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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812



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NOTICES



OF



THE WAR OF 1812



BY JOHN ARMSTRONG.



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NEW-YORK:

GEORGE DEARBORN, PUBLISHER.
1836.



Cbeckecf
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I THit SKK- YORK

PUBLIC LIBRARY

p. 191» L



Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1836,

BY GEORGE DEARBORN.

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of
New- York.



CONTENTS.



CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Causes of the "War. — Declaration of War by the United States. —
Opposition to the measure. — Its character and effects. . . 9

CHAPTER II.

Hull's Expedition. — ^Loss of Michilimackinac. — Surrender of De-
troit, the Michigan Territory, and the Army 15

CHAPTER III.

Militia Operations in the West. — ^Harrison's Autumnal and Win-
ter Campaigns 52

-... . CHAPTER, ^y;-'.

Operations 6n tne' Niagara. — Partial Armistice. — ^Renewal of
hostilities. — ^Vail. ResssGlaer's attack on Clueenstown. —
Smyth's invasion ot Canada. — Dearborn's Campaign against
the British advanced posts on Lake Champlain. . . .97

C'^ VPTER V.

First investment of Fort Meigs.— Dearborn and Chauncey's Ex-
pedition.— Reduction of York and Fort George.— Chandler's
defeat and capture on Stony Creek.— Bcerstler's defeat.— Af-
fair of Sacket's Harbor. 121

1*



yj CONTENTS.



CHAPTER VI.

PAGE

Second investment of Fort Meigs. — Gallant defence of Fort Ste-
phenson. — Defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie. — Capture
of Anjherstburg. — Recapture of Detroit and tlie Michigan Ter-
ritory. — Harrison's pursuit and defeat of Proctor. — Arrival of
a part of the Western Army on tlie Niagara. . . .163

Appendix. 187



PREFACE.



" Were nations to review in peace their motives
for having made war, with the means they em-
ployed, and the method by which they conducted
it, they would in general find much to blame in
a moral as well as a military view ; the conviction
of the wrongs they did, and the blunders they com-
mitted, might, on another and similar occasion,
improve both their ethics and their tactics, and
make them, at once, better men and abler soldiers ;
but as nations cannot be brought together, it rests
with governments to perform this duty of self-
examination ; when, if they omit it, the task de-
volves on the historian."

Mabby. ^



;^-/^v



J^'iA^^



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.



CHAPTER I



Causes of the War. — ^Declaration of War by the United States.—
Opposition to the measure. — Its character and effects.

The Treaty of Paris of 1783, by which Great
Britain acknowledged "the freedom, sovereignty,
and independence of the United States," was, on
the part of the former, virtually a truce, not a
pacification ; a temporary and reluctant sacrifice of
national pride to national interest ; not a frank and
honest adjustment of differences, seeking no cause-j
nor indulging any disposition, to renew the contro-
versy. Indeed, so little careful was this power to
conceal, or even to dissemble her temper and policy
on this subject, that the first American minister
accredited to her court, had scarcely passed the
threshold of the palace, when he discovered, that
a spirit of unextinguished animosity towards the
United States, pervaded alike her councils and her
conduct. * Nor was it the effect of longer residence,
or more intimate acquaintance, to modify, much less
to efface this first impression. Every overture on

1 Appendix, No. I.



10 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

his part, made with a view of placing the diplo-
matic relations of the two countries on a fair and
friendly footing, was disregarded ; the north-west-
ern, and other military posts, though confessedly
within the limits of the United States, were forcibly
retained ;' the Indian nations in alliance with Great
Britain, were openly instigated to a renewal of hos-
tilities ; and when at last, this diabolical purpose
was accomplished, as if to leave no room for doubt-
ing her instrumentality in the case, she was found
extending her territorial encroachments, and taking
a new and formidable position on the Miami of the
Lake ; whence, during three campaigns, she supplied
the wants, and prompted the attacks of these savage
tribes.*

