fayette on February 24 wrote to Steuben from Morris-
town, declaring that ''nothing will be vranting to hurry
the detachment, which you will find to be an excellent
body of troops. I hope the French ships will strictly
blockade ^Ir. Arnold, and as your position will no doubt
exclude the possibility of his taking any advantage by
land, I hope we may, before long, give a good account
of him. Should he by chance make any proposition, no
communication ought to be held with him that might
countenance any pretension to his being a prisoner of
^^ar."
Lafayette and his force marched south, and on his
arriving at the Head of Elk, which is about forty miles
northeast of Baltimore, at the upper end of Chesapeake
GREENE AND STEUBEN 223
Bay, on March 3d, he wrote to General Muhlen-
berg : "In all cases I am to request you that no communi-
cation be held with Arnold that may in any way give him
the least claim to the advantages of a prisoner of war/*
From all of which it appears that the capture of Arnold
was looked upon as the principal object of the expedition.
As may be supposed, Steuben did not look on this
new movement with any great degree of satisfaction. In
the face of tremendous difficulties and mainly with the
help of untrained militia, he had forced Arnold into
Portsmouth, which with the co-operation of a suitable
naval force he felt sure of capturing. The mouse had
been almost within his grasp, and had it not been for the
refusal of the French naval commander to blockade the
mouth of the river the British must surely have surren-
dered. Now when he had matters in better shape than
ever, with the French fleet almost in sight, he could bring
the campaign to an end with advantage to the country
and credit to himself. In a letter to Greene, dated March
3, he thus expresses himself:
T'^morrow I set out for Williamsburg to finish my prepara-
tions for the arrival of the marquis and fleet. I have com-
municated to him the plan of operation T should have followed
had the fleet been here to assist me. I think the same plan,
with very little alterations should now be adopted. I flatter
myself that a marquis and minus six hundred troops that are
coming, it would have been in my power to have delivered to
you Mr. Arnold, but this honor is reserved for another. But
do not think, my dear general, that this idea, however mortify-
ing, will in the least relax my zeal in the affair: on the con-
trary, I hope the marquis will find everything prepared for his
arrival.
The Baron was not one to sulk in his tent when
there was a duty to be performed, and he went vigorously
to work collecting supplies for the coming of Lafayette,
boats, horses and provisions, with the usual scarcity of
224 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
everything that was needed. Muhlenberg had only eight
rounds of ammunition and provisions for four days, so
that had the promised reinforcement from the state ar-
rived, it would doubtless have been of little use. Steuben
had declared that the fortifications of Portsmouth could
be taken sword in hand, but this idea was based on the
expectation of having the ''swords'' to do it with, which
in this case meant ammunition, etc.
As stated, Lafayette arived with his troops at Elk
Head on March 3, from which point they were trans-
ferred to Annapolis by water. As it would be useless to
move the troops to Portsmouth until the arrival of the
fleet, Lafayette took an open boat down the Chesapeake
bay to arrange with Steuben for a convoy and other
necessaries. He found the latter at Yorktown on the
14th, full of business and expecting the co-operation of
five thousand militia. Lafayette wrote to Washington
the next day, giving a summary of the situation, con-
cluding, ''In your first letter to the Baron, I wish, my
dear General, you would write to him that I have been
much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please
him, and harmony shall be my first object."
We have already seen, however, that the expected
resources were largely on paper, although the ultimate
failure of the expedition cannot be charged to this cause.
The French fleet was already due, but there was no sign
of it. While waiting Lafayette went down to Muhlen-
berg's camp at Suffolk on the 19th, and while there had
a light skirmish with the enemy. But Steuben never re-
laxed his operations ; Arnold's outposts were attcked and
all communication with the country was cut off. His
capture was regarded as a certainty, and when, on the
20th, a large fleet was seen entering the bay there was
jubilation among the Americans. The fleet came in
GREENE AND STEUBEN 225
slowly, and it was not until the 23d that the colors on the
vessels were discovered to be British and not French.
