case of Belgium
be taken into consideration when adjusting any other claims arising
from the war.

1. The complete restoration, territorial, economic and political, of
Belgium.

2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded
Provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries.

3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a terri-
torial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation for
the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two Provinces,
whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were incor-
porated in Germany against their will.

4. Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible
along the lines of nationality.

5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their
place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to enter
into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of
Austria-Hungary.

6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included in the bound-
aries of the Russian Empire, the annulment of all treaties, contracts
or agreements made with subjects, agents or representatives of
enemy Powers since the revolution and affecting territory or inter-
ests formerly Russian, and cooperation of the Associated Powers in
securing conditions under which the various nationalities of the
former Empire of Russia shall determine their own form of Govern-
ment.

7. The formation of an independent Polish State with access
to the sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by pre-
dominantly Polish populations, and the indemnification of Poland
by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought.

8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, the evacuation
and restoration of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, the Associated
Powers to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan ques-
tion on an equitable basis.

9. The removal, so far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over
all non-Turkish peoples.

10. The people of Schleswig shall be free to determine their own
allegiance.

11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by
Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable
to replace the merchant tonnage belonging to the Associated and
neutral nations illegally damaged or destroyed.

12. The appointment of a tribunal before which there shall be
brought for impartial justice individuals of any of the belligerents
accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.

13. The fornfer Colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her in
consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no
case be returned to Germany.

The following conditions of Peace are negotiable:

1. The adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from
the operations of war, and not included amongst the indisputable
conditions.

2. The establishment, constitution and conditions of member-
ship of a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future
wars and improving international relations.

3. The League of Free Nations shall be inspired by the resolve
of the Associated Powers to create a world in which, when the con-
ditions of the Peace have been carried out, there shall be opportunity
and security for the legitimate development of all peoples.

The action taken thereon by the Enemy Propaganda Com-
mittee at Crewe House was as follows: At their suggestion Lord
Northclifle made it the basis of an address to the United States
officers in London on Oct. 22 1918. The Production Depart-
ment of the Committee got to work on a series of pamphlets
and leaflets dealing with the different points of the memoran-
dum. The memorandum was sent to the French, Italian, and
American members of the inter-Allied Body for Propaganda
in enemy countries, with the request that they should take
similar action on it to that taken by the British Policy Com-
mittee and bring it up for discussion at the next meeting of
the inter-Allied body. Lastly they decided to prepare and give
wide publicity to an article covering the whole ground of the
memorandum, so that the policy could be presented in the same
terms to the British people, to their Allies and to the enemy.
The steps taken by Crewe House, and the corresponding action
taken by other departments concerned, were reported and
approved at a meeting of the Policy Committee at Crewe House
on Oct. 28 1918, the last meeting actually held.

Events were moving swiftly, and Crewe House found that
there was no time to carry out the original intention of cir-



culating the general statement through one of the more im-
portant monthly periodicals. It was therefore decided to ask
Lord Northcliffe to give the peace policy the wide and immediate
publicity possible by the use of his name and by the sources
of distribution at his command. He agreed at once, and so
consummated the efforts of British propaganda. On Nov. 4
1918 an article under his name appeared in The Times and
The Daily Mail, The Paris Daily Mail, and the leading papers
in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa, Newfoundland,
India, the British Dependencies, the United States of America,
S. America, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Japan and elsewhere, and very soon after-
wards in Germany. The arrangements for this wide publicity
were made personally by Lord Northcliffe, and the cost of
cabling was borne by him. The final form of the article was
due to him, but its substance represented the unanimous views
of his advisory committee, the members of which he had selected,
and over whose deliberations he had presided.

ALLIED PROPAGANDA. The principles and methods of propa-
ganda have been so fully illustrated in the foregoing account
of the British effort, that little would be gained by a detailed
description of the operations of England's Allies. France went
through a history much like that of Great Britain. In the earlier
stages of the war, propaganda was conducted by a number of
agencies, for the most part in extension of their normal func-
tions. As the war proceeded, concentration and intensification
were achieved, ending in the work being placed under the control
of a single minister with a large staff. The control of home
opinion was less difficult than in England, as it was already in
the tradition of the Government to regulate the dissemination
of information and of official views. As, however, a consider-
able part of the French population was in territory occupied by
the Germans, there had to be an extensive distribution of propa-
ganda through the army and by secret agents. An intensive
campaign was conducted in Alsace and Lorraine, the services of
distinguished Alsatians of French descent being employed
with great success. Neutral opinion was influenced by special
missions and by resident agents. Much care was given to
French propaganda amongst the Allies. Distinguished civilians
of British and American nationality were frequently invited
to France, and given every opportunity of seeing the spirit in
which France was making her prodigious effort and the enormous
difficulties she had to face. French agents kept in close touch
with British opinion of every class, and in every part of the
Empire, not neglecting Ireland and Quebec. In one respect this
branch of French propaganda was more far-seeing than most
of the British work; it was not content with the actual problems
of the war, but anticipated and prepared for many of the
difficulties and possible causes of friction that might arise in
the making even of a victorious peace. France early foresaw
that, as German colonies were unlikely to be restored to Ger-
many, it would be necessary for France and Britain to be in
general agreement with regard to extra-European territories.
The French effort to reach the enemy directly was on a smaller
scale, but was similar to the work done by the British War
Office. By exchange of views and materials a high degree of con-
cord was reached.