Checked by Wayne's victory in 1794, in this plan
of desolating the west, she next employed herself
in attempting to corrupt the east ; and in 1809,
mistaking the ireeuoiii of political discussion, for a
spirit of revolt, despatched a confidential agent to
Boston, with authority to mature the terms on which
that section of tlie country would separate from the
Union, and reconnect itself with the British Em-
pire. The failure, no less than the atrocity of this
proj«^,rf, forbade i(s acknowledgment ; but though
officially disavowed, the number and character of

> The poHb? retained contrary to treaty, were Michilimackinac, De-
troit, Niagara, (^swerrotch^, Point an Fer, and Dutchman's Point

« SL Clair's Narrative of the campaign of 1791, and Lord Dorches-
tcr'H Speech to the Indians, in 1794. See, also, Washington's letter
to Jay, of tlie 30Uj of August of the same year, Appendix, No. 3.



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 11

the documents produced in support of the charge,
leave no doubt of its validity.*

It cannot be supposed that the spirit of hostility,
thus manifested on the land, would be slow in show-
ing itself on the ocean. Having in 1793, become
a party to the coalition against republican France,'*
she adopted a policy, which sought at once to dis-
tress and impoverish her enemy and enrich herself,
at the expense of neutral commerce ; and accord-
ingly, on the 8th of June of that year, issued an
order for capturing and carrying into British ports,
" all vessels laden wholly or in part with corn, flour,
or meal, and destined to France, or to other coun-
tries, if occupied by the arms of that nation."

Offensive as this measure could not fail to be, its
vexations and injuries were nearly forgotten, in the
greater mischief and malignity which characterized
that of the 6th of November of the same year ; and
which, by instructions secretly communicated to her
citizens, subjected " to capture and adjudication, all
vessels laden with the produce of any French colony,
or with supplies for such colony" — a measure, which
in the opinion of a careful inqui er and competent
judge, " annihilated at a blow, a large portion of
the commerce of the United States."^ But how-
ever great, in this case, the loss to us, or the profit

1 Appendix, No. 4.

2 The basis of the several coalitions against France, was the con-
ference at Mantua in 1791 ; to which the King of England was a
party, as elector of Hanover.

3 Dallas's exposition of the causes and character of the late war.



12 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

to her, there was soon superadded another measure,
which interdicted all neutral commerce, not only
with ports blockaded by forces sufficient for the
purpose, (which the laws of war would not have
forbidden) but with places where no force whatever
existed ; and even with whole coasts of territory,
which her naval means, if acting in concert, would
have been incompetent to blockade. Still, her abuse
of power did not stop here ; it was not enough that
she thus outraged our rights on the ocean ; the
bosoms of our bays, the mouths of our rivers and
even the wharves of our harbors, were made the
theatres of the most flagitious abuse; and, as if
determined to leave no cause of provocation untried,
the personal rights of our seamen were invaded ;
and men, owing her no allegiance, nor having any
connexion with her policy or arms, were forcibly
siezed, dragged on board her ships of war and made
to fight her battles, under the scourge of tyrants
and slaves, w4th whom submission, whether right
or wrong, forms the whole duty of man.*

Evils of such magnitude and continuance, could
not fail to produce a high degree of excitement in
the nation, and nmch of a correspondent feeling on
the part of the government ; but though three suc-
cessive administrations saw in the conduct of Great
Britain, sufficient cause of war, all doubted the
expediency of acting upon it. Barely recovered
from the debility, resulting from the defects of their

I Official letters of Mr. King while Minister at London.



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 13

first Federal compact, and but just entered on the
experiment of another of more efficient character,
forbearance was adopted as a principle, and means
simply diplomatic prescribed, as those alone which
covild be employed with safety and success. Un-
fortunately, this estimate of their value was decep-
tive, and the event showed, that with a nation like
Great Britain, which makes her own interest and
convenience the governing rules of her conduct,
persuasion, admonition, remonstrance, argument,
and even concession, are alike unavailing. All
these elements of diplomacy were frequently and
faithfully employed, but without other effect than
that of multiplying and augmenting the evils they
were intended to mitigate or remove ; the appetite
of the aggressor grew on what it fed ; her insolence
increased with her power, and the violation of one
right, was made to justify that of another ; when
at last, disdaining longer to discuss wrongs she had
no intention to redress, she ofllicially announced —
that " farther negotiation was inadmissible." ^

Having thus lost the respect of her adversary, it
but remained for the United States to decide, whether
she would preserve her own ? On this question, she
could not hesitate long or seriously ; and accord-
ingly, on the 18th of June, 1812, declared war
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and their dependancies.