Admiral Arbuthnot had followed D'Estouches down the
coast, and had engaged the latter sixty miles off the en-
trance of Chesapeake bay. The result appeared to be a
drawn battle, but the French admiral turned back to
Newport to repair damages, a most fatal procedure for
the Americans, while the British proceeded to Ports-
mouth for the same purpose, a situation which could not
have been more favorable to Arnold.
Lafayette, who seems to have construed his orders
to limit his Southern operations simply to the capture of
Arnold, as soon as he learned the new situation of affairs,
returned to Annapolis, from where he transported his
army back to Elk Head, with the intention of again join-
ing Washington in the North.
By this time the British force in Virginia was
greatly augmented, and Clinton had sent General Phil-
lips with two thousand men to relieve Arnold. The latter
was subsequently sent back to New York, and Phillips
vras now in command at Portsmouth with about three
thousand five hundred troops. Steuben's force was not
able to confine this army inside of Portsmouth, and it
was evident that Virginia was to suffer yet more largely
from the ravages of war. But notwithstanding Steuben
went to work with the object of at least saving the stores
and supplies which had been collected at various points
if he could not check the enemy. The next day after the
arrival of Phillips he ordered Muhlenberg to concentrate
all his troops at one point, which it would be impossible
to do after Phillips had begun to move. Colonel Parker,
who had a difficult journey across Dismal Swamp, suc-
ceeded in uniting with the main force, so that by April
3 he was able to report to Steuben that in his judgment
226 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
his division, located near Suffolk, was in the best position
either to prevent the enemy from making hostile ex-
cursions into the country or to keep pace with them
should they move up James river, which was anticipated.
But desertions soon crippled his force to such an extent
as to endanger the safety of his command, and he was
forced to retire farther back into the country.
It may be remarked here that while Lafayette was
in camp Steuben had formulated a plan for driving the
British not only out of A^irginia but freeing the entire
South. It was to take the whole body of militia and
march to Greene's assistance in North Carolina, and then
move directly on Cornwallis, who would be forced to call
on Phillips to save him. He had four thousand men as-
sembled, and with an additional tw^o thousand for thirty
days it looked as though the operation would be success-
ful. But the state government, which claimed to control
the militia, was incapable of taking such a broad view
of operations.
Its reply was that although the proposition seemed
to be founded on very probable principles, yet as the
number of arms that such a detachment would carry
with them vv^as greater than the number which would re-
main in the state, it would be a measure unjustifiable in
the present circumstances of affairs, the enemy having
lately received a great reinforcement ; that although the
militia at present in sen-ice would be unable to resist the
wdiole force of the enemy in any quarter, yet, being
strangers to their certain intentions, the militia would be
able to repel the incursions of detachments, which other-
wise would be rendered impracticable for want of arms.
While the reasoning which lead to this conclusion
was clearly faulty, yet as it emanated from the powers
that be there was nothing to do but submit, and Steuben
GREENE AND STEUBEN 227
turned once more to the task of trying to make bricks
without straw. His report to \Vashington on April 15
gives a graphic picture of his unsatisfactory situation.
W^riting from Chesterfiekl Court House, he says :
My situation is not the most agreeable, as I am obliged to
undertake the defense against three thousand regular troops,
with nothing to oppose them but militia, whose numbers de-
crease every day. Those who have served since the beginning
of the invasion have discharged themselves and are not replaced
by others, in consequence of which General Muhlenberg is left
on the south side of the river (James) with only seven hundred
men, and General Weedon on the north side with about six
hundred men. If the enemy have any intention to penetrate
the country, the opposition we can make will avail little.
A very great evil resulting from the invasion is, that it
stops recruiting for the army. So long as a county has any
militia in the field, so long that county is prevented from draft-
ing, and as most of the counties have had part of their militia
either here or with General Greene, little or nothing has been
done in the business. Only fifty-two have yet come in, and of
these some have already deserted. Some who came as substi-
tutes have received twenty-five and thirty thousand pounds
(paper) for eighteen months.
