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tom, his term being expired.

Callicratidas was not welcomed by Cyrus, and he was also
left without funds bv Lvsander, who returned to „.

J J ' Vigorous

the Persians the sums he had received. This con- measures of

the Lacedse-

duct so much enraged the Spartan admiral that he monians.
sailed with his whole fleet — the largest which had been
assembled during the war, one hundred and forty triremes,
of which only ten were Lacedaemonian — the rest being fur-
nished by allies — to Lesbos, and liberated the Athenian
captives and garrison at Methymna, and seemed animated by
that old Panhellenic patriotism which had united the Greeks
half a century before against the Persian invaders, declaring
that not a single Greek should be reduced to slavery if he
could help it. But while he was thus actuated by these
noble sentiments, he also prosecuted the war of his country,
which had been intrusted to him to conduct. He blocked
up the Athenian fleet at Mitylene, which had no provisions
to sustain a siege. The Athenians now made prodigious
efforts to relieve Conon, and one hundred and ten triremes
were sent from the Piraeus, and sailed to Samos. Callicra-
tidas, apprised of the approach of the large fleet, went out
to meet it. At Arginusae was fought a great The battle of
battle, in which the Spartan admiral was killed, Ar s ir >us;e.
and his forces completely defeated. Sixty-nine Lacedae-
monian ships were destroyed ; the Athenians lost twenty-
19



290 The Pelojponnesian War. [Chap. XIX.

five, a severe loss to Greece, since, if Callicratidas had gained
tlie victory, he would, according to Grote, have closed the
Peloponnesian war, and united the Greeks once more against
Persia.

The battle of Arginusa? now gave the Athenians the con-
trol of the Asiatic seas, and so discouraged were the Lace-
daemonians, that they were induced to make proposals of
peace. This is doubted, indeed, by Grote, since no positive
results accrued to Athens.

The Chians and other allies of Sparta, in conjunction with
Lysandcr Cyrus, now sent envoys to the ephors, to request

returns to J ' J r ' i

power. the restoration of Lysander to the command of

the fleet. They acceded to the request substantially, and
Lysander reached Ephesus, b. c. 405, to renovate the Lace-
daemonian power and turn the fortunes of war.

The victorious Athenian fleet was now at iEgospotami, in
the Hellespont, opposite Lampsacus, having been inactive
for nearly a year. There the fleet was exposed to imminent
danger, which was even seen by Alcibiades, in his forts op-
posite, on the Chersonese. He expostulated with the Athenian
admirals, but to no purpose, and urged them to retire to
capture of Sestos. As he feared, the Athenian fleet was sur-

the Atheni- .

an fleet. prised, at anchor, on this open shore, while the
crews were on shore in quest of a meal. One hundred and
seventy triremes were thus ingloriously captured, without
the loss of a man — the greatest calamity which had hap-
pened to Athens since the beginning of the war, and
decisive as to its result. The captive generals were
slaughtered, together with four thousand Athenian prisoners.
Conon, however, made his escape. So disgraceful and un-
necessary was this great calamity, that it is supposed the
fleet was betrayed by its own commanders ; and this sup-
position is strengthened by its inactivity since the battle of
Arginusse. This crowning disaster happened in September,
Despair of B - c - ^ 5 i an ^ caused a dismay at Athens such as
Athens. j m( ^ never before been felt — not even when the
Persians were marching through Attica. Nothing was now



Chap. XIX.] Humiliation of Athens. 291

left to the miserable city but to make what preparation it
could for the siege, which everybody foresaw would soon take
place. The walls were put in the best defense it was pos-
sible, and two of the three ports were blocked up. Not
only was Athens deprived of her maritime power, but her
very existence was now jeopardized.

Lysander was in no haste to march upon Athens, since he
knew that no corn ships could reach the city from the
Euxine, and that a famine would soon set in. The Athe-
nian empire was annihilated, and nothing remained Annihila .
but Athens herself. The Athenians now saw that *>'•" of . the

Athenian

nothing but union between the citizens could give empire.
them any hope of success, and they made a solemn pledge
in the Acropolis to bury their dissensions and cultivate har-
monious feelings.

