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C&ap.XX.] March through Armenia. 301

not only on account of the narrow defiles, but from the vast
quantities of snow Avhich fell. Their situation was Their penis
full of peril, and fatigue, and privation. Still they ships.
persevered, animated by the example and eloquence of
their intrepid leader. At every new pass they were obliged
'to fight a battle, but the enemies they encountered could not
withstand their arms in close combat, and usually fled, con-
tented to harass them by rolling stones down the mountains
on their heads, and discharging their long arrows.

The march through Armenia was still more difficult, for
the inhabitants were more warlike and hardy, and The march

i T/v i mi n i through

the passage more difficult, lhey also were sorely Armenia,
troubled for lack of guides. The sufferings of the Greeks
were intense from cold and privation. The beasts of burden
perished in the snow, while the soldiers were frost-bitten and
famished. It was their good fortune to find villages, after
several days' march, where they halted and rested, but
assailed all the while by hostile bands. Yet onward they
pressed, wearied and hungry, through the country of the
Taochi, of the Chalybes, of the Scytheni, of the They reach
Marones, of the Colchians, and reached Trapezus the E,lxine -
(Trebizond) in safety. The sight of the sea filled the Greeks
with indescribable joy after so many perils, for the sea was
their own element, and they could now pursue their way in
ships rather than by perilous marches.

But the delays were long and dreary. There were no ships
to transport the warriors to Byzantium. Thev New

, , , „ , . .,„ troubles and

w r ere exposed to new troubles irom the indifference dangers.
or hostility of the cities on the Euxine, for so large a force
created alarm. And when the most pressing dangers were
passed, the license of the men broke out, so that it was diffi-
cult to preserve order and prevent them from robbing their
friends. They were obliged to resort to marauding expedi-
tions among the Asiatic people, and it was difficult to sup-
port themselves. Not being able to get ships, they marched
along the coast to Cotyora, exposed to incessant hostilities.
It was now the desire of Xenophon to found a new city on



302 Retreat of the Ten Thousand. [Chap. XX.

the Euxine with the army ; but the army was eager to re-
turn home, and did not accede to the proposal. Clamors arose
against the general who had led them so gloriously from the
heart of Media, and his speeches in his defense are among
the most eloquent on Grecian record. He remonstrated
against the disorders of the army, and had sufficient influence
to secure reform, and completely triumphed over faction as
he had over danger.

At last ships were provided, and the army passed by sea
They pass to Sinope — a Grecian colony — where the men
sinope. were hospitably received, and fed, and lodged.

From thence the army passed by sea to Heracleia, where
the soldiers sought to extort money against the opposition
of Xenophon and Cherisophus, the latter of whom had nobly
seconded the plans of Xenophon, although a Spartan of
superior military rank. The army, at this opposition, divid-
ed into three factions, but on suffering new disasters, re-
united. It made a halt at Calpe, where new disorders broke
out. Then Oleander, Spartan governor of Byzantium,
arrived with two triremes, who promised to conduct the
army, and took command of it, but subsequently threw up his
command from the unpropitious sacrifices. Nothing proved
Their the religious character of the Greeks so forcibly

courage and . . . ... .

faith/ as their scrupulous attention to the rites imposed

by their pagan faith. They undertook no enterprise of im-
portance without sacrifices to the gods, and if the auguries
were unfavorable, they relinquished their most cherished
objects.

From Calpe the army marched to Chalcedon, turning into
money the slaves and plunder which it had collected. There
it remained seven days. But nothing could be done with-
out the consent of the Spartan admiral at Byzantium, Anaxi-
bius, since the Lacedremonians were the masters of Greece
both by sea and land. This man was bribed by the Persian
They reach satrap Pliarnabazus, avIio commanded the north-
Byzantium. we stern region of Asia Minor, to transport the
army to the European side of the Bosphorus. It accordingly



Chap. XX.] Lasting Impression of the Betreat. 303

crossed to Byzantium, but was not allowed to halt in the
city, or even to enter the gates.