Then follows the usual report as to lack of arms,
horses for cavalry and pretty much everything else
needed for an army. He concludes by stating that he
had asked Greene to call him to the front, wdiich W'Ould
be infinitely preferable to the Sisyphonian task in which
he v;as now engaged. In fact, he had w-ritten to Greene
on April 2, saying: "If I preferred my ow^i inclinations
to the public interest I should immediately set out to join
you; my desire to act under your immediate directions,
and the disgust I have from my situation here are mo-
tives equally forcible to urge my departure hence. I,
however, think it is my duty to remain here till I am to
bring my first detachment with me, which I intend shall
amoimt to five hundred infantry and sixty to eighty cav-
alry, and for this I am now exerting my very utmost."
That Greene appreciated the Baron's work, and
228 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
deeply sympathized with him in his discouragements, is
evident from a letter which he wrote on April 3, probably
before the epistle quoted above had reached him, in which
he says :
I see and feel for your disagreeable situation, and anything
that is in my power you may command. But if you leave Vir-
ginia all things will run into confusion, and I am so far from
thinking that you are disgraced by your command in Virginia,
that everybody allows you have acquired great credit, and
though it is not of that splendid kind, it is neverthe-
less very honorable, and is founded upon the same
line of conduct from which General Washington has
justly acquired so much honor — I mean that of guarding
against misfortune. My greatest expectations of support are
from Virginia, drawn forth under your regulations and arrange-
ments. If you leave them, state policy and partial views will
counteract all the support we may expect from that quarter,
and we shall all fall together to the southward. Nothing in my
power shall be wanting to do justice to 3^our reputation, and I
feel my obligations to you for your exertions. Should you
wish to join the army, you shall most readily have my consent,
for I am greatly in want of your aid here as well as there, but
it is my opinion that you can be more extensively useful there
than here.
On April 0, Greene having no doubt in the mean-
time received Steuben's letter of the 3d, replied, again
giving his consent for the latter to come to the front,
but adding, ''However, my dear Baron, when you con-
sider the critical and disagreeable situation I am in, the
little prospect I have of acquiring glory, and the almost
certain disgrace that will accompany my manoeuvres,
from the nature and constitution of our arm}^ and from
the many difficulties I have to combat, and compare your
situation with mine, you may think yourself happy that
you are not in as perplexing a state as I am. I wish both
our prospects were better, but mine, of all men, is the
most disagreeable. Let us labor and faint not; haply
we may get through the thorny path in due time, and by
ways and means not very clear to either at present."
GREENE AND STEUBEN 229
With this kind of patriot's faith, although the clouds
were very dark and lowering the final outcome, under
the protection of a favoring Providence was certain, and
deliverance was already nearer than the leaders in this
great drama supposed. For six weary years had the war
dragged along, more wearing even on the moral and
mental faculties of those who were conducting it than on
the material interests of the country. After all, one great
goal had been reached. The traitors, the sycophants
and incompetents in the higher branches of the service
had been weeded out by the progress of events, and the
military machine, although in many, and, in fact, most
places, was badly out of shape, yet was operated for the
most part in harmony. Washington in the North,
Steuben in the Centre and Greene in the South, under-
stood each other thoroughly, and had bent all their ability
and energy solely to the advancement of the cause, with-
out selfish ambition, but only considering the interests of
their common country. The Civil War furnishes a
parallel to this in the closing work of Grant, Sherman
and Sheridan, although the surroundings were very dif-
ferent.
That the enemy had the intention of penetrating the
country soon became evident, and Steuben set himself to
work to hinder his progress as much as possible. He
gave directions for the entire militia to turn out in what-
ever section the British might appear. If Muhlenberg
was attacked he was to retire to Petersburg to protect the
upper country as far as possible, but should they turn
south towards North Carolina, then the flank was to be
harassed continuously in order to delay their junction
with Cornwallis by which that General might be able to
overwhelm Greene. ]^.Iuhlenberg was to remain at
Petersburg in case the enemy should come up James
230 GENERAL \MLLIA.AI VOX STEUBEN
river. Nelson was ordered to follow Phillips, and the
battery at Hood's, not being considered defensible, stores
in the neighborhod were ordered carried to Petersburg.
They had not long to wait until Phillips manifested
by his movements which route he intended taking. Leav-
ing a garrison at Portsmouth, whose fortifications had
been strengthened, he started on April 16 for the James
vv'ith twenty-five flat boats, each carrying a hundred men.
