them j for we have nothing to defire from
them, but what 'tis their Interell to give, nor
they to fear from us, whilft we act as Englijh-
men but if we fhould ever facrifice our own
Interefls to fuch as are not our own, we muft
thank ourfelves if we make Enemies of thofe
who would be glad to be our Friends.

It



ii6 CATO's LETTERS,

It is certainly the Intereft of the Kingdom of
nce to have an impotent Adminifiration,.
and a diftra&ed State of Affairs in England,
and a Prince at the Head of them, that either
from Weaknefs cannot, or from other Motives
and Dependences will not obftrucl: the Union
oftheS/ww/fc Monarchy to their own, which
would foon give them the Poffeflion of it ef-
fectually as if they had conquer'd it; but the
Intereft of the Regent, who governs France, is
far otherwife: The appearing Prof peel, and
probable Chance of that Crown's defending
to him, or his Pofterity, will en.qage him to
fopporra Power which can alone fupport him,
and ^ which has every Motive to do fo : In fuch
a Circumftance of Affairs, no Intereft in France,
except his immediate Dependents, can abet his
Perform! Prerendons againfl: the Interns of all
France., and therefore he mull depend upon fo-
reign Alliances; and England alone can be fafe-
iy rely'd upon, who have no Cloirn to any Pare
or his Do;ninions, or Intereft and Defire to feize
them; which cannot be faid of the Emperor,
or any other Potentate, who has Power and
Motives enough to uU.u him.

I have wonder'd therefore at the Weak-
nefs of many among cur (elves, who can be fo
often dated or terrified with the Defigns of
the Regent, who can never confpire again ft us>
without confpiring againft himfelf ; and no
Provocation even on our Part could make him
undermine and betray, in fo tender an Inftance,
his own Intereft. I doubt not but he withes
Gibraltar out of ourHands ; and if Negotiations
or big Words can prevail upon us to part with



LETTERS. 117

it, I prefume they ^ are eafily to be obtain'd,
but he will never join with Spain to force it :
this Danger therefore is a meer Bugbear, made
ufe of to delude the Jacobite^ and intimidate
honefter Men, and by making the firft plot,
or prare and bounce, to govern the others.

So that the Pope excepted, who can do us no
harm by his own Force, the King of Spain a-
lone is the Power in Europe that can be con-
cern'd to favour the Pretender's Intereft ; nor
could he find his Account in it, unlefs to open
his Way to the Crown of France, in Cafe of
the young King's Death.

The Divine Kight of Monarchy in the Right
Line is fo well eftabliflh'd in Arbitrary Coun-
tries, that I dare fay that Prince would be
fbrry to depend upon a forced Renunciation
-and the Power of Spain, to defend himfelf a-
gainft his Neghew, if other Powers were not
at hand to afiift him , and no Power in Europe
can do it effectually but England ; and whilit
there is a King at the Head of it, who will pur-
fue his own and his Peoples true Inrereft in
protesting him, and preferving the Fricndfhip
\vhich for more than an Age has been propiti-
ous to both Kingdoms, and has the Means by
the Poileillon or Gibraltar and Port M<ihon, of
refenting any Injury done on his Part ; it is
\vild to think that at great Hazard and Expence
he would attempt to bring about a Revolution
which may engage us in a long Civil War,
,and disenable us to give him the Protection he
can receive no where elfe.

Therefore, if he is favourable to the Pre-
tender's Jntereft, it mud be owing to perfonal

Refentments,



n8 C A TO's LETTERS.

Refcntments, or his Views towards the Crown
of France. I hope we fhall give him no more
Caufe for the firft ; and as to the latter, he
has the Interefts of the Regent, of all Germany,
Italy, the States of Holland, and indeed of all
Europe againft him, as well as the united Inte-
reft of his own Subjects, who will not be con-
tented to be a Province to France ; and 1 may
venture to aflert, that whilft we keep the Pof-
feilion of Gibraltar, and make a proper life of
it, he can neither effect the one nor the other ;
namely he can never make himftlf King of
France, nor the Pretender King of England.

