" Yon will make a diversion in liis (General Hull's) favor at Niagara
and at Kingston, as soon as may be practicable, and by such other ope-
rations as maybe within your control." See vol. 6th, p. 199, Records
of tlie "War Department. These orders, substantially, were repeated
in several subsequent communications.
5*
54 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.
far short of its objects, was, notwithstanding, w^ell
adapted to the feehngs, wants, and calculations of
the west.
The sedative effect produced by the war on the
value of ordinary labor and its products ; the com-
paratively ample compensation given for military
service ; the political excitement of the times, and the
increased impulse given to this by the late disaster
at Detroit, operating conjointly on an abundant, un-
occupied, and high-spirited population, could not fail
to bring together a large mass of ill-equipped and
undisciplined men, who believing in the infallibility
of western courage and rifles, sought no auxiliary in
fulfilling the intentions of government, within even
the short period of their own engagements.^ The
force, which under these influences was in a few
weeks assembled at different points of the frontier,
exceeded ten thousand combatants f of which, that
portion originally destined to the support of Hull,
and best prepared for immediate service, was de-
tached to fort Wayne — a small post on tiie Miami
of the Lake, already sustaining an Indian investment,
and still farther menaced by a British detachment,
advancing under the command of Major Muir. But
of these enemies, the former disappeared on the ap-
proach of the American column, without making
any resistance ; and the latter, not showing more
disposition to hazard a contest, hastily withdrew to
its boats and returned to Maiden. It was now deemed
1 McAffee. ft Idem.
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 55
proper, as well for the purpose of giving occupation
to the troops, as for that of preventing any new at-
tempt on the fort, to direct a few detachments against
such of the Indian villages as had most contributed
to the late investing party ; but though made with
sufficient zeal and activity, the experiment failed
in producing any effect more important than the
destruction of a few cabins and the corn growing
around them.
While these circumstances were taking place in
the northern section of the district, others, of a mixed
character, good and bad, grave and ludicrous, were
occurring in the southern. Early in September, a
small band of savages, of the Potowatamie and Win-
ebago tribes, appeared at fort Harrison ; and feigning
weariness and hunger, besought for the night the
shelter and hospitality of the fort. But on finding
that Captain Taylor, the commanding officer, gave
no credit to their story, and even suspected their
hostility, they threw off the mask, and collecting
their associates, (who had hitherto laid concealed in
the neighboring thickets,) united in a bold and per-
severing attack on the fort. During the progress of
this, the assailants found means to burn a block-
house, (which made part of the work,) and thus
opened to themselves a new passage to the interior ;
but, though making many strenuous efforts to profit
by this advantage, they failed in all, and were ulti-
mately repulsed with considerable loss. To make
up in some degree for this disappointment, the party
repaired to a frontier settlement on the Pigeon's
56 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.
Roost, where they killed or captured twenty-one of
the inhabitants.
This last incident w^ould, perhaps, have been alone
sufficient to have called forth a new display of Ken-
tucky population and patriotism ; but to its authority
was superadded that of a requisition from General
Harrison for a force, which, with the three regiments
already detached to Vincennes, would be competent
not merely to the defence of Indiana and Illinois, but
to the punishment of such Indian tribes as were most
likely to disturb and molest any neighboring terri-
tory.^ Governor Shelby, upon w^iom the requisition
was made, hastened to give it execution, and with
not more of attention, than the General himself had
employed, in proportioning the quantum of force to
the nature and exigencies of the service. When,
therefore, we consider that the invitation to the field
was without limitation as to numbers ; that the
causes requiring it were not a little exaggerated,^
and that the policy, no less than the patriotism of
the state, induced every man to become a soldier,
we can no longer wonder that the GovernoJ^ proc-
lamation should, within twenty days, have assem-
bled an army of four thousand men, equipped for
service, and all, Tartar-like, mounted on horseback.
