chief saw fit to visit every part of the army to see that
uniformity prevailed ; also inspect the military hospitals.
The Baron took great pride in displaying his manoeuvres
in the presence of the French officers, when their precision
and quiet attracted special attention in view of the rather
boisterous evolutions of their Gallic brothers. Once in dis-
cussing some evolutions with a French general the latter
mentioned one of considerable difficulty which he had
witnessed in Silesia by the Prussian army, adding, "But
we do not expect you to equal the veterans of the King of
Prussia. All in good time." When the general had left
Steuben remarked, 'The time shall be next week. I will
save the gentlemen who have not been in Silesia the
276 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
trouble of going any further than Verplanck's Point for
instructions." The affair came off as the Baron antici-
pated with great eclat and edification for the visitors.
The Baron gave a dinner in his tent to his French asso-
ciates, saying, ''I am glad to pay some part of the dinner
debt we owe our allies." In fact, Steuben was always a
great stickler for fulfilling the duties of hospitality in a
manner which he conceived befitting his position, not-
withstanding his financial condition, owing to the irregu-
lar receipt of his pay, was not always equal to the de-
mands imposed upon it. This was forcibly illustrated
just after the siege of Yorktown, when the major gen-
erals took turns in entertaining the British officers. At
this time the Baron called on Colonel Walter Stewart and
desired to sell him his favorite charger in order to secure
funds with which to entertain his late foes. '' 'Tis a
good beast," said he, ''and has proved a faithful servant
through all the dangers of the war, but though painful
to my heart we must part." Colonel Stewart refused to
accept the horse, but offered his purse freely, with the
suggestion that if this were not sufficient the Baron
m.ight sell or pledge his watch. "]\Iy dear friend," vras
the reply, '* 'tis already sold. Poor North was sick and
wanted necessaries. He is a brave fellow and possesses
the best of hearts. The trifle it brought is set apart for
his use. My horse must go — so no more, I beseech you,
to turn me from my purpose. I am a major general in
the service of the United States, and my private con-
venience must not be put in the scale with the duty which
my rank calls upon me imperiously to perform. " An-
other account says he sold such part of his camp equip-
age, brought from Europe, as was of silver, that he
might entertain, saying, ''I can stand it no longer; we
are continually dining with these people and cannot give
YORKTOWN AND AFTER 277
a piece of bratwurst in return ; they shall have one grand
dinner if I eat my soup with a wooden spoon hereafter."
Let us trust, although the Baron was compelled to sacri-
fice his silver, yet he was enabled to retain his fourfooted
companion..
There is usually a reaction after a spurt of any kind,
and the condition of affairs in 1782 was no exception to
the rule. Officially the war was in progress as much as
ever, but there w-as talk of peace on both sides, causing
a relaxation of efforts to keep up and provide for the
army, which were just as necessary as ever. There v;ere
small skirmishes and much brutal outrage by companies of
British partisans which scoured the country, but Wayne
and Greene succeeded in largely suppressing this kind
of work in the South, and on July 11 Savannah was
evacuated, the regulars going to Charleston, the only
ctiy south of the Potomac now left to them, and the
Tories to Florida. Clinton was guilty of acts in New
York which will forever render his memory infamous,
but on May 5 he was superseded by Sir Guy Carleton,
a humane and generous commander, who treated the
peace negotiations as practically in force. Towards the
close of the year Wilmot was killed in an enterprise
against James Island, the last man to fall in the war.
Under the Articles of Confederation Congress could
requisition the States for money, but the States could suit
themselves about complying, w^iich in most cases was
not at all. As a single example of the state of aft'airs, on
March 1, 1782, the country owed Steuben $6,850 in
specie (figures would hardly be sufficient to state this in
Continental courrency), and being unable to draw bills
of exchange even at heavy discount or to borrow any
money he addressed the following personal letter to
Washington :
278 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
Without troubling your Excellency with a tedious detail
of the hardships attending my situation, I pray you to consider
the peculiarity of m}^ employment compared with that of other
officers. The arrangements which are going to take place for
furnishing the army with provisions, forage, etc., will not be of
advantage to me, and I am bound to travel from one part of the
country to the other, to live at double expenses in taverns, in
which I have to pay ready money not only for my personal ex-
penses, but also for the entertainment of my aides de camp and
horses necessary to perform our journeys. I would be happy
if the pay allowed by Congress were equal to such expenses.