I am,



Subjects which Men underiland lead,
are generally what they talk of
moft, and none Jo much as of Government,
which alrnoft every Man thinks he has Ta-
lents to direct, and like Sancha Pancba, believes
he can make a very good Viceroy : He thinks
nothing is neceiiary, but to get at the Helm,
where his Bufinefs is to Command, and that
of others to Obey ; and then, as the aforefaid
Sancha (Viceroy-like) (ays, Who but I_? But
to govern a State well, is the moft difficult
Science in the World ; and few Men, who
have ever been in the Poffellion of Power,
have known what to do with it, or ever un-

clerilood



C^rO'sLETTERS. 119

derdood the Principles upon which all Power
is founded ; and their Miftakes have made
endleis Havock amongft Mankind.

Government is Political, as a humane Body
is Natural Mechanifm ; both have proper
Springs, Wheels, and a peculiar Organization
to qualify them for fuitable Motions, and can
have no other than that Organisation enables
them to perform ; and when thofe Springs or
Principles are deftroyed by Accident or Vio-
lence, or are worn out by Time, they muft
fuffer a natural or political Demife, and be bu-
ried, or elfe fmell above Ground ; and though
neither of them ought to be murdered, yet
when they are dead, they ought to be interred.
Now it is moft certain, that the firft Prin-
ciple of all Power is Property ; and every Man
wijl have his Share of it in Proportion as he
enjoys Property, and makes life of that Pro-
perty, where Violence does not interpofe.
Men will ever govern or influence thofe whom
they employ, feed, and clothe, and who can-
not get the fame neceffary Means of Subfiftence
upon as advantageous Terms tlfewhere. This
is natural Power, and will govern and confti-
tute the political, and will certainly draw the
latter after it, if Force is abfent ; and Force
cannot fubfift long without altering Property ;
fo that both mufr unite together, firft or laft,
and Property v/ill either get the Power, or
Power will feize the Property in its own De-
fence j for it is fooliO'i to think, that Men of
Fortunes will be governed by tru,le who have
none, and be plundered to make fuch whom
they defpife, and have every Day new Reafons

to



'no CATCfs LETTERS.

to hate, rich and infblent : And on the other
hand, Men will contentedly fubmit to be go-
verned by thole who have large Pofieilions 4
and from whom they receive Protection and
Support, whilft they will always emulate their
Equals. Tho' the People of Ifynu extorted a
Law from the Senate, that Commoners might
be admitted into the chief Offices of the State
jointly with the Nobles ; yer all the Addrefs
and Power of the Tribunes could not for a
long Time make them chute one of their own
Body into thofe Offices, till Commoners had
got Eftates equal to the obility ; s:d then
the Ballance of Proper 1 ti ing to the People,
they carried all befort t

The only true defp. , : Governments now
in the World, are thofc v 4ie whole Pro-
perty is in the Prince ; as ir- e Eaftern Mo-
narchies, that of Moroccr, Z . vhere every
Man enjoying what he ha. J?.e Bounty of
his Sovereign, has nc Motive or Means to con-
tend with him, but looks upon him as his
Benefaclor: and fuch ' : have no Property, do
not think themfelves to be ii jured : But when
Men are in PofLllien of any Thing which
they call their own, and think they have a
Right to enjoy it, the] will ever contend for
it, when thay have tK V.e:: :s to do fb, and
will always take Advantage of every Exigence
in their Prince's AfrVrs to attain that Right.
Other Princes, \vho hu'.'e a Mind to be as Ar-
bitrary us the forr/Ler, and wanting either the
Capacity or the Power tc acquire this natural
Dominion, feize by Violence the Productions
of their Subjeds Eftates and Induftry, which

is



's LETTERS, izt

is a conftant State of Force on one Side, and
Oppre/fton on the other ; it perpetually pro-
vokes the People, and yet leaves them often
the Means of revenging the Injuftice done them,
and mult end in the former Government, or
in the letting up fome new Form by the Ex-
tin6tion of die Tyranny : whereas in the other,
; rho' the Monarchs are often deftroy'd yet the
Monarchy is preferved jntire, there being no In-
tercft in the Srate capable of fhaking it. ^

