of a depreciating paper currency, Franklin in
France had neither necessity, nor opportunity,
nor leisure for studying either the ethics or the
solution of so perplexing a problem. He now
HABITS OF LIFE AND OF BUSINESS 353
hastily made such inquiries as he could among the
Americans lately arrived in Paris, but did not
pretend "perfectly to understand" the subject.
To master its difficulties, however, did not seem
essential, because he recognized that the obvious
duty of the moment was to say something which
might at least mitigate the present wrath of the
French ministry, and so gain time for explanation
and adjustment in a better state of feeling. He
had once laid down to Arthur Lee the principle :
" While we are asking aid it is necessary to grat
ify the desires and in some sort comply with the
Humors of those we apply to. Our business now
is to carry our point." Acting upon this rule
of conciliation, he wrote, on July 10, to de Ver-
gennes :
" In this I am clear, that if the operation directed by
Congress in their resolution of March the 18th occa
sions, from the necessity of the case, some inequality of
justice, that inconvenience ought to fall wholly upon the
inhabitants of the States, who reap with it the advantages
obtained by the measure ; and that the greatest care
should be taken that foreign merchants, particularly the
French, who are our creditors, do not suffer by it. This
I am so confident the Congress will do that I do not
think any representations of mine necessary to persuade
them to it. I shall not fail, however, to lay the whole
before them."
In pursuance of this promise Franklin wrote on
August 9 a full narrative of the entire matter; it
354 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
was a fair and temperate statement of facts which
it was his duty to lay before Congress. 1 Before
sending it he wrote to Adams that de Vergennes,
"having taken much amiss some passages in your
letter to him, sent the whole correspondence to
me, requesting that I would transmit it to Con
gress. I was myself sorry to see those passages.
If they were the effects merely of inadvertence,
and you do not, on reflection, approve of them,
perhaps you may think it proper to write some
thing for effacing the impressions made by them.
I do not presume to advise you; but mention it
only for your consideration." But Adams had
already taken his own measures for presenting
the case before Congress.
Such is the full story of Franklin s doings in
this affair. His connection with it was limited
to an effort to counteract the mischief which an
other had done. Whether he thought that the
"inconvenience" which "ought to fall" only on
Americans could be arranged to do so, does not
appear; probably he never concerned himself to
work out a problem entirely outside his own de
partment. As a diplomatist, who had to gain
time for angry people to cool down for amicable
discussion, he was content to throw out this gen
eral remark, and to express confidence that his
countrymen would do liberal justice. So far as
he was concerned, this should have been the end
of the matter, and Adams should have been grate-
1 Franklin s Works, vii. 110-112.
HABITS OF LIFE AND OF BUSINESS 355
ful to a man whose tranquil wisdom and skillful
tact had saved him from the self-reproach which
he would ever have felt had his well-intentioned,
ill-timed act borne its full possible fruit of injury
to the cause of the States. But Adams, who
knew that his views were intrinsically correct,
emerged from the imbroglio with an extreme re
sentment against his rescuer, nor was he ever able
to see that Franklin did right in not reiterating
the same views. He wished not to be saved but
to be vindicated. The consequence has been
unfortunate for Franklin, because the affair has
furnished material for one of the counts in the
indictment which the Adamses have filed against
him before the bar of posterity.
It may be remarked here that the few words
which Franklin ever let drop concerning paper
money indicate that he had given it little thought.
He said that in Europe it seemed "a mystery,"
"a wonderful machine;" and there is no reason
why he should have understood it better than
other people in Europe. He also said that the
general effect of the depreciation had operated as
a gradual tax on the citizens, and "perhaps the
most equal of all taxes, since it depreciated in the
hands of the holders of money, and thereby taxed
them in proportion to the sums they held and the
time they held it, which is generally in proportion
to men s wealth." 1 The remark could not keep
a place in any very profound discussion of the
1 See also Franklin s Works, vii. 343.
356 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
subject; but it should be noted that in this point
of view the contention of de Vergennes might be
logically defended, on the ground that a foreigner
ought not to be taxed like a citizen; but the in
superable difficulty of making the distinction prac
ticable remained undisposed of.
