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THE MODERN ARMY
IN ACTION
THE MODERN ARMY
IN ACTION
AN EXPOSITION OF THE CONDUCT
OF WAR
BY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN F. O'RYAN
Commanding N. Y. Division
AND
CAPTAIN W. D. A. ANDERSON
Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.
NEW YORK
McBRIDE, NAST & COMPANY
1914
Copyright, 1914, by
McBride, Nast & Co.
Published November, 1914
*, *â– . L c
on
y^
FOREWORD
I tave read **Tlie Modern Army in Action'*
with very great interest, and consider the subject
treated by Major-General O'Ryan and Captain
Anderson, especially at this time, as being of
prime importance from every point of view. It
should, and I have no doubt will, cause the people
of our country to devote serious attention to the
general technique of war, and direct their
thoughts toward the necessity for placing our
country in a condition of preparedness which can
be secured only through the establishment of ade-
quate reserves for the regular Army and Militia,
and ample supplies to equip them in case we have
the misfortune to become engaged in war with a
iirst-class power, prepared as these powers are
immediately to make their maximum military ef-
fort. No matter how righteous our cause may be,
or how considerate we may be of the rights of
others, we must be prepared to defend our rights
and to secure for ourselves just treatment. This
cannot be secured by treaties alone. It can
'Mmi'rV
vi Foreword
be secured only when our people are prepared
promptly to meet force with force. Undeveloped
military resources are of no more value in the on-
set of a modem war than would be an undeveloped
gold mine in Alaska during a panic on Wall
Street.
Major-General, U. S. A.,
Commanding Eastern Division.
November 4, 1914.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTEB PAGE
I Genesis of Strategy 1
Influence of politics. — Definitions of strategy. —
Logistics. — Tactics. — Historical development of strat-
egy. — Ancient strategy. — The great captains. — In-
ternational arbitration. — The peace propaganda. —
Causes of war. — The national struggle for existence.
— Future wars. — The influence of strategy.
II On Wak 19
What it is. — Violence. — Objects. — Influence of civ-
ilization. — An art, not a science. — Fortunes of war. —
The nation in arms. — Leadership. — Racial influences.
— Moral influences. — The psychology of war. — Phys-
ical fear. — Drill.
Ill Peepaeations foe Wae 32
Historical. — Tribal methods. — Oriental nations. —
Greece. — Methods of Alexander. — Importance of phys-
ical training. — Military information. — Storing of war
supplies. — ■Numbers. — • Armament. — Technical train-
ing. — Development of morale. — The manly virtues.
IV Gekman System. Univebsal Service 42
Enrollment. — Classes of service. — Company train-
ing. — Maneuvers. — Other nations.
V British System. Volunteer Armies ..... 60
Recruitment. — Classes of forces. — Training. —
American system.
VI Mobilization and Concentration 70
Mobilization. Rapidity essential. — Preparedness. —
Order and duties of various classes. — Supply.
Concentration. Strategic. — Rail service. — Other
transport. — Supply.
Examples. Prussians against Austria, 186G. — Ger-
mans against France, 1870. — British against Boers,
1900.
Table of Contents
CHAPTEB PAGE
VII Tbanspoetation and Supply 90
Railroad service. — Water routes. — Wagon trains. —
Automobiles. — Depots. — Issues.
VIII Pbinciples of Stbateqy 110
Offensive and defensive warfare. — Examples. —
Initial success. — Influence of maneuvering. — Jomini.
— Van Clausewitz. — Von der Goltz. — Von Camer-
rer. — Influence of roads and railroads. — Boldness. —
British comment on German strategical ideals.
IX The Strategic Offensive 124
Advantages. — Disadvantages. — Lines of communi-
cation. — Historical examples. — Influence of topo-
graphical features. — Necessity for continuous stream
of reserves. — Concentration and dispersion. — Rail-
roads. — Military policy.
X The Steategio Defensive ..,.,... 137
Advantages. — Disadvantages. — Supply. — Tactical
considerations. — Historical examples. — Topographical
features. — Maneuvering. — Diversion. — Historical. —
Retreat. — Counter-stroke.
