and in Britain the bonds which previously existed between
protozoology and medicine have been greatly strengthened.
One of the most obvious conditions necessary for the con-
tinuance of this alliance is the growth of protozoology itself.
Unless the protozoologists can build scudly, and not too slowly,
they will lose their advantages. Unfortunately, no adequate
provision has yet been made for the training of workers in
protozoology. At present there are in Britain and elsewhere
few first-rate professional protozoologists and few competent
teachers, but a large number of day labourers and dabblers
from other sciences. Protozoologists are still mainly recruited
from other professions. The remedy for this state of affairs will
be found only when protozoology is recognized as a separate
science an occupation for specialists and not for smatterers;
and when encouragement is given to its development by the
founding of .professorships in the subject or similar appoint-
ments in the larger universities. These professorships must
be primarily for research, and secondarily for teaching purposes.
The professor must have ample time and funds for teaching
himself, and for carrying out his own researches. If he is suffi-
ciently gifted to do both these things, he will be able at the same
time to teach his science to others who would follow in his foot-
steps. But the tune has now gone when the junior demonstrator
in zoology or the lecturer on general parasitology in the medical
schools can expect to " take up " protozoology for a term or two
and thereby profit science or himself. Unfortunately, too little
had been done up to 1921 to create the necessary facilities.
A professorship in the subject, founded on the right lines, was
indeed instituted in London University some years ago, but it
had remained unoccupied up to 1921 since the death of its first
holder in 1915. At Cambridge the Quick professorship of biology,
founded later, at one time appeared likely to develop into a chair
of protozoology, but these hopes were not fulfilled. An assistant
professorship, chiefly devoted to protozoology, recently existed
in the Imperial College of Science in London; but no further
appointment was made to this post after it was vacated by its
first occupant. The medical schools of Great Britain have, in
some instances, lecturers in protozoology, but these are mostly
medical men with other work to perform and no special knowl-
edge of the science as a whole. The schools of tropical medicine
in London and Liverpool have been more fortunate, and have
been able to appoint to their staffs protozoologists who can
devote their undivided attention to the subject. But here again
it is chiefly the practical side of the science, as applied to medi-
cine, that is being fostered. Rothamsted Experimental Station
has a protozoologist to study the subject in its agricultural
aspects, and several universities and other institutions of minor
importance have members who have specialized in protozoology.
Veterinary medicine in Great Britain has, however, still done
little for research or instruction in protozoology.
In the British colonies and dependencies things are no better.
A chair of protozoology has recently been created in India;
PRYOR PRZEMYSL, SIEGES OF
but as a general rule protozoological research and teaching are
still being carried out under unfavourable conditions by hard-
worked professors of other subjects. The valuable work already
done by many of these men is surely a sufficient pledge of the
profits that will accrue when more adequate provisions are made.
If we turn to the United States we find that Columbia Uni-
versity has a professor of protozoology and Johns Hopkins an
assistant professor. There is also an American professor of
protozoolory in the Philippines. But with these exceptions, and
a few of lesser importance, protozoology is advancing in America
and elsewhere by the labours of zoologists and medical men
whose appointments were not primarily established for the
furtherance of the science.
RECENT LITERATURE. The most trustworthy of recent books deal-
ing with the Protozoa as a whole are those of E. A. Minchin, An Intro-
duction to the Study of the Protozoa (1912), and F. Dollein, Lehrbuch
der Protozoenkunde (4th ed., Jena, 1916). See abo D. Bruce and
others (19031919), Reports of the Sleeping Sickness Commission,
i.-xvii. (Royal Society, London); C. Dobell (1911), "The Prin-
ciples of Protistology" (Arch.f. Protistenkund? , vol. xxiii., p. 269) ; C.
Dobell and others (1921), A Report on the Occurrence of Intestinal
Protozoa in the Inhabitants of Britain (Medical Research Council,
Special Report Series, No. 59, London) ; C. Dobell and F. W.
O'Connor (1921), The Intestinal Protozoa of Man (London); S. P.
James (1920), Malaria at Home and Abroad (London); H. S. Jen-
nings (1906), Behavior of the Lou'er Organisms (New York) ; A.
Laveran and F. Mesnil (1912), Trypanosomes et Trypanosomiases
(2 ed. Paris) ; E. L. Walker and A. W. Sellards (1913), " Experimen-
tal Entamoebic Dysentery," Philippine Journ. Sci. (B. Trop. Med.,
vol. viii., p. 253). (C. Do.)