The command of this formidable array w^as com-
mitted to Major-General Hopkins of the militia,
who reached fort Harrison about the 10th of Octo-
ber. Finding nothing nearer to liis own frontier to
1 McAffee.
8 Harrison's Iciter to Shelby, otli Sept. 1812 ; McAffee, p. 156,
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 57
give him occupation, lie on the 14th, began his
march for the Indian villages on the Wabash and
lUinois. Much of the ground he had to traverse
was of the prairie character, (scantily supplied with
water and entirely destitute of wood,) but abound-
ing in tall, coarse grass. The effect of this redun-
dant herbage on the army resembled enchantment ;
every step they took upon it, abated alike their
ardor and intelligence ; the guides lost their way ;
the General his authority, and the troops their sub-
mission ; and on the fourth day after leaving fort
Harrison (discovering that the prairie was on fire,
and mistaking this for a ruse of the enemy) this
" press of western chivalry" turned their backs on
the war, and withdrew en masse to Kentucky.
About the same time, and in concert with the
preceding movement, an expedition on a smaller
scale, but of more successful character, was insti-
tuted by Governor Edwards of the Illinois Territory,
and conducted by Colonel Russell of the rangers.
Its object w^as an Indian town at the head-waters
of Lake Peoria, which, by a rapid and well-directed
march, the detachment was able to surprise and
destroy. On the first alarm, the savages betook
themselves to a neighboring swamp, whither they
were hotly pursued and speedily routed — leaving
behind them twenty dead bodies, a considerable
store of corn, and sixty horses laden with baggage.
A second expedition under the direction of Gene-
ral Hopkins, and made for the laudable purpose of
fulfilling the intentions and wiping out the disgrace
5d NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.
of the first, was now organized at fort Harrison.
The corps employed on this occasion, was composed
of a few regular troops, about fifty mounted gun-
men, and the three regiments of Kentucky mihtia,
detached under the first requisition ; who, directing
their march along the eastern bank of the Wabash,
in eight days reached their first object, and destroyed
in succession three of the principal Indian villages,
with the loss of eighteen of their own corps ; who,
by some negligence or misdirection in their march,
fell into an ambuscade of the enemy. Admonished
alike by this disaster, the nakedness of the troops,
an unfavorable change in the weather, and the
impossibihty of bringing the savages to a general
action, the commanding ofilicer thought it advisable
to return to Vincennes.
Such was the state of things on the western
frontier, when the government, having decided the
rival pretensions of General Winchester and Harri-
son, vested in the latter the command of the army
and district ;^ with orders sufliciently definite as to
1 The intrigue by which this outrage on militaiy nilca and tlie laws
of Kentucky was accomplished, will be found in McAffoo, pp. 107 —
8, and is substantially as follows : Governor Scott had a desire to
commission Harrison as a J\I(ij or- General of the Kentucky militia,
with a view of thus enabling him to supersede Winchester in the com-
mand ; but to the honest and unsopliisticatcd mind of Scott, tlie ar-
rangement appeared impossible, inasunich as by the laws of Kentucky,
officers of militia must l)c inhabitants of the stafe— a qualification
which did not apply to General Harrison. To get over these scruples
of conscience on the part of the Governor, a few casuists were em-
ployed to change his opinions, and in tliis they at last succeeded. For
the General's own agency in the business, see Appendix, No. 6.
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 59
the objects to be pursued, but entirely discretionary
as to the time and mode of pursuing them. Avail-
ing himself of the latitude given by this new and
increased authority, the General hastened to re-
model his plan of campaign, and promptly rejecting
his first project of recapturing Detroit by a coup de
main,^ substituted for it a march by three separate
and distant routes across the swampy and unin-
habited region in his front, to the Rapids of the
Miami — whence, "after accumulating one million
of rations for the troops, and forage for two thousand
horses and oxen,^ he proposed marching rapidly on
Brownstown, crossing the river Detroit, and before
the commencement of winter, taking Maiden and recap-
turing the Michigan Territory."
