mouth and Portsmouth, were subjected to very
harsh treatment; and others were even being sent
to the fort of Senegal on the coast of Africa, and
to the East Indies, whence they could not hope
ever to regain their homes. Franklin immediately
resolved, if possible, to utilize these assets in the
shape of English sailors in the usual course of
exchange. A letter was accordingly addressed
by him to Lord Stormont, asking whether it
would be worth while to approach the British
court with an offer to exchange one hundred Eng
lish prisoners in the hands of the captain of the
Reprisal for a like number of American sailors
from the English prisons. The note was a simple
interrogatory in proper form of civility. No an
swer was received. After a while a second letter
was prepared, less formal, more forcible in state
ment and argument, and in the appeal to good
sense and decent good feeling. This elicited from
his lordship a brief response: "The king s ambas
sador receives no applications from rebels, unless
they come to implore his majesty s mercy." The
commissioners indignantly rejoined: "In answer



254 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

to a letter which concerns some of the most mate
rial interests of humanity, and of the two nations,
Great Britain and the United States of America,
now at war, we received the inclosed indecent
paper, as coming from your lordship, which we
return for your lordship s more mature considera
tion."

The technical position of the English in this
business was that the captured Americans were
not prisoners of war, but traitors. Their practical
position was that captains of American privateers,
not finding it a physical possibility to keep their
prisoners, would erelong be obliged to let them go
without exchange. This anticipation turned out to
be correct, and so far justified their refusal; for
soon some five hundred English sailors got their
freedom as a necessity, without any compensatory
freeing of Americans. Each of them gave a sol
emn promise in writing to obtain the release of an
American prisoner in return ; but he had as much
authority to hand over the Tower of London,
and the British government was not so roman
tically chivalrous as to recognize pledges entered
into by foremast hands.

All sorts of stories continued to reach Franklin s
ears as to the cruelty which his imprisoned coun
trymen had to endure. He heard that they were
penniless and could get no petty comforts; that
they suffered from cold and hunger, and were
subjected to personal indignities; that they were
not allowed to read a newspaper or to write a



MINISTER TO FRANCE 255

letter; that they were all committed by a magis
trate on a charge of high treason, and were never
allowed to forget their probable fate on the gibbet ;
that some of them, as has been said, were deported
to distant and unwholesome English possessions.
For the truth of these accounts it is not necessary
to believe that the English government was inten
tionally brutal; but it was neglectful and indiffer
ent, and those who had prisoners in charge felt
assured that no sympathy for rebels would induce
an investigation into peculations or unfeeling be
havior. Moreover there was a deliberate design,
by terror and discouragement, to break the spirit
of the so-called traitors and persuade them to be
come real traitors by entering the English service.
By all these tales Franklin s zeal in the matter
of exchange was greatly stimulated. His humane
soul revolted at keeping men who were not crimi
nals locked up in wasting misery, when they
might be set free upon terms of perfect equality
between the contending parties. Throughout his
correspondence on this subject there is a magna
nimity, a humanity, a spirit of honesty and even
of honor so extraordinary, or actually unique, in
dealings between diplomats and nations, that the
temptation is irresistible to give a fuller narrative
than the intrinsic importance of the subject would
warrant. For after all there were never many
English prisoners in France to be exchanged ; after
a while they might be counted by hundreds, but
perhaps they never rose to a total of one thousand.



256 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

There was at this time in England a man to
whose memory Americans ought to erect statues.
This was David Hartley. He was a gentleman
of the most liberal and generous sentiments, an
old and valued friend of Franklin, member of
Parliament for Hull, allied with the opposition in
this matter of the American war, but personally
on good terms with Lord North. He had not
very great ability; he wrote long letters, some
what surcharged with morality and good-feeling.
One would expect to hear that he was on terms of
admiring intimacy with his contemporary, the
good Mrs. Barbauld. But he had those opportu
nities which come only to men whose excellence of
character and purity of motive place them above
suspicion, opportunities which might have been
shut off from an abler man, and which he now
used with untiring zeal and much efficiency in
behalf of the American prisoners. Lord North
did not hesitate to permit him to correspond with
Franklin, and he long acted as a medium of com
munication more serviceable than Lord Stormont
had been. Furthermore Hartley served as al
moner to the poor fellows, and pushed a private
subscription in England to raise funds for secur
ing to them reasonable comforts. There were
responsive hearts and purses, even for rebels,
among his majesty s subjects, and a considerable
sum was collected.