According to Steuben's orders Muhlenberg had removed
all stores on the right or south bank of the river from
the lower counties to Prince George Court House, about
sixty miles northwest of Suffolk, and six miles from
Petersburg. Steuben, not deeming them safe even here,
had them moved into the country above Richmond. It
must be remembered that Richmond was at the head of
navigation on the James, and unless he considered his
force strong enough to overcome all obstacles Phillips
was not likely to leave his boats so far away that they
Vv'ould not be a refuge in case of retreat. Wliile Muhlen-
berg Vv'as gathering stores on the south side of the river
Colonel Innes was doing the same on the north side,
and prcparir.g for any emergency. On the 18th the
enemy reached Pagaa's Creek, below Jamestown Island,
and on the next day Muhlenberg, keeping ahead of Phil-
lips, marched to Cabin Point, a short distance above. On
the 20th the enemy reached Jamestown and landed at
Sandy Point the next day. We do not hear of them ac-
complishing anything special at this place, but they no
doubt committed depredations wherever they stopped.
Steubeii was at Chesterfield Court House, about half way
between Richmond and Petersburg, where he was or-
ganizing a cavalry corps, and, as usual, looking after
stores. On the 23 Phillips landed at Westover, on the
left side of the river, and easily dispersed the five hun-
GREENE AND STEUBEN 231
dred militia there, only two hundred of whom were
armed. As Arnold had plundered this place a little over
two months before the British probably did not find much
to destroy, although it is said they committed some depre-
dations. The militia were ordered in all cases to avoid
a general engagement, which could only lead to a dis-
astrous defeat with useless sacrifice of life, but to harass
the enemy and impede his operations as much as possible.
Matters certainly looked bad, and Steuben writes to
Washington that there was not a single company of regu-
lar troops in the state, and the militia were too inex-
perienced to hope for the least resistance from them.
This time the British did not stay long at Westover, but
crossing the river on the 2ith, landed at City Point, at the
mouth of the Appomattox river, twelve miles from
Petersburg. Steuben had gone over to the latter place
from Chesterfield the same day and taken charge of af-
fairs there. We will let him tell the story of subsequent
operations :
"J reconnoitred the enemy's fleet, then lying off
Westcver, and consisting- of thirteen topsail vessels and
twenty-three fiat-bottomed boats full of men. The whole
number of troops on board I judged to be about two
thousand five hundred, a Hessian sergeant who deserted
to us made them three thousand. The fleet of the enemy
soon came to sail, and stood up the river tovv^ard City
Point, which continued to keep me in doubt on which
side they would debark. I therefore ordered the militia
under command of General Aluhlenberg to retire to the
vicinity of Blandford, a short distance from Petersburg.
The same evening the enemy landed all their force at
City Point, which fully evinced that their first object was
Petersburg. Being obliged to send large detachments to
the neck of land between Appomattox and James rivers,
232 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
I had not more than one thousand men left to oppose the
enemy's advance. In this critical situation there were
many reasons against risking a total defeat — the loss of
arms was a principal one, and, on the other hand, to re-
tire without some show of resistance, would have inti-
midated the inhabitants and encouraged the enemy to
further incursions. This last consideration determined
me to defend the place as far as our inferiority in num-
bers would permit. I made choice of Blandford as the
place of defense, and the bridge of Pocahontas as our re-
treat; the troops were disposed accordingly, and passed
the night under arms.
*'The morning of the 25th I was informed that the
enemy was within three miles of our advanced posts, and
that eleven, flat-bottomed boats, with troops, were at the
same time moving up Appomattox river. Towards noon
the enemy came in sight, formed themselves and de-
ploye-1 to their left, but it was near three o'clock before
the firirg coiniricnced, which continued from post to post
till past five o'clock, when the superior number of the
enenn^ rind a vrant of ammunition obliged me to order the
retreat and tlie bridge to be taken up, which was executed
in the greatest order, notwithstanding the fire of the
enemy'; cannon and muketry. The troops, with the same
good order, retreated to this place (Chesterfield), where
they are just encamped. I am not yet able to ascertain
our loss, but believe it not great. I do not think the
enemy took a single prisoner. The enemy's loss I am
also unable to form any judgment of. General ^luhlen-
berg merits my particular acknowledgements for the good
disposition which he made, and the great gallantry v/ith
which he executed it. Indeed, the gallant conduct of all
the officers and the particular good behavior of the men,
must, I am persuaded, have attracted the admiration of
GREENE AND STEUBEN 233
the enemy. I have the pleasure to say that our troops
disputed the ground with the enemy inch by inch, and the
manoeuvres were executed with the greatest exactness."
