againit in Proteftant Countries ; for there^ no
Man is obliged to truft his Wife with a Prieft 3
and, for the moil part, they find it conve-
nient to marry themfelves ; and a^BleiTing vi-
fibiy attends their Endeavours, no Rank of
People being more oblerved to multiply their
Species.
In Popifli Countries many foreign Wars arc
raifed and ftirred up by the Pride and Ambi-
tion of the Ecclefiafticks to increafe their Pow-
er ; and many domeftick ones fomented for the
"fame Reafon, about the Power of the Pope,^
the Inveftiture of Princes, the Immunities ^oi*
the Clergy ; and endlefs Contentions arlfe with
the States they live under, about their pecu-
liar Privileges, as well as conftant Perfections
againPc all who oppofe their Pretences: All
which Wars and Quarrels exhauft the People 9
perplex the publick Affairs, and either divide
them into Factions, or, which is much worfe,
make them all of their own. But in Proteftanj
Countries thefe Evils are lefs enormous : The
People begin to- fee with their own Eyes, and
will not undo one another to gratify the Am-
bition of any who would opprefs them all ;
nor force or drive cut of their Country ufefu!
Inhabitants, for dry Chimera's and ufelcfs No-
;;ons, and for the Shape of their i houghts,
and Imaginations ; and many, of their < Jie-rg)'
do not -defire it.
In Popifib Countries, great Numbers ot idle
ufelefs Members of Society are employee!
* *-
euro's LETTERS.
fo fupport the Luxury of the Ecclefiafticfcsi or
to contribute to their Superdirion; as Orga^
nifts, Fidlers, Singers, Scholars as they are called,'
numerous Officers of various Kinds, and many
lazy Beggars, who feed upon their Scraps, or
are fupported by their Means out of the Cha*
rity of others, who are perfwaded that they
ferve God in keeping them idle and neceiHtous,
and' without labouring for a Stibfiftance : All
thefe are a dead Weight upon Society, live
like Drones in a Hive, and eat Honey without
making any. This Grievance is not fo great
in Proteftan-t Countries, the Clergy among ft
them not being ufed to throw away their Mo^
ney without having fomething for it.
Iti Popidi Countries there is an Afvlurrr and
San&uary in every Parifti, where "Robbers,
Murderers, and all forts of -Criminals, are de-
fended againft their Sovereigns and their Laws;
by which- Means Banditti and Aflaflins are
Become a fort of Eft abli (foment, and are the
Swifs and Guards of -the Papacy, depend up.
on the PrieR-s for Protection, and are always
at hatd to execute their bloody Defigns, and
ro partake of the Spoil, as well as to be hired
by others; by which Means there are numerous
and nightly Murders- in thofe Countries, and
the People there dare. not go- about their -necef-
fery Affairs ; and therefore cannot have the
fame Security and Encouragement as in Pro-
Eeftant -^Countries, where this enormous- Wide-
cdneJ3 !s net allowed and pratifed, and where
ie Priefls cannot proteft AiTajfins ; 'and the
\vortfc that can be faid of any of them is, that
ih.i/ \v-or/t ad fai:4c with" theai alterward3 ?
but
CATO's LETTERS. 31 f
but are ready to abfblve them at the Gallows-
if they have been doing" their Work : And in
one Inftance, in a certain Junfdi&iorj, where
a certain High-Priefr, or thofe who afc under
him, compound with Delinquents by the Great
for Crimes they have committed, or are to
commit for the Year enfuing ; alamode of his
Holinef5 ; at tyme
Thefe, and infinite other Evils, are pro*
duced by the Popifh Religion, which depo-
pulates Nations, deftroys InduRry, overturns
Law and Juftice, the Cements of Society, di
courages Trade, drives out Merchants, ener-
. vates States, and renders the Race of Mankind
feeble, lazy, and miferable : .Nor can- I fee a
barePoffibility how thefe wretched People can
extricate themiei'ves out of their doleful Con-
dition, which muft ftill go on from bad to
worfe, till they become fo weak as to be the
Prey of foreign Enemies, or to expire by an
internal Confumprion ; for the Power of the
Eccleirafticks is (b great, and depends fo much
upon keeping the Layety poor, ignorant, idle,
and helplefs, that they cannot have the Will
or Power to recover themfeives.