CHAPTER XIV
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: LAST YEARS IN FRANCE
THE war had not been long waging before over
tures and soundings concerning an accommodation,
abetted and sometimes instigated by the cabinet,
began to come from England. Nearly all these
were addressed to Franklin, because all Europe
persisted in regarding him as the one authentic
representative of America, and because English
men of all parties had long known and respected
him far beyond any other American. In March,
1778, William Pulteney, a member of Parliament,
came under an assumed name to Paris and had
an interview with him. But it seemed that Eng
land would not renounce the theory of the power
of Parliament over the colonies, though willing
by way of favor to forego its exercise. Franklin
declared an arrangement on such a basis to be
impossible.
A few months later there occurred the singular
and mysterious episode of Charles de Weissen-
stein. Such was the signature to a letter dated at
Brussels, June 16, 1778. The writer said that in
dependence was an impossibility, and that the Eng
lish title to the colonies, being indisputable, would
358 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
be enforced by coming generations even if the
present generation should have to "stop awhile in
the pursuit to recover breath; " he then sketched a
plan of reconciliation, which included offices or
life pensions for Franklin. Washington, and other
prominent rebels. He requested a personal inter
view with Franklin, and, failing that, he appointed
to be in a certain spot in Notre Dame at a certain
hour, wearing a rose in his hat, to receive a written
reply. The French police reported the presence
at the time and place of a man obviously bent
upon this errand, who was traced to his hotel and
found, says John Adams, to be "Colonel Fitz-
something, an Irish name, that I have forgotten."
He got no answer, because at a consultation be
tween the American commissioners and de Ver-
gennes it was so decided. But one had been
written by Franklin, and though de Weissenstein
and Colonel Fitz-something never saw it, at least
it has afforded pleasure to thousands of readers
since that time. For by sundry evidence Frank
lin became convinced, even to the point of alleging
that he "knew," that the incognito correspondent
was the English monarch himself, whose letter
the Irish colonel had brought. The extraordinary
occasion inspired him. It is a rare occurrence
when one can speak direct to a king as man with
man on terms of real equality. Franklin seized
his chance, and wrote a letter in his best vein, a
dignified, vigorous statement of the American po
sition, an eloquent, indignant arraignment of the
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 359
English measures for which George III. more
than any other one man was responsible. In
language which was impassioned without being
extravagant, he mingled sarcasm and retort, state
ment and argument, with a strenuous force that
would have bewildered the royal "de Weissen-
stein." To this day one cannot read these sting
ing paragraphs without a feeling of disappoint
ment that de Yergennes would not let them reach
their destination. Such a bolt should have been
sent hotly home, not dropped to be picked up as
a curiosity by the groping historians of posterity.
The good Hartley also was constantly toiling
to find some common ground upon which negotia
tors could stand and talk. One of his schemes,
which now seems an idle one, was for a long
truce, during which passions might subside and
perhaps a settlement be devised. Franklin ever
lent a courteous ear to any one who spoke the
word Peace. But neither this strong feeling, nor
any discouragement by reason of American re
verses, nor any arguments of Englishmen ever
induced him to recede in the least from the line
of demands which he thought reasonable, nor to
abate his uncompromising plainness of speech.
With the outbreak of war Franklin s feelings
towards England had taken on that extreme bit-
O
terness which so often succeeds when love and
admiration seem to have been misplaced. "I was
fond to a folly," he said, "of our British connec
tions, . . . but the extreme cruelty with which
360 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
we have been treated has now extinguished every
thought of returning to it, and separated us for
ever. You have thereby lost limbs that will never
grow again." English barbarities, he declared,
"have at length demolished all my moderation."
Often and often he reiterated such statements in
burning words, which verge more nearly upon
vehemence than any other reminiscence which sur
vives to us of the great and calm philosopher.
