family, he was not rich. He must make money by his
profession, or he must borrow it, if he would secure
office. It seems he borrowed it. How he contrived to
borrow such vast sums as he spent on elections, I do
not know. He probably made friends of rich men
like Crassus, who became security for him. He was
in debt to the amount of $1,500,000 of our money
before he held office. He was a bold political gambler,
and played for high stakes. It would seem that he
had very winning and courteous manners, though he
was not distinguished for popular oratory. His terse
and pregnant sentences, however, won the admiration
of his friend Cicero, a brother lawyer, and he was very
social and hospitable. He was on the liberal side in
politics, and attacked the abuses of the day, which won
him popular favor. At first he lived in a modest house
with his wife and mother, in the Subarra, without
attracting much notice. The first office to which he
was elected was that of a Military Tribune, soon after
his sojourn of two years in Ehodes to learn from Apol-
lonius the arts of oratory. His next office was that
of Quaestor, which enabled him to enter the Senate, at
74 JULIUS CAESAR.
the age of thirty-two ; and his third office, that of
^Edile, which gave him the control of the public build-
ings : the aediles were expected to decorate the city,
and this gave him opportunities of cultivating popu-
larity by splendor and display. The first thing which
brought him into notice as an orator was a funeral
oration he pronounced on his Aunt Julia, the widow
of Marius. The next fortunate event of his life was his
marriage with Pompeia, a cousin of Pompey, who was
then the foremost man in Rome, having distinguished
himself in Spain and in putting down the slave insur-
rection under Spartacus; but Pornpey's great career in
the East had not yet commenced, so that the future
rivals at that time were friends. Caesar glorified Pom-
pey in the Senate, which by virtue of his office he had
lately entered. The next step to greatness was his
election by the people through the use of immense
amounts of borrowed money to the great office of
Pontifex Maximus, which made him the pagan Pope
of Eome for life, with a grand palace to live in. Soon
after he was made Praetor, which office entitled him to
a provincial government; and he was sent by the Sen-
ate to Spain as Pro-praetor, completed the conquest of
the peninsula, and sent to Rome vast sums of money.
These services entitled him to a triumph; but, as he
presented himself at the same time as a candidate for
the consulship, he was obliged to forego the triumph,
IMPERIALISM. 75
and was elected Consul without opposition: his vanity
ever yielded to his ambition.
Thus far there was nothing remarkable in Caesar's
career. He had risen by power of money, like other aris-
tocrats, to the highest offices of the State, showing abili-
ties indeed, but not that extraordinary genius which has
made him immortal. He was the leader of the politi-
cal party which Sulla had put down, and yet was not
a revolutionist like the Gracchi. He was an aristo-
cratic reformer, like Lord John Russell before the pas-
sage of the Beform Bill, whom the people adored. He
was a liberal, but not a radical. Of course he was not
a favorite with the senators, who wished to perpetuate
abuses. He was intensely disliked by Cato, a most
excellent and honest man, but narrow-minded and con-
servative, a sort of Duke of Wellington without his
military abilities. The Senate would make no conces-
sions, would part with no privileges, and submit to no
changes. Like Lord Eldon, it "adhered to what was
established, because it was established."
Caesar, as Consul, began his administration with con-
ciliation ; and he had the support of Crassus with his
money, and of Pompey as the representative of the army,
who was then flushed with his Eastern conquests,
pompous, vain, and proud, but honest and incorruptible.
Cicero stood aloof, the greatest man in the Senate,
whose aristocratic privileges he defended. He might
76 JULIUS CAESAR.
have aided Caesar " in the speaking department ; " but
as a "new man" he was jealous of his prerogatives, and
was always conservative, like Burke, whom he resem-
bled in his eloquence and turn of mind and fondness
for literature and philosophy. Failing to conciliate the
aristocrats, Caesar became a sort of Mirabeau, and
appealed to the people, causing them to pass his cel-
ebrated " Leges Julio?," or reform bills ; the chief of
which was the " land act," which conferred portions
of the public lands on Pompey's disbanded soldiers for
settlement, a wise thing, which senators opposed,
since it took away their monopoly. Another act re-
quired the provincial governors, on their return from
office, to render an account of their stewardship and
hand in their accounts for public inspection. The
Julian Laws also were designed to prevent the plunder
of the public revenues, the debasing of the coin, the
bribery of judges and of the people at elections.