1 While acting in a subordinate capacity to Winchester, the Gene-
ral had no doubt of being able, with a few mounted men, to retake
Detroit by a coup de main, and was careful so to inform the govern-
ment. — Mc^iffee, p. 166. When, however, by means of this and other
representations, having the same object, he became commanding offi-
cer of the ai-my and district, his views suddenly changed ; the rapid
and certain process by a coup de main was abandoned as hopeless,
{McAffee, p. 141,) and one, more systematic and imposing, substituted
for it — requiring as a preliminary to any direct movement on Maiden
or Detroit, an accumulation at the Rapids of twelve months' forage and
provisions, with carts, wagons, &c., necessary to transport them from
the place of deposit to the scene of action —or, in other words, the
entire purchase of all surplus corn, flour and fodder, oxen, horses,
carts, wagons, &c., to be found within the State of Ohio ; and this at
a time, (22d of October,) when he says of the roads — "to get supplies
forward through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles, in
wagons, or on pack-horses, wliich are to cany their own provisions, is
absolutely impossible."
2 McAffee, p. 167.
60 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.
In prosecution of this plan, the army was divided
into three columns ; that of the left, composed of
Kentucky militia and the seventeenth United States
regiment, (commanded by Brigadier-General Win-
chester) was assigned to the route of the St. Mary;
the central column, consisting of twelve hundred
Ohio militia and eight hundred mounted infantry,
commanded by Brigadier-General Tupper, to that of
fort McArthur ; while the column of the right, made
up, or intended to be made up, (for all its elemen-
tary parts had not yet arrived) of three brigades of
militia from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio, led
by General Harrison in person, was to approach its
object by the two Sandusky's.
Under these arrangements, the General had hopes
on the 4th of October, that "within a fortnight from
that date" he would be able to accumulate at the
Rapids the necessary supply of food and forage, as-
semble the several parts of the army and begin his
intended movement on Brownstown. But these
hopes, which liad little if any thing to justify them,
were not fated to be of long duration ; as on the
very day on which they were expressed, the column
of the left was found to be on the verge of mutiny
and desertion. This conduct in a corps, which had
hitherto showed only zeal in forwarding the objects
of the expedition, was produced by the increased
coldness of the weather and the miserable condition
of their clothing ; by a state of the roads, rendering
them nearly impassable ; by a deficiency of food,
not easily to be accounted for ; and by a discovery
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 61
(in which they but anticipated their commander)
that his project of an autumnal campaign was wholly
impracticable.^ In this dilemma, the General found
it prudent to employ persuasion rather than author-
ity, and invoking the aid of Colonel Allen's elo-
quence in addition to his own, prevailed upon the
column to prolong its stay and its efforts.
With Brigadier-General Tupper and the mounted
men of the central column, he was less fortuna.te.
Learning while at Winchester's cantonment that a
party of Indians occupied the Rapids, (his intended
point of concentration,) he ordered Tupper with
eight hundred mounted men to advance and dis-
lodge them, but this order, though reinforced by
another from Winchester, was from time to time
scandalously evaded — when the troops losing all
confidence in their General and the General in
the troops, they mutually agreed to withdraw to
Urban na.
To this useless band succeeded another, fortu-
nately possessing a leader of more efficient character.
Colonel Allen Trimble having arrived at St. Maiy
with a corps of five hundred mounted infantry, was
directed to march to the defence of fort Wayne,
(now menaced with a second investment by the
Indians,) and thence to the Potowatomie villages,
on the sources of the river St. Joseph. No enemy
being found at the fort, the Colonel hastened t<\
execute the remaining and secondary part of the .
1 McAffee, p. 146. 183—4.
6
62 NOTICES OF TFIE WAR OF 1812.
expedition, when one half of the corps, in the exer-
cise of its volunteer rights, refused to go farther.
The Colonel, being thus left to choose between an
abandonment of his purpose, or an attempt to exe-
cute it with half the force originally assigned to the
enterprise, did not hesitate to adopt the latter; and
supplying the want of numbers by vigilance and
activity, was soon able to reach and destroy the two
villages indicated in his orders.