In November, Lysander, with two hundred triremes,
blockaded the Piraeus. The whole force of Sparta, under
King Pausanias, went out to meet him, and encamped at the
gates of Athens. The citizens bore the calamity with forti-
tude, and, when they began to die of hunger, sent proposi-
tions for capitulation. But no proposition was received
which did not include the demolition of the long walls which
Pericles had built. As famine pressed, and the condition of
the people had become intolerable, Athens was obliged to
surrender on the hard conditions that the Piraeus Surrender of

Athens to

should be destroyed, the long walls demolished, the Spartans.
all foreign possessions evacuated, all ships surrendered, and,
most humiliating of all, that Athens should become the ally
of Sparta, and follow her lead upon the sea and upon the
land.

Thus fell imperial Athens, after a glorous reign of one
hundred years. Lysander entered the city as a conqueror.
The ships were surrendered, all but twelve, which Fate f
the Athenians were allowed to retain ; the unfin- Athens>
ished ships in the dockyards were burned, the fortifications
demolished, and the Piraeus dismantled. The constitution of
the city was annulled, and a board of thirty was nominated,



292 The Pelqponnesian War. [Ciiap. XIX.

under the dictation of Lysander, for the government of the
city. The conqueror then sailed to Samos, which was easily
reduced, and oligarchy was restored on that island, as at
Athens.

The fall of Athens virtually closed the Peloponnesian war,
after a bitter struggle between the two leading States of
close of the Greece for thirty years. Lysander became the
war- leading man in Greece, and wielded a power great-

er than any individual Greek before or after him. Sparta,
personified in him, became supreme, and ruled over all the
islands, and over the Asiatic and Thracian cities. The
tyrants whom he placed over Athens exercised their power
with extreme rigor — sending to execution all who were obnox-
ious, seizing as spoil the property of the citizens, and disarm-
ing the remaining hoplites in the city. They even forbade
intellectual teaching, and shut the mouth of Socrates. Such
was Athens, humbled, deprived of her fleet, and rendered
powerless, with a Spai'tan garrison occupying the Acropolis,
and discord reigning even among the Thirty Tyrants them-
selves.

In considering the downfall of Athens, we perceive that
the unfortunate Sicilian expedition which Alcibiades had
stimulated proved the main cause. Her maritime suprem-
Cause of the acy might have been maintained but for this ag-
Ithens. gression, which Pericles never would have sanc-
tioned, and. which Nicias so earnestly disapproved. After
that disaster, the conditions of the State were totally changed,
and it was a bitter and desperate struggle to retain the frag-
ments of empire. And the catastrophe proved, ultimately,
the political ruin of Greece herself, since there was left no
one State sufficiently powerful to resist foreign attacks. The
glory of Athens was her navy, and this being destroyed,
Greece was open to invasion, and to the corruption brought
about by Persian gold. It was Athens which had resisted
Persia, and protected the maritime States and islands. When
Athens was crippled, the decline of the other States was rapid,
for they had all exhausted themselves in the war. And the



Chap. XIX.] Death of Alcibiades. 293

war itself has few redeeming features. It was a wicked con-
test carried on by rivalry and jealousy. And it pro- Miserable

-, , tit i # spirit of the

duced, as war generally does, a class ol unprinci- war.
pled men who aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
country. Nothing but war would have developed such men
as Alcibiades and Lysander, and it is difficult to say which
of the two brought the greatest dishonor on their respective
States. Both were ambitious, and both hoped to gain an
ascendency incompatible with free institutions. To my
mind, Alcibiades is the worst man in Grecian history, and
not only personally disgraced by the worst vices, but his
influence was disastrous on his country. Athens owed her
political degradation more to him than any other Alcibiades

TX ° J the evil creni-

man. He was insolent, lawless, extravagant, and us of Athens.
unscrupulous, from his first appearance in public life. He
incited the Sicilian expedition, and caused it to end disas-
trously by sending Gylippus to Syracuse. He originated the
revolt of Chios and Miletus, the fortification of Decelea, and
the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. And though he par-
tially redeemed his treason by his three years' services, after
his exile, yet his vanity, and intrigues, and prodigality pre-
vented him from accomplishing what he promised. It is
true he was a man of great resources, and was never defeated
either by sea or land ; " and he was the first man in every
party he espoused — Athenian, Spartan, or Persian, oligarchal
or democratical, but he never inspired confidence with any
party, and all parties successively threw him off." The end
of such a man proclaims the avenging Nemesis in His ingiori-
this world. He died by the hands of Persian assas- ous death "
sins, at the instance of both Lysander and Cyrus, who felt that
there could be nothing settled so long as this restless schemer
lived. And he died, unlamented and unhonored, in spite of
his high birth, wealth, talents, and personal accomplishments.
Lysander was more fortunate ; he gained a great ascend-
ency in Sparta, but his ambition proved ruinous Glory of Ly-
to his country, by involving it in those desperate Ban er "
wars which are yet to be presented.