There were laws also for the protection of citizens
from violence, and sundry other reforms which were
enlightened and useful. In the passage of these laws
against the will of the Senate, we see that the people
were still recognized as sovereign in legislation. The
laws were good. All depended on their execution ;
and the Senate, as the administrative body, could
practically defeat their operation when Crcsar's term
of office expired ; and this it unwisely determined to
IMPERIALISM. 77
do. The last thing it wished was any reform what-
ever; and, as Mr. Froude thinks, there must have
been either reform or revolution. But this is not so
clear to me. Aristocracy was all-powerful when money
could buy the people, and when the people had no
virtue, no ambition, no intelligence. The struggle
at Eome in the latter days of the Kepublic was not
between the people and the aristocracy, but between
the aristocracy and the military chieftains on one side,
and those demagogues whom it feared on the other.
The result showed that the aristocracy feared and dis-
trusted Caesar ; and he used the people only to advance
his own ends, of course, in the name of reform and
patriotism. And when he became Dictator, he kicked
away the ladder on which he climbed to power. It was
Imperialism that he established ; neither popular rights
nor aristocratic privileges. He had no more love of the
people than he had of those proud aristocrats who after-
wards murdered him.
But the empire of the world to which Caesar at
that time may, or may not, have aspired: who can
tell ? but probably not was not to be gained by civil
services, or reforms, or arguments in law courts, or by
holding great offices, or haranguing the people at the
rostrum, or making speeches in the Senate, where
he was hated for his liberal views and enlightened
mind, rather than from any fear of his overturning the
78 JULIUS CAESAR.
constitution, but by military services and heroic
deeds and the devotion of a tried and disciplined regu-
lar army. Caesar was now forty-three years of age,
being in the full maturity of his powers. At the close
of his term as Consul he sought a province where
military talents were indispensable, and where he could
have a long term of office. The Senate gave him the
" woods and forests," an unsubdued country, where
he would have hard work and unknown perils, and
from which it was probable he would never return.
They sent him to GauL But this was just the field
for his marvellous military genius, then only partially
developed; and the second period of his career now
began.
It was during this second period that he rendered
his most important services to the State and earned his
greatest fame. The dangers which threatened the Em-
pire came from the "West, and not the East. Asia was
already subdued by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey, or
was on the point of being subdued. Mithridates was
a formidable enemy ; but he aimed at establishing an
Asiatic empire, not conquering the European provinces.
He was not so dangerous as even Pyrrhus had been.
Moreover, the conquest of the East was comparatively
easy, over worn-out races and an effete civilization ;
it gave e*clat to Sulla and Pompey, as the conquest of
India, with a handful of British troops, made Clive and
IMPERIALISM. 79
Hastings famous ; it required no remarkable military
genius, nor was it necessary for the safety of Italy.
Conquest over the Oriental monarchies meant only
spoliation. It was prompted by greed and vanity more
than by a sense of danger. Pompey brought back
money enough from the East to enrich all his generals,
and the Senate besides, or rather the State, which a
few aristocrats practically owned.
But the conquest of Gaul would be another affair. It
was peopled with hardy races, who cast their greedy
eyes on the empire of the Eomans, or on some of its
provinces, and who were being pushed forward to inva-
sion by a still braver people beyond the Khine, races
kindred to those Teutons whom Marius had defeated.
There was no immediate danger from the Germans; but
there was ultimate danger, as proved by the union they
made in the tune of Marcus Antoninus for the inva-
sion of the Eoman provinces. It was necessary to raise
a barrier against their inundations. It was also neces-
sary to subdue the various Celtic tribes of Gaul, who
were getting restless and uneasy. There was no money
in a conquest over barbarians, except so far as they
could be sold into slavery ; but there was danger in
it. The whole country was threatened with insur-
rections, leagues, and invasion, from the Alps to the
ocean. There was a confederacy of hostile kings and
chieftains ; they commanded innumerable forces ; they
80 JULIUS C&SAR.
controlled important posts and passes. The Gauls had
long made fixed settlements, and had built bridges and
fortresses. They were not so warlike as the Germans ;
but they were yet formidable enemies. United, they
were like " a volcano giving signs of approaching
eruption ; and at any moment, and hardly without
warning, another lava stream might be poured down
Venetia and Lombardy."