I do not want to lay up any part of my pay, I ask no addition
to it, but I declare it to be totally out of my power if my ap-
pointments, as well those of January and February, as those
occurring in the future, are not regularly paid me. With regard
to the arrearages, I shall be satisfied to leave in the public
funds $6,000 provided I am paid the remaining $850, which are
indispensably necessary to enable me to discharge my expenses
here and provide myself with the necessary equipage for the
ensuing campaign.
Washington took up the matter, and by special ex-
ertions obtained the $850 asked for and also $500 on
account of pay due for January and February, which
was all he received since entering the service up to this
time.
The troubles in regard to arrears of pay and lack of
supplies were not confined to Steuben, but were general
throughout the army, Washington and some of the
other officers had independent resources, but the destitu-
tion was general. The army was not in condition to
make a day's march, and had the British in New York
not become apathetic they might at least have caused
considerable trouble. There was mutiny among the Con-
necticut soldiers arising from these causes, and it was
deemed necessary to shoot the ringleaders. Officers sent
in their resignations, and there appeared great danger of
a general collapse.
Amid all these troubles Washington did not lose
sight of the fact that a direct movement against New
York would be most desirable if there was the slightest
YORKTOWN AND AFTER 279
chance of success, and that in any event it was better to
keep the army employed in active work than permit it to
disintegrate through inanition. So, as in a similar con-
dition, two years before, he called on Steuben for a review
of the situation, a plan of attack, should one be attempted,
and the chances of success or of failure. Steuben's re-
port gives a valuable resume of the state of affairs at
that time. Leaving out Canada he sums up the forces
then in America as follows :
British Army.
Regulars at New York 9,000
Militia [ 3;(X)0
Garrison at Charleston 3^000
Garrison at Savannah 700
Total 15^700
Allied Army.
Northern Cont. Army 10.000
French Troops [][ 4^000
Southern Army 2.000
Total 16^000
American militia do not seem to be included in the
above, which number was constantly fluctuating from
practically nothing to four or five thousand. Taking the
above figures as a basis the Baron proceeds to discuss the
chances of an attack on New York, as follows :
The position of the enemy is on three islands. Whenever
we attack one the other two must be kept in check. If, then,
the besieged should consist of 12,000 men. and the besiegers of
24,000. the latter must be divided into three parts, each consist-
mg of 8.000 men. The points of attack are the passage at
Kingsbridge. the Heights of Brooklyn, and the works on Staten
Island. The shortest line of communication between them is
from twenty to twenty-four miles with a river between each.
How, then, is the one to support the other in case of a superior
attack, which the enemy may easily make, as they possess every
possible advantage by water? And. even supposing we should
obtain possession of either island, what position should we take
to cover our flanks from the enemy's force by water? But if
280 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
we should be unfortunate enough to have any one division de-
feated, what retreat is left while the enem}- keep possession of
the water?
These reasons alone prove to me sufficiently the impropriety
of such an undertaking as long as the enemy keep possession
of the port and the river by which the islands are surrounded.
As soon as a superior fleet shall have blocked up the harbor
without, our principal object, I conceive, will be Long Island,
in which case the greater part of our strength will be necessarily
employed in carrying the works at Brooklyn, either by
storm or regular approaches, and to erect batteries to bombard
the city and the fleet in the ba3^ But even then it will be neces-
sary that our frigates should be in possession of the Sound, and
that batteries should be erected on our flanks commanding the
river.