CHAPTER XX.

MARCH OF CYRUS AND RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND
GREEKS.

The Peloponnesian war being closed, a large body of
Effect of Grecian soldiers were disbanded, but rendered

the Pelopon- . - .

nesian war. venal and restless by the excitements and changes
of the past thirty years, and ready to embark in any warlike
enterprise that promised money and spoil. They were un-
fitted, as is usually the case, for sober and industrial pur-
suits. They panted for fresh adventures.

This restless passion which war ever kindles, found vent
__ , and direction in the enterprise which Cyrus led
ends of from Western Asia to dethrone his brother Artax-

Cyrus dis-
guised, erxes from the throne of Persia. Some fourteen

thousand Greeks from different States joined his standard —
not with a view of a march to Babylon and an attack on the
great king, but to conquer and root out the Pisidian moun-
taineers, who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the
southeast of Asia Minor. This was the ostensible object of
Cyrus, and he found no difficulty in enlisting Grecian mer-
cenaries, under promise of large rewards. All these Greeks
were deceived but one man, to whom alone Cyrus revealed
his real purpose. This was Clearchus, a Lacedaemonian
general of considerable ability and experience, who had been
banished for abuse of authority at Byzantium, which he
commanded. He repaired to Sardis and offered his services
to Cyrus, who had been sent thither by his father Darius to
command the Persian forces. Cyrus accepted the overtures
of Clearchus, who secured his confidence so completely that



Chap. XX.] Cyrus. 295

he gave him the large sum of ten thousand claries, which
he employed in hiring Grecian mercenaries.

Other Greeks of note also joined the army of Cyrus with
a view of heinsr emploved against the Pisidians. Mercenary

° 1 -' . ° Greeks enlist

Among them were Aristippus and Menon, of a under Cyrus,
distinguished family in Thessaly ; Proxenus, a Bceotian ;
Agis, an Arcadian ; Socrates, an Achaean, who were employed
to collect mercenaries, and who received large sums of
money. A considerable body of Lacedaemonians were also
taken under pay.

The march of these men to Babylon, and their successful
retreat, form one of the most interesting episodes in Grecian
history, and it is this march and retreat which I purpose
briefly to present.

Cyrus was an extraordinary man. The younger son of
the Persian king, he aimed to secure the sover- character of
eignty of Persia, which fell to his elder brother, °y rua -
Artaxerxes, on the death of Darius. During his residence
at Sardis, as satrap or governor, he perceived and felt the
great superiority of the Greeks to his own countrymen, not
only intellectually, but as soldiers. He was brave, generous,
frank, and ambitious. Had it been his fortune to have
achieved the object of his ambition, the whole history of
Persia would have been changed, and Alexander High esti-
would have lived in vain. Perceiving and appre- win h he
ciating the great qualities of the Greeks, and Greeks.
learning how to influence them, he sought, by their aid, to
conquer his way to the throne.

But he dissembled his designs so that they were not sus-
pected, even in Persia. As has been remarked, he He dis-

. iici i sembles his

communicated them only to the Spartan general, designs.
Cleai*chus. Neither Greek nor Persian divined his object
as he collected a great ai*my at Sardis. At first he employed
his forces in the siege of Miletus and other enterprises, which
provoked no suspicion of his real designs.

When all was ready, he commenced his march from Sardis,
in March, b. c. 401, with about eio;ht thousand Grecian



29G Retreat of the Ten Thousand. [Chap, xx

lioplites and one hundred thousand native troops, while a
Ho com- joint Lacedaemonian and Persian fleet coasted

niences his - i r> a • -\ir-

march. around the south ot Asia Minor to co-operate with

the land forces.

These Greeks who thus joined his standard under promise
character of large pay, and were unwittingly about to plunge

• if the .. -

Greeks who into unknown penis, were not outcasts and

ioined his , ~ . . . ,

standard. paupers, but were men ot position, reputation, and,
in some cases, of wealth. About half of them were Arca-
dians. Young men of good family, ennuied of home, rest-
less and adventurous, formed the greater part, although
many of mature age had been induced by liberal otters to
leave their wives and children. They simply calculated on
a year's campaign in Pisidia, from which they would return
to their homes enriched. So they were assured by the
Greek commanders at Sardis, and so these commanders be-
lieved, for Cyrus stood high in popular estimation for liber-
ality and good faith.