Franklin s first letter to Hartley on this sub
ject, October 14, 1777, has something of bitter-



MINISTER TO FRANCE 257

ness in its tone, with much deep feeling for his
countrymen, whose reputed woes he narrates. "I
can assure you," he adds, "from my certain know
ledge, that your people, prisoners in America,
have been treated with great kindness, having had
the same rations of wholesome provisions as our
own troops," "comfortable lodgings" in healthy
villages, with liberty "to walk and amuse them
selves on their parole. " " Where you have thought
fit to employ contractors to supply your people,
these contractors have been protected and aided
in their operations. Some considerable act of
kindness towards our people would take off the
reproach of inhumanity in that respect from the
nation and leave it where it ought with more cer
tainty to lie, on the conductors of your war in
America. This I hint to you out of some remain
ing good will to a nation I once loved sincerely.
But as things are, and in my present temper of
mind, not being over-fond of receiving obligations,
I shall content myself with proposing that your
government should allow us to send or employ a
commissary to take some care of those unfortunate
people. Perhaps on your representations this
might be obtained in England, though it was
refused most inhumanly at New York."

In December following he had arranged with
Major Thornton, "who appears a man of human
ity," to visit the prisons and give relief to the
prisoners, and he hopes that Thornton "may
obtain permission for that purpose." "I have



258 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

wished," he added, "that some voluntary act of
compassion 011 the part of your government to
wards those in your power had appeared in abat
ing the rigors of their confinement, and relieving
their pressing necessities, as such generosity to
wards enemies has naturally an effect in softening
and abating animosity in their compatriots, and
disposing to reconciliation." Of such unconven
tional humanity was he !

Hartley met Franklin s ardent appeals with
responsive ardor. May 29, 1778, he writes that
he will press the point of exchange as much as he
can, "which in truth," he says, "I have done
many times since I saw you; but official depart
ments move slowly here. A promise of five
months is yet unperformed." But a few days
later, June 5, he is "authorized" to propose that
Franklin should send to him "the number and
rank of the prisoners, upon which an equal num
ber shall be prepared upon this side for the ex
change." Franklin at once demanded lists from
his captains, and replied to Hartley : " We desire
and expect that the number of ours shall be taken
from Forton and Plymouth, in proportion to the
number in each place, and to consist of those who
have been longest in confinement." He then
made this extraordinary suggestion: "If you think
proper to clear all your prisoners at once, and
give us all our people, we give you our solemn
engagement, which we are sure will be punctually
executed, to deliver to Lord Howe in America,



MINISTER TO FRANCE 259

or to his order, a number of your sailors equal to
the surplus, as soon as the agreement arrives
there." It is easy to fancy a British minister
thrusting his tongue into his cheek as this simple-
minded proposal of the plain-dealing colonist was
read to him. The only occasion on which Frank
lin showed ignorance of diplomacy was in assum
ing, in this matter of the prisoners, that honesty
and honor were bases of dealing between public
officials in international matters.

He suggested also retaining a distinction be
tween sailors of the navy and of the commercial
marine. After repeated applications to the Board
of Admiralty, Hartley was only able to reply to
all Franklin s proposals that no distinction could
be made between the naval and merchant services,
because all the Americans were "detained under
commitments from some magistrate, as for high
treason."