To rescue the Empire from such dangers was the
work of Csesar ; and it was no small undertaking. The
Senate had given him unlimited power, for five years,
over Gaul, then a terra incognita, an indefinite
country, comprising the modern States of France, Hol-
land, Switzerland, Belgium, and a part of Germany.
Afterward the Senate extended the governorship five
years more ; so difficult was the work of conquest, and so
formidable were the enemies. But it was danger which
Csesar loved. The greater the obstacles the better
was he pleased, and the greater was the scope for his
genius, which at first was not appreciated, for the best
part of his life had been passed in Rome as a lawyer
and orator and statesman. But he had a fine constitu-
tion, robust health, temperate habits, and unbounded
energies. He was free to do as he liked with several
legions, and had time to perfect his operations. And his
legions were trained to every kind of labor and hard-
ship. They could build bridges, cut down forests, and
IMPERIALISM. 81
drain swamps, as well as march with a weight of eighty
pounds to the man. They could make their own
shoes, mend their own clothes, repair their own arms,
and construct their own tents. They were as familiar
with the axe and spade as they were with the lance
and sword. They were inured to every kind of danger
and difficulty, and not one of them was personally
braver than the general who led them, or more skilful
in riding a horse, or fording a river, or climbing a
mountain. No one of them could be more abstemious.
Luxury is not one of the peculiarities of successful
generals in barbaric countries.
To give a minute sketch of the various encounters
with the different tribes and nations that inhabited
the vast country he was sent to conquer and govern,
would be impossible in a lecture like this. One must
read Caesar's own account of his conflicts with Hel-
vetii, ^Edui, Eemi, Nervii, Belgse, Veneti, Arverni,
Aquitani, Ubii, Eubueones, Treveri, and other nations
between the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Ehine, and the
sea. Their numbers were immense, and they were
well armed, and had cavalry, military stores, efficient
leaders, and indomitable courage. When beaten in
one place they sprang up in another, like the Saxons
with whom Charlemagne contended. They made trea-
ties only to break them. They fought with the des-
peration of heroes who had their wives and children,
82 JULIUS CJZSAR.
firesides and altars, to guard ; yet against them Caesar
was uniformly successful. He was at times in great
peril, yet he never lost but one battle, and this through
the fault of his generals. Yet he had able generals,
whom he selected himself, Labienus, who afterwards
deserted him, Antony, Publius Crassus, Cotta, Sabinus,
all belonging to the aristocracy. They made mistakes,
but Caesar never. They would often have been cut off
but for Caesar's timely aid.
When we consider the dangers to which he was con-
stantly exposed, the amazing difficulties he had to sur-
mount, the hardships he had to encounter, the fears he
had to allay, the murmurs he was obliged to silence,
the rivers he was compelled to cross in the face of ene-
mies, the forests it was necessary to penetrate, the
swamps and mountains and fortresses which impeded
his marches, we are amazed at his skill and intrepidity,
to say nothing of his battles with forces ten times more
numerous than his own. His fertility of resources, his
lightning rapidity of movement, his sagacity and in-
sight, his perfection of discipline, his careful husbandry
of forces, his ceaseless diligence, his intrepid courage,
the confidence with which he inspired his soldiers, his
brilliant successes (victory after victory), with the enor-
mous number of captives by which he and the State
became enriched, all these things dazzled his country-
men, and gave him a fame such as no general had ever
IMPERIALISM. 83
earned before. He conquered a population of warriors
to be numbered by millions, with no aid from charts
and maps, exposed perpetually to treachery and false
information. He had to please and content an army
a thousand miles from home, without supplies, except
such as were precarious, living on the plainest food,
and doomed to infinite labors and drudgeries, besides
attacking camps and assaulting fortresses, and fighting
pitched battles. Yet he won their love, their respect,
and their admiration, and by an urbanity, a kindness,
and a careful protection of their interests, such as no
general ever showed before. He was a hero perform-
ing perpetual wonders, as chivalrous as the knights
of the Middle Ages. No wonder he was adored, like a
Moses in the wilderness, like a Napoleon in his early
conquests.
