from the United States to the newnations, referred to Mr. Monroe's message of March
8, 1S22, in which he announced such recognition, and not to his message of December
2, 1823. All his remarks which bear on the subject of the Monroe doctrine are,
therefore, irrelevant. I am perfectly aware of the importance and transcendency
that the policy enunciated by President Monroe in his last-named Message, generally
called the Monroe Doctrine, had on the fate of the American nations, and I certainly
do not try to belittle or depreciate it in any manner whatever.
Genesis ot /iDcjlcan 1Tn&epen^eucc. 331
Hemisphere. The northwest boundary between the Uinted States and
Canada had not then been determined, and the territory in dispute
had not been occupied or even fully explored. Russia, by formal pro-
clamation in 182 1, had set up a claim to territory along the Pacific
coast as far south as the fifty-first parallel, and had given unmistakable
signs of her intention to plant a Russian colony within the disputed
territory. The movement was alarming to Great Britain as well as to
the United States.
The other cause of alarm was that the Metternich-Bourbon reaction
had set in, and there was good reason to fear that an attempt was about
to be made to resubjugate the Spanish-American colonies. This fear
found ample justification in the attitude of the "holy alliance,"
formed immediately after the downfall of Napoleon, by Russia, Austria,
Prussia, and France, for the avowed object of protecting the Catholic
religion and the Divine Right of Kings. This Alliance was offered for
signature to all the monarchs of Europe except the Pope and the
Sultan. Of all the powers, Great Britain alone declined to join in the
Alliance, but under the leadership of Metternich this combination pro-
ceeded with its reactionary work.' In 1821 it sent an Austrian army
into Italy to prevent the adoption of a constitution at Naples, and two
years later it threw a French army into Spain to suppress a popular
movement in behalf of the free constitution of 181 2 and to reinstate
the Bourbon dynasty. Having thus put under its heel all opposition
in Europe, the Alliance proposed a congress to consider the subjuga-
tion of the revolted Spanish colonies in America, and the re-establish-
ment of Spanish authority in the Western Hemisphere. Before matters
were far advanced, the design became known to Great Britain, and
word concerning it was at once sent by the British Minister to the Gov-
ernment of the United States. President Monroe immediately con-
sulted Jefferson and Madison, as well as his Cabinet, of whom John
Quincy Adams and Calhoun were the most prominent members. All
agreed that the matter was of such momentous interest as to justify a
' I think it is an historical fact that Mr. George Canning, the Prime Minister of
England in 1823, suggested to the United States a policy which culminated in the
Monroe Doctrine, in the shape of an understanding between Great Britain and the
United States to prevent the interference of tlie holy alliance on the part of the Spanish
colonies of America. It may be interesting, therefore, to know what Mr. Canning
said in a letter which the papers assure has just come to light, and which is as follows :
"The great danger of the time — a danger which the policy of the European sys-
tem would have fostered — was a division of the world into European and American,
republican and monarchial : a league of worn out governments on the one hand and
youthful and stirring nations, with the United States at their head, on the other. We
slip in between and plant ourselves in Mexico. The United States have gotten the
start of us in vain, and we link once more America to Europe. Six montiis more and
the mischief would have been done."
332 iblstorlcal IRotes on /IDcjtco,
formal remonstrance. John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State,
wrote a declaration of policy relating to colonization, and Jefferson a
similar declaration in regard to interference. These two were tacked
together by President Monroe and embodied in his Message, which
can be summarized in the following four propositions:
1. That the United States would not tolerate further colonization
in the American continent by European powers.
2. That they would not permit the subjugation or subversion of
any American Government by the Governments of Europe.
3. That they would not allow the extension to America of the
monarchial system of the " holy alliance."
4. That the United States had not interfered and would not in-
terfere with any of the existing colonies or dependencies of any
European power on this continent.