It Avas now the 28th of October. The fortnight
which, according to General Harrison's calculations,
was to have done much, had passed away without
doing any thing ; the rainy season had already be-
gan ; land transportation, always difficult, was now
impracticable; and idleness, nakedness and hunger
were working their ordinary effects on the health,
habits and temper of the troops ; rendering them sick,
and sour, and restless — a state of things which the
General could no longer conceal from himself, and
which brought him, at last, to the reluctant confes-
sioji, that the project of an autumnal campaig;n must
be abandoned, and a winter expedition adopted in its
stead. " My present plan," he says, in a letter of
the preceding date, to the Secretary of War, " is to
occupy Sandusky and accumulate, at that place, as
much provision and forage as possible ; to be taken
from thence in sleds to the river Raisin. For to get
supplies forward through a swampy wilderness of
nearly two hundred miles extent, in wagons, or on
pack-horses carrying their own provender, is impos-
sible. Still the main object may be accomplished
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 63
by using tlie frozen margin of the lake, if the troops
are provided with warm clothing, and the winter be
such as it usually is in this climate."^
As, however, many weeks must elapse between
the date of this new determination and the actual
occurrence of such a condition of weather as could
alone render it practicable, it was deemed expedient
to employ the interval in destroying such Indian
lodgements, temporary and permanent, as from ac-
tual force or locality of position, were most likely to
disturb the left wing of the army, or the transporta-
tion of supplies going on under its protection. Of
these lodgements, one had recently been made at
tjie foot of the Rapids ; ostensibly for the purpose
of gathering and transporting corn, but, as was
suspected, secretly destined to co-operate with the
Miamis in some military enterprise on our frontier
posts and convoys. To break up this party became,
therefore, a matter of moment ; and to effect it. Gen-
eral Tupper, whose feats in arms we have already
commemorated, was detached, early in November,
at the head of six hundred and fifty Ohio militia and
a few mounted rangers. On approaching his object,
he prudently employed a reconnoitring party to
ascertain whether any changes had taken place in
the force or position of the enemy ? And being as-
i It was by thus qualifying his real opinions, tliat he carried the
cabinet along with liim in liis attempts to execute his absurd projects.
They at last saw, or thought they saw, in these contradictory state-
ments, a desire on the part of the General, to escape responsibility,
and a design to induce tliem to incur it.
64 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.
sured, on the return of the party, that the alUes, red
and white, besides continuing wliere they had been,
and without any material increase of numbers, were
"now indulging themselves in singing and dancing,"
he manfully determined to cross the Miami and take
part in the revel ; but defeated in this by the depth
of the water and strength of the current, instead of
ascending the river and seeking a fording place of
safer and quieter character, (which might have been
readily found,) he followed the stream downward,
and placing himself directly in front of the British
and Indian camp, sufficiently announced, not only
his arrival, but his intention also of shifting from
himself and imposing on his enemy, both the trouble
and danger of crossing the river. In this last cal-
culation, however, he entirely lost sight of the anti-
chivalrous character of Indian warfare. The firsf.
care of the red man of the forest is to take care of
himself; and the second, so to measure the strength
and temper of his antagonist as will enable him to
judge, not merely on what side of a stream he shall
fight, but whether he shall fight on either side of it.
With this view, on the present occasion, after send-
ing their women and children to the woods, and their
allies to their boats, the Indians made a show of
engaging at long shot ; while a few mounted par-
ties despatched across the Miami, soon found out
the flanks and rear of their adversary, and sufficiently
indicated their intention — not of fighting a pitched
battle, but of harassing his progress when he moved,
and disquieting his positions when he became sla-
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 65
tionary. As this was a state of things the General
had not foreseen, and greatly disliked, he quickly
resorted to the only expedient by which he supposed
it could be remedied ; and accordingly, early in the
night of the 15th, began a rapid retreat to fort Mc-
x\rthur. '
While Tupper was making this second display
of military talent, another expedition, under bet-
ter auspices, was preparing at Franklintown. A
corps of six hundred mounted men, selected from
the arm)^, were placed under the direction of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Campbell, with orders to march
against the Indian villages on the Missisineway.
Of these, the}^ reached the most northwardly, at
daybreak on the 18th of December, but without
having been able to surprise it completely. A por-
tion of the occupants escaped across the river ;
whilst the remainder, after a short and feeble resist-
ance, surrendered to the assailants. No time was
lost in pursuing this advantage, and three other vil-
lages were visited and destroyed by the party.