But bot h thefe Sovereignties have one Mifchief
in common, and infeparable from them, v/r.
as they ever fubfiiT, by (landing Armies, fb
they muft ever be fubjecT: to the Caprices and
Difgufts of the Military Men, who often de-
pofs and murther their Sovereigns ; but in the
latter much oftner than in the former ; for
whilft the People have the Name, and as they
think a Right to Property, they will always
have fome Power, and will expect to be con-
; fider'd by their Princes, and the Soldiers wilt
, expect to have Leave to opprefs them, which
will make continual Struggles ; and the Prince
finding himfelf oblig'd to take Part with one of
them, often falls in the Struggle, which was
the Cafe of the t(oman Emperors, moft of
! whom were flaughter'd either by the People,
i or their own Soldiers ; whereas in a natural
abfolute Guverment, there is no Danger, buc
from the latter alone ; and if he can pleafe
them, all is well, and he is fafe.

But neither of thefe ought to be called by

the Name of Government, but both indeed ars

only Violence and Rapine, and the Subjection

of many Millions of miferable Wretches to the

VOL. III. F wide



Giro's LETTERS.

wide and wanton Will of often the worft Man
among them : They deface humane Nature,
and render the bountiful Gifts of indulgent
Providence ufelefs to the World ; and the tell
which can be (aid of them is, that they make
the grand Tyrant and his inferior Opprefiors
as miserable and unfafe as the poor Wretches
they opprefs; nor fhould I have mentioned
them as Governments, but to make what I have
farther to lav the betier underflood.

Another Dominions are either limited Mo-
narchies, fimple Ariftocracies, Democracies, or
Mixtures of them ; and the Actions and Ope-
rations in thofe Governments, or the Continu-
ance of thofe Governments, depend upon the Di-
ftribution and Alteration of the Ballance of Rro-
perty and the not obferving the Variation and
the frequent Change? of this Primum Mobile^
caufes all the Combuftions we fee and feel in
States : Men who fancy themfelves in the
lame Situation, as to outward Appearance, flare
about them, and wonder what is become of
the Power their Predeceffors" enjoyed, without
being able to judge how they loft it by the float-
ing of Property, think they have a Right to
enjoy the fame ftill, and io in fpite of Nature,
ufe Fraud and Violence to attain what they
cannot hold, if it was attain'd ; however, they
will ftruggle for it, and this Struggle produces
Contentions and Civil Wars, which moft com-
monly end in the Deftrudion of one of trie
Parties, and ibinetimes of both.

Now in feems to me that the great Secret in
Politick^ is nicely to watch and obferve this
l-iu6tuation and Change of Natural Power,

and



LETTERS. 113

and to adjiift the Political to it by prudent Pre-
cautions and timely Remedies, and not put:
l\au/\e to the Expence cf Throws and Con-
v'ulfions to do her own Work ; I do not mean
b}' - ing the Form of the Government,
wbi'-h is rarely to be done without Violence
and Danger, and therefore ought not to be at-
tempted v. hen any Thing elfe can be done, hue
by genrle and infenuble Methods. Suppofe,
for Example, a limited Monarchy which cafi-
not fill fift without a Nobility : It the Nobles
have not Power enough to ballance the great
Weight of the People, and fupport the Crown
and themfelves, it is n^ceffary to take fbme of
the rkheft of the Commoners into that Order ;
if they have more Power than, is contiHent
v, *rh their Dependence upon their Monarch,
it is right to create no more, but to let thole
already created expire and wafee by degrees till
they become a proper Bailance : If the People
by Trade and Induftry grow To , thac nei-
ther the Crown nor Nobles, or ! ^together,
can keep pace with them, then there is no way
left but by ufirig Violence to haz.ird what tl.c
two latter are already in Pofidiion of by an un-
equal Conteft ; or by ufing Moderation ^and a
beneficent Conduct, to let the former enjoy all
they can hope to get by a Struggle, and vo-
luntarily to give up all odious Powers of doing
Miichief, tho' milcaiicd Prerogative, which
muft ever be a Power of doing good, when or-
dinary Prcvifions fail, and are iniurhcient.