XI Infantry 149
* Historical. — Development of firearms. — Tactics un-
der Frederick the Great. — Under Napoleon. — The
Civil War. — Historical references. — In attack. — In
defense. — Flank attack.— The rifle. — Fire superior-
ity. — Casualties. — Morale. — Examples, -r— Value of
marksmanship. — Fire rapidity. — Fire distribution. —
Peace time training. — Physical and nervous strain of
battle.
XII Cavalry 181
Knights in armor. — Effect of introduction of gun-
powder. — Cuirassiers. — Cavalry luider Frederick the
Great. — Under Napoleon. — Civil War period. — War
of 1866. — Franco-Prussian War. — Manchurian Cam-
paign. — Boer War. — Ratio to other arms. — Prelim-
inary training. — Mounts. — Modern role. — Eyes of
the army. — Dismounted action. — Absence of bayonet.
Table of Contents
CHAPTER PAGE
— American characteristics. — Historical examples. —
In the pursuit. — Wastage of horses in war.
XIII Ahtiixeby 201
Various types of. — Fortress artillery. — Light ar-
tillery. — Organization. — Motive power. — Historical.
— Of the ancients.— Of the Middle Ages.— Of Na-
poleon. — In the present European war. — Horse artil-
lery. — Howitzers. — Siege artillery. — Mountain artil-
lery. — The modern gun. — Its construction. — The sys-
tem of indirect fire explained. — Shrapnel. — Shell. —
Tactical use of. ,
XIV Auxiliary Services 226
Aviation. — Balloons. — Dirigibles. — Aeroplanes. —
Historical references. — Functions of aircraft. — Their
limitations. — Moral effect of. — Signal Corps. — The
telegraph. — The telephone. — Radio communication. —
Engineer troops. — Pontoons. — Bridges. — Reconnais-
sance. — Field fortification. — Railroad operation. —
Demolition. — Supply Corps. — Purchase of supplies.
— Transportation. — Subsistence. — Medical Department.
— Effects of disease. — Prevention of. — Evacuation of
wounded.
XV Security and Information 243
Information obtainable in time of peace. — Military
attaches. — Spies. — Special agents. — Classes of in-
formation. — General Staff. — Security in time of War.
— Historical newspapers. — War correspondents. —
Friendly and unfriendly inhabitants. — Reconnaissance
in force. — Patrols. — Sights and sounds. — Advance
guards. — Rear guards. — Flank guards. — Cavalry
screen. — Outposts.
XVI Combined Arms in Action 265
Estimate of the situation. — The mission. — The con-
siderations affecting the enemy. — Considerations af-
fecting our own forces. — The decision. — The orders.
— Communication of orders. — The march of the di-
vision. — March discipline. — Tlie independent cavalry.
Table of Contents
CHAPTKB PAGE
— The advance and flank guards. — The halt for
mess. — The selection of a camp site. — The halt or-
dered. — The establishment of outposts. — The outpost
commander and his duties. — The functions of the out-
post. — The functions of the division staff. — The
bivouac. — The resumption of the march. — The cav-
alry action. — The action of the advance guard. — The
development of the action. — Tlie responsibilities of
the commanding general. — The duties of his sub-
ordinates. — The preparation for the infantry attack.
— The functions of the supporting artillery. — Of the
signal corps. — Of the engineers. — Of the sanitary
troops.
XVII Combined Arms in Action — Continued .... 309
The attack and the assault. — The pursuit. — The
care of the wounded and the burial of the dead. —
The functions of the chaplain and of the bandsmen.
— The resumption of the march. — The renewal of con-
tact. — Aeroplane reconnaissance. — The artillery at-
tack. — The infantry assault. — Comments and con-
clusions.