The troops, having been now thirty-six hours on
horseback, and having suffered much from cold,
hunger, and fatigue, encamped for the night on
the bank of the river, where they remained undis-
turbed till near daylight ; when the outposts were
furiously driven in, and the camp sharply and gen-
erally assailed, but without producing the smallest
ill-effect on its spirit and order. At the dawn of
1 McAffee, p. 171.
6*
66 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 18X2.
day, when a proper direction could be given to the
movement, both flanks of the Indian hne were rapidly
turned, and its rear charged and routed. The gen-
eral result of the expedition, however, w^as not flat-
tering : twenty-three Indians were killed, forty-two
taken, and four out of five villages, destroyed ;*
while on our side, ten men were killed, forty-eight
wounded, and nearly two hundred rendered unfit for
service, by disease and frost-bitten hands and feet.
These preliminary steps taken, and the column
of the right with the park of artillery arrived at San-
dusky, orders were now given to General Winchester,
who had hitherto occupied a position near the mouth
of the Au Glaize, to push forward to the Rapids ; clear
the front and flanks of that post of hostile parties ;
construct huts for the better protection of the ad-
vancing supplies; and prepare sleds for the intended
movement on Maiden. Under these orders, the Gen-
eral commenced liis march on the 31st of December,
at the head of about one thousand efTectives ; but
the roads becoming much obstructed by snow, it was
not till the 10th of January, that he reached the point
to which he was destined. Finding on his arrival
no traces of an enemy, excepting a single and small
Indian encampment, (the occupants of which were
promptly pursued and routed,) he now directed his
attention to the preparatory labors already indicated
— when on the 13tli, 14th, and 15th of the month,
1 The fifth, and unapproached village, contained the principal Indian
force.
NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 67
expresses were received from the inhabitants of
Frenchtown, representing the many and aggravated
horrors of their situation, and entreating the interpo-
sition of the American arms. " The British," they
said, " no longer conceal their intention of carrying
off our grain and our cattle ; and the savages menace
us with the destruction of our dwellings, and the
massacre or captivity of our persons. Without your
aid, we have no hope ; with it, we may be able to
defend ourselves, our wives, and our children ; but
this aid, to be effectual, must be prompt. The pres-
ent number of the enemy among us, does not exceed
three hundred combatants — a force that will be soon
and considerably augmented ; after which, your in-
terposition would be useless, and our ruin complete."
An appeal like this, addressed to men of high and
liberal views, could not be made in vain. The warm-
hearted and gallant Allen, became its ready and
zealous advocate. To his quick and intelhgent
mind, the policy it invoked appeared to be sustained
by every motive that ought to govern in the case —
sympathy for the afflicted ; duty to fellow-citizens,
and a correct interpretation of military maxims.
" Can we," he said, "turn a deaf ear to the cries of
men, women and children, about to perish under the
scalping-knife and tomahawk of the savage ? Can
we regard with indifference the perils of those whose
attachments to the United States have alone rendered
them obnoxious to the calamities they dread 1 Can
it be possible, that the wisdom of beating an enemy
in detail, can either escape our notice or require argu-
68 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.
ments to obtain ouv approbation 1 For what purpose
are we here, but to seek, to find, and to fight this
very enemy ? And shall we permit his advanced
guard to perpetrate all the mischief it meditates, and
return in safety to its main body 1 Is it by such con-
duct that we shall wipe out the disgrace of Hull's
surrender, or fulfil the promises made to our friends
when, leaving our own firesides, we took upon us the
temporary profession of arms 1 And if not, by what
considerations is it recommended 1 Will it be said,
that the force of the hostile detachment is too great
to be successfully combated, or in other words, that
a thousand freemen are unequal to a contest with
three hundred savages and slaves ? The supposition
is degrading, and merits not the ceremony of a refu-
tation. Will it, on the other hand, be alleged, that
it is too inconsiderable to be noticed ? This also
would be an error — for besides, that victory, on any
scale, is not without its moral effects on both bellige-
rents, an abstraction of three hundred men from the
present force of the enemy, would materially dimin-
ish his power, and give us a decided ascendency in
prosecuting wliat remains of the campaign. Again :
will it be said, (and, if I mistake not, it has been
said,) that so near an approach to the den of the
Lion would be imprudent 1 To this I reply, that