PRYOR, ROGER ATKINSON (1828-1919), American jurist
and politician (see 22.533*), died in New York City March 14
1919. In 1912 he published a volume of Essays and Addresses.
PRZEMYSL, SIEGES OF, 1914-5. The Galician town of
Przemysl (see 22.534) was first fortified in 1854, when Austria
mobilized against Russia. The completely exposed position of
the N.E. frontier made it imperative to lay out fortifications.
The Archduke Charles had already, in 1824, called attention to
this weak point. In case of an invasion of East Galicia by the
Russians, the first natural obstacle capable of bringing them to a
halt would be the river beds of the lower San and the Dniester,
and the obvious thing to do was to strengthen this line by con-
structing a series of fortifications. On the San it was originally
intended to build out Jaroslau as a fortress, but the decision in
1854 fell on Przemysl. In later years a row of smaller bridge-
heads and points d'appui arose along the Dniester, which greatly
increased its value as an obstacle. In the course of one year a
fortified ring of no less than 65 forts had been erected round the
town of Przemysl. The year 1870 saw the building of a perma-
nent ring of forts finished, but the works were not a match for a
bombardment by modern siege guns, owing to the very niggardly
expenditure sanctioned. Although after 1888, and in the last
years before the World War, the modernization of the fortress
from a technical standpoint was begun and some modern self-
contained forts were constructed, it was in 1914 still in a very
unsatisfactory condition. The short time available for equip-
ment between the first days of mobilization and the first siege by
the Russians was indeed spent in feverish activity, but only a
very small part of the neglect of the past 10 years could now be
made good. The works on the ring of forts, which was 48 km.
in circumference, were more or less out of date. Only 1 2 of them
could be considered " bombproof," while all the rest were only
" shellproof ," and even so only against 24-011. bombs and 15-cm.
shells of old-fashioned construction. The points d'appui for the
infantry and the battery emplacements lying between the forts
were almost without exception only splinterproof shelters, and
some were mere field fortifications constructed of wood and
earth. The infantry line running through these was protected by
wire obstacles, generally only three rows deep. In front of the
line of the ring of forts one enormous task had to be undertaken
in preparing for the defence the clearing of the foreground.
No less than 18 villages and from 7 to 8 km. of forest were levelled
to the ground. Numerous barracks, ammunition magazines,
communications, bridges and other buildings, had still to be
erected within the ring. The armament of the fortress was also
on a very low footing, consisting of about 1,000 guns in all, of
which more than half were short-range weapons for ditch defence,
andmtradilores. These were 12- and 15-cm. cannon dating from
1861, 15-cm. mortars dating from the 'eighties, and 8-cm. cupola,
disappearing cupola, and minimum port guns of old construction.
About 450 of the guns were distant defence guns, being for the
most part old g-cm. field guns (M 75/96) with a range of only
6 km. Of modern guns the fortress at the beginning of the war
had altogether only four 30.5-011. mortars, with a range of 9-5
km., and 24 8-cm. field guns dating from 1905, effective up to
7-5 kilometres. The distant defence guns also included some
12-cm., 15-cm. and i8-cm. siege cannon, dating from 1880, 10
lo-cm. and 15-011. cupola howitzers made in 1899, 15-011. mobile
howitzers of the same year, and 24-cm. mortars made in 1898.
As regards munitions the average provision was 500 rounds per
gun, and not even that in the case of the modern mortars. For
all the four 30-5-011. mortars taken together there were 300
rounds in the fortress. Of machine-guns there were altogether
114, one-third of which were built into the forts, leaving two-
thirds for mobile use.
For the purpose of provisioning the fortress an estimate of
85,000 men and 3,710 horses had been established. In peace
tims one month's supplies were stored in the fortress, with the
understanding that an increase to three months' should be made
during the arming period. The Austro-Hungarian Higher Com-
mand did its utmost at this time to increase the store of supplies,
and, by making full use of the available railways and motor
columns, succeeded in provisioning the fortress for four months
and a-half. These precautions were all the more justified as, at
the last moment, the garrison was augmented by the addition of
the 23rd Honved Inf. Div., two field tramway sections and other
minor formations, which brought up its strength to 130,000
men and 21,000 horses. At this strength the fortress was pro-
visioned, not for four and a-half, but for three months.