The wrath of the soldiers was boundless when they were
thus excluded from Byzantium. They rushed into But are
the town and took possession, which conduct from 11 the
gave grave apprehension to Xenophon, who Clty '
mustered and harangued the army, and thus prevented
anticipated violence. They at length consented to leave the
city, and accepted the services of the Theban Coeratidas, who
promised to conduct them to the Delta of Thrace, for pur-
poses of plunder, but he was soon dismissed. After various
misfortunes the soldiers at length were taken under the pay
of Seuthes, a Thracian prince, who sought the recovery of
his principality, but who cheated them out of their pay. A
change of policy among the Lacedaemonians led to the con-
veyance of the Cyrenian army into Asia in order to make
war on the satraps. Xenophon accordingly conducted his
troops, now reduced to six thousand men, over Mount Ida
to Pergamus. He succeeded in capturing the Persian general
Asidates, and securing a valuable booty, b. c. 399. The
soldiers whom he had led were now incorporated They enligt
with the Lacedaemonian army in Asia, and Xeno- ™ ei ^f C(1 of
phon himself enlisted in the Spartan service. His s P arta -
subsequent fortunes we have not room to pi'esent. An exile
from Athens, he settled in Scillus, near Olympia, with
abundant wealth, but ultimately returned to his native city
after the battle of Leuctra.

The impression produced on the Grecian mind by the
successful retreat of the Ten Thousand was pro- Moral effect

1 of the

found and lasting. Its most obvious effect wsis to expedition,
produce contempt for Persian armies and Persian generals,
and to show that Persia was only strong by employing
Hellenic strength against the Hellenic cause. The real
weakness of Persia was thus revealed to the Greeks, and
sentiments were fostered which two generations afterward
led to the expeditions of Alexander and the subjection of
Asia to Grecian rule.



CHAPTER XXL



THE LACEDJEMOITCAN EMPIRE.



I have already shown that Sparta, after a battle with the
Sparta Argives, b. c, 547, obtained the ascendency in the

her power, southern part of the Peloponnesus, and became
the leading military State of Greece. This prestige and
power were not lost. The severe simplicity of Spartan life,
the rigor of political and social institutions, the aristocratic
form of government, and above all the military spirit and
ambition, gave permanence to all conquests, so that in the
Persian wars Sparta took the lead of the land forces. The
great rival power of Sparta was Athens, but this was founded
on maritime skill and enterprise. It was to the navy of
Athens, next after the hoplites of Sparta, that the successful
resistance to the empire of Persia may be attributed.

After the Persian wars the rivalship between Athens and
Continued Sparta is the most prominent feature in Grecian

glory of .

Athens also, history. The confederacy of Delos gave to Athens
supremacy over the sea, and the great commercial prosperity
of Athens under Pericles, and the empire gained over the
Ionian colonies and the islands of the JEgsean, made Athens,
perhaps, the leading State. It was the richest, the most
cultivated, and the most influential of the Grecian States,
and threatened to absorb gradually all the other States of
Greece in her empire.

This ascendency and rapid growth in wealth and power
were beheld with jealous eyes, not only by Sparta, but other
States which she controlled, or with which she was in alliance.
The consequence was, the Peloponnesian war, which lasted



Chap. XXL] Pre-eminence of Sparta. 305

half a generation, and which, after various vicissitudes and
fortunes, terminated auspiciously for Sparta, but Couso .
disastrously to Greece as a united nation. The ^ePdopon-
Persian wars bound all the States together by a nesian war -
powerful Hellenic sentiment of patriotism. The Pelopon-
nesian war dissevered this Panhellenic tie. The disaster at
Syracuse was fatal to Athenian supremacy, and even inde-
pendence. But for this Athens might have remained the
great power of Greece. The democratic organization of the
government gave great vigor and enterprise to all the ambi-
tious projects of Athens. If Alcibiades had lent his vast
talents to the building up of his native State, even then
the fortunes of Athens might have been different. But he
was a traitor, and threw all his energies on the side of
Sparta, until it was too late for Athens to recover the pres-
tige she had won. He partially redeemed his honor, but
had he been animated by the spirit of Pericles or ISTicias, to
say nothing of the self-devotion of Miltiades, he might have
raised the power of Athens to a height which nothing could
have resisted.

Lysander completed the war which Brasidas had so nobly
carried on, and took possession of Athens, abolished the
democratic constitution, demolished the walls, and set up,
as his creatures, a set of tyrants, and also a Spartan gov-
ernor in Athens. Under Lysander, the Lacedasmo- Paramount

. J . . authority of

nian rule was paramount m Greece. At one time, Sparta after

. the victories

he had more power than any man in Greece ever of Lysander.
enjoyed. He undertook to change the government of the
allied cities, and there was scarcely a city in Greece where
the Spartans had not the ascendency. In most of the Ionian
cities, and in all the cities which had taken the side of Athens,
there was a Spartan governor, so that when Xenophon
returned with his Ten Thousand to Asia Minor, he found he
could do nothing without the consent of the Spartan govern-
ors. Moreover, the rule of Sparta was hostile to all demo-
cratic governments. She sought to establish oligarchal insti-
tutions everywhere. Perhaps this difference between Athens
20



306 The Laeedmmonian Empire. [Chap. xxi.

and Sparta respecting government was one great cause of
the Peloponnesian war.