July 13, 1778, Franklin remitted to Hartley
the lists of English prisoners. September 14 he
recurs again to the general release: "You have
not mentioned whether the proposition of sending
us the whole of those in your prisons was agreed
to. If it is, you may rely on our sending imme
diately all that come to our hands for the future;
or we will give you, [at] your option, an order
for the balance to be delivered to your fleet in
America. By putting a little confidence in one
another, we may thus diminish the miseries of
war." Five days later he took a still more ro-



260 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

mantic position: heretofore, he said, the Ameri
can commissioners had encouraged and aided the
American prisoners to try to escape ; " but if the
British government should honorably keep their
agreement to make regular exchanges, we shall
not think it consistent with the honor of the
United States to encourage such escapes, or to
give any assistance to such as shall escape."

Yet at the same time he showed himself fully
able to conduct business according to the usual
commonplace method. This same letter closes
with a threat under the lex talionis : " We have
now obtained permission of this government to
put all British prisoners, whether taken by conti
nental frigates or by privateers, into the king s
prisons; and we are determined to treat such
prisoners precisely as our countrymen are treated
in England, to give them the same allowance of
provisions and accommodations, and no other."
He was long obliged to reiterate the like menaces. 1

October 20, 1778, he reverts to his favorite
project: "I wish their lordships could have seen
it well to exchange upon account ; but though
they may not think it safe trusting to us, we shall
make no difficulty in trusting to them;" and he
proposes that, if the English will "send us over
250 of our people, we will deliver all we have in
France ; " if these be less than two hundred and
fifty, the English may take back the surplus
Americans; but if these be more than two hun-
1 Hole s Franklin in France, i. 352.



MINISTER TO FRANCE 261

dred and fifty, Franklin says that he will never
theless deliver them all in expectation that he will
receive back an equivalent for the surplus. u We
would thus wish to commence, by this first ad
vance, that mutual confidence which it would be
for the p ood of mankind that nations should main-

o

tain honorably with each other, tho engaged in
war."

November 19, 1778, nothing has been achieved,
and he gets impatient: "I have heard nothing
from you lately concerning the exchange of the
prisoners. Is that affair dropt? Winter is com
ing on apace." January 25, 1779: "I a long
time believed that your government were in earnest
in agreeing to an exchange of prisoners. I begin
now to think I was mistaken. It seems they can
not give up the pleasing idea of having at the end
of the war 1000 Americans to hang for high
treason." Poor Hartley had been working with
all the energy of a good man in a good cause ; but
he was in the painful position of having no excuse
to offer for the backwardness of his government.

February 22, 1779, brought more reproaches
from Franklin. Months had elapsed since he had
heard that the cartel ship was prepared to cross
the Channel, but she had never come. Pie feared
that he had been "deceived or trifled with," and
proposed sending Edward Bancroft on a special
mission to England, if a safe conduct could be
procured. At last, on March 30, Hartley had
the pleasure of announcing that the exchange ship



262 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

had "sailed the 25th instant from Plymouth."
Franklin soon replied that the transaction was
completed, and gave well-earned thanks to Hart
ley for his "unwearied pains in that affair."

Thus after infinite difficulty the English govern
ment had been pushed into conformity with the
ordinary customs of war among civilized nations.
Yet subsequent exchanges seem to have been
effected only after every possible obstacle had
been contumaciously thrown in the way by the
English and patiently removed by Franklin. The
Americans were driven to various devices. The
captains sometimes released their prisoners at sea
upon the written parole of each either to secure
the return of an American, or to surrender him
self to Franklin in France. In November, 1781,
Franklin had about five hundred of these docu
ments, "not one of which," he says, "has been
regarded, so little faith and honor remain in that
corrupted nation." At last, after France and
Spain had joined in the war, Franklin arranged
that the American captors might lodge their pri
soners in French and Spanish prisons.