I take from the note of Mr. Richard Henry Dana on the Monroe
Doctrine, contained in the eighth edition, Boston, 1866, of Elements of
International La7v, by Henry Wheaton, paragraph 67, Part H., Chapter
I., page 97, the following passages, which explain the object and scope
of the Monroe Doctrine, supported by the ample authority further
stated in detail in that note.
As a summary of this subject it would seem that the following positions may be
safely taken :
" I. The declarations upon which Mr. Monroe consulted Mr. Jefferson and his
own Cabinet related to the interposition of European powers in the affairs of Ameri-
can States.
" II. The kind of interposition declared against was that which may be made for
the purpose of controlling their political affairs, or of extending to this hemisphere the
system in operation upon the continent of Europe, by which the great powers exercise
a control over the affairs of other European States.
" III. The declarations do not intimate any course of conduct to be pursued in
case of such interpositions, but merely say that they would be ' considered as danger-
ous to our peace and safety,' and as ' the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
toward the United States,' which it would be impossible for us to ' behold with indif-
ference ' ; thus leaving the nation to act at all times as its opinion of its policy or duty
might require.
" IV. The declarations are only the opinion of the administration of 1823, and
have acquired no legal force or sanction.
" V. The United States has never made any alliance with or pledge to any other
American State on the subject covered by the declarations.
" VI. The declaration respecting non-colonization was on a subject distinct from
European intervention with American States, and related to the acquisition of sovereign
title by any European power, by new and original occupation or colonization there-
after. Whatever were the political motives for resisting such colonization, the princi-
ple of public law upon which it was placed was, that the continent must be considered
as already within the occupation and jurisdiction of independent civilized nations."
Daniel Webster had still a more narrow view of the object and
scope of the Monroe Doctrine, as appears from the following extract
jl
6enesis of /IDejican 1InOepenC>ence. 333
from a speech he delivered in the House of Representatives, on March
27, 1826:
"The amount of it (Mr. Monroe's declaration) was that this Government could
not look with indifference on any combination to assist Spain in her war against the
South American States ; that we could not but consider any such combination as dan-
gerous or unfriendly to us ; and that if it should be formed it would be for the compe-
tent authorities of this Government to decide, when the case arose, what course our
duty and our interest should require us to pursue."
T/ie Panama Congress. — When Simon Bolivar proposed the assem-
bling at Panama of a congress of the American nations to agree upon
sopie continental policy, President John Quincy Adams laid before
Congress, in his annual message of 1826, the question of the repre-
sentation of the United States at that Congress. The coalition against
the Adams Administration, which ultimately became the Jacksonian
party, made its first great fight on this measure. It called forth long
debates and aroused great excitement in the House of Representatives,
because it was not an ordinary mission, and seemed to have far greater
importance than any question of foreign relations that had previously
come under discussion. It was believed to be an attempt to make a
confederation or league of all the American countries, and thus to a
certain extent to extinguish the individuality of the United States.
This discussion lasted from February 3 to April 21, 1826, when the
Committee on Foreign Affairs reported a resolution declaring that it
was expedient to appropriate the necessary funds to send representa-
tives to the Panama Congress. This resolution was approved by a
vote of 143 to 54, and passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 19.
The United States delegates to the Panama Congress were in-
structed to attend the Congress merely in a diplomatic character,
without discussing or accepting any proposition of alliance binding the
United States, These restrictions had been embodied in an amend-
ment presented both in the House and Senate, which had passed the
House, but was finally rejected, because it was considered an infringe-
ment upon the prerogatives of the Executive. As it expressed the
views of Congress, however, its provisions were embodied in the
instructions to the Commissioners.
I understand that one of the objects of that Congress was to ac-
complish the independence of the island of Cuba, but the idea did not
meet with the approval of the United States, and that fact prevented
the Panama Congress from arriving at any practical result.