But the same envy which had once existed among the
Sparta in- Grecian States of the prosperity of Athens, was
jealousy of 110w turned upon Sparta. Her rule was arrogant
Greece. an( ^ ^rd, and she in turn had to experience the
humiliation of revolt from her domination. " The allies of
Sparta," says Grote, " especially Corinth and Thebes, not only
relented in their hatred of Athens, now she had lost her
power, but even sympathized with her suffering exiles, and
became disgusted with the self-willed encroachments of
Sparta ; while the Spartan king, Pausanias, together with
some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary and
oppressive conduct of Lysander. He refused to prevent the
revival of the democracy. It was in this manner that Athens,
rescued from that sanguinary and rapacious regime of the
Thirty Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble and
dependent member of the Spartan alliance — with nothing
but the recollection of her former power, yet with her de-
mocracy again in vigorous action for internal government.

The victory of JEgospotami, which annihilated the Athe-
nian navy, ushered in the supremacy of Sparta, both on the
Her oppres- land and sea, and all Greece made submission to the

6ive superi- . .

ority. ascendant power. Lysander established m most

of the cities an oligarchy of ten citizens, as well as a Spartan
harmost, or governor. Everywhere the Lysandrian dekarchy
superseded the previous governments, and ruled oppressively,
like the Thirty at Athens, with Critias at their head. And
no justice could be obtained at Sparta against the bad con-
duct of the harmosts who now domineered in every city.
Sparta had embroiled Greece in war to put down the ascen-
dency of Athens, but exercised a more tyrannical usurpation
than Athens ever meditated. The language of Brasidas,
who promised every thing, was in striking contrast to the
conduct of Lysander, who put his foot on the neck of Greece.
The rule of the Thirty at Athens came to an end by the
noble efforts of Thrasybulus and the Athenian democracy,



Chap, xxi.] War with Persia. 307

and the old constitution was restored uecause the Spartan
king was disgusted with the usurpations and arrogance of
Lysander, and forbore to interfere. Had Sparta Effect of the
been wise, with this vast accession of power gain- ^ncy of 1
ed by the victories of Lysander, she would have s P arta -
ruled moderately, and reorganized the Grecian world on
sound principles, and restored a Panhellenic stability and
harmony. She might not have restored, as Brasidas had
promised, a universal autonomy, or the complete independ-
ence of all the cities, but would have bound together all the
States under her presidency, by a just and moderate rule.
But Sparta had not this wisdom. She was narrow, hard,
and extortionate. She loved her own, as selfish people gen-
erally do, but nothing outside her territory with any true
magnanimity. And she thus provoked her allies into rebel-
lion, so that her chance was lost, and her dominion short-
lived. Athens would have been more enlightened, but she
never bad the power, as Sparta had, of organizing a general
Panhellenic combination. The nearest approach which
Athens ever made was the confederacy of Delos, which
did not work well, from the jealousy of the cities. But
Sparta soon made herself more unpopular than Athens ever
was, and her dream of empire was short.

The first great movement of Sparta, after the establish-
ment of oligarchy in all the cities which yielded to her, was
a renewal of the war with Persia. The Asiatic Renewal of

the war with

Greek cities had been surrendered to Persia ac- Persia.
cording to treaty, as the price for the assistance which Per-
sia rendered to Sparta in the war with Athens. But the
Persian rule, under the satraps, especially of Tissaphernes,
who had been rewarded by Artaxerxes with more power
than before, became oppressive and intolerable. Nothing
but aggravated slavery impended over them. They there-
fore sent to Sparta for aid to throw off the Persian yoke.
The ephors, with nothing more to gain from Persia, and
inspired with contempt for the Persian armies — contempt
created by the expedition of the Ten Thousand — readily



808 The Lacedaemonian Empire* [Chap. xxr.

listened to the overtures, and sent a considerable force into
Asia, under Thimbron. He had poor success, and was recall-
ed, and Dercyllidas was sent in his stead. He made a truce
with Tissaphernes, in order to attack Pharnabazus, against
whom he had an old grudge, and with whom Tissaphernes
himself happened for the time to be on ill terms. Dercyl-
lidas overran the satrapy of Pharnabazus, took immense
spoil, and took up winter-quarters in Bythinia. Making
a truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed over into Europe
and fortified the Chersonesus against the Thracians. He
then renewed the war both against Pharnabazus and
Tissaphernes upon the Mseander, the result of which was
an agreement, on the part of the satraps, to exempt
the Grecian cities from tribute and political interference,
while the Spartan general promised to withdraw from Asia
his army, and the Spartan governors from the Grecian cities.