The actual garrison of the fortress at the beginning of mobiliza-
tion consisted of the Austrian uith and the Hungarian 9 7th
Landsturm Inf. Bdes., one reserve squadron, one reserve bat-
tery, 40 companies of garrison artillery, 44 Landsturm artillery
brigades, 7 companies of sappers, and the essential sanitary
and labour detachments. When the Austro-Hungarian armies
retreated behind the San, after the breaking-off of the battle
of Lemberg-Nawa Ruska, there were added to the fortress
command (under Field-Marshal-Lt. Kusmanek von Burgneu-
stadten) the Austro-Hungarian 93rd and loSth Landsturm Inf.
Bdes. and the 23rd Honved Inf. Division. Earlier additions had
been: two Hungarian march regiments, of which, however, one
was handed over to Jaroslau and Radymno, one Hungarian
Landsturm hussar unit, and lastly a group consisting of four
battalions formed out of various Landsturm formations, auxil-
iary police and others, cut off from the main body. All in
all, the fortress establishment, when the last man of the mobile
armies had left the zone, consisted of: 6i| infantry battalions
(of which 40! were Landsturm), 7 squadrons, 4 field-gun bat-
teries, 43 fortress-artillery companies, 48 Landsturm artillery
brigades, and 8 sapper companies; also sanitary corps, military
and Landsturm labour detachments, fortress and tramway
formations, balloon detachments, telegraph, telephone and radio
formations, and so forth. The value of the troops shut up in the
fortress may best be judged by the facts that two-thirds of them
were Landsturm, including therefore older and less trained men,
and that the formations which had been fighting on the open
field were reduced to nearly half their strength. There had been,
since the beginning of the World War, only two brigades to take
duty in the fortress, and one of these even was sent temporarily
to the IV. Army Command. The rest of the troops in the fortress
were therefore not over-familiar with the duty of the fortress.
The Russian siege army, commanded by Gen. Radko Dimi-
triev, consisted originally of the whole of the III. Army, with the
IX., X., XI. and XXI. Corps and parts of the IV. and VIII.
Armies. When the Austro-Hungarian forces resumed the offen-
sive in the beginning of Oct. 1914, the Grand Duke Nicholas
withdrew three divisions of the III. Army from the circle of
' These figures indicate the volume and page number of the previous article.
PRZEMYSL, SIEGES OF
bombardment and sent them to the lower Vistula, with the ob-
ject of enveloping the enemy. There were now nine and a-half
infantry and two cavalry divisions left behind for the blockade
of the fortress. Three of these divisions were posted on the N.
front, half a division on the S., while the main force of six di-
visions encircled the E. and S.E. front, which was the point
of attack actually fixed upon by Radko Dimitriev, and the two
cavalry divisions were encamped on the W. and S.W. front.
Counting the Russian infantry division at 16 battalions and the
cavalry division at 24 squadrons, the Russians employed no
fewer than 150 battalions and 48 squadrons, 800 guns of the
field army and the heavy guns of the siege-artillery parks in the
siege of Przemysl.
First Sie|e 18 3 I4-9-IO-I4
1,2. etc. Defence Commands
Armouredforts Other works
^ Investment line
C3 etc Russian troops
The First Siege, Sept. i8-Ocl. 9 1914. On Sept. 18 1914, when
the Austro-Hungarian armies had marched off westwards from
the San and the area of the Przemysl fortress, the fortress was
left to itself, with orders issued to Kusmanek on the i6th to
resist " to the uttermost." The building of the ring of forts and
the distribution of the fortress garrison in the defence zone had
now been completed. Only one correction had to be made in the
line of defence on the S.W. front, where it lay too near to the
town itself, thus exposing the town and the San bridges to the
danger of a direct bombardment. Kusmanek therefore selected
a position in the foreground, 2 to 3 km. in front of the ring of
forts, running from Krasiczyn over the height of Pod Mazurami
to that of Helicha, and had this rapidly fortified and occupied by
four battalions. This measure obliged the Russians to fix their
line of investment at a corresponding distance from the town at
this point also.
