rope to lire, aever to eet foot on
AGDerteaB sail agaio, Mr Roo«eveit
lurned to me and said Tbey may

treat me lite Dewey bol I tell yo*
ooe thJog. I ahall neither weep no#
•bail 1 go to Europe'"

He arrived la New York about tbe
middle of Jooe. 1910. and began at
oac* to devote Himself to bis editor-
loi work oo Tbe Outlook. Tbe go-
campaign of tbla fttale
gwIds Some of tbe youog-



paigo He



declined Tbey said to
publlcaa Party had beap-



H a delegate froeo Nsj







*~*.' 4



purge tt of aome of tbe corrupt el*>
e»du b* ought not to desert ibem
-If tbat la the way you feed about lt."
waa bU reply. 1 will take bold aod
do what I can, bat 1 wars y<o« that
t^ero ts b&rdry a fighting chanea for
aoeeaaa and thai wa shall all proba*
bry go down u ignominious defeat to>
aetto '
It was In this spirit uau be weot
tbe campaign. He wu elected)



of Mr etim-
f Governor, gave
opponents, tbe "OM Ouard. tbe



ing Roosevelt's autographic comments
on the Presidential Campaign of 190S



63



64 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

never before published." The issue in which this
paper appeared was that of January 4, 191 2. I
did not consult Mr. Roosevelt while writing the
article, but after it was printed I cut it out, pasted
it on some sheets of white paper with wide margins,
and showed it to him. These margins contain
annotations, in his own hand, written with an
indelible pencil.

It seems to me that the best way I can interpret
Mr. Roosevelt's course from 1908 to 1912 is to
quote here the essential portions of that article
giving especially his own notes upon my statements.
I do this with some reluctance because Mr. Taft
and Mr. Roosevelt resumed friendly relations
before the latter' s death, and because I personally
share in the country's affection for Mr. Taft's
genial kindliness of spirit. But my purpose, in-
deed my duty is to interpret Mr. Roosevelt, and
that can only be done by frankly stating the
facts connected with the Progressive campaign
of 1912.

THE "LOCAL PRESS" ARTICLE WITH MR. ROOSEVELT^
ANNOTATIONS

In order to understand the present political situation
[January 191 2] with regard to the presidential nomination
next summer it may be interesting to review Mr. Roosevelt's
connection with National politics during the last three years.



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 65

In 1908 Mr. Roosevelt declined the Republican nomination
which he could very easily have had. In fact, the party
tried everything in its power to make him take it. But he
stood by his public statement, made in 1904, that he would
not take the nomination in 1908 even if it were offered to him.
In keeping this promise it is quite within the bounds of truth
to say that he worked harder to prevent his nomination in
1908 than most presidential candidates have to work to cap-
ture a nomination. [This statement was one that Roosevelt
made to me in more than one conversation.]

Mr. Roosevelt having eliminated himself, it was necessary
for the Republican Party in 1908 to find a candidate who
would be considered by the country as capable of carrying
out the uncompleted programme of the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration. The chief feature of this programme was the estab-
lishment of successful principles and methods by which the
great railway and industrial corporations of the country
could be brought under government control.

The three prominent figures in the Republican Party at
that time, next to Mr. Roosevelt, were Governor Hughes,
Secretary Root and Secretary Taft. Governor Hughes had
not then won the great national confidence which he after-
ward enjoyed. It was thought by the political managers,
unjustly no doubt, that he did not possess those qualities
of personal magnetism, the lack of which defeated President
Harrison in 1892.

Mr. Root, a great lawyer and a great Secretary of State,
was a man of presidential timber, and in my judgment would
have made a great President, but there was at that time
throughout the country such a feeling of antagonism toward
the great corporations and so-called trusts, that it was be-
lieved that Mr. Root's reputation as a great corporation
lawyer might endanger his election. This was especially
feared in view of the fact that Mr. Bryan was likely to make
an anti-corporation campaign. [Note by Mr. Roosevelt:
Cl I found that the westerners would not stand Root."]



66 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

It is easy enough now to look back and feel that probably
any highminded Republican could have been elected, but
those who remember the activities of the campaign of 1908
will also remember that there were times when even the
Republican managers felt that Mr. Bryan's chances of elec-
tion were altogether too good for their comfort.