THE ILLUSTRATIONS
A United States mountain battery Frontispiece
JACINO
PAGE
Infantry deploj-ed in skirmishing line 2
Strongly entrenched and screened infantry 20
Firing line showing density to obtain fire superiority . . 34
Infantry supports waiting under cover 52
Type of heavy German siege gun 86
High-angle gun on motor truck for attacking air craft . . 104
Armored motor-car equipped with rapid-fire gun .... 130
A portable observation tower as used in the German Army . 152
Keconnaissance by a dirigible airship 176
Engineers constructing a pontoon bridge 194
Armored and armed aeroplane used for reconnaissance . . 212
An advance guard hastily deployed 244
A motor-bus supply train 272
Infantry firing from behind wire entanglements .... 300
Entrenched infantry commanding a valley 324
INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe
the interest of the general public in matters mili-
tary has become keen. Many dissertations on the
strategy of the campaigns now in course of con-
duct have appeared in the daily press. Some of
these have obviously been illy considered and
hastily prepared, while others were evidently
written by men of no military training.
The authors have undertaken the preparation
of this elementary treatise on the conduct of war
at the request of the publishers, and upon their
assurance that there is an intelligent and wide-
spread public demand for a work of this char-
acter.
It is believed that this timely book will prove
understandable and instructive to the intelligent
public, who cannot but realize that much of what
is now appearing in the daily press on the con-
duct of war, ranges from the improbable to the
grotesque. The strategy of the present war can-
not be written until the facts are authentically
Introduction
known, and for obvious military reasons these are
withheld or distorted by the combatant powers.
It is believed, however, that the reader after
perusal of this treatise will be enabled more in-
telligently and with greater interest to follow the
reports of the campaigns, to discard theories ob-
viously unreal, and to confine his speculations to
what is reasonable and probable under the prin-
ciples herein laid down. And it should be remem-
bered that many of the principles of strategy are
eternal, and even now are the subject of careful
consideration by those charged with the conduct
of military activities abroad.
The work should prove of interest and value to
the large number of officers and men of the Na-
tional Guard, whose intelligent interest in the
profession of arms is so well known, but who have
not the time to digest, in addition to their pre-
scribed studies, a detailed and advanced work cov-
ering a field so broad as that of strategy.
If the work serves no other purpose than to
bring to the minds of some of our influential fel-
low citizens a realization of the helplessness of
a nation forced into war without military pre-
paredness, and the need in this country for an
intelligent and provident military policy as a na-
Introduction
tional insurance, it will have accomplished its
mission.
Chapters I, II, HI, VIH, IX, X, XI, XH, XIH,
XIV, XV, and XVI were written by Major Gen-
eral O'Ryan, and Chapters IV, V, VI and VII by
Captain Anderson.
THE MODERN ARMY
IN ACTION
THE MODERN ARMY IN
ACTION
CHAPTER I
THE GENESIS OF STRATEGY
As accounts are read of the stupendous opera-
tions of the armies engaged in the war on the
continent of Europe, the thought naturally occurs
to the reader how such immense numbers of men
are moved, how they are fed, whence they are
brought. There is perhaps no field of human ac-
tivity which has so attracted the attention of men
throughout the ages as that of war. In war are
seen human emotions at their best and at their
worst. The game of war is a magnet which has
attracted to destruction more human beings than
any agency that has ever existed, and yet out of
the fire and bloodshed of war has arisen much
that is best in the world to-day. Political free-
dom, the liberation of slaves, the expansion of
2 The Modern Army in Action
governments, and the development of savage peo-
ples, all these are the products of war.
It is said that the human mind is incapable of
appreciating numbers which reach millions. The
average reader of war news accepts with incred-
ulity accounts which describe millions of men
maneuvering and fighting in a common war. But
it must be remembered that from the beginning of
time, more minds have been concerned in the de-
velopment of the art of war than of any other art
or science, and it is therefore but reasonable that
its development should have reached standards
of accomplishment not to be expected of younger
and more limited fields of endeavor.
The domain of war is so extensive that its ac-
tivities are grouped into many fields. In any ex-
position of the work of armies in action and of
the conduct of war, the subject should be simi-
larly subdivided.
As war is conducted pursuant to principles
based largely on historical precedents, these prin-
ciples will first be considered. They constitute
what is commonly called Strategy. First, then,
as to the genesis of Strategy.