Among other illustrious Greeks that were thus to be led
so far from home was Xenophon, the Athenian

Xenophon. . . . .

historian, who was induced by his friend Proxe-
nus, of Boeotia, to join the expedition. He was of high
family, and a pupil of Socrates, but embarked against the
wishes and advice of his teacher.

When the siege of Miletus was abandoned, and Cyrus
began his march, his object was divined by the satrap Tissa-
phernes, who hastened to Persia to put the king on his
guard.

At Celence, or Kelrenae, a Phrygian city, Cyrus halted and
Cyrus re- reviewed his army. Grecian re-enforcements here

views his . . . .

army. joined him, which swelled the number of Greeks

to thirteen thousand men, of whom eleven thousand were
hoplites. As this city was on the way to Pisidia, no mistrust
existed as to the object of the expedition, not even when the
army passed into Lycaonia, since its inhabitants were of the
same predatory character as the Pisidians. But when it had
erossed Mount Taurus, which bounded Cilicia, and reached



Chap XX.] Cyrus* March. 297

Tarsus, the Greeks perceived that they had been cheated, and
refused to advance farther. Clearchus attempted The ?'' eek3

■i perceive

to suppress the mutiny by severe measures, ^ at ^g 7
but failed. He then resorted to stratagem, and deceived.
pretended to yield to the wishes of the Greeks, and likewise
refused to march, but sent a secret dispatch to Cyrus that
all would be well in the end, and requested him to send fresh
invitations, that he might answer by fresh refusals. He
then, with the characteristic cunning and eloquence of a
Greek, made known to his countrymen the extreme peril of
making Cyrus their enemy in a hostile country, where
retreat was beset with so many dangers, and induced them
to proceed. So the army continued its march to Issus, at the
extremity of the Issican Gulf, and near the mountains which
sepai'ate Cilicia from Syria. Here Cyrus was further re-en-
forced, making the grand total of Greeks in his army four-
teen thousand.

He expected to find the passes over the mountains, a day's
iourney from Issus, defended, but the Persian Cyrus

•> * _ crosses into

general Abrocomas fled at his approach, and Cyrus Syria.
easily crossed into Syria by the pass of Beilan, over Mount.
Amanus. He then proceeded south to Myriandus, a Phoeni-
cian maritime town, where he parted from his fleet. Eight
days' march brought his army to Thapsacus, on the Euphrates,
where he remained five days to refresh his troops. Hero
again the Greeks showed a reluctance to proceed, but, on
the promise of five minse a head, nearly one hundred dollars
more than a year's pay, they consented to advance. It was
here Cyrus crossed the river unobstructed, and He crosses

. the

continued his march on the left bank for nine days, Euphrates.
until he came to the river Araxes, which separates Syria
from Arabia. Thus far his army was well supplied with
provisions from the numerous villages through which they
passed ; but now he entered a desert country, entirely with-
out cultivation, where the astonished Greeks beheld for the
first time wild asses, antelopes, and ostriches. For eighteen
days the army marched without other provisions than what



298 Retreat of the Ten Thousand. [Chap. XX.

they brought with them, parched with thirst and exhausted
by heat. At Pylse they reached the cultivated territory of
Babylonia, and the alluvial plains commenced. Three days'
further march brought them to Cunaxa, about seventy miles
Battle of from Babylon, where the army of Artaxerxes was
cunaxa. marshaled to meet them. It was an immense
force of more than a million of men, besides six thousand
horse-guards and two hundred chariots. But so confident
was Cyrus of the vast superiority of the Greeks and their
warfare, that he did not hesitate to engage the overwhelming
forces of his brother with only ten thousand Greeks and one
hundred thousand Asiatics. The battle of Cunaxa was
fatal to Cyrus ; he was slain and his camp was pillaged. The
expedition had failed.

Dismay now seized the Greeks, as well it might — a hand-
Dismav of f u l °f rnen m the midst of innumerable enemies,
the Greeks. an( j m t j ie very centre of the Persian empire. But
such men are not driven to despair. They refused to sur-
They render, and made ixp their minds to retreat — to

retreat. £ n( ^ ^gjj. wa y b ae k again to Greece, since all

aggressive measures was madness.

This retreat, amid so many difficulties, and against such
powerful and numerous enemies, is one of the most gallant
actions in the history of war, and has made those ten thou-
sand men immortal.