The Grand Duke allowed only a very cautious pursuit of the
retreating Austro-Hungarians by the Russian armies. The IV.
and V. Armies advanced toward the N. of the fortress and across
the San; the VIII. Army was ordered to push forward through
the Chyr6w and Sambor area, and S. of the fortress to the ridge
of the Carpathians; the III. Army was to take up a position
immediately in front of the E. front of the fortress. On Sept. 20
the first Russian detachments crossed the San at Walawa, to be
followed at once by other troops coming from Radymno and
Jaroslau, where the bridgeheads had been surrendered to the
Russians. These troops surrounded the N. front of the fortress.
Portions of the III. and VIII. Armies now advanced towards
the S. and S.W. fronts, while on the W. front two cavalry divisions
by Sept. 24 completed the hemming-in of the fortress. By means
of numerous very vigorous sorties and by violent artillery fire,
Kusmanek succeeded in his task, which was to draw as many
Russian forces on to himself as possible. He turned the Russian
investiture into an exceedingly difficult undertaking.
Sorties during the first and
Nov 14 Dec 14
Fob 15 raxB&>. March 15
note: The Sortie of 27' was in
some direction as on /f V
50 Bn. o
The first great sortie was executed by Maj.-Gen. Weher,
Commandant of the VI. defence zone, with five battalions and
two batteries, on the Grodek road and S. of it, to force back the
Russian line of investment between Medyka and Bykow. Taken
entirely by surprise, the Russians fell back from the first position,
and two infantry divisions brought up to their support suffered
heavy losses from the artillery fire which now began.
Kusmanek's next opportunity was when he learned that
considerable forces were concentrated in the Nizankowice-
Kurmanowice-Fredropol area, with the intention of passing
along the S. side of the fortress to push forward towards the west.
On Sept. 29 he sent Field-Marshal-Lt. von Tamassy with the
23rd Honved Inf. Div. to attack them by way of Halicha in the
direction of the Szybenica height. Here the result was the forced
deployment of considerable Russian forces against the 23rd
Honved Inf. Div., and consequently the delaying of the Russian
Minor sorties on other fronts were also successful, and every-
where a lively artillery battle was kept up in order to rivet the
enemy's attention on the fortress. The Russians, for their part,
maintained a violent bombardment of the forts in the ring. On
Oct. 2 an interruption occurred in the Russian gunfire on the E.
front. A parlementaire distinguished by a white flag brought a
message from Radko Dimitriev demanding the surrender of the
fortress. He was sent back as quickly as he had come bearing
Kusmanek's written answer to Radko Dimitriev: " Herr Kom-
mandant, I consider it beneath my dignity to give your insulting
demand the reply that it deserves." Thereupon the hail of steel
on the forts began afresh.
Kusmanek's refusal had hit Radko Dimitriev hard. It was
scarcely possible to fulfil the Tsar's wish and bring about the
speedy fall of Przemysl. A coup de main was impracticable,
because the siege artillery material was still too far away and
could not be fetched up quickly enough on account of the bottom-
less roads. In the first days of Oct., too, the Austro-Hungarian
offensive was launched, and this might within a very short time
bring Przemysl the looked-for relief. Radko Dimitriev therefore
found himself obliged to revert to a curtailed form of attack, and
now tried to make up for the defectiveness of his artillery and
technical preparations by reckless onslaughts. As the Austro-
German general offensive had necessitated the removal of some
of his N. front divisions to the mobile armies, he made up for
PRZEMYSL, SIEGES OF
lost numbers by making excessive demands on his remaining
brave divisions which he sacrificed literally to the last man.
Kusmanek had tried to prevent the withdrawal of the Russian
divisions by a sortie of the 23rd Honved Inf. Div. with 12 bat-
talions and 7 batteries in the direction of Rokietnica. Radko
Dimitriev's plan was, while keeping up the bombardment against
the whole ring of forts, to make a demonstration on the N. front
and direct the main attack on the S. front against the Siedliska
group. The Russian infantry had gradually worked its way up
to the ring of forts. The number of siege batteries had been
successively augmented mainly long-distance lo-cm. field-gun
batteries, but also some is-cm. and 2i-cm. batteries.
When the Austro-Hungarian offensive had begun on Oct. 4
there was no more time to be lost. The bombardment was
doubled in intensity, and on Oct. 5 a coup de main was attempted
by a Russian division against the Siedliska group. But the attack
was broken by the fire of the defenders, and the division streamed
back to its positions, losing heavily. On the 6th three other
divisions met the same fate, when, after a bombardment of the
N. and S. fronts had increased to the utmost violence, they
attempted to take the Siedliska group by storm. Kusmanek,
not to be misled by the Russian demonstrations, had recognized
in time the direction in which the main attack would be delivered
and had raised the strength of the most exposed section of the
defence (Section VI.) from n to 25 battalions and increased its
artillery to some 350 guns.