This conquest of Gaul, during which he drove the
Germans back to their forests, and inaugurated a policy
of conciliation and moderation which made the Gauls
the faithful allies of Rome, and their country its most
fertile and important province, furnishing able men
both for the Senate and the Army, was not only a great
feat of genius, but a great service a transcendent ser-
vice to the State, which entitled Caesar to a magnifi-
cent reward. Had it been cordially rendered to him,
he might have been contented with a sort of perpetual
consulship, and with the dclat of being the foremost
84 JULIUS CJESAR.
man of the Empire. The people would have given him
anything in their power to give, for he was as much
an idol to them as Napoleon became to the Parisians
after the conquest of Italy. He had rendered services
as brilliant as those of Scipio, of Marius, of Sulla, or
of Pompey. If he did not save Italy from being sub-
sequently overrun by barbarians, he postponed their
irruptions for two hundred years. And he had par-
tially civilized the country he had subdued, and intro-
duced Roman institutions. He had also created an
army of disciplined veterans, such as never before was
seen. He perfected military mechanism, that which
kept the Empire together after all vitality had fled.
He was the greatest master of the art of war known to
antiquity. Such transcendent military excellence and
such great services entitled him to the gratitude and
admiration of the whole Empire, although he enriched
himself and his soldiers with the spoils of his ten years'
war, and did not, so far as I can see, bring great sums
into the national treasury.
But the Senate was reluctant to give him the custom-
ary rewards for ten years' successful war, and for add-
ing Western Europe to the Empire. It was jealous of
his greatness and his renown. It also feared him, for
he had eleven legions in his pay, and was known to be
ambitious. It hated him for two reasons : first, be-
cause in his first consulship he had introduced re-
IMPERIALISM. 85
forms, and had always sided with the popular and
liberal party; and secondly, because military successes
of unprecedented brilliancy had made him dangerous.
So, on the conclusion of the conquest of Gaul, it with-
drew two legions from his army, and sought to deprive
him of his promised second consulate, and even to
recall him before his term of office as governor was
expired. In other words, it sought to cripple and dis-
arm him, and raise his rival, Pompey, over him in the
command of the forces of the Empire.
It was now secret or open war, not between Csesar
and the Koman people, but between Csesar and the
Senate, between a great and triumphant general and
the Roman oligarchy of nobles, who, for nearly five
hundred years, had ruled the Empire. On the side of
Caesar were the army, the well-to-do classes, and the
people ; on the side of the Senate were the forces which
a powerful aristocracy could command, having the
prestige of law and power and wealth, and among
whom were the great names of the republic.
Mr. Froude ridicules and abuses this aristocracy, as
unfit longer to govern the State, as a worn-out power
that deserved to fall. He uniformly represents them as
extravagant, selfish, ostentatious, luxurious, frivolous,
Epicurean in opinions and in life, oppressive in all their
social relations, haughty beyond endurance, and con-
trolling the popular elections by means of bribery and
86 JULIUS CAESAR.
corruption. It would be difficult to refute these charges.
The Patricians probably gave themselves up to all the
pleasures incident to power and unbounded wealth, in a
corrupt and wicked age. They had their palaces in the
city and their villas in the country, their parks and gar-
dens, their fish-ponds and game-preserves, their pictures
and marbles, their expensive furniture and costly orna-
ments, gold and silver vessels, gems and precious works
of art. They gave luxurious banquets ; they travelled
like princes ; they were a body of kings, to whom the
old monarchs of conquered provinces bowed down in
fear and adulation. All this does not prove that they
were incapable, although they governed for the interests
of their class. They were all experienced in affairs of
State, most of them had been quaestors, sediles, prae-
tors, censors, tribunes, consuls, and governors. Most of
them were highly educated, had travelled extensively,
were gentlemanly in their manners, could make speeches
in the Senate, and could fight on the field of battle when
there was a necessity. They doubtless had the com-
mon vices of the rich and proud ; but many of them
were virtuous, patriotic, incorruptible, almost austere
in morals, dignified and intellectual, whom everybody
respected, men like Cato, Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, and
others. Their sin was that they wished to conserve
their powers, privileges, and fortunes, like all aristoc-
racies, like the British House of Lords. Nor must
IMPERIALISM. 87
it be forgotten that it was under their re'gime that the
conquest of the world was made, and that Borne had
become the centre of everything magnificent and glo-
rious on the earth.