At this point, b. c. 397, Dercyllidas was recalled to Sparta,
Agesiiaus, and King Agesiiaus, who had recentlv arrived
Sparta. with large re-enlorcements, superseded him m com-

mand of the Lacedaemonian army. Agesiiaus was the son of
king Archidamus, and half-brother to King Agis. He was
about forty when he became king, through the influence of
Lysander, in preference to his nephew, and having been
brought up without prospects of the throne, had passed
through the unmitigated rigor of the Spartan drill and
training. He was distinguished for all the Spartan virtues —
obedience to authority, extraordinary courage and energy,
simplicity and frugality.

Agesiiaus was assisted by large contingents from the allied
Greek cities for his Avar in Asia ; but Athens, Corinth, and
Thebes stood aloof. Lysander accompanied him as one of
the generals, but gave so great offense by his overweening
arrogance, that he was sent to command at the Hellespont.
The truce between the Spartans and Persians being broken,
Agesiiaus prosecuted the war vigorously against both Tissa-
phernes and Pharnabazus. He gained a considerable victory
over the Persians near Sardis, invaded Phrygia, and laid



Chap. XXL] Invasion of Mis. 309

waste the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He even surprised the
camp of the satrap, and gained immense booty. Recall of
But in the midst of his victories he was recalled ^f^ the 8
by Sparta, which had need of his services at home. war -
A rebellion of the allies had broken out, which seriously
threatened the stability of the Spartan empire.

" The prostration of the power of Athens had removed that
common bond of hatred and alarm which attached the allied
cities to the headship of Sparta ; while her subsequent
conduct had ariven positive offense, and had ex- Discontent
cited against herself the same fear of unmeasured dan states.
imperial ambition which had before run so powerfully against
Athens. She had appropriated to herself nearly the whole
of the Athenian maritime empire, with a tribute of one
thousand talents. But while Sparta had gained so much by
the war, not one of her allies had received the smallest
remuneration. Even the four hundred and seventy talents
which Lysander brought home out of the advances made
by Cyrus, together with the booty acquired at Decelea,
was all detained by the Lacedaemonians. Hence there
arose among the allies not only a fear of the grasping
dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity
of Sparta. This was manifested by the Thebans and
Corinthians when they refused to join Pausanias in his
march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in
Piraeus. But the Lacedaemonians were strong enough to des-
pise this alienation of the allies, and even to take Alienation of

. ,,.,., the allies of

revenge on such as incurred their displeasure. Sparta.
Among these were the Elians, whose territory they invaded,
but which they retreated from, on the appearance of an earth-
quake."

The following year the Spartans, under King Agis, again
invaded the territory of Elis, enriched by the offerings made
to the temple of Olympeia. Immense booty in slaves, cattle,
and provisions was the result of this invasion, provoked by
the refusal of the Elians to furnish aid in the Avar against
Athens. The Elians were obliged to submit to hard terms



310 The Lacedcemonian Empire. [Chap. xxi.

of peace, and all the enemies of Sparta were rooted out of the
Peloponnesus.

Such was the triumphant position of Sparta at the close of
the Peloponnesian war. And a great change had also taken
place in her internal affairs. The people had become enrich-
ynriciiment ec ^ ^y successful war, and gold and silver were
of Sparta. admitted against the old institution of Lycurgus,
which recognized only iron money. The public men were
enriched by bribes. The strictness of the old rule of Spartan
discipline was gradually relaxed.

It was then, shortly after the accession of Agesilaus to the
throne, on the death of Agis, that a dangerous conspiracy
Conspiracy broke out in Sparta itself, headed by Cinadon, a

against the f J "

states. man ol strength and courage, who saw that men

of his class were excluded from the honors and distinctions
of the State by the oligarchy — the ephors and the senate.
But the rebellion, though put down by the energy of Ages-
ilaus, still produced a dangerous discontent which weakened
the power of the State.