^Vhen it was finally decided that the nomination of either
Mr. Hughes or Mr. Root was out of the question for the rea-
sons I have given above, Mr. Taft was left as the most availa-
ble, I may almost say, the only available candidate. It has
been sometimes said that his candidacy was forced upon the
party by Mr. Roosevelt. This is not so. He was the free
choice of the party. [Note by Mr. Roosevelt: "But it is
so! I could not have nominated an extreme progressive or an
extreme conservative but I could by a turn of the hand have thrown
the nomination to either Taft or Hughes. The only way to
prevent my own nomination was for me actively to champion
and to force the nomination of some one else; I chose Taft rather
than Hughes, and I still think I was wise."] He had won a
deservedly national reputation through his administration
of the Philippine Islands; he had been a successful and popular
Secretary of War; he was believed to understand intimately
Mr. Roosevelt's philosophy and principles of government and
to be in sympathy with them; he was a warm personal friend
of Mr. Roosevelt; and his nomination gave satisfaction not
only to the party but to the country. Mr. Roosevelt entered
into the campaign for Mr. Taft's election with his character-
istic enthusiasm and tireless vigour. His speeches, his letters,
his knowledge of the conditions and his political experience
contributed so largely to the successful result of the election
that his critics have said that he alone nominated and elected
Mr. Taft.

Unfortunately, some of Mr. Taft's advisers took this mis-
taken view of the case and, between the date of his election
and his inauguration in 1909, urged him to separate himself
so thoroughly from any Roosevelt associations that his ad-



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 67

ministration could create its own policies and that thus he
might be renominated and reelected in 1912 on his own in-
dividual merits "without any taint of Rooseveltism."

When Mr. Roosevelt succeeded to the presidency on the
death of Mr. McKinley he promised to carry out Mr. Mc-
Kinley's policies. This he did loyally. He retained in
his Cabinet all of the members of Mr. McKinley's Cabinet
and it was not until he was elected in 1904 that he began to
shape the government upon the policies, in contra-distinction
to those of Mr. McKinley, which have now become historic-
ally associated with his administration. [Note by Mr.
Roosevelt: "No; the mere force of events had made me strike
absolutely my own note by October igo2, when I settled the coal
strike and started the trust control campaign. In 1903 I took
Panama"]

Mr. Taft on his election no doubt wished to carry on the
work of his predecessor, and, if not publicly, often privately
said that it was his desire and intention to retain those Cabi-
net colleagues of Mr. Roosevelt who had contributed so much
to the re-creation of the Republican Party. [Note by Mr.
Roosevelt: "He told me so, and authorized me to tell the Cabi-
net, specifically Garfield, Straus and Luke Wright."] But this
intention became gradually modified during the winter of
1908-09. Only one member of the Roosevelt Cabinet was
retained, and the one member who was Mr. Roosevelt's most
intimate associate and on whom he depended more than on
any one else in his struggle to take the government out of the
control of "big business," the member of all others whom he
would have preferred to see retained, was not retained. I
refer, of course to Mr. James Garfield, Mr. Roosevelt's Sec-
retary of the Interior.

In the Ballinger controversy, which has had so disastrous
an effect upon the Taft Administration, another of Mr.
Roosevelt's intimate colleagues, Mr. Gifford Pinchot, was
practically dismissed. It was perfectly manifest from these
and many other occurrences, of which these are only exam-



68 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

pies, that Mr. Taft preferred to "go it alone." No one has
ever accused Mr. Roosevelt of being dull in his perceptions.
He quickly found that Mr. Taft wished to be relieved of any
intimate Roosevelt associations, and he cheerfully and
promptly acquiesced. One of the reasons why he went to
Africa, to bury himself in the wilds for nearly a year, was to
remove any possible ground for the charge that he was inter-
fering with Mr. Taft's administration. [Mr. Roosevelt often
told me that this was one of his motives for his African trip.]