It must not however be dissembled, that this act.



I Dallas's Exposition.
2



14 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

though forced upon tlie government by the long-
continued and increasing injustice of England, re-
ceived from the community, a less general support,
than might have been expected from the purity of
the motives in which it originated, or the nature
and extent of the evils it was intended to redress.
The habitual opponents of the administration, believ-
ing the circumstances of the times furnished a favor-
able opportunity for attempting the recovery of the
political ascendency they had lost, hastened to in-
stitute a system of indiscriminate opposition ; directed
as well against measures merely preparatory for war,
as against those which were in themselves acts of
war. In this headlong career, the fiscal operations
of the government were opposed ; the recruiting ser-
vice discountenanced ; the militia made insubordi-
nate, and even the constitutional authority of the
President to organize their masses and direct their
services within the states respectively, denied and
resisted. We need hardly add, that an opposition,
thus active and lawless, could not fail to be mis-
chievous, and became, as will be seen in the progress
of our story, the source of both calamity and disgrace
to the nation.^

I Appendix, No. 5.



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 15



CHAPTER II.

Hull's Expedition. — Loss of Michilimakinac. — Surrender of Detroit^
the Michigan Territory, and the Army.

Among the measures of precaution, taken by the
Government of the United States, previously to their
declaration of war,^ was that " of placing within
the Michigan Territory, a force that should be com-
petent to the defence of the north-western frontier
against Indian hostility ; and which, in the event
of a rupture with Great Britain, would enable the
United States to obtain the command of Lake Erie ;
and with it, the means of more easily co-operating"
with such other corps, as might be destined to the
invasion of the Canadas.'"^ The troops assigned
to this service, amounting to two thousand men of
all arms,^ were placed under the command of Brig-
adier-General Hull, then Governor of the Michigan

1 The principal of these were, an Act laying an embargo on ship-
ping — a second, authorizing a detachment of one hundred thousand
militia — a third, for increasing the regular army — a fourth, for the
acceptance of volunteers — and a fifth, for borrowing money on public
account.

2 President Madison's Message to Congress, of Nov. 4th, 1812.

3 Three companies of the first United States regiment of Artillery ;
the fourth, and part of the first regiment of Infantry ; three regiments
of Ohio volunteers ; the Micliigan militia and one company of Rangers.



16 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

Territory ; and formerly an officer, not without dis-
tinction, in the war of the revolution.

This General, after giving the necessary attention
to the equipment and subsistence of his corps, ^ began
his march from Dayton, a frontier town in the State
of Ohio, on the first day of June, 1812. Though
unencumbered with artillery, and in no way impeded
by an enemy, his progress was unavoidably slow ;
from the necessity of opening roads, making bridges
and constructing blockhouses, for the better security
of his rear, and of the supplies and reinforcements
moving upon it. It was not, therefore, until the
30th of the month, that he was enabled to reach
the Miami of the Lake ; where, under an admoni-
tion, recently received from the War Department,
"to quicken his movements," he determined to
avail himself of the means of navigation which now
offered, for the more rapid and economical trans-
portation of his baggage, stores, sick and convales-
cent.* Embarking these, accordingly, on board of
the Cayahoga Packet, they were despatched for
Detroit ; while the army, with the same destination,
resumed its march by land.

Tlie day following this transaction, the General

1 Hull asserts, that he found the Oliio volunteers deficient in arms,
equipment and clothing; and even unprovided witli either contract,
or commissariat, for the supply of their fcKxl. — //»//'« JSIemoirs.

2 Colonel Mr Arthur admonished tlie General against tliis measure,
on the presumption that war was already declared, and funiished
Btrong evidence of the fact ; but with so little efiect, that the General
availed himself of the packet to forward, even "the instructions of lu3
government and Uic returns of his army."