Mr, Buchanan, a Member of Congress from Pennsylvania, and
afterwards President of the United States, introduced in 1826 a resolu-
tion which passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 99 to 95,
and which reads as follows (see Wharton, International Law Digest,
Volume I., Chapter III., paragraph 57, page 282):
334 1[3i5toi*ical IRotes on /iDcjico.
" It is, therefore, the opinion of this House that the Government of the United
States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama, except in a diplomatic
character ; nor ought they to form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or negotiate
respecting such alliance, with all or any of the South American Republics ; nor ought
they to become parties with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the
purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European powers with their inde-
pendence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing
colonization upon the continents of America ; but that the people of the United States
should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such manner as their feelings of friendship
towards these Republics, and as their own honor and policy, may at the time dictate."
It is interesting to quote here what Mr. J. C. B. Davis says in his
Notes on Treaties of the United States, in regard to the Panama Con-
gress, and which appears in Wharton's hiternational Law Digest, Vol.
I., Chapter II., paragraph 57, page 279.
" The Congress of Panama in 1826 was planned by Bolivar to secure the union of
Spanish America against Spain. It had originally military as well as political pur-
poses. In the military objects the United States could take no part ; and indeed the
necessity for such objects ceased when the full effects of Mr. Monroe's declarations
were felt. But the specific objects of the Congress, the establishment of close and
cordial relations of amity, the creation of commercial intercourse, of interchange of
political thought and of habits of good understanding between the new rejiublics and
the United .States and their respective citizens, might perhaps have been attained had
the Administration of that day received the united support of the country. Unhappily
they were lost ; the new States were removed from the symjiathetic and protecting in-
fluence of our example, and their commerce, which we might then have secured,
passed into other hands unfriendly to the United States.
' ' In looking back upon the Panama Congress from this length of time it is easy
to understand why the earnest and patriotic men who endeavored to crystallize an
American system for this continent failed. . . . One of the questions proposed
for discussion in the conference was ' The consideration of the means to be adopted for
the entire abolition of the African slave trade,' to which proposition the Committee of
the United States Senate of that day replied : ' The United States have not certainly
the right, and ought never to feel the inclination, to dictate to others who may differ
from them upon this subject ; nor do the Committee see the expediency of insulting
other States with whom we are maintaining relations of perfect amity, by ascending
the moral chair, and proclaiming from thence mere abstract principles, of the rectitude
of which each nation enjoys the perfect right of deciding for itself.' The same Com-
mittee also alluded to the possibility that the conditions of the islands of Cuba and
Porto Rico, still the possessions of Spain, and still slave-holding, might be made the
subject of discussion and of contemplated action by the Panama Congress. ' If ever
the United States' (they said) ' permit themselves to be associated with these nations
in any general congress assembled for the discussion of common plans in any way
affecting European interests, they will, by such act, not only deprive themselves of the
ability they now possess of rendering useful assistance to the other American States,
but also produce other effects prejudicial to their interests.'
" The printed correspondence respecting this mission will be found in the fifth
volume of the Foreign Relations, folio edition, pages 834-905. It was the subject of
animated discussion in Congress, which will be found in the second part of the second
volume of the Register of Congressional Debates for the Year 1826."
(Benesis ot /IDejican Hn^epeu^cnce, 335
Conclusion. — Circumstances have made this paper much longer than
I expected, but it was necessary to speak of several subjects, all of
which were closely connected with the independence of Mexico and
the other Spanish colonies in America.
I hope that this statement of facts will serve to show that the
Spanish colonies in America achieved their independence by their own
efforts and without the aid of any foreign nation, and that if some of
them expected such aid from England they never got it, and they
had to rely upon the native element. I trust, also, that it will dispel
some errors prevailing on that subject.
The Government of the United States maintained during the War
of Independence a strict neutrality, although the recognition of bel-
ligerency of the revolted colonies was a decided advantage to them.
But the people of the United States heartily sympathized with them,
and in some cases personally assisted the cause of independence.
PART 11.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTIONS.
337
II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTIONS.