The government of every nation reflects in its
policy to a greater or less extent the ideals, com-
The Genesis of Strategy 3
mercial ambitions, economic needs and national
fears of its people. If the government be an au-
tocratic power, its policies may not reflect the sen-
timents of the people to the extent that a repre-
sentative form of government would reflect them,
but certain it is that public sentiment in all ages
and in all forms of government has been an im-
portant factor in the determination of the policies
of government. Largely through the agency of
politics, the national or governmental policy is
determined, and when a national policy brings its
parent government into collision with a conflicting
policy of another government and a readjustment
of these conflicting policies cannot through the
agency of politics and diplomacy be mutually ar-
ranged, recourse is necessarily had to might for
the enforcement of the national will. This con-
flict between national mights, is called war. In
war, politics and diplomacy are succeeded by
strategy. Strategy is therefore merely an exten-
sion of national politics.
On this point, Clausewitz,^ a leading authority
on war, says: "War should not be included in
the domain of the arts and sciences, but rather in
the sphere of social life. It is a conflict of vast
1 Clausewitz on War.
4 The Modern Army in Action
interests, which is solved in blood, and only in
this respect does it differ from other contests. A
better comparison could be made with commerce
than with any art whatever, for trade is also a
conflict of human interests and activities; and
much nearer to it still is politics, which, for its
part, can be regarded as a species of trade on a
large scale. Besides, it is the lap in which war
is developed ; in it the features of war are already
obscurely outlined, like the attributes of living
creatures in their germs."
Strategy is the art of directing armies so as
best to attain the ends for which the war is fought.
Strategy deals with questions involving the move-
ments of military forces, the decision to give bat-
tle, and the time, place and manner of offering it.
Tactics relate to the control on the field of combat,
of the organizations which compose the army. A
strategic study may indicate for example the de-
sirability of promptly moving forces for the sei-
zure of an important railroad center. The order,
however, in which the troops are placed in the
column of march, and the manner in which they
are deployed for the attack for the accomplish-
ment of that object, are tactical considerations.
Clausewitz said of strategy, that it ** Fixes the
The Genesis of Strategy 5
point where, the time when, and the numerical
forces with which the battle is fought."
Jomini ^ defines strategy to be " The art of plan-
ning military operations upon the map."
Wagner^ defines strategy as "The art of mov-
ing an army in the theater of operations, with a
view to placing it in such a position, relative to
the enemy, as to increase the probability of vic-
tory, increase the consequences of victory, or
lessen the consequences of defeat."
The conduct of war includes another field of
thought and of activity equal in importance to
that of strategy. That field relates to the prob-
lems involved in the movement and supply of
armies. This subject is called logistics. There-
fore, we have politics determining the national
policy, which makes war and fixes its objects,
strategy providing the plan of operations by which
the armies are to forcibly gain these objects,
logistics solving problems of the movement of the
armies to the theater of operations and their
maintenance and supply during the period of war,
and tactics governing the detailed movement and
fighting methods of the organizations composing
2 "The Art of War"— Jomini.
« Wagner'a Organization and Tactics.
6 The Modern Army in Action
the army in order to make more effective their
offensive or defensive power, under the particu-
lar conditions affecting them at the time.
The earliest warlike contests of mankind were
doubtless fought out for the possession of par-
ticular hunting grounds, or of natural features of
the terrain, such as caves, lakes, woods or streams.
There is early historical record of raids and wars
conducted for punitive purposes, and for the cap-
ture of women and slaves. From the earliest
times when man's weapons were but stone hatch-
ets, his cunning prompted him to cooperate his
efforts in the fight with those of his fellow war-
riors. Experience and observation showed him
the most effective ways of using his crude weap-
ons, and example and emulation produced stand-
ards and methods among clans which might,
broadly considered, be termed tactics. Strategy,
however, was not developed until man's mind had
developed its reasoning powers, its analytical
sense. As the man born without speech or sight
is apt to develop the remaining senses more fully
and acutely, so it is probable that clans or tribes
physically weaker than their neighbors, were here
and there enabled to survive by resorting to
strategic movements more effective in their re-
The Genesis of Strategy 7
suits than would have been mere physical resist-
ance. This was strategy in its infancy. Surprise
was probably one of the earliest manifestations of
a knowledge and appreciation of strategy. To
accomplish surprise requires a maneuvering of
forces, and surprise was probably the first prin-
ciple of strategy practically applied by ancient
man.