Harry the Vllth, dreading the Strength of
the Nobles, who had al.va/s plagued and
Sometimes deftroy'd hu rredcceifors, found

F x



Core's LETTERS.

Means to make them alienate a great part of
their Eftates, which threw a proportionable
Power into the Commons j and his Son by feiz*
ing the Revenues of the Ecclefiafticks, (who u-
fuaily cabaii'd with them) and difperfing thole
Eila^es amongft the People, made that Ballance
much heavier ; which Queen Elizabeth wifely
obferving, (tho' (he lov'd Power as well as any
who went before her) yet carefTed them with
ib much Dexterity, that (he preferv'd not only
the Crown upon her Head, but wore it in its
full Luftre, and by encouraging Trade, and
jeittng Nature take its Courfe, ftill encreas'd
the Peoples Wealth and Power, which her Sue-
ceffor early faw and often lamented ; but want-
ing her Moderation, Abilities and Experience,
did not know how to temporife with an Evil
which he could not help, but took a prepofte-
rous Way to cure it, and endeavour'd by the
Affiftance of the governing Clergy (who hop'd
by his Means to recover what they loft at the
Reformation,) to regain a Power by Pulpit-
haranguing and Diftin&iotis which hedurft not
contend for with the Sword, and fb his Reign
was a perpetual Strugle between himfelf and
his Parliaments : When they were qu'et he
bounc'd, and when they had thoroughly pro-
vok'd them, he drew back and gave good Words
again ; but by fuch Conduft he (owed the
Seeds of that fatal and bloody Civil War which
fprang up in the Reign of his Son, and ended
in the DtffoJution of the Monarchy, and fbon.
after of all Liberty ; for the General of the
conquering Army let up himfelf, (as all others
will ever do in the fame Circutuftance ; ) but

the



's LETTERS.



the Property remaining where it was,

new Tyranny was violent and again ft Nature,,

i; and could not hold long, and all Parties uni~

[ ted againft it, and fo the Nation was reftor'd

; to its ancient Form of Government.

King Charles the lid. came in with all the exte*
| riour Advantages requifite to enflave a People -

The Nation was become weary of the Sound

'of Liberty, having fuffer'd fb much in their
I Struggle for it, and loft all they ftruggled for:

The Clergy were provok'd by the Lofs of
I their Dignities and Revenues; the Nobility
I and Gentry were imiverfally dilTafted and a-

lier/ared by Sequeftrations, and being fb long

deprived of the OrTices and Deflinclions they

Haim'd by their Birth ; and the Body of the-
I People had been harrafs'd and exhaufted by a

long Civil War, and were weary of being
J tofs'd and tumbled once in a Month out of one.
:, Government into another : and all were pre-

pared to accept and fall into any Meafares;
i which might fat] ate their Revenge upon thole-

who had opprefs'd them, and to root: out the-
\ very Principles of Liberty, the Abufe of which
> had brought fuch Mifchiefs upon them.

That Prince got a Parliament to his Mind

(as all Princes will do upon a Revolution,,
: whenParties run high, and will do any Thing to.
, mortify their Opponents) and kept it in conftant:

Fenfion but 1'roperty remaining in the Peo-
pie, it infenfibly gain'd Ground, and prevail'd

at laft : The People grew univerfally difaf-

feded, and- look'd upon the Parliament a? a,.

Cabal of perjur'd Hirelings, and no longer

their Reprefentatlves, and the Nation was

F wo



Giro's LETTERS.

workM up into fuch a Ferment, that their
Betrayers would not or durft not ferve the
Court, nor the Court keep them any longer.
That Prince had Wit enounh to drive Things
no farther than they would go, and knew
when it was Time to give back ; but his Bro-
ther, wk-h lefs "Understanding and a much worfe
'g'cn than his PredeceiTor openly profefs'dw
hop'd to accomplifh what he had attempted,
or'deipair'd of bringing about; and how he
iacceec'ed we nil know. I gladly throw a Veil
over what has happened fince, and hope 1 {hall
hereafter have no Reafon to repent it.