Ariseus, who commanded the Asiatic forces on the left
wing of the army at the battle of Cunaxa, joined the Greeks
with what force remained, in retreat, and promised to guide
them to the Asiatic coast, not by the route which Cyrus had
taken, for this was now impracticable, but by a longer one,
up the course of the Tigris, through Armenia, to the Euxine
Sea. The Greeks had marched ninety days from Sardis,
about fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles, and
rested ninety-six days in various places. Six months had
been spent on the expedition, and it would take more than
that time to return, considering the new difficulties which it
was necessary to surmount. The condition of the Greeks,



Chap. XX.] Dissimulation of the Persians. 299

to all appearance, was hopeless. How were they to ford rivers
and cross mountains, with a hostile cavalry in Their

. . , , forlorn

their rear, without supplies, without a knowledge condition.
of roads, without trustworthy guides, through hostile terri-
tories ?

The Persians still continued their negotiations, regarding
the advance or retreat of the Greeks alike impos- Deceitful
sible, and curious to learn what motives had ofUie* 110113
brought them so far from home. They replied Persians -
that they had been deceived, that they had no hostility to
the Persian king, that they had been ashamed to desert
Cyrus in the midst of danger, and that they now desired
only to return home peaceably, but were prepared to repel
hostilities.

It was not pleasant to the Persian monarch to have thir-
teen thousand Grecian veterans, whose prestige The p erS i a n
was immense, and whose power was really formida- thef/over-**
ble, in the heart of the kingdom. It was not easy tbl0W -
to conquer such brave men, reduced to desperation, without
immense losses and probable humiliation. So the Persians
dissembled. It was their object to get the Greeks
out of Babylonia, where they could easily intrench and
support themselves, and then attack them at a disad-
vantage. So Tissapherhes agreed to conduct them home
by a different route. They acceded to his proposal,
and he led them to the banks of the Tigris, and advanced
on its left bank, north to the Great Zab River, about
two hundred miles from Babylon. The Persians marched in
advance, and the Greeks about three miles in the rear. At
the Great Zab they halted three days, and then Tissaphernes
enticed the Greek generals to his tent, ostensibly to feast
them and renew negotiations. There they were seized, sent
prisoners to the Persian court, and treacherously murdered.

Utter despair now seized the Greeks. They were deprived
of their crenerals, in the heart of Media, with un- The despair

i • • i -. n . of the

scrupulous enemies m the rear, and the mountains Greeks.
of Armenia in their front, whose passes were defended



300 Retreat of the Ten Thousand. [Chap. XX.

by hostile "barbarians, and this in the depth of winter,
deprived of guides, and exposed to every kind of hardship,
difficulty, and danger. They were apparently in the hands
of their enemies, without any probability of escape. They
were then summoned to surrender to the Persians, bat they
resolved to fight their way home, great as were their dangers
and insurmountable the difficulties — a most heroic resolu-
tion. And their retreat, under these circumstances, to the
Euxine, is the most extraordinary march in the whole history
of war.

But a great man appeared, in this crisis, to lead them,
whose prudence, sagacity, moderation, and courage can
Xenophon never be sufficiently praised, and his successful re-

rallies the . ,

Greeks. treat places him in the ranks of the great generals
of the world. Xenophon, the Athenian historian, now
appears upon the stage with all those noble qualities which
inspired the heroes at the siege of Troy— a man as religious as
he was brave and magnanimous, and eloquent even for a
Greek. He summoned together the captains, and persuaded
them to advance, giving the assurance of the protection of
Zeus. He then convened the army, and inspired them by
his spirit, with surpassing eloquence, and acquired the as-
cendency of a Moses by his genius, piety, and wisdom. His
military rank was not great, but in such an emergency
talents and virtues have more force than rank.

So, under his leadership, the Greeks crossed the Zab, and
resumed their march to the north, harassed by Persian
Their re- cavalry, and subjected to great privations. The

treat to the •" J , .

Tigris. army no longer marched, as was usual, in one un-

divided hollow square, but in small companies, for they were
obliged to cross mountains and ford rivers. So long as they
marched on the banks of the Tigris, they found well-stocked
villages, from which they obtained supplies ; but as they
entered the country of the Carducians, they were obliged to
leave the Tigris to their left, and cross the high mountains
which divided it from Armenia. They were also compelled
to burn their baggage, for the roads were nearly impassable,



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