People have said to me sometimes, "Why is it that Mr.
Roosevelt, who was such an intimate friend of Mr. Taft's,
ceased to maintain that intimacy after Mr. Taft got into the
White House?" I should suppose it would be apparent to
any one who stops to think that Mr. Roosevelt refrained from
imposing himself upon the new President, from the highest
sense of delicacy. The ex-President of a college who remains
on the Board of Trustees, and constantly attempts to advise
or correct or meddle with his successor is one of the most un-
pleasant persons in the world.

Mr. Roosevelt has never failed to respond quickly and
cordially to the slightest wish expressed by Mr. Taft for his
company or his advice. Take for instance one incident
in the political campaign of the autumn of 1910 when Mr.
Roosevelt was carrying on his almost single-handed fight in
the State of New York. One stormy day Mr. Roosevelt
jumped into a motor boat at Oyster Bay, crossed Long Island
Sound, and had a private interview with Mr. Taft at New
Haven, when the latter was attending a meeting of the Cor-
poration of Yale University. The following day the news-
papers announced — very unfortunately with the apparent
acquiescence of those nearest to Mr. Taft — [as a matter of
fact the announcement was made in an official despatch from
the presidential train on which Mr. Taft was travelling] that
the meeting was sought by Mr. Roosevelt for the purpose of
getting some help in his contest with the "Old Guard" of
the New York State Republican Machine. The facts are —



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 69

and I have learned them not from Mr. Roosevelt but from a
friend of Mr. Taft's who knew all the circumstances, that
Mr. Taft sent word to Mr. Roosevelt asking Roosevelt to
come in order that he, Mr. Taft, might get the benefits of
Mr. Roosevelt's advice regarding the serious split in the na-
tional affairs of the Republican Party, which resulted from
the fight of the "progressives" in Congress against so-
called "Cannonism." The newspapers, not knowing the
facts, said, "Aha! This is just like Roosevelt. He has
neglected Mr. Taft but the moment he gets into trouble he
runs to him for help!"

The exact contrary is true and when Mr. Taft called on Mr.
Roosevelt he quickly and generously responded to the call.

These facts have never been published, for, of course, Mr.
Roosevelt could not publish them; he simply had to grin and
bear it, as he has borne many other unjustifiable criticisms.
I am stating them now on my own responsibility without
consultation with Mr. Roosevelt, as an example of the mis-
interpretation which every man in public life has often to
undergo. [Note by Mr. Roosevelt: "My personal feeling
about Taft's relations with me never influenced by one iota my
public course; it took 18 months to convince me that he was a
first-class lieutenant, but no leader, with no real conviction on or
appreciation of the magnitude of the really vital problems before
this country."]



He [Mr. Roosevelt] arrived in New York about the middle
of June, 1910, and began at once to devote himself to the
editorial work on the Outlook. The gubernatorial cam-
paign of this state was in full swing. Some of the younger
leaders in the party came to him and asked him to go into the
campaign. He declined. They said to him that it was not
fair to decline; that the Republican Party had heaped honours
upon him and that now in the time of its tribulation and



70 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

danger when they were honestly trying to purge it of some
of the corrupt elements he ought not to desert them. "If
that is the way you feel about it," was his reply, "I will take
hold and do what I can, but I warn you that there is hardly a
fighting chance for success and that we shall all probably go
down to ignominious defeat together." [Note by Mr. Roose-
velt: ft Hughes in especial asked me."]



The result of the campaign is a matter of record. Mr.
Roosevelt was defeated. For a time he suffered from a most
pronounced reversal of popularity and his opponents and his
critics rejoiced in their openly expressed belief that he was
permanently down and out. He made no complaint but
went on with his editorial work, discussing questions of poli-
tics and public importance with zest and without repining.
As the year 191 1 came into its last quarter, the people of the
State, even some of the most enthusiastic supporters of
Governor Dix, began to perceive that what Mr. Roosevelt
had said in his public speeches during the campaign was true.
The defeat of Mr. Stimson meant the saddling of Tammany
upon the whole political machinery of the State.



What Mr. Roosevelt does or says will be interpreted by
some critics to his disadvantage. In the building where the
Outlook has its offices there are two elevators, one in the main
hall and one in the side hall. Mr. Roosevelt once said with
a laugh during the campaign of 1910 when the Outlook office
was crowded with people who came to consult him: "If I go
down in the front elevator, my critics call it ostentation; if
I go down in the side elevator, they call it secretiveness!"