''Governor Jefferson congratulated Steuben on the
resistance which the raw militia under him gave to the
trained troops, and later wrote to Washington that ''The
enemy was received by Steuben with a body of militia
somewhat under one thousand, who, though the enemy
were two thousand three hundred strong, disputed the
ground very handsomely for two hours, during which
time the enemy gained one mile only, and that by inches."
Greene \vrote to the same effect, and, and although
Irving mentions Muhlenberg alone in connection with
this action, it is clear that he acted in a subordinate ca-
pacity under Steuben's direct supervision.
Phillips burned the tobacco warehouses in Peters-
burg and destroyed all the vessels lying in the river, re-
peating the destruction at Chesterfield, which was also
abandoned.
While this was going on a detachment under Arnold
burned the tobacco magazines at Warwick, a little town
in the neighborhood, and opened fire on some small
armed vessels in the James, the fleet which had been col-
lected when the first effort was made to blockade Arnold
at Portsmouth, but which was defeated through the re-
fusai of the French naval commander to co-operate. The
crews sunk or burned the ships and escaped to the upper
side of the James.
Phillips and Arnold pursued their course up the
James, burning and plundering, until they reached Man-
chester, opposite Richmond, from whence they could view
the capital by the light of blazing warehouses.
During this expedition some smaller detachments
practically unopposed carried on similar exploits on some
234 GENERAL W ILLIA:\I VOX STEUBEN
of the other rivers in the Virginia tidewater region. One
of these going up the Potomac stopped at ]Mount Vernon,
Avhere Lund Washington, a relative of the General, had
charge. By furnishing the British with provisions he
prevented the ravaging of the estate, for which he was
severely reprimanded by the owner. But the country has
looked very leniently on this action, which saved the his-
toric estate from destruction.
CHAPTER XV.
THE WAR IN VIRGINIA.
Lafayette Ordered to Steuben's Assistance — Cornwallis Moves
Northward — Steuben Prepares to Oppose Him — Magazines
of Supplies Formed and Recruits Gathered — Lafayette Re-
treats to Fredericksburg — Steuben Extricates Himself From
Point of Fork — Important Stores Saved — Brilliant Tactics —
Cornwallis Outwitted — Steuben Gives Up Going South,
and Requested to Join Lafayette.
While Virginia was being ravaged by this desultory
warfare, what had become of Lafayette and the one
thousand two hundred Continental troops which Wash-
ington had sent to aid in capturing Arnold or driving him
out of the state? They were still at the head of Chesa-
peake bay preparing to march back to the northern army.
But the arrival of General Phillips made it apparent to
Washington that Steuben with his hand full of militia
would be unable to cope with this increased force, to say
nothing of Cornwallis in North Carolina, whose move-
ments were yet uncertain, whether he would follow
Greene to southward or turn northward and join the
enemy in Virginia. Accordingly the Commander-in-
chief sent a courier with all haste to Lafayette, directing
him to proceed at once to the help of Steuben. The mes-
senger arived at Elk Head on April 8, and, as the British
fleet controlled the lower bay, an overland march was
determined upon. A new difficulty here arose. Most of
Lafayette's troops were New Englanders, who feared the
Southern climate, although it could hardly be considered
dangerous in April, and the difference had not been suf-
ficiently marked to prevent Virginia troops from serving
in Massachusetts, so thev refused to move. Desertions
23(3 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
followed, but Lafayette made an appeal to their patriotic
pride by announcing that he was about to start on a dan-
gerous enterprise, and hoped that none of his comrades
would leave him, but if any were deterred by the prospect
he would issue permits for them to return North. That
was the end of the disaitection, and it is said that a lame
sergeant, afraid of being left behind, hired a place in a