NOTICES of THE WAR OF 1812. 17

received the first official notice of the declaration of
war ; and on reaching the river Raisin, was made
acquainted with the fate of his detachment ; which,
in attempting to pass the British post of Maiden,
had been attacked and captured, " by a British
subaltern and six men, in a small and open boat."

The effect of this disaster on General Hull, was
not such as might have been expected from long
military service, or high military character ; and
probably produced the first doubts that existed of
his capacity as a leader. Instead of exciting to
increased spirit and exertion, which would soon
have compensated for the loss and atoned for the
disgrace so unexpectedly incurred, he unfortunately
saw it only in the light of an evil omen, and pre-
cursor of an attack, fatal alike to the objects and
agents of the expedition ; and accordingly employed
himself in imagining and practising devices to avoid
a battle,^ which all circumstances — time, place and
relative strength — made it his duty to seek. Nor
were his stratagems on this occasion unavailing ;
the enemy saw and respected his strength, and per-
mitted him to reach Detroit, without molestation or
menace.

Finding himself now vested with an authority to
invade the Canadas, "if consistent with the safety
of his own posts," and not having, as he believed,
any thing to fear on their account, he on the 12th
of July crossed the river Detroit and encamped at



1 Hull's Memoirs, p. 39.

2*



18 NOTICES OF THE wIr OF 1812.

Sandwich, with the professed object of marching
directly upon Maiden — a measure, recommended
by many considerations ; but more particularly by
the fact, that from the local position of the fort,
(nearly twenty miles in the rear of Detroit) its gar-
rison had the power of destroying or obstructing all
supplies coming from the United States, unless pro-
tected by a force superior to itself.

In prosecution of this important object, the Gene-
ral began by issuing a proclamation addressed as
well to the hopes, as to the fears of the Canadian
colonists ; and vaunting, in an especial manner, the
possession of a force " equal to the purpose of either
protection or punishment." Nor did the party ad-
dressed, put a different estimate on its power of
doing good or evil — "all opposition seemed to fall
before it; one month it remained in the country,
and was fed from its resources. In different direc-
tions, detachments penetrated sixty miles into the
settled parts of the province, and the inhabitants
seemed satisfied with the change of situation which
appeared to be taking place. The militia at Am-
hcrstburg were daily deserting, and tlie whole
country under the control of the army, asking for
protection — while the Indians generally, appeared
to be neutralized and determined to take no part in
the controversy. " '

If such was the effect of tlic mere appearance of
the American army within the limits of Canada,

1 Hull's ofTicial letter to the War Department, 27th August, 1S12.



NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 19

what might not have been expected from a prompt,
steady and well-dhected application of its powers]
Maiden was but eighteen miles from Sandwich ;
the road between the two, wholly unobstructed ;
and what at the former was called a fortification,
utterly unworthy of the name.^ Nor was the gar-
rison more formidable than the work it occupied ;
consisting only of one hundred regular troops, and
four hundred disaffected militia and neutralized
Indians. Instead, however, of availing himself of
circumstances thus auspicious, and putting into his
conduct that vigor and intelligence, which always
deserve success and often command it, the General
unfortunately took council only from his fears, and
for the first time discovered, that " he had neither
cannon nor howitzers of large calibre, fit to travel ;
and that without arms of this description, it would
be unsafe to advance." Artificers were therefore
set to work to supply the deficiency, and at the end
of three weeks, two twenty-four pounders and three
howitzers, were put upon wheels strong enough to
carry them.^

It may be reasonably supposed that this long
interval had not been permitted to escape, without



1 Hull's trial ; Cass and Miller's testimony.

2 General Brock's estimate of the use of heavy cannon in breaching
earthern walls and cedar pickets, was very different. In approaching
Detroit, a work of much more strength than Maiden, he would not
encumber his movements with guns of larger calibre than six and
three pounders. Yet to Brock's knowledge of his trade, General
Hull bears willing testimony.