The earliest record of warfare comes to us from
the Jews. The Bible contains many accounts
which give us a general idea of the conduct of war
in the earliest times. The records of early wars
are also preserved on Egyptian monuments and
from these we know something of the armament
and organization of the ancients. In Homer's
Hiad we see a picture of war as it was conducted
more than a thousand years before the birth of
Christ. We glean a knowledge of Persian wars
and of the strategy in the era before Christianity
from the accounts of Herodotus, and from other
ancient writers we are able to follow the gradual
development of the earlier methods of warfare.
Warfare is generally grouped into four stages
of development. First, from the earliest times
to the fall of the Roman Empire in the west, a. d.
476. This period includes three of the great cap-
8 The Modern Army in Action
tains of history : Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar.
The second stage covers the wars of the Middle
Ages from the fall of the Roman Empire to the
Thirty Years' Wars, a. d. 1618. The third stage
covers the modern wars, from 1618 to the begin-
ning of the French Revolution. This period in-
cludes the wars of the great captains Gustavus
Adolphus and Frederick the Great. The fourth
stage covers the period of recent wars, from the
French Revolution to the Great European War
of 1914. This period includes the great captain,
Napoleon. These great captains, as they are
called, were the exponents of the strategy of their
time.
The subject of international arbitration is not
here discussed at length, for the reason that it is
.not strictly germane to strategy, and also because
of its evident futility as a dependable agency for
the adjustment of conflicting international policies.
In view, however, of the large number of per-
sons in our country who as advocates of perpetual
peace believe in the efficacy of disarmament and
of the neglect of military preparedness as means
to that most desirable end, passing reference is
made to the subject of international arbitration.
It is believed that a study of the history of man-
The Genesis of Strategy 9
kind and of the world's nations shows little upon
which to base a belief that in the matter of self-
interest peoples and governments of this age differ
greatly from those of the past, and that they will
no longer resort to force for the accomplishment
of their ends when other means fail.
To the military student, history teaches the les-
son that nations will abrogate or disregard the
most solemn treaty obligations when the national
conscience will justify such act on the ground of
necessity. The fact that the national conscience
of other nations not confronted with the momen-
tous consequence involved will not justify the act,
is immaterial in the determination of the question
of war or peace by the nation concerned. This
truth is frequently lost sight of. Necessity knows
no law, and when a nation on the verge of war,
sees its power handicapped and its estate jeopar-
dized by treaty obligations, those obligations are
frequently disregarded on the ground of national
necessity. As a self-confessed murderer, under
our system of jurisprudence, cannot by pleading
guilty stipulate away his life, but is required to
stand trial, so it might also be said that by the
common consent of mankind, a government cannot
stipulate away the sovereign life of the State.
10 The Modern Army in Action
Treaties, therefore, entered into in good faith and
with every intention of the fulfilment of mutual
obligations by the high contracting parties, are
often disregarded when one of the parties is con-
fronted with uncontemplated results of such char-
acter that their happening would seriously affect
the stability or the vital interests of the nation.
We have only to recall that under the terms of the
treaty to which Germany was a party, the neutral-
ity of Belgium in the event of war was guaranteed.
Nevertheless at the outbreak of the present war
in Europe, Germany moved her forces through
Belgium in her invasion of France and justified
the act mainly on the ground of military necessity.
An international court of arbitration is not a
dependable agency for the adjustment of interna-
tional differences, because it has no power for the
enforcement of its decrees. The moral obligation
to abide by the decision of a court of arbitration
cannot be said to be greater than the moral obliga-
tion to abide by the terms of a treaty solemnly
and voluntarily entered into. As the judgment
of a civil court would become worthless without
due process to execute it, and the findings of a
criminal court an empty form without a sheriff
to enforce them, so the mandate of an interna-
The Genesis of Strategy 11
tional court without an international sheriff to en-
force its decrees, becomes a futile agency for the
correction of wrongs and the establishment of
rights when the judgment-debtor will not volun-
tarily assume the role of sheriff and self-execute