It is always difficult for the outside world to understand fully, and
to form a correct opinion in regard to the real condition of things
existing in a country, especially so when that country is in an abnor-
mal state, that is, when it is passing through a period of serious disturb-
ances. This is particularly difficult in the case of Mexico, whose pe-
culiar conditions make it so different from all other countries, that even
educated Mexicans cannot always clearly understand the real situation
of affairs in their country, unless they have made a special study of
such matters. In this way I account for the general impression pre-
vailing in the outside world that because Mexico has been disturbed
by a long series of civil wars, which lasted for over half a century, we
were constitutionally disposed to fight, and did so without any plausible
cause or reason; but such a view is a very mistaken one, and the fol-
lowing remarks will, I hope, explain the philosophy of our civil wars.
In the first edition of this paper I passed very briefly on the war of
independence in Mexico, because I intended to write an article as
short as possible without sacrificing the end in view ; but, having been
obliged to enter into some details of the war of independence of the
South American Republics, I thought I could not afford to say less
about the same war in Mexico. In the paper entitled " Genesis of
Mexican Independence" I dealt at length on the war of independence
in Mexico, and to avoid repetitions I will omit here the incidents and
views there expressed.
To treat this subject methodically, I will divide this paper into
three parts: the first embracing the war of independence, from 1810 to
1821, the second the revolutionary period from 1821 to 1855, and the
third the war of reform and French intervention from 1856 to the
present time.
WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
During the Spanish rule in Mexico, which lasted exactly three
centuries, from 152 1 to 1821, there were three controlling privileged
33'J
34° "fcistorical IRotes on /IDcjico.
classes, the people counting for absolutely nothing. The first was the
clergy, who, by obtaining bequests from persons who were about to die,
and in various other ways had accumulated very large fortunes, owning
directly or through mortgages over two thirds of the whole real estate
of the country, and so absorbed the principal financial business.
Their power was based not only upon their immense wealth, but also
upon the religious influence which they exercised, and on the fact of
their being the only educated class, for although they knew but little,
they knew a great deal more than the other classes did, who were kept
in ignorance. Their thorough discipline assisted the clergy very
materially in wielding great influence. They were so powerful during
the Spanish rule that a Viceroy once attempted to enforce his authority
over a recalcitrant archbishop of the City of Mexico by arresting him
and sending him to Spain. The Viceroy succeeded in making the
arrest, but when it became known that the archbishop was on his way
to Veracruz, so violent was the excitement of the people that he was
speedily brought back to the City of Mexico, and the Viceroy was
obliged to leave the country.
The Spanish Colonial Government of Mexico was an autotheo-
cratic one, the civil and ecclesiastical administrations being as closely
united as it was possible for them to be. Among the long list of
Spanish Viceroys who ruled Mexico during the three hundred years of
the colonial period, ten out of sixty-two, or over seventeen per cent.,'
were archbishops of Mexico, the highest ecclesiastical dignitaries in the
colony; and the archbishop was, in fact, the ex-officio Viceroy, as
whenever a Viceroy died, or was removed and left the country before
his successor arrived, generally the archbishop took his place.
The second privileged class were the Spaniards by birth, who
formed a kind of aristocracy, a few of them having titles; and being
the only one holding offices of trust, responsibility, or emolument in
the country, and monopolizing the principal commercial business, they
were also a wealthy class. They were so jealous of the native Mexi-
cans that even the children of Spaniards born in Mexico of a Mexican
mother were not considered on the same footing as the Spaniards; they
were called Creoles, had no rights whatever, and could not fill any
public office or hold any position of importance. But few Spanish
women ever went to Mexico. The men generally went there while
very young, grew up in the country, and married Mexican women,
occasionally pure-blooded Indians, but generally the daughters of
Spaniards by Mexican mothers born in Mexico. From these unions
came the Creoles.