Yet in the bottom of his heart he felt that the
chasm should not be made wider and deeper than
was inevitable. In 1780 he told Hartley that
Congress would fain have had him "make a school-
book " from accounts of "British barbarities," to
be illustrated by thirty -five prints by good artists
of Paris, "each expressing one or more of the
different horrid facts, ... in order to impress
the minds of children and posterity with a deep
sense of your bloody and insatiable malice and
wickedness." He would not do this, yet was
sorely provoked toward it. "Every kindness I
hear of done by an Englishman to an American
prisoner makes me resolve not to proceed in the
work, hoping a reconciliation may yet take place.
But every fresh instance of your devilism weakens
that resolution, and makes me abominate the
thought of a reunion with such a people."
In point of fact the idea of an actual reunion
seems never from the very outset to have had
any real foothold in his mind. In 1779 he said :
"We have long since settled all the account in
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 361
our own minds. We know the worst you can do
to us, if you have your wish, is to confiscate our
estates and take our lives, to rob and murder us;
and this ... we are ready to hazard rather than
come again under your detested government." 1
This sentiment steadily gained strength as the
struggle advanced. Whenever he talked about
terms of peace he took a tone so high as must
have seemed altogether ridiculous to English states
men. Independence, he said, was established; no
words need be wasted about that. Then he auda
ciously suggested that it would be good policy for
England "to act nobly and generously; ... to
cede all that remains in North America, and thus
conciliate and strengthen a young power, which
she wishes to have a future and serviceable friend."
She would do well to "throw in" Canada, Nova
Scotia, and the Floridas, and "call it ... an
indemnification for the burning of the towns."
Englishmen constantly warned him of the blun
der which the colonies would commit, should they
"throw themselves into the arms" of France, and
they assured him that the alliance was the one
"great stumbling-block in the way of making
peace." But he had ever the reply, after the
fashion of Scripture: By their fruits ye shall
know them. France was as liberal of friendship
and good services as England was of tyranny and
cruelties. This was enough to satisfy Franklin;
1 See also a strong statement in letter to Hartley of October 14,
1777 ; Works, vii. 106.
362 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
he saw no Judas in the constant and generous
de Vergennes, and could recognize no inducement
to drop the substance France for the shadow Eng
land. 1 To his mind it seemed to concern equally
the honor and the interest of the States to stand
closely and resolutely by their allies, whom to
abandon would be "infamy;" and after all, what
better bond could there be than a common interest
and a common foe? From this view he never
wavered to the hour when the definitive treaty of
peace was signed. 2
Such was Franklin s frame of mind when the
surrender at Yorktown and the events incident
to the reception of the news in England at last
brought peace into really serious consideration.
The States had already been forward to place
themselves in a position for negotiating at the first
possible moment. For in 1779 Congress had re
ceived from France an intimation that it would
be well to have an envoy in Europe empowered
to treat; and though it was seizing time very
much by the forelock, yet that body was in no
mood to dally with so pleasing a hint, and at once
nominated John Adams to be plenipotentiary.
This, however, by no means, fell in with the
schemes of the French ministry, for de Vergennes
knew and disliked Mr. Adams s very unmanage
able character. Accordingly the French ambassa-
1 See Franklin s Works, vi. 303.
2 See Franklin s Works, vi. 151, 303, 310 ; vii. 3, for examples
of his expressions on this subject.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 363
dor at Philadelphia was instructed to use his great
influence with Congress to effect some ameliora
tion of the distasteful arrangement, and he soon
covertly succeeded in inducing Congress to create
a commission by appointing Adams, Jay, Frank
lin, Jefferson, who never went on the mission,
and Laurens, who was a prisoner in England and
joined his colleagues only after the business had
been substantially concluded. Adams promptly
came to Paris, created a great turmoil there, as
has been in part narrated, and passed on to Hol
land, where he still remained. Jay, accredited
to, but not yet received by, the Spanish court,
was at Madrid. Franklin therefore alone was on
hand in Paris when the great tidings of the cap
ture of Cornwallis came.