I fhall only obferve before I conclude this
Lcrrer, that there is no need of the caballing
of different Interefts, the uniting joint Court-
ciJr, and concerting regular Meafures, to bring
about fbrne of the greateft Events in humane
. airs; and confequently in great publick
Exigencies, Oppreflors will find no Security in
tl -'ing Oppofition of Parties, ^ who like
- Sheers will cut only what is between
ihern when they ieem moft to threaten one
another. When Nature has prepared the Way,,
all Things will tend to their proper Center ;
and tho' Men for fome Time will dally and-
play with their lefler Interefts, yet at laft they
will mechanically fall into their great ones, and
often without intending or knowing it ; Men
will aways feel their Strength when they can't
reafon upon it, or are afraid to do fo. J could
name a Party that for above thirty Years toge-
ther have aded in the Intereds of Liberty, and
for the greateft Part of the Time could not bear
the Sound of Liberty, till at laft great Numbers

of



LETTERS. 117

of them are caught by the Principles they mod
detected; which I intend as a feafonable Cau-
tion to all thofe who have the Honour to lit at
the Helm of States, or to advife Princes, who
may at any Time hereafter want fiich a Me-
mento.

I fhall, in my next Letter, endeavour to
fhe\v, upon the Principles here laid down, that
England at prefent is not capable of any other
Form of Government than what it enjoys, and
has a Right to enjoy ; and that another neigh-
bouring State wilt with very great Difficulty
preferve the Conftitution they now are in Po
feliion of.




I %,

^ c ' tas obferved of the RCMMS, in hisTime,
Qucd nee tctam liberttitem ncc tot am fervi-
tutem fati poffunt ; That they could neither
bear full Liberty, or perfect Slavery. This is
certainly the Cafe of England at prefent, if
Jjiberty is unclerftood what I prefume he meant
by it, a Republican Form of Government. But
I conceive Liberty may be better preferved by
a well poifed Monarchy, than by any popular
Government I know now in the World, what-
ever Forms may ex'ft in Imagination ; but
whether this be true or not, it is certainb
that no Man in his Wits will !cfe the Benefit
of a very good prefent Eftablifnment, and run
infinite Hazards to try to get one a little better,

F 4



CA r OX LETTERS.

it he could have any Profpe<5l of attaining it :
But I fhall endeavour to {"hew, that the effect-
ing fuch a Project, is ijnpoffible 5 and that du-
ring the prefent Diftribution of Property, we
can preferve Liberty by no other than what we
have ; and in the Attempt to alter it, muft run
great Hazard of lofing what we are in PofTeilion
of, or perhaps failing into an abfolute Monar-
chy, or at belt muft return to the fame again,
as we have done once already by fuch Feats. of
Gallantry,

It proceeds from a con&mmate Ignorance Ji>
Politicks, to think that a Number of Men a-
greeing together, can make and hold a Com-
monwealth, before Nature lias prepared the
Way for fne alone muft do it. An Equality
of Eftare will give an Equality of Power; and
an Equality of Power ^is a Commonwealth, or
Democracy : An Agr nr lan Law, or foraething
equivalent to it, muft make or fend a fuitable
Diipoiition of Property ; and when that comes
to be the Cafe, there is no hindering a popular
Form of Government, unlefs fadden Violence
rakes away all Liberty, and to preferve it (elf,
alters the Diftribution of Property again. L
hope no one ^amongft us has a Head fo wrong
turned, as to imagine that any Man or Number
of Men, in the prefent Situation of Affairs^ !
can ever get Power enough to turn all the Pof-
feilions of England topfy-turvy, and throw them.
in Average, especially any who can have la Will
and Intereft in doing it ; and without all this it
is impolFible to fettle a Commonwealth here;
and I dare fay, fewdefire it, but fuch as having
no Eilates of their own y or Means and Merit

to



's LETTERS,

to acquire them, would be glad to (hare, ir
other People's.