The third class was the army, which was comparatively small, but
' A nominal list of Viceroys in Mexico during the colonial period, stating the time
that they remained in office, will be found at the end of this paper.
pbilosopbp of tbe /IDcjican 1Rex>olutton9. 341
was a very important element in the country. Native Mexicans
usually held very subordinate positions, only in a few cases being
admitted among the commissioned officers.
These three classes were, of course, devotedly attached to the
Spanish rule, because under it they prospered and had all the wealth
and power they could possibly desire, while any change would only
endanger their position and welfare. The higher clergy were, of
course, heartily loyal to Spain, while a few members of the lower clergy,
Mexicans by birth — the Church being almost the only career open to
the natives — having on the other hand some patriotic feeling, were the
only ones who could appreciate the condition of things, and longed for
a change.
However much may be said against the Spanish colonial rule in
Mexico, it must be borne in mind that it was only a necessary conse-
quence of the ideas and conditions of things prevailing at that time,
and although it was selfish and greedy, the Spaniards did nothing more
than it was thought proper at the time to do; and it cannot be denied
that the Madrid Government had a kindly feeling towards the natives,
which was, however, not always shared by the authorities, and that,
notwithstanding all the sufferings and degradation to which they were
subjected they were not exterminated, as was the unhappy fate of those
living in the northern part of the New World, settled by the Anglo-
Saxon race.
Spain gave Mexico all she had — her religion, her language, her
laws, her civilization, her genius; and not for the exclusive benefit of
her subjects of Spanish descent; the conquered race also shared these
advantages, and produced many men of note as lawyers, priests,
mathematicians, astronomers, literary men and'artisls. The centrali-
zation of power and the common language began the work of assimila-
tion, which although far from being wholly accomplished, yet had its
beginning during the time of the Spanish conquest.
Opposition of Privileged Classes to Independence. — The opposition of
the clergy to independence from Spain, and the alarm with which they
viewed the movement in that direction were so great that its leaders
were excommunicated by all the bishops of the country the moment
the insurrection broke out. The Inquisition commenced proceedings
against them, and several members of the higher clergy took up arms
against the cause of independence. The Bishop of Oaxaca, forgetting
the teachings of the founder of his religion, organized his clergy into a
regiment to fight against the insurgents; but the martial prelate had no
occasion to come into conflict with them, for he fled from the city,
when Morelos approached it in 1812.
Something similar happened in Colombia, where the Bishop of
Popayan, Jimenez de Padilla, incited the natives in favor of the
342 Ibistorical IRotes on /IDejico.
Spaniards by his preaching and fought the patriots with his sword,
until the royalists capitulated to Bolivar, on June 8, 1822, after eleven
years of hard fighting, for which it has been called the Colombian
Vendue, comparing it with the resistance that the French Revolutionists
met in that province.
The higher Catholic clergy in Peru took the same attitude. In
Argentina a capitulation was signed, on P'ebruary 20, 1813, by General
Belgrano, commanding the Argentine troops, with General Tristan,
commander of the Spanish army, by which the latter bound himself
under oath not to take up arms during the war against the Argentine
Government within the limits of the Viceroyalty of La Plata, and the
Archbishop of Charcas in Argentina, and the Bishop of La Paz in
Upper Peru, released the Spanish officer from his oath, under the plea
that God did not consider binding treaties made with insurgents.
The example of the United States, and even that of Spain — where
the people rebelled against the Government established by Napoleon
in 180.8, under his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, notwithstanding that it
had the sanction of King Ferdinand VIL, who had abdicated in favor
of the French Emperor — could not but affect the Spanish colonies in
America, and most of them proclaimed their independence in 1810.
In the preceding paper on " The Genesis of Mexican Independ-
ence," I dwelt upon the causes of the same, and upon the remarkable
coincidence that it was proclaimed almost simultaneously in all the
American colonies of Spain, and I therefore do not say here any
more upon the subject.
Proclamation of Itidependence. — Independence was proclaimed in