It was on November 25, 1781, that Lord North
got this news, taking it "as he would have taken
a ball in his breast." He recognized at once that
"all was over," yet for a short time longer he
retained the management of affairs. But his ma
jority in Parliament was steadily dwindling, and
evidently with him also "all was over." In his
despair he caught with almost pathetic eagerness
at what for a moment seemed a chance to save his
ministry by treating with the States secretly and
apart from France. He was a man not troubled
with convictions, and having been obstinate in
conducting a war for which he really cared little,
he was equally ready to save his party by putting
an end to it with the loss of all that had been at
364 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
stake. Franklin, however, decisively cut off that
hope. America, he assured Hartley, would not
forfeit the world s good opinion by "such per
fidy;" and in the incredible event of Congress
instructing its commissioners to treat upon "such
ignominious terms," he himself at least "would
certainly refuse to act." So Digges, whom Frank
lin described as "the greatest villain I ever met
with," carried back no comfort from secret, tenta
tive errands to Adams in Holland and to Franklin
in France. Simultaneous furtive advances to
de Vergennes met with a like rebuff. France and
America were not to be separated; Lord North
and his colleagues were not to be saved by the
bad faith of either of their enemies. On Febru
ary 22, 1782, an address to the king against con
tinuing the American war was moved by Con way.
It was carried by a majority of nineteen. A few
days later a second, more pointed, address was
carried without a division. The next day leave
was granted to bring in a bill enabling the king
to make a peace or a truce with the colonies.
The game was up; the ministry held no more
cards to play; on March 20 Lord North an
nounced that his administration was at an end.
In his shrewd, intelligent fashion, Franklin was
watching these events, perfectly appreciating the
significance of each in turn. On March 22 he
seized an opportunity which chance threw in his
way for writing to Lord Shelburne a short note,
in which he suggested a hope that the "returning
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 365
good disposition " of England towards America
would "tend to produce a general peace." It
was a note of a few lines only, seemingly a mere
pleasant passage of courtesy to an old friend, but
significant and timely, an admirable specimen of
the delicate tact with which Franklin could meet
and almost create opportunity. A few days later
the cabinet of Lord Rockingham was formed,
composed of the friends of America. In it
Charles Fox was secretary for foreign affairs,
and Lord Shelburne had the home department,
including the colonies. No sooner were the new
ministers fairly instated than Shelburne dispatched
Richard Oswald, a retired Scotch merchant, of
very estimable character, of good temper, reason
able views, and sufficient ability, to talk matters
over with Franklin at Paris. Oswald arrived on
April 12, and had satisfactory interviews with
Franklin and de Vergennes. The important fact
of which he became satisfied by the explicit lan
guage of Franklin was, that the hope of inducing
the American commissioners to treat secretly and
separately from France was utterly groundless. 1
After a few days he went back to London, carry
ing a letter from Franklin to Shelburne, in which
Franklin expressed his gratification at these over
tures and his hope that Oswald might continue
1 About the same time Laurens was released on parole and
sent to confer with Adams in Holland, concerning- a separate
treating-, and brought from Adams the like response as Oswald
brought from Franklin.
366 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
to represent the English minister. Oswald also
carried certain "Notes for Conversation," which
Franklin had written out; "some loose thoughts
on paper," as he called them, "which I intended
to serve as memorandums for my discourse, but
without a fixed intention of showing them to him."
As matters turned out later, it would have been
better if Franklin had not been quite so free with
these "memorandums," which contained a sugges
tion that the English should cede Canada and
the Americans should recoup the losses of the
royalists. Indeed, no sooner had the paper left
his hands than he saw his error, and was "a little
ashamed of his weakness." The letter only was
shown to the whole cabinet.
