DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF
TITUS LIVIUS
BY
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE
TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN BY
NINIAN HILL THOMSON, M.A.
LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1883
TO PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI.
DEAR PROFESSOR VILLARI,
Permit me to inscribe your name on a translation of Machiavelli's
Discourses which I had your encouragement to undertake, and in which I
have done my best to preserve something of the flavour of the original.
Yours faithfully,
NINIAN HILL THOMSON.
FLORENCE, May 17, 1883.
BOOK I.
PREFACE
CHAPTER
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of
Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman
Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of
the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made
Rome free and powerful
V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of
the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire
power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of
commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as
would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to
accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to
accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct
old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits
praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that
Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to
their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and
made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced
to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had
recourse to Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident
it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be
preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after
one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great
results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession
of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be
without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and
the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not
forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often
hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments
for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must
retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken
possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their
citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude;
and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity
for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through
their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until
they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer
to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the
Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the
free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp
for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought
about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the
liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth
should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is
a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to
ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the
course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different
Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to
be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes
may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or
to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute
Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should
not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not
to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity
in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at
first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in
particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless
or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is
utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest
degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom,
have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their
freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find
this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to
bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done
by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too
powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to
objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to
advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often
desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises
easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an
excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body
of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where
equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country,
signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we
make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were
given without respect to Age
BOOK II.
PREFACE
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or
to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these
were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round
about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of
Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their
power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and
Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the
Countries of others
IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has
reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to
await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by
Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that
tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of
ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to
Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be
just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient
warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not
the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to
their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to
Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor;
nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it
the Romans always avoided half measures
XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think
to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them,
without yielding him any advantage
XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have
obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory
turns to defeat
XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or
private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have
them hinder her designs
XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy
Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then
prowess
XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns
XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the
fullest Powers
BOOK III.
I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought
back to its beginnings
II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of
Brutus
IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom
he has deprived of it
V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom
VI. Of Conspiracies
VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from
Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other
times reek with blood
VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed
to its character and condition
IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times
X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him
at all hazards
XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than
they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset
XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his
own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity
XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army,
or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights
or Sounds
XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is
disadvantageous to have more leaders than one
XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in
quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended
by wealth or connection who are most in favour
XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an
important Office or Command
XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to
forestall the designs of his adversary
XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a
Multitude
XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the
might of the Roman Arms
XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that
taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other
achieved in Spain
XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of
Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory
XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome
XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude
XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens
XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States
XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false opinion
that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided
XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about;
since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of
generous deeds
XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince
XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal
service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City
should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy
XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change
the same spirit and bearing
XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible
XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your soldiers
with confidence in one another and in you
XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic
are led to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are
bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince
XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new
measures; and that the more unusual the measures, the greater the danger
XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at
the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than
Women
XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes;
and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy
XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide
XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places
XL. That Fraud is fair in War
XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and
in either way is well defended
XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed
XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times
nearly the same character
XLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often
succeed
XLV. Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy's
attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset
XLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated
XLVII. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget
private wrongs
XLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder we
should suspect some fraud to lurk behind
XLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of
new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius
received the surname of Maximus
NICCOLÃ’ MACHIAVELLI
TO
ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI
HEALTH.
I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe you, is
at any rate the greatest which Niccolò Machiavelli has it in his power
to offer. For in it I have expressed whatever I have learned, or have
observed for myself during a long experience and constant study of human
affairs. And since neither you nor any other can expect more at my
hands, you cannot complain if I have not given you more.
You may indeed lament the poverty of my wit, since what I have to say
is but poorly said; and tax the weakness of my judgment, which on many
points may have erred in its conclusions. But granting all this, I know
not which of us is less beholden to the other: I to you, who have forced
me to write what of myself I never should have written; or you to me,
who have written what can give you no content.