20 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

some movements calculated to try the strength and
temper of the enemy ; and more particularly, that
the approaches to his position, as well as the posi-
tion itself, had been thoroughly reconnoitred and
ascertained. Nothing, however, of this character
was either meditated or executed, if we except two
or three small and isolated detachments, sent as far
as the river Canard ; but without any sustaining
corps, to enable them to hold what they gained, if
found to be useful ; nor even any instruction to do
so, if practicable, by the means they possessed. Of
these, the detachment commanded by Colonels Cass
and Miller is most worthy of notice.

On approaching the river (a narrow but deep
stream four miles from Maiden) a British picket
was found in possession of the bridge, and appa-
rently determined to hold it. After a short trial of
strength, the position was turned and the picket
driven back upon the fort, whither the fugitives
carried their panic along with them, "creating in
the garrison much alarm and confusion" — a state
of tbings which continued to exist until it was dis-
covered that the detachment, instead of being (as
had been imagined) the precursor of an army, was
merely a recoimoitring party, ignorant of tlie value
of tlie position it liad gained, or not instructed and
prepared to maintain it.^

If the effects of this experiment on the enemy,
appear to be extraordinary and without sufficient

1 Hull's trial ; Forbish's testimony.



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 21

cause, how much more so must be considered those
which it produced on the American commander ]
When the success of the party in taking the bridge
and driving in the picket, was reported by Colonels
Cass and Miller, they did not fail to report also the
importance of the acquisition they had made to the
future objects of the campaign ; and entreated, that
if any circumstances unknown to them, made it
inexpedient or improper to move the army to this
new and important position, they might themselves
be permitted to hold it and be sustained in doing
so, by occasional or permanent reinforcements and
supplies. On this expression of facts and opinions,
which should have excited only respect for those
who had given them, the General yielded to a
paroxysm of ill-temper and obstinacy ; criminated
the attack made on the enemy, as a breach of
orders ; rejected the advice offered to him in all its
parts, and peremptorily commanded the immediate
return of the detachment. Nor could any modifi-
cation of this order be obtained, but on condition
that Colonels Cass and Miller would take upon
themselves the whole responsibility of the measure,
wdthout any corresponding obligation on the part of
the General to supply the means necessary to its
execution — a condition, to which he well knew, no
prudent officer would yield his assent.^

1 Hull's trial. Colonel Miller's testimony. — " Witness mentioned to
Colonel Cass and they agreed, that as they had not the disposition of
the whole force, they should not take the responsibility." See also
the testimony of Gtuartermaster-General Taylor.



22 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

Such want of knowledge, of judgment and of
enterprise, could not be long concealed by any
devices ; and had now become so flagrant and
alarming, that even the General appeared to be
touched by a desire of redeeming what he had lost.
He regretted that a blow had not been already
struck ; and declared himself pledged to lead the
army promptly and directly to Maiden.^ The am-
munition was accordingly placed in wagons ; the
cannon, on floating batteries ; and every other
requisite for the attack prepared, when to the grief
and disappointment of all, the plan was abandoned,
the encampment raised, and the army, with the
exception of a small detachment of one hundred
and fifty men, recrossed in the night of the 7th of
August, to the town and fort of Detroit !

While the American commander was thus de-
pressing the spirit of his own army, raising that of
his enemy, taking from the savages every motive
for longer inaction, and entirely destroying the con-
fidence reposed in his promises by the Canadian
colonists, his adversary (General Brock) was pursu-
ing a system, which, in all respects, tended directly
to augment and confirm these effects. Apprised,
as early as the 26th of June, of the declaration of
war,'* he hastened to transmit the information to his
outposts ; and without waiting the instructions of
Sir George Provost, suggested to the commandant

1 Colonel Cass's letter to the Secretary of War, of the 10th Sep-
tember, 1812.

2 Cliristic's Memoir of the late war in the Canadas.



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 23

of St. Joseph's, an immediate attack on Fort Michi-
limackinac, as the best mode of defending his own.

Tliough Captain Roberts, the officer to whom
this suggestion was made, found himself ill-pre-
pared for an enterprise of such moment ; yet enter-
ing fully into the views of his commander, and