On May 5. Oswald was again in Paris, charged
to discuss terms with Franklin. But on May 7
there arrived also Thomas Grenville, deputed by
Fox to approach de Yergennes with the design
not only of treating with France, but also of treat
ing with the States through France. The double
mission indicated a division in the English cabi
net. Fox and Shelburne were almost as hostile
to each other as were both to Lord North; and
each was aiming to control the coming negotia
tions with the States. Which should secure it
was a nice question. For English purposes of
classification the States, until independence was
acknowledged, remained colonies, and so within the
charge of Shelburne. Hence came Fox s scheme
for reaching them indirectly through France, also
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 367
his avowed willingness to recognize their independ
ence immediately, for foreign business belonged
to him. Shelburne, on the other hand, strenu
ously resisted this ; at worst, as he thought, inde
pendence must come through a treaty, and with
equivalents. Moreover it seems that he cherished
an odd, half -defined notion, apparently altogether
peculiar to himself, that he might escape the
humiliation of a grant of full independence, and
in place thereof might devise some sort of "fed
eral union." Perhaps it was out of this strange
fancy that there grew at this time a story that
the States were to be reconciled and joined to
Great Britain by a gift of the same measure of
autonomy enjoyed by Ireland.
When Oswald and Franklin next met, they
made at first little progress; each seemed desirous
to keep himself closed while the other unfolded.
The result was that Franklin wrote, with unusual
naivete: "On the whole I was able to draw so
little of the sentiments of Lord Shelburne . . .
that I could not but wonder at his being again
sent to me." At the same time Grenville was
offering to de Vergennes to acknowledge the inde
pendence of the United States, provided that in
other respects the treaty of 1763 l should be rein
stated. That is to say, France was to agree to
a complete restoration of the status, quo ante
helium in every respect so far as her own interests
1 Made between England and France at the close of the last
war, in which France had lost Canada.
368 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
were concerned, and to accept as the entire re
compense for all her expenditures of money and
blood a benefit accruing to the American States.
This was a humorous assumption of the ingenuous
ness of her most disinterested protestations. The
French minister, we are told, "seemed to smile"
at this compliment to the unselfishness of his
chivalrous nation, 1 and replied that the American
States were making no request to England for
independence. As Franklin happily expressed it :
"This seems to me a proposition of selling to us
a thing that was already our own, and making
France pay the price they [the English] are
pleased to ask for it." But the design of wean
ing the States from France, in the treating, was
obvious.
Grenville, thus checked, next tried to see what
he could do with Franklin in the way of separate
negotiation. But he only elicited a statement that
the States were under no obligations save those
embodied in the treaties of alliance and com
merce with France, and a sort of intimation, which
might be pregnant of much or of little, that if
the purpose of the former were achieved through
the recognition of independence, then the com
mercial treaty alone would remain. This some
what enigmatical remark doubtless indicated no
thing more than that the States would not continue
active and aggressive hostilities in order to further
1 " The Peace Negotiations of 1782-83," etc., by John Jay ; in
Winsor s Narr. and Crit. Hist, of America, vol. vii.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 369
purely French designs. Clearly it would depend
upon the demands of France whether the States
might not find themselves in a somewhat delicate
position. Their obligation to make 110 separate
peace with England had been contracted upon the
basis that France should ally herself with them
to obtain their independence; and the injury
expected to result therefrom to England, with
the chance of commercial advantages accruing to
France, had been regarded as a full consideration.
Yet it would seem ungrateful, to say the least, to
step out of the fight and leave France in it, and
to refuse to back her demands for the recoupment
of some of the losses which she had suffered in
the previous war. But now the French alliance
with Spain threatened grave complications; she
had joined France in the war, and the two powers
were held closely together by the Bourbon family
interests. Spain now had demands of her own in
the way of territory on the American continent,
where she had made extensive conquests, and even
for the cession of Gibraltar. But the States owed
little to Spain, vastly less, indeed, than they had
tried to owe to her; for their incessant begging
had elicited only small sums, and they were more
irritated at their failure to obtain much than
thankful for the trifles they had extorted. So
they now easily and gladly took the position of
entire freedom from any obligation, either by
treaty or of honor, towards that power. But in
the probable event of France standing by Spain,
370 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
peace might be deferred for the benefit of a coun
try with which the States had no lien, unless the
States could treat separately. It was not within
the purview of the treaty that they should remain
tied to France for such purposes; and to this
purport Fox wrote to Grenville. But though it
might be tolerably easy to enunciate a theory by
which the States could justly control their own
affairs, with no regard to France, it was only too