The last proposition supposes that we were in possession
of the harbor and had the superiority at sea. In this case we
should be highly reprehensible if we did not m.ake the attempt;
yet even then I would propose that we should have the most
pointed assurances that the fleet destined for this service should
remain long enough to effect a co-operation on the occasion. It
would also be necessary to make an exact estimate of the num-
ber of troops and the means which we possess to make the at-
tempt. If the enemy should abandon the southern States and
colVct their whole force at New York, it would amount to
16,000 men, and by recalling our troops thence we should
amount to the same number. If they retain possession of
Charleston and Savannah General Greene must also remain
there, and then we shall be in the same proportion of 14,000 to
14,000.
It would be no less difficult than hazardous to attack the
enemy in their present position with less than double this num-
ber, or 28,000 men. If the States of Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York and Jersey could send 4,000 men as
rank and file into the regular army, it would amount to 14,000
men (Continental troops); 4,000 French and 10,000 militia; with
this and no less than this, I conceive we might attempt the en-
terprise.
As a conclusion to the above resume of the whole
situation the Baron expresses the fear that the supposi-
tions on which the questions depend will never be real-
ized. "The late unfortunate defeat of the French fleet
in the West Indies, the improbability of collecting a force
sufficient to carry on the siege, and the difficulty, I had
almost said the impossibility, of supporting them, afford
YORKTOWN AND AFTER 281
but too just grounds for this suggestion." He goes
farther, however, and although the proposition to attack
New York is shown to be chimerical, he concludes as
follows :
However, though our particular situation makes it hazard-
ous to undertake an operation which calls for more force and
greater resources than we at present possess, yet I am not of
opinion that we should permit the campaign to waste away
without improving those advantages which are within our reach.
The army should move down and take some advantageous posi-
tion at or near the White Plains, and if our force will admit
that the two York regiments, with Hazen's, should be added
to the two Hampshire regiments who are now stationed on the
northern frontier, and march under the command of Hazen. to-
wards St. John's in Canada, by the road lately laid out or which
other way may appear most proper; if this diversion should be
attended with no other advantages it would at least prevent the
incursions of the savages, a circumstance of the greatest import-
ance. Should it, therefore, be advisable to recall the French
troops from Virginia I should conceive the army would be form-
idable enough to move down and take an advantageous post at
or near White Plains: and if by the addition of recruits or mili-
tia our situation would admit of a diversion with the two York
regiments under Hazen. added to those of Hampshire, toward
the garrison of St. John's in Canada, I am persuaded it would
be attended with the most salutary consequences.
But peace talk and other causes had produced so much
apathy that the inertia could not be overcome, and so none
of these suggestions was adopted. Neither New Eng-
land nor the Middle States possessed a George Rogers
Clark to invade Canada and at least make the St. Law-
rence the northeastern boundary from Lake Ontario to
the sea.
During this period Washington received a letter
from one Colonel Lew^is Nicola, who had obtained some
prominence in the army, who attributed the existing dis-
tress to the form of government, and suggesting a con-
stitutional monarchy like that of England. It w^as deli-
cately hinted that Washington would be the proper per-
282 GENERAL WILLIA:\I VON STEUBEN
son to head a movement in that direction. Had Wash-
ington been either a Caesar or Napoleon the suggestion in
the then desperate state of affairs might have carried
some weight. Being neither, but an American patriot,
he wrote a most stinging reply, concluding with the
words, "I am much at a loss to concci'/e w^hat part, of
my conduct could have given encouragement to an ad-
dress, which to me seems big with the greatest mischiefs
that can befall my country. If I am not deceived in the
knowledge of myself you could not have found a person
to vv'hom your schemes are more disagreeable. At the
same time, in justice to my own feelings, I must add
that no man possesses a more sincere wish to see ample
justice done to the army than I do, and as far as my
powers and influence, in a constitutional way, extend,
they shall be employed to the utmost of my abilities to
that effect should there be any occasion. Let me conjure
you, then, if you have any regard for your country, con-
cern for yourself or posterity, respect for me, to banish
these thoughts from your mind, and never communicate,
as from yourself or any one else, a sentiment of the like
nature."