If Mr. Roosevelt is ever elected President again it will not
be because he seeks or wants the office; it will be because the




t**>




o
o



c
U




0, Underwood & Underwood



The Inaugural Address of 1904



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 71

country wants him in the office to perform a certain job. He
has had all the political and official honours that any normal
man can possibly want. He accepted a nomination for the
Vice- Presidency in 1900 when such a nomination was thought
to be equivalent to political oblivion, and although he wanted
to run again for governor of the State of New York in order
to complete some important work in that office. But his
friends told him that it was his duty to sacrifice himself in
order to strengthen Mr. McKinley's nomination and the
campaign for sound money and the financial honour of the
Nation. He accepted the nomination on that ground, al-
though at the time both his friends and his enemies said it
would mean the end of his political career. But instead of
plunging into oblivion it brought to him an election to the
Presidency in 1904 by one of the largest popular and electoral
majorities ever received by an American President. This
is what his critics call "Roosevelt luck."

In 1908 he not only declined, but put a stop to his nomina-
tion at a time when such a nomination was equivalent to an
election. He has a European reputation as a statesman
which has never been surpassed by any other American in
political life and he appears to-day to be as popular among
his own countrymen as he ever was. What possible incentive
can there be to a man with such a record of achievements and
honours to enter the arduous, disagreeable and often disas-
trous contests into which the candidate who struggles for the
Presidency is inevitably plunged.

To be understood properly the notes which
Roosevelt made upon the document here repro-
duced need some interpretation. He wrote them
briefly and categorically because he was aware that
I would understand them without amplification.

When he says: "I could have nominated Hughes



72 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

more easily than Taft" or: "I could not have
nominated an extreme Progressive or an extreme
Conservative," he means, of course, not that he
was acting as a dictator but as the acknowledged
leader of his party to whom not only the party
managers but the delegates themselves came for
advice. What they wanted was that he should
tell them whom they should vote for in the con-
vention if not for him. It was his moral and
personal leadership and not his dictatorial and
official power that made him the arbiter of the
nomination.

The same interpretation is to be given to his
phrase: "In 1903 I took Panama." Of course he
could not have taken it in the sense in which Philip
II of Spain took the free cities of the Netherlands.
The meaning of the phrase will be more clear if it is
paraphrased in this way: "In 1903 / took action^
guided almost solely by my own judgment of what
was wise and proper, that resulted in the building of
the Panama Canal." The fact that the inhabi-
tants and the government of Panama itself were
the most enthusiastic supporters and approvers of
this action is proof that Roosevelt did not use the
verb "to take" in the sense of seizure or conquest.

What he says about Mr. Taft being "a first-class
lieutenant but no leader, with no real convictions



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 73

on or appreciation of the magnitude of the really
vital problems before the country" is perhaps suffi-
ciently explained later in this article. He did not
mean that Mr. Taft had no convictions of any kind.
On the contrary, I am convinced that he believed
Mr. Taft's convictions on legal and judicial ques-
tions were of a very high order. In a later chapter
of the book from which this article is taken I quote
in full Roosevelt's own statement of the reasons
that led him to become a Progressive. From the
time of his governorship of the State of New York
he had been slowly but steadily coming to the con-
viction that there needed to be a thorough-going
reform of the relations of government to industry
both as regards capital and as regards labour. He
felt that the country was approaching a crisis in its
social and industrial conditions, a feeling that the
outcome of the European war has more than con-
firmed. His belief was that Mr. Taft did not share
this conviction and did not appreciate the magni-
tude and imminence of the crisis. The cleavage
between the two men was due not to friction in
their personal relations but to a fundamental differ-
ence in their point of view. The personal friction
was not the cause but the result of the difference in
their political philosophies. I hope it is not pre-
sumptuous in me to say that I think Mr. Taft's at-



74 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

titude toward these social and human problems has
changed since 191 2, and that he and Roosevelt
found themselves much more in agreement during
the last year of the European war. Mr. Taft's
vigorous and broadminded leadership in support
of the plan for a League of Nations against the
bitter opposition of powerful members of his own
party discloses those qualities of statesmanship in
matters of national and international procedure
which originally drew him and Roosevelt together
during the years of the latter's Presidency.