The crisis came on Oct. 7. The 76th Inf. Regt. of the Russian
igth Inf. Div. had on the previous night crept up unnoticed to
Fort I. and the infantry lines adjoining it. At dawn one bat-
talion of the regiment succeeded in entering the fort. After a
furious battle, heroically led by the commandant, Lt.-Col.
Svrljuga, the 149 survivors of the Russians who had forced an
entry laid down their arms. The courageous garrison had with-
drawn to the interior of the fort, defending it section by section,
and all attempts to smoke them out and kill them failed. The
neighbouring flanking batteries at Hurko were able to prevent
Russian reinforcements from coming in. While this attack was in
progress the 6gth Reserve Div. on the Grodek Road, the 6oth
and I3th in front of Jaksmanici, and the 3rd Rifle Bde. on the S.
front had lost heavily by unsuccessful assaults.
In the night of the 7th to the 8th the Russians renewed their
furious attacks but without penetrating at any point. A general
attack, which was to have followed on the next day, did not take
place; and only the Siedliska group was again the object of
assaults by Radko Dimitriev's decimated divisions, both morn-
ing and evening. This last desperate effort also failed completely,
and bled the Russians so severely as to put a complete stop to
their attacks from that time onward. After more than 7 2 hours
of embittered fighting a gradual detente set in, none too soon for
the overstrained nerves and spirits of the defenders.
On the gth the first effects of the approaching relief were felt.
In the course of the night the Russian cavalry divisions on the
W. front had withdrawn, and during the day the investing ring
began to be opened by the troops on the N. and S. fronts, while
those on the S.E. and E. fronts gradually retired to their posi-
tions in the line of investment. With the entry into the fortress
of the first Austro-Hungarian cavalry patrol on the evening of
the gth and of infantry detachments on the nth, the relief of
Przemysl was accomplished.
Of the Austro-Hungarian armies the III., under Boroevic',
advanced direct on Przemysl. Three corps of this army forced a
battle upon portions of the siege army N. of Przemysl, and, on
the nth, beat them back across the river, now greatly swollen
by a downpour of many days, with enormous losses. The Rus-
sians thereupon entrenched themselves on the E. bank of the
river. The Russian VIII. Army now established itself on the
heights S.E. of Przemysl up to the Chyrow-Sanok area. The
III. Army, at a good distance, faced the E. front of Przemysl.
Radko Dimitriev had imagined that he could subdue Przemysl
in a very short time. But all these enormous sacrifices proved
vain. During a siege of barely three weeks he had lost nearly
K,ooo dead and wounded without having any results to show,
for the works of the fortress had suffered very little, and the
Austro-Hungarian losses were quite small. ,On the other side
the brave conduct of the Austro-Hungarian defenders had saved
a powerful fortress which, in the forthcoming battles on the San,
afforded a good basis as a point d'appui for the field armies and
was able to come to their aid when their supplies failed.
Period Between the First and Second Sieges. When the Austro-
Hungarian armies on the San and S. of the fortress as far as
Chyrow advanced to attack along the whole front, the hope of an
interval for reconstruction, which the fortress so urgently needed,
was by no means realized. On the contrary, lying as it did in the
centre of the battle front, it was obliged to take a most active
part in the battle now developing, lending garrison troops to the
field armies on the one hand and helping generously with the
provisioning and supplies on the other.
Very soon after the relief the 23rd Honved Inf. Div. was with-
drawn to reinforce the III. Army. It played a successful part in
the hardest battles, especially distinguishing itself in the storm-
ing of the strong Magiera height.
Altogether there were taken from the garrison, which also
made repeated sorties onto the foreground of the E. front, 22
battalions and 27 batteries. Further assistance was given by the
artillery support from the ring of forts.
Even greater tean the active part taken in the battle, and far
more lowering in its effect on the garrison, was the support in
material given by the fortress to the field armies. During the
long rainy period before the relief the lines of communication
for the fresh drafts of the armies had become an absolute bog.
In addition to this, the Russians in their retreat had systemati-
cally destroyed roads, bridges and railways (the railway termini