This wicked Policy Iras turned the Campania
of Romci and all the populous and fertile Pro-
vinces of Italy, into Boggs, MoraiTes, and. De-
farts, and would have long (ince extinguished
Popery, if fome of the Proteiiant States had
not forgot the Principles upon which they had
reformed, and others had not fubmitted to do-
meftick Slavery, but little worfe than Eccleft-
aftical, as both flowing from the fame Root,
and producing the fame Evils, tho' not in the
fame
CA ro's LETTERS;
lame Degree ; however, I think the Cata-
ftrophe of Popery is but a little farther removed,
for the few States amongit theProteftants, with
prudent Laws, and a wife Conduct alone, may-
be in a Condition, if they can keep their Li-
berty, without (Inking a Stroke but in their
own Defence, to demolifli and overturn this
monilrous Babel, or make or fuger it to de-
ftroy itfelf.
I 'am, 6cc.
NLY the Checks put upon Magiftrates
make Nations free ; and only the Want
of fuch Checks makes them Slaves. They are
free,where their Magiftrates are confined with-
in certain Bounds fet them by the People, and
a& by Rules prefcribed them by the People ;
And they are Slaves, where their Magiftrates
chufe their own Rules, and follow their Luft:
and Humours'; than which, a more dreadful
Curfe can befai no People ; nor did ever any
Magiftrate do what he pleated, but the People
were undone by his Pleafure ; and therefore
mod Nations in^ the World are undone, and
thote Nations only who bridle their Governours
do not wear Chains.
Unlimited Power is fo wild and monftrous
a Thing, that however natural ir be fo define
it, it i? as natural to oppofe k ; nor ought in
to be fruited with any mortal Man, be his In-
tentions
CATffs LETTERS. 3-17
tentions ever To upright : For, befides that he
will never care to part with it, he will rareiy
dare. In fpight of himfelf he will make many
Enemies, againft whom he will be protected
only by his Power, or at leaft think himfelt
bell protected by it. The frequent and un-
forefeen Neceffities of his Affairs, and frequent
Difficulties and Oppofition, will force him,
for his own Prefervation, or for the Preferva-
tion of his Power, to try Expedients, to tempt
Dangers, and to do Things which he did not
forefee, nor intend, and perhaps, in the
ginning, abhorred.
We know, by infinite Examples and Expe-
rience, that Men poffeffed of Power, rather
than part with it, will do any thing, even the
worft and the blackeft, to keep it ; and Icarce
ever any Man upon Earth went out of it as
long as he could carry every thing his own Way
m it ; and when he could not, he refigned. I
doubt there is -not one Exception in the Work
to this Rule ; and that Dioclefian, Charles the
Fifth, and even Sylla, laid down their Power
out of Pique and Difcontent, and from I
pofition and Difappointmenr. This feems cer-
tain, That the Good of the World, or of their
People, was not one of their Motives either
for continuing in Power, or for quitting it.
It is the Nature of Power to be ever en-
croaching . and converting every extraordinary
Power, granted at particular Times, and upc
particular Occafions, into an ordinary Power,
to be ufed at all Times, and when there is no
Occafion : nor does it ever part willingly witi
any Advantage. From this Spirit ic is, tnac
OCC&*
3z8 CATO's LETTERS.
occafiona'l Commi (lions have grown fometimes
perpetual ; that Three Years have been im-
proved into Seven, and One into Twenty ;
and that when the People have done with their
Magiftrates, their Mag id rates will not have
done with the People.
The Romans, who knew this Evil, having
fuffered by it, provided wife Remedies againft
it ; and when ordinary Power grew too-great,
checked it with another. Thus the Oflice and
Power- of the Tribunes was fet up to ballance
that of the Confuls, and to protect the Po-
pulace againft the Tnfolence, Pride, and In-
trenchments oF the Nobility : And when the
Authority of the Tribunes grew too formida-
ble, a good Expedient was found out to reftrain
it ; for in any turbulent or factious Defign of
the Tribunes, the Proteft or Diffent of any
one of them made void the Purposes and Pro-
ceedings of all f the red. And both the Con-
fuls and the Tribunes were chofen only for a
Year.
Thus the Romans prcferved their Liberty by
limiting the Time and Power of their JViagi-
ftrates, and by making them anfwerable after-
wards for their Behaviour in it : And beildes
all this, there lay from the Magiilrates an- Ap-
peal to the People ; a Power which, however
great, they generally ufed with eminer.r-Mo-
d-e(ly and Mercy ; and, like the People of othsr
Nations, finned much feldomer than their Go-
vernours. Indeed, in- any publick Diforder,
or Misrortime, the People are (cares ever in
the Fau-lt ; but, ^ far on the other Side, fu%r
often 5 with a criminal .Patience 5 the fore Evils
brought
LETTERS. 329
brought wantonly or fooliflily upon them by
others, whom they pay dear to prevent them.