Under flags of truce two cargoes of English
sailors were dispatched from Boston to England ;
but the English refused to reciprocate. "There
is no getting anything from these barbarians,"
said Franklin, "by advances of civility or hu
manity." Then much trouble arose because the
French borrowed from Franklin some English pri
soners for exchange in Holland, and returned to



MINISTER TO FRANCE 263

him a like number a little too late for delivery
on board the cartel ship, which had brought over
one hundred Americans. Thereupon the English
men charged Franklin with "breach of faith,"
and with "deceiving the Board," and put a stop
to further exchanging. This matter was, of
course, set right in time. But the next point
made by the admiralty was that they would make
no exchanges with Franklin except for English
sailors taken by American cruisers, thus excluding
captives taken by the privateer smen. Franklin,
much angered at the thwarting of his humane and
reasonable scheme, said that they had " given up
all pretensions to equity and honor." In his dis
appointment he went a little too far; if he had
said "liberality and humanity" instead of "equity
and honor " he would have kept within literal
truth. To meet this last action on the part of
England he suggested to Congress: "Whether it
may not be well to set apart 500 or 600 English
prisoners, and reuse them all exchange in Amer
ica, but for our countrymen now confined in Eng
land?"

Another thing which vexed him later was that
the English government would not give the Amer
icans an "equal allowance" with the French and
Spanish prisoners. He suggested retaliation upon
a certain number of English prisoners in America.
He himself was constantly remitting money to be
distributed to the American prisoners, at the rate
of one shilling apiece each week. But he had the



264 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

pain to hear that the wretched fellow, one Digges,
to whom he sent the funds, embezzled much of
them. "If such a fellow is not damned," he said,
"it is not worth while to keep a devil." One
prisoner of distinction, Colonel Laurens, captured
on his way to France, complained that Franklin
did not show sufficient zeal in his behalf. But he
made the assertion in ignorance of Franklin s
efforts, which for a long while Franklin had reason
to believe had been successful in securing kind
and liberal treatment for this captive.

In all this business Franklin ought to have
received efficient assistance from Thomas Morris,
who held the position of commercial agent for the
States at Nantes, and who might properly have
extended his functions to include so much of the
naval business as required personal attention at
that port. But he turned out to be a drunken
rascal, active only in mischief. Thereupon, early
in 1777, Franklin employed a nephew of his own
from Boston, Jonathan Williams, not to supersede
Morris in the commercial department, but to take
charge of the strictly naval affairs, which were
construed to include all matters pertaining to war
ships, privateers, and prizes. This action became
the source of much trouble. It was a case of
nepotism, of course, which was unfortunate; yet
there was an absolute necessity to engage some
one for these duties, and there was scant oppor
tunity for choice. During the year that Williams
held the office there is no reason to believe that



MINISTER TO FRANCE 265

he did not prove himself both efficient and honest,
liobert Morris, however, whose brother Thomas
was, and who had obtained for him the commercial
office, was much offended, and it was not until in
the course of time he received masses of indispu
table evidence of his brother s worthlessness, that
he was placated. Then at length he wrote a
frank, pathetic letter, in which he acknowledged
that he had been misled by natural affection, and
that his resentment had been a mistake.

Arthur Lee also poured the destructive torrent
of his malignant wrath over the ill-starred Wil
liams. For William Lee pretended to find his
province and his profits also trenched upon. The
facts were that he was appointed to the commer
cial agency jointly with Thomas Morris; but
shortly afterward he was promoted to the diplo
matic service, and left Nantes for a permanent
stay in Paris. He did not formally vacate his
agency, but practically he abandoned it by ren
dering himself unable to attend to its duties. So
even if by any construction he could have estab
lished a show of right to conduct the naval busi
ness, at least he never was on hand to do so.
These considerations, however, did not in the
least mitigate the rage of the Lee brethren, who
now brought a great variety of charges. Frank
lin, they said, had no authority to make the
appointment, and Williams was a knave engaged
in a scandalous partnership with Deane to make-
money dishonestly out of the public business,



266 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

especially the prizes. The quarrel continued un
abated when John Adams arrived, in 1778, as
joint commissioner with Franklin and Arthur Lee.
At once the active Lee besieged the ear of the
newcomer with all his criminations; and he must
have found a ready listener, for so soon as the
fourth day after his arrival Adams felt himself
sufficiently informed to take what was practically
judicial action in the matter. He declared upon
Lee s side. The two then signed an order for
Williams s dismissal, and presented it to Frank
lin. It was discourteous if not insulting behavior
to an old man and the senior commissioner; but
Franklin wisely said not a word, and added his
signature to those of his colleagues. The rest of
the story is the familiar one of many cases: the
agent made repeated demands for the appointment
of an accountant to examine his accounts, and
Franklin often and very urgently preferred the
same request. But the busy Congress would not
bother itself ever so little with a matter no longer
of any practical moment. Lee s charges remained
unrefuted, though not a shadow of justifiable sus
picion rested upon Franklin s unfortunate nephew.