It was doubtless shortsighted and ungrateful in these
nobles to attempt to deprive Caesar of his laurels and
his promised consulship. He had earned them by
grand services, both as a general and a statesman. But
their jealousy and hatred were not unnatural. They
feared, not unreasonably, that the successful general
rich, proud, and dictatorial from the long exercise of
power, and seated in the chair of supremest dignity
would make sweeping changes ; might reduce their au-
thority to a shadow, and elevate himself to perpetual
dictatorship ; and thus, by substituting imperialism for
aristocracy, subvert the Constitution. That is evidently
what Cicero feared, as appears in his letters to Atticus.
That is what all the leading Senators feared, especially
Cato. It was known that Csesar although urbane,
merciful, enlightened, hospitable, and disposed to gov-
ern for the public good was unscrupulous in the use
of tools ; that he had originally gained his seat in the
Senate by bribery and demagogic arts; that he was
reckless as to debts, regarding money only as a means
to buy supporters ; that he had appropriated vast sums
from the spoils of war for his own use, and, from being
poor, had become the richest man in the Empire ; that
88 JULIUS CAESAR.
he had given his daughter Julia in marriage to Pompey
from political ends ; that he was long-sighted in his am-
bition, and would be content with nothing less than the
gratification of this insatiate passion. All this was
known, and it gave great solicitude to the leaders of the
aristocracy, who resolved to put him down, to strip
him of his power, or fight him, if necessary, in a civil
war. So the aristocracy put themselves under the
protection of Pompey, a successful but overrated
general, who also aimed at supreme power, with the
nobles as his supporters, not perhaps as Imperator,
but as the agent and representative of a subservient
Senate, in whose name he would rule.
This contest between Csesar and the aristocracy un-
der the lead of Pompey, its successful termination in
Ciesar's favor, and his brilliant reign of about four
years, as Dictator and Imperator, constitute the third
period of his memorable career.
Neither Caesar nor Pompey would disband their le-
gions, as it was proposed by Curio in the Senate and
voted by a large majority. In fact, things had arrived
at a crisis : Caesar was recalled, and he must obey the
Senate, or be decreed a public enemy; that is, the
enemy of the power that ruled the State. He would
not obey, and a general levy of troops in support of
the Senate was made, and put into the hands of Pom-
pey with unlimited command. The Tribunes of the
IMPERIALISM. 89
people, however, sided with Caesar, and refused con-
firmation of the Senatorial decrees. Csesar then no
longer hesitated, but with his army crossed the Ru-
bicon, which was an insignificant stream, but was the
Rome-ward boundary of his province. This was the
declaration of civil war. It was now "either anvil
or hammer." The admirers of Csesar claim that his
act was a necessity, at least a public benefit, on the
ground of the misrule of the aristocracy. But it does
not appear that there was anarchy at Rome, although
Milo had killed Clodius. There were aristocratic
feuds, as in the Middle Ages. Order and law the
first conditions of society were not in jeopardy, as
in the French Revolution, when Napoleon arose. The
people were not in hostile array against the nobles, nor
the nobles against the people. The nobles only courted
and bribed the people ; but so general was corruption
that a change in government was deemed necessary by
the advocates of Csesar, at least they defended it. The
gist of all the arguments in favor of the revolution is :
better imperialism than an oligarchy of corrupt nobles.
It is not my province to settle that question. It is my
work only to describe events.
It is clear that Caesar resolved on seizing supreme
power, in taking it away from the nobles, on the ground
probably that he could rule better than they, the plea of
Napoleon, the plea of Cromwell, the plea of all usurpers.
90 JULIUS CJESAR.
But this supreme power he could not exercise until
he had conquered Pompey and the Senate and all his
enemies. It must need be that "he should wade
through slaughter to his throne." This alternative was
forced on him, and he accepted it. He accepted civil
war in order to reign. At best, he would do evil that
good might come. He was doubtless the strongest man