This facred Right of appealing to the Peo-
pie, was fecured to them by a very good and
very fevere Law, which is to be found m.Lify
in thefe Words : Aliam delnde confularem legem
de provocatione, unlcum prccfidium Libertatis de-
cemvirali poteftate everfam, ncn reftituunt modo 9
fed etiam muniunt, fanciendo novam legem, ne
quis ullum Magiftratum fine provocatione ere-
aret : Qui creaffet, eum Jus Fafque eflet occi-
di : Neve Cxdes capitalis noxse haberetur.
" The former confular Law for appealing to
" the People, (the firft and only great Support
" of Liberty) having been overturned by the
" Ufurpation of the Decemviri, was now not
" only reftored, but fortified by a new Law,;
" which forbad the creating of any Mfigiftrnte with-
" out Appeal, and made it lawful to kill any Man
" that did fo, without fubjetting the Kjller to a
" capital Penalty" The Romans had but too
good Reafori for thefe Laws ; for the Decemviri,
from whom there was no Appeal, had enflav'd
them.
And becaufe the being frequently choien into
Power, might have Effefts as bad as the long.
Continuance in it, Cicero, in his Book De Legi-
bus, tells us,, that there was an expfefs Law,
Eundem Magiftratura, ni interfuerint decem Anni,
ne quis Capita ; " That no Man (hould bear
" the fame Magiftracy which he had born be-
" fore, but after an Interval of ten Years."
This Law was afterwards ftrengthened
fevere Penalties. Hence %utilius Cenforius
blamed the People in a publick Speech for
creating,
3 jo C^rO's LETTERS.
creating him twice Cenfor : And Fabius *Maxi-
mus would have hindered them from chufing
his Son Conful, tho' poiTeiTed of every Virtue
proper for one, becaufe the chief Magiftracies
had been too long and too often in the Fabian
Family. And there are many Inftances in the
Roman Hiflory, of Magiftrates, Chief Magi-
ftrates, being degraded for their Pride, Ava-
rice, and Male- Adrniniftration ; and thofe who
were thus degraded, were by Law difabled, like
our late Directors, from ever enjoying again
any Pod or Power. Nor were the Romans lefs
careful to oblige their Magiftrates, as Toon as
they came out of their Offices and Govern-
ments, to make up their Accounts, and to give
a ftricl; Account of their good Behaviour ; and
for an ill one they were often condemned,
and their Eftates confifcated. Befides all which,
to be a Senator, or a Magiflrate, a certain
Qualification in Point of Fortune was required ;.
and thofe who had run through their Fortunes,,
were degraded from the Dignity of Senators
A reafonable Precaution, that they who were
* w
entrufted with the Intereft of their Country,
fhould have fbrne Interell of their own in it !
In this Manner did the fyman People check
Pov/er, and thofe who had it ; and when any
Power was grown quite ungovernable, th^y
aholifhed it. Thus they expelled Tarquin, and
the Kingly Government, having firft fuffered
much by it ; and they profpered as eminently
without if. That Government too had been.>
extremely 'limited : The firil tymtin Kings
were little more than Generals for Life : They
had no negative Vote in the Senate, and could
neither
's LETTERS. 331
neither make War nor Peace ; and even in
the Execution of Juftice, an Appeal lay from
them to the People, as is manifeft in the Cafe
of the furviving Horatius-, who flew his Sifter.
Servtus Tullus made Laws, fays -Tacitus, which
even the Kings were to obey. By confining the
Power of the Crown within proper Bounds,
he gained Power without Bounds in the Affec-
tions of the People. But the infolent Tarquin
broke through all Bounds, and a<5led fo openly
againft Law, and the People of Home, that-
they had no Remedy left but to expel him
and his Race ; which they did with glorious
SuccefSi
The Dictatorial Power was afterwards given
occafionally, and found of great life; but ftill
h was limited to fo many Months ; and there
are Inftances where even the Dictator could
not do what he pleafed, but was over-ruled
by the Judgment of the People. Befides,
when the Romans came to have great and dJ-
ftant Territories, and great Armies, they
thought the Dictatorial Power too great ^and
too dangerous to be crafted with any Subject,
and laid it quite afide ; nor was it ever after-
wards ufed, till it was violently ufurped, hfHH
by Sjlla, afterwards by C<efar 9 and then tymc
loft its Liberty.
Lam, 6cc.
Jlhe End of the Third Volume.