CHAPTER XI

MINISTER TO FRANCE, III
TREATY WITH FRANCE: MORE QUARRELS

THE enthusiastic reception of Franklin in France
was responded to by him with a bearing so cheer
ful and words so encouraging that all the auguries
for America seemed for a while of the best. For
he was sanguine by nature, by resolution, and by
policy; and his way of alluring good fortune was
to welcome it in advance. But in fact there were
clouds enough floating in the sky, and soon they
expanded and obscured the transitory brightness.
Communication between the two continents was
extremely slow; throughout the war intervals oc
curred when for long and weary months no more
trustworthy news reached Paris than the rumors
which got their coloring by filtration through
Great Britain. Thus in the dread year of 1777,
there traveled across the Channel tales that Wash
ington was conducting the remnant of his forces
in a demoralized retreat; that Philadelphia had
fallen before Howe; that Burgoyne, with a fine
army, was moving to bisect the insurgent colonies
from the north. It was very well for Franklin,
when told that Howe had taken Philadelphia, to



268 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

reply: "No, sir: Philadelphia has taken Howe."
The jest may have relieved the stress of his mind,
as President Lincoln used often to relieve his own
over-taxed endurance in the same way. But the
undeniable truth was that it looked much as if
the affair, to use Franklin s words, would prove to
be a "rebellion " and not a "revolution." Still,
any misgivings which he may have inwardly felt
found no expression, and to no one would he ad
mit the possibility of such an ultimate outcome.
Late in the autumn of this dismal year he wrote :

" You desire to know my opinion of what will prob
ably be the end of this war, and whether our new estab
lishments will not be thereby again reduced to deserts.
I do not, for my part, apprehend much danger of so
great an evil to us. I think we shall be able, with a
little help, to defend ourselves, our possessions, and our
liberties so long that England will be ruined by persist
ing in the wicked attempt to destroy them. . . . And I
sometimes flatter myself that, old as I am, I may possi
bly live to see my country settled in peace, when Britain
shall make no more a formidable figure among the
powers of Europe."

But though Franklin might thus refuse to de
spair for his country, the French ministry were
not to be blamed if they betrayed an increased
reserve in their communications with men who
might soon prove to be traitors instead of ambassa
dors, and if they were careful to stop short of
actually bringing on a war with England. It
was an anxious period for Franklin when the days



TREATY WITH FRANCE 269

wore slowly into months and the months length
ened almost into a year, during which he had no
trustworthy information as to all the ominous news
which the English papers and letters brought.

In this crisis of military affairs the anxious
envoys felt that the awful burden of their coun
try r s salvation not improbably rested upon them.
If they could induce France to come to the rescue,
all would be well; if they could not, the worst
might be feared. Yet in this mortal jeopardy
they saw France growing more guarded in her
conduct, while in vain they asked themselves, in
an agony, what influence it was possible for them
to exert. At the close of November, 1777, they
conferred upon the matter. Mr. Deane was in
favor of demanding from the French court a direct
answer to the question, whether or not France
would come openly to the aid of the colonies ; and
he advised that de Vergennes should be distinctly
told that, if France should decline, the colonies
would be obliged to seek an accommodation with
Great Britain. But Dr. Franklin strenuously
opposed this course. The effect of such a de
claration seemed to him too uncertain ; France
might take it as a menace; she might be in
duced by it to throw over the colonies altogether,
in despair or anger. Neither would he admit
that the case was in fact so desperate; the colonies
might yet work out their own safety, with the
advantage in that event of remaining more free
from any European influence. The soundness of



270 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

this latter argument was afterward abundantly
shown by the history of the country during the first
three administrations. Fortunately upon this oc