Belgium was in the unfortunate position of being able to
operate directly only in a very small part of her own territory.
By direct effort, and with the willing cooperation of France
and Britain, she was able to keep in close contact with her own
people. The unmerited calamities which fell on Belgium secured
her in advance the sympathy of neutral and Allied nations,
so that special propaganda was unnecessary. Italy was rather a
theatre for propaganda than a direct propagandist. She spoke
with so many different voices that, except for a certain amount
of direct propaganda addressed to the enemy, she was unable
to explain her attitude very clearly either to neutrals or to Allies.
On the other hand, she issued a series of magnificent photo-
graphic descriptions of her arduous campaigns, which explained
well the immense difficulties of military operations on the
Italian front, and the brilliant technical methods by which



184



PROPAGANDA



they were overcome. The Americans devoted the same energy
to propaganda as to preparation for actual warfare. 'Repre-
sentatives were at once sent to Europe to examine and report
on the methods of propaganda employed by the Allies. BySept.
1918, an American Propaganda Department had been estab-
lished with branches in London, Paris and near Verdun. Much
literature was produced, and its distribution by aeroplane and
by balloon had been arranged when the Armistice came.

GERMANY. It would be difficult to say how far the exaltation
of the German spirit in 1914 was due to official inspiration, or
how far the long campaign of German intellectuals and in-
dustrials, before 1914, for the aggrandizement of Germany, had
inspired official opinion. In any event, the outbreak of the war
let loose a flood of literature unanimous in sentiment and appar-
ently spontaneous. Professors and pastors, politicians of every
section, pan-Germans and socialists were united in proclaiming
the necessity of the war and the certainty of victory. But even
in these early days there were striking differences of opinion.
One school urged that the war was defensive, forced on Germany
by the " encircling policy " of her enemies. German militarism
was a necessary consequence of a position surrounded by power-
ful enemies, of the Russian danger, and of English jealousy of
her commercial success. As it was difficult to reconcile this theory
with the actual German plan of campaign and with the fate of
Belgium, much stress was laid on the theme that an offensive
was only the best means of defence. When victory came,
annexations were to be limited to what might be necessary for
future security. Another school proclaimed the historic mission
of Germany, her high culture and civilization, the advantage to
the world of her victory. The great empires of the past had
expanded and developed for selfish ends; Germany wished to
free the seas for all the nations, and to open up the world so
that all the peoples great or small could develop on their own
lines. England, France and Russia had been the great oppressors
of smaller nations and races; Germany would liberate them. The
unification of Germany had been the first stage in a beneficent
process which would lead, first, to a great federation of Middle
Europe, and then to a federation of the whole world. A third
school expounded a somewhat careful form of the Bernhardi
and Treitschke doctrine. The great and expanding German
people required land within the German Empire in which the
surplus population might find room and yet remain German.
Outlet must be found for German talent, organizing capacity,
capital, manufactures, and the necessary supplies of raw ma-
terial must be forthcoming. These objects Germany would have
preferred to attain peacefully. But she was a late arrival on the
world-scene, and her rapid development had aroused such envy,
particularly from England, that her legitimate rights could be
secured only by force. Yet a fourth school, relatively small in
numbers but of great influence in the navy, army and among
the big industrials, appealed directly to cupidity. The riches,
natural resources and possibilities of all parts of the world in
which German influence could be extended or which Germany
could take from her enemies were described elaborately. The
growth of the British Empire was displayed in almost affectionate
caricature as an accomplishment of successful piracy; England,
however, must now disgorge to the younger and stronger pirate.
It was an odd but possibly significant circumstance that, in all
these diverging views, little attention was' paid to the events
immediately preceding the various declarations of war.

So far we are dealing with the unofficial home propaganda
of Germany. It consisted to a much larger extent than in Great
Britain of books and pamphlets, some oi which doubtless were
subsidized, but most of which apparently were spontaneous.
These served also for the German peoples in foreign lands, and
were exported in very large quantities, often in their original
form, often in translation so as to serve as propaganda for
neutrals. It was a characteristic of German self-confidence
that they appeared to think that explanations good enough for
Germans were good enough for neutrals and even for enemies.
But in addition to such private or at least apparently unofficial
efforts, there was an official propaganda on a large and highly



organized scale. The German Press was organized for war,
with the object not only of influencing home opinion but
neutral opinion, directly through the circulation of German
papers in Switzerland, Holland, and Scandinavia, and by their
effect on foreign editors. Dr. Theodor Wolff, the well-known
editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, said that " German censorship
passed news concerning facts, but forbade discussion of war
events or internal politics and of many other subjects." The
Government suppressed criticism or the giving of information
with regard to the internal conditions of the country. Every two
or three days the newspapers received printed orders indicating
what they were forbidden to publish, the attitude they were to
assume on particular topics, and the articles from other papers
they were free to reproduce. Editors were usually allowed to
produce their papers without a preliminary examination of the
proofs, but transgression of .the regulations was followed by
prosecution or suspension. One form of punishment was to