Now 'tis certain, that the Diftribution ofc
Property in England, is adapted to our prefent:
Eftablifhment.'The Nobility and Gentry have
great PofFeilions, and the former have great
Privileges and Diftinclions by the Constitution,
and the latter have them in Fa&, tho'pofitive
Laws give but few of them, for their^ Birth
and Fortunes procure diem eafy Admittance
into the Legislature ; and their near Approach
to the Throne gives them Pretences to honour-
able and profitable Employments, which create :
a Dependence from the inferior Part of Man-
kind; and the Nature of many of their Eitates,,,
and particularly of their Manners, add to than
Dependence. Now all th'efe muft ever be in
the Interelt of Monarchy, whillr. they are in
their own ; for Monarchy fuppprts and keeps
up this Diftinftion, and fub fills by it ; for it is-
fenfelefs to imagine, that Men, who have great
Poffeilions, will ever put themlelves upon the
level with thofe who have none, or with fLch
as depend upon them far Subfiftance or Pro-
teclion, whom tl^ey will always think they
have a Right to govern or influence, and will
be ever able to govern whild they keep their
PoiTeilions, and a monarchical Form of Go-
vernment, and therefore will always endeavour
to keep it!

All the Bifhops, Dignitaries, or goreming
Giergy, all who have good Preferments in rhe
Church, or hope to get them, are in the In-
terefts of Monarchy, for the Reafbns I gave ';i
SL-former, and (brne bthen which I chufe r^ :

F l



i 3 o Giro's LETTERS.

to give now : They know very well too, that
a popular Government would take away all
Puffeifions which it fhould think fit to call fu
perfiuous, would level all the reft, and be apt
to reafon, that Chrifttatiity would fare never
the worfe if its Profefiors were lefs Politicians,
of which they fee before their Eyes a pregnant
and very affecting Inftance in Holland. All
great and excluiive Companies are in the In-
tereft of Monarchy, (whatever weak People
have alledged to the contrary) for they can
much eafier preJerVe their feparate and unwar-
rantable Privileges by Applications to the Vices
and Patlions of a Court, than by convincing a
popular Aflembly : and for the fame Reafbrz,
all Officers who have great Salaries and exor-
bitant Fees, mud ever be fure Friends to Mo-
narchy. Rich Merchants, and indeed ail rich
Men, wiil be equally in the fame Intereft, ana
be willing to ertjoy themielves, and leave to
their Pofreriry all the Advantages and Diilincti-
ons which always attend large Fortunes in
Monarchies.

Afrer thefe (many of whom are Men of
Virtue and Probity, and defire only to enjoy
the Rights they were born to, or have ac-
quired) follow and bring up the Rear all the
xvhple Poffe of Debauchees, and riotous Livers,
leud Women, Gamellers, and Sharpers ; all
who get by OpprefSpn and unequal Laws, or
the Non execution of good ones; who are
t-vcT for Monarchy and the' right Line, as ex-
peih'ng much fairer Quarter from the Corrup-
tions ;' Courtiers, than they can ever hope to
meet with in popular States, who always de-

flroy






CATCTs LETTERS. :

ftroy and exterminate fuch Vermin, of which
fort (I thank God) we have none amongft us
at prefent ; but who knows how foon we

may. A .

Now, without entering into tne Quelhon,
Which is the beft Government in Theory, a
limited Monarchy, or a democratical Form oir
Government ? I think I may fafeiy affirm, .that
it is impoflibleto contend againfl all thefe In-
terefts, and the Crown too, which is almoft a
Match for them all together ; and the Phan-
torn'e of a Commonwealth rnuft vanifii, and
never appear again but in difordered Brains,.
If this is the true Circumftance of England at
prefenr, as I conceive it indSfpurably is, we have
nothing left to do, or indeed which we ran^do,,
bitf to make the bed of our own Conftitution^
which if duly adminiftred, provides excellently