The muster roll of the northern army at the June
inspection, 1782, disclosed seven thousand nine hundred
and thirty-seven infantry and seven hundred and ninety-
eight artillery, a total of eight thousand seven hundred
and thirty-five, with two hundred and thirty-four sick
and absent, leaving eight thousand four hundred and
ninety-four fit for duty, this, of course, not including the
sporadic militia. The universal poverty w^as displayed
to an almost ludicrous extent by the fact that blanks and
muster rolls were allowed to lie in the post offices for
want of cash to pay for the cost of postage. Congress not
having allowed them the franking privilege unless the
YORKTOWN AND AFTER 283
words ''public business" were written upon them, a duty
which some of the officers neglected to perform. In spite
of all these drawbacks drilling and inspection were car-
ried on with such efficiency that on June IcS Washington
issued a general order from his headquarters in Newburg
expressing satisfaction with the appearance and manoeu-
vres of the troops and returning thanks to Major General
Baron De Steuben for the indefatigable assiduity and
singular attention exhibited in the late inspection and
review, and for his eminent service in promoting the dis-
cipline of the army on all occasions.
In accordance with his policy of keeping up the in-
spection and drill at all hazards Steuben paid the ex-
penses of two officers sent to Saratoga out of his own
pocket. On another occasion when Colonel Hazen's
regiment was to be reviewed at Lancaster, Pa., the Min-
ister of War said it was not worth while to go to that
out-of-the-way place, to which Steuben replied, "It is my
opinion that omitting the inspection of only one regiment
for one month can cause more expense to the United
States than the inspection of the whole army for a year
can cost."
Matters were going from bad to worse. Steuben
writes : "If my life depended on it I would not be able to
raise ten dollars on credit. The certificate for $G,000
which I held from the United States I offered in vain for
one-tenth of its nominal value. There is no resource
whatever left in me. I have already lost six horses since
I am in the service chiefly for want of forage, the two
best were stolen, as, while in West Point, I had to send
them twenty miles from that place to find pasturage for
them; besides that for want of bolts and bars for my
house, my silver and linen were stolen, so that I am re-
duced in everything."
284: GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
Of course the $S50 pittance which Steuben had re-
ceived from Congress in the spring was a mere bagatelle
and was speedily dissipated. In June he wrote to the
Secretaries of War and Finance that the defrayment of
at least his ordinary expenses w^as an absolute necessity,
pointedly stating that, "While other officers were sta-
tioned w^ithin their respective divisions, brigades and
corps, and could avail themselves of their ordinary sup-
plies, the nature of my duty kept me in constant motion
from one division of the army, and even from one army
to another, necessarily subjecting me to all the expenses
incident to traveling. I ever have been, and ever will be,
disposed to draw an equal lot with those truly brave men
whose sufferings have long since called aloud for speedy
redress ; with them I have frequently wanted not only
the conveniences but even the necessaries of life, and if
my duty confined me to my camp and quarters, I would
net conceive myself entitled to any extraordinary privi-
lege. Hitherto I have never made a requisition of any
kind to Congress, and entreat your Excellency to be per-
suaded that it is with singular pain I am compelled to
make one at this time; but the duty I owe to my own
feelings, as well as the respect I entertain to that august
body, required that I should thus be explicit with them."
This communication, not appearing to have any ef-
fect, Steuben concluded to go in person to Philadelphia,
and during the journey he inspected and reviewed the
troops stationed along the line of his route. In order to
better sustain his claims he propounded certain questions
to Washington as to the necessity of his department in
the army, and whether it had been conducted during the
previous five years in accordance with the wishes of the
commander-in-chief, and whether it had come up to ex-
pectations. To both these questions Washington responded
YORrCrOWN and after 285
decidedly in the affirmative, adding that the department
had been of the utmost utihty and continued to be of the
greatest importance for reasons too obvious to need
enumeration, but more especially for having established
one uniform system of maiiceuvres and regulation in an
army composed of thirteen states (each having its local
prejudices), and subject to interruptions and deviations
from the frequent changes and dissolutions it had under-
gone. The intelligence, activity and zeal of the Baron
were highly commended as not less beneficial to the public
than honorable to himself, and the general expressed
himself as having abundant reason to be satisfied with the
inspector's abilities and attention to the duties of his
of^ce..