The statement that "Hughes in especial asked
me" refers to these facts: Mr. Hughes at the Har-
vard Commencement of 1910 added his urgency
to that of the younger Republicans who were beg-
ging Roosevelt to go into the state campaign of
that year. Mr. Hughes put this request on the
ground that the Direct Primary cause which he
had inaugurated needed Roosevelt's backing.
Roosevelt assented and went into the fight, but
somewhat to his chagrin Mr. Hughes then failed
to give him any active support in the contest.

As the Local Press article was commented upon
by Mr. Roosevelt and in that way received the
stamp of his personal approval it may be taken
as a fair indication of his state of mind as to poli-
tics at the opening of the campaign of 191 2. The



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 75

dissatisfaction of the Liberals or "Progressives"
in the Republican party with the course of Mr.
Taft/s administration had steadily grown during
191 1. Early in 1912 President Taft made a speech
at Cleveland in which he reviewed and defended
his Administration. The Outlook made the follow-
ing comment on that speech, and as Mr. Roosevelt
was then a member of the editorial staff I know
that its comment was not inharmonious with his
own view.

Why is it that there should be wide-spread popular dis-
content with the Administration, not only on the part of the
President's political opponents, but also within the ranks of
the President's own party?

In the first place, the President [Mr. Taft] has allowed him-
self to become identified in the public mind with those elements
in his party which have been frankly opposed to progress. It
was not, for example, merely his defense of the Payne-Aldrich
Tariff Act, as made in his Winona speech, that set the Pro-
gressive element in his own party to questioning his attitude;
it was even more the evidence that in the conferences over
the tariff he seemed to find most congenial to him those lead-
ers in the party who had been most opposed to real tariff re-
form. Another illustration of this point was the famous
Norton letter, in which it was admitted that the President
had used Federal patronage against the Progressives in Con-
gress. This feeling on the part of the Progressive element
in the party has been confirmed by many expressions of the
President himself. A notable illustration occurs in the clos-
ing sentence of his Cleveland speech:

"On this, the natal day of William McKinley, let us

take new vows in behalf of the Grand Old Party, standing



76 IMPRESSIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

by the Constitution, standing by the rights of liberty and
property of the individual, and willing to face defeat many
times in behalf of the cause of sound Constitutional gov-
ernment."

This might have been said in exactly these words by Mr.
Cannon or any of the so-called standpatters who believe that
the prime function of party government is to promote ma-
terial prosperity or mere money-making. In such a sen-
tence there is no hint of that feeling for which the Progressive
element of Mr. Taft's party stands, that feeling which is
growing more and more throughout the country — that in the
end when human rights clash with property rights, human
rights should prevail. In this sentence there is no hint of
really sympathetic understanding of that movement which
has changed the complexion of Congress and which has put
the reactionary element in both parties on the defensive.

The Progressive element, for the reasons thus set
forth, was busily seeking for a candidate represent-
ing the Liberal wing of the Republican party who
could be put in nomination against Mr. Taft at the
National Republican Convention at Chicago in
June. The Liberal leaders were in constant con-
sultation with Mr. Roosevelt, and his office was
daily crowded with people. It was a veritable
political headquarters. When urged to accept the
titular leadership of the Liberal wing he steadily
declined, and more than once I heard him say dur-
ing this period that, while he was glad to help in any
way he could, Senator La Follette of Wisconsin was
the man on whom the Liberals must probably de-



THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 77

pend. This was not because of his personal admira-
tion for Senator La Follette, about whom there was
much which was not sympathetic to Roosevelt,
but because he thought that justice to Senator La
Follette required recognition of the sacrifices he
had made in fighting the champions of reaction,
for the Senator had devoted himself for many years
with unflagging energy to the cause of popular
government as opposed to special privilege.

But in February, 191 2, Senator La Follette
collapsed in an aggravated attack of nervous
prostration. This collapse came in a dramatic
and tragic fashion while he was making a speech
at the annual dinner of the Periodical Publishers'
Association in Philadelphia, a speech which I
happened to hear and which culminated in one