The Lacedaemonian naval power, at this crisis, was seri-
ously threatened by the union of the Persian and Athenian
Lacednemo- fleet under Conon. That remarkable man had

nian fleet in i -i» -n • •

threatened, escaped from the disaster of ^Egospotami with
eight triremes, and sought the shelter of Cyprus, governed by
his friend Evagoras, where he remained until the war between
Sparta and the Persians gave a new direction to his enter-
prising genius. He joined Pharnabazus, enraged with the
Spartans on account of the invasion of his satrapy by Lysan-
der and Agesilaus, and by him was intrusted with the com-
mand of the Persian fleet. He succeeded in detaching
Rhodes from the Spartan alliance, and gained, some time
Naval vie- after, a decisive victory over Pisander — the Spar-
Lawdffimo^ 9 tan ac l irur al, off Cnidus, which weakened the
nians. power of Spar ta on the sea, b. c. 394. More than

half of the Spartan ships were captured and destroyed.

This great success emboldened Thebes and other States to
throw off the Spartan yoke. Lysander was detached from



Chap. XXI.] Battle of Coroncea. 311

his command at the Hellespont to act against Boeotia, while
Pausanias conducted an army from the Pelopon-
nesus. The Thebans, threatened by the whole power Theb es-
of Sparta, applied to Athens, and Athens responded, no longer
under the control of the Thirty Tyrants. Lysander was
killed before Haliartus, an irreparable blow to Sparta, since he
was her ablest general. Pausanias was compelled to evacuate
Boeotia, and the enemies of Sparta took courage. An alliance
between Athens, Corinth, Thebes, and Argos was now made
to carry on war against Sparta.

Thebes at this time steps from the rank of a secondary
power, and gradually rises to the rank of an ascendant city.
Her leading citizen was Ismenias, one of the great Renewed

r. t . n t power of the

organizers ot the anti-Spartan movement — the pre- city.
cursor of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. He conducted success
ful operations in the northern part of Boeotia, and captured
Heracleia.

Such successes induced the Lacedaemonians to recall Agesi-
laus from Asia, and to concentrate all their forces against
this new alliance, of which Thebes and Corinth were then
the most powerful cities. The allied forces were also con-
siderable — some twenty-four thousand hoplites, besides light
troops and cavalry, and these were mustered at Corinth,
where they took up a defensive position. The Lacedaemonians
advanced to attack them, and gained an indecisive victory,
b. c. 394, which secured their ascendency within the Pelo-
ponnesus, but no further. Agesilaus advanced from Asia,
through Thrace to co-operate, but learned, on the confines of
Boeotia, the news of the great battle of Cnidus. At Coronaea
another battle was fought between the Spartan Battle of
and anti-Spartan forces, which was also indecisive, Corona3a -
but in which the Thebans displayed great heroism. This
battle compelled Agesilaus, with the Spartan forces, which
he commanded, to retire from Boeotia.

This battle was a moral defeat to Sparta. Nearly all her
maritime allies deserted her — all but Abydos, which was held
by the celebrated Dercyllidas. Pharnabazus and Conon now



312 The Lacedaemonian Empire. [Chap. XXI.

sailed with their fleet to Corinth, but the Persian satrap
Decline of soon ^ e ^' an< ^ Conon remained sole admiral, assist-
Sparta. e( j w ith Persian money. With this aid he rebuilt

the long walls of Athens, with the hearty co-operation of
those allies which had once been opposed to Athens.

Conon had large plans for the restoration of the Athenian
power. He organized a large mercenary force at Corinth,
which had now become the seat of war. But as many evils
resulted from the presence of so many soldiers in the city, a
conspiracy headed by the oligarchal party took place, with a
view of restoring the Lacedaemonian power. Pasimelus, the
head of the conspirators, admitted the enemy within the
long walls of the city, which, as in Athens, secured a com-
Corinth be- munication between the city and the port. And
seat of war. between these walls a battle took place, in which
the Lacedaemonians were victorious with a severe loss. They
pulled down a portion of the walls between Corinth and the
port of Lechaeum, sallied forth, and captured two Corinthian
dependencies, but the city of Corinth remained in the hands
of their gallant defenders, under the Athenian Iphicrates.
The long walls were soon restored, by aid of the Athenians,
but were again retaken by Agesilaus and the Spartans, to-



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