But Congress dallied along and did nothing, and al-
though Steuben was in receipt of unsolicited testimonials
as to the justice of his cause and the condition of the
anny, they did not relieve the tension. Walker wrote
from Newburg on November 20 that the discontent \\'as
general, and a memorial to Congress was under consid-
eration. North wrote him on October 29 : ''Your ser-
vices to my ungrateful country have been treated with a
neglect shocking to every man of sensibility. * * *
The army of the United States know what you have
done; your intimate friends only know what you have
suffered, since you took upon you the Herculean task of
forming the American armies. It is now five years since
you undertook this last work. How well you have suc-
ceeded the present state of the army will declare; but
unfortunately for our honor your reward only consists
in the consciousness of having acted a great and good
part. The war, my dear general, is, perhaps, drawing
towards a close. It has happily been successful, and you
doubtless have acquired a lasting honor by the part you
286 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
had in it. But honor alone will never compensate for
your sacrifices in Europe, nor your sacrifices in America ;
a reward of another kind is due. Justice to yourself and
to your friends points out the necessity of your endeav-
ouring to procure it."
General Otho Williams, coming north at this time,
was especially struck with the change in the condition of
the troops, and volunteered the following: "How much
our troops are indebted to you, sir, for that military abil-
ity and appearance in which they now both so advantage-
ously compare with the best disciplined troops in Europe,
Congress, his Excellency General Washington and other
eminent characters, bear honorable testimony. The per-
sonal knowedge I have, as an of^cer of the American
army, acquired from your general instructions, influences
my gratitude to add my private thanks to the more im-
portant acknowledgements you have already and repeat-
edly received."
General Gates visited the army during the fall of
1782 while it was building huts to go into winter quar-
ters at New W^indsor. He had been absent three years,
and writes to the Baron his astonishment with which he
beheld the order, regularity and attention which he had
taught the American army, and that the obedience, ex-
actness and true spirit of military discipline which he had
infused into them did him the highest honor. He hopes
that the generosity of the governing powers will proclaim
to the world his merits and their obligation, and thus
convince mankind that the Republics of America have at
least the virtue to be grateful."
General Robert Howe wrote to the same effect, and
these epistles might be considerably multiplied if neces-
sary, but the evidence would only be cumulative.
But still there was nothing doing, and at last, tired
YORKTOWN AND AFTER 287
out with waiting, Steuben on December 4 addressed a
letter to Hon. Elias Bondinot, President of Congress,
calling- attention to the fact that he had now given five
years' service to the American army after renouncing
respectable commands and affluent circumstances in Eu-
rope, and it was mortifying to appeal to Congress
in reference to his private affairs. Flis private resources
being exhausted, he entreated Boudinot to appoint
a committee to examine into his situation and report the
reasonableness of his demands. He was ready to demon-
strate wherein his administration had resulted in im-
mense saving to the country, and refers to the remarkable
order and discipline which now prevailed in the army,
winning the approbation of its allies. He concluded as
follows : "When I drew my sword in defense of these
states I did it with a determination that death only should
force me to lay it down before Great Britain had ac-
knovv^ledged the independence of America, and I still
persist in the same resolution. Your own feelings, sir,
and those of Congress may enable you to judge of those
of an old soldier who finds himself obligated to mention
facts of such a nature as those I have been laying before
you. Congress w^ill do me the justice to believe that, in
doing justice to the zeal and capacity of the officers, and
the docility of the soldiers of the Federal army, to speak
of myself is a task highly painful and disagreeable to
me."
Congress seemed moved at last to take the matter
up, and appointed a committee, consisting of Messrs.
Hamilton, Clarke and Carroll, to investigate and report.
It did not take the committee long to verify each and
every statement made by the Baron, his relinquishment
of substantial benefits in Europe, his coming to America
at a critical period, his disinterested work in the army
288 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN
without the compensation similar to those made to other
foreign officers ; his estabHshment of discipHne, order and