Take this, however, in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend
should be taken, in respect whereof we always look more to the intention
of the giver than to the quality of the gift. And, believe me, that in
one thing only I find satisfaction, namely, in knowing that while in
many matters I may have made mistakes, at least I have not been mistaken
in choosing you before all others as the persons to whom I dedicate
these Discourses; both because I seem to myself, in doing so, to have
shown a little gratitude for kindness received, and at the same time
to have departed from the hackneyed custom which leads many authors to
inscribe their works to some Prince, and blinded by hopes of favour or
reward, to praise him as possessed of every virtue; whereas with more
reason they might reproach him as contaminated with every shameful vice.
To avoid which error I have chosen, not those who are but those who from
their infinite merits deserve to be Princes; not such persons as have it
in their power to load me with honours, wealth, and preferment, but such
as though they lack the power, have all the will to do so. For men, if
they would judge justly, should esteem those who are, and not those
whose means enable them to be generous; and in like manner those
who know how to govern kingdoms, rather than those who possess the
government without such knowledge. For Historians award higher praise
to Hiero of Syracuse when in a private station than to Perseus the
Macedonian when a King affirming that while the former lacked nothing
that a Prince should have save the name, the latter had nothing of the
King but the kingdom.
Make the most, therefore, of this good or this evil, as you may esteem
it, which you have brought upon yourselves; and should you persist in
the mistake of thinking my opinions worthy your attention, I shall not
fail to proceed with the rest of the History in the manner promised in
my Preface. _Farewell_.
DISCOURSES
ON THE FIRST DECADE OF
TITUS LIVIUS.
BOOK I.
* * * * *
PREFACE.
Albeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed to censure than
to praise the work of others, has constantly made the pursuit of new
methods and systems no less perilous than the search after unknown
lands and seas; nevertheless, prompted by that desire which nature has
implanted in me, fearlessly to undertake whatsoever I think offers a
common benefit to all, I enter on a path which, being hitherto untrodden
by any, though it involve me in trouble and fatigue, may yet win me
thanks from those who judge my efforts in a friendly spirit. And
although my feeble discernment, my slender experience of current
affairs, and imperfect knowledge of ancient events, render these efforts
of mine defective and of no great utility, they may at least open the
way to some other, who, with better parts and sounder reasoning and
judgment, shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain no credit, at
all events I ought to incur no blame.
When I see antiquity held in such reverence, that to omit other
instances, the mere fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at a
great price, in order that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn his
house, or to have it copied by those who take delight in this art; and
how these, again, strive with all their skill to imitate it in their
various works; and when, on the other hand, I find those noble labours
which history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the monarchies and
republics of old times, by kings, captains, citizens, lawgivers, and
others who have toiled for the good of their country, rather admired
than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced by every one that not a
trace of that antique worth is now left among us, I cannot but at once
marvel and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more because I
perceive that, in civil disputes between citizens, and in the bodily
disorders into which men fall, recourse is always had to the decisions
and remedies, pronounced or prescribed by the ancients.
For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient
jurisconsults, which, being reduced to a system, teach the jurisconsults
of our own times how to determine; while the healing art is simply
the recorded experience of the old physicians, on which our modern
physicians found their practice. And yet, in giving laws to a
commonwealth, in maintaining States and governing kingdoms, in
organizing armies and conducting wars, in dealing with subject nations,
and in extending a State's dominions, we find no prince, no republic, no
captain, and no citizen who resorts to the example of the ancients.
This I persuade myself is due, not so much to the feebleness to which
the present methods of education have brought the world, or to the
injury which a pervading apathy has wrought in many provinces and cities
of Christendom, as to the want of a right intelligence of History, which
renders men incapable in reading it to extract its true meaning or to
relish its flavour. Whence it happens that by far the greater number
of those who read History, take pleasure in following the variety of
incidents which it presents, without a thought to imitate them; judging
such imitation to be not only difficult but impossible; as though the
heavens, the sun, the elements, and man himself were no longer the same
as they formerly were as regards motion, order, and power.
Desiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought fit to note down
with respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped
the malignity of Time, whatever seems to me essential to a right
understanding of ancient and modern affairs; so that any who shall read
these remarks of mine, may reap from them that profit for the sake of
which a knowledge of History is to be sought. And although the task be
arduous, still, with the help of those at whose instance I assumed the
burthen, I hope to carry it forward so far, that another shall have no
long way to go to bring it to its destination.
CHAPTER I. - _Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular
of that of Rome._
No one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning, who were its
founders, and what its ordinances and laws, will marvel that so much
excellence was maintained in it through many ages, or that it grew
afterwards to be so great an Empire.
And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been
founded either by the people of the country in which they stand, or by
strangers. Cities have their origins in the former of these two ways
when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely if
they live dispersed in many and small societies, each of them unable,
whether from its situation or its slender numbers, to stand alone
against the attacks of its enemies; on whose approach there is no time
left to unite for defence without abandoning many strongholds, and thus
becoming an easy prey to the invader. To escape which dangers, whether
of their own motion or at the instance of some of greater authority
among them, they restrict themselves to dwell together in certain
places, which they think will be more convenient to live in and easier
to defend.
Among many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and
Venice; the former of which, for reasons like those just now mentioned,
was built by a scattered population under the direction of Theseus. To
escape the wars which, on the decay of the Roman Empire daily renewed in
Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of Barbarians, numerous refugees,
sheltering in certain little islands in a corner of the Adriatic Sea,
gave beginning to Venice; where, without any recognized leader to direct
them, they agreed to live together under such laws as they thought best
suited to maintain them. And by reason of the prolonged tranquility
which their position secured, they being protected by the narrow sea and
by the circumstance that the tribes who then harassed Italy had no ships
wherewith to molest them, they were able from very small beginnings to
attain to that greatness they now enjoy.
In the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the
settlers are either wholly independent, or they are controlled by
others, as where colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a
republic, to relieve their countries of an excessive population, or to
defend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at small
cost. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all
parts of their dominions. It may also happen that such cities are
founded by a prince merely to add to his renown, without any intention
on his part to dwell there, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the
Great. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in freedom,
seldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms.
The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been
independent from the first; for whether we ascribe its origin to the
soldiers of Sylla, or, as some have conjectured, to the mountaineers of
Fiesole (who, emboldened by the long peace which prevailed throughout
the world during the reign of Octavianus, came down to occupy the plain
on the banks of the Arno), in either case, it was founded under the
auspices of Rome nor could, at first, make other progress than was
permitted by the grace of the sovereign State.
The origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people,
either by themselves or under some prince, are constrained by famine,
pestilence, or war to leave their native land and seek a new habitation.
Settlers of this sort either establish themselves in cities which they
find ready to their hand in the countries of which they take possession,
as did Moses; or they build new ones, as did Æneas. It is in this last
case that the merits of a founder and the good fortune of the city
founded are best seen; and this good fortune will be more or less
remarkable according to the greater or less capacity of him who gives
the city its beginning.
The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a site,
or by the laws which he frames. And since men act either of necessity or
from choice, and merit may seem greater where choice is more restricted,
we have to consider whether it may not be well to choose a sterile
district as the site of a new city, in order that the inhabitants, being
constrained to industry, and less corrupted by ease, may live in closer
union, finding less cause for division in the poverty of their land;
as was the case in Ragusa, and in many other cities built in similar
situations. Such a choice were certainly the wisest and the most
advantageous, could men be content to enjoy what is their own without
seeking to lord it over others. But since to be safe they must be
strong, they are compelled avoid these barren districts, and to plant
themselves in more fertile regions; where, the fruitfulness of the soil
enabling them to increase and multiply, they may defend themselves
against any who attack them, and overthrow any who would withstand their
power.
And as for that languor which the situation might breed, care must be
had that hardships which the site does not enforce, shall be enforced by
the laws; and that the example of those wise nations be imitated, who,
inhabiting most fruitful and delightful countries, and such as were
likely to rear a listless and effeminate race, unfit for all manly
exercises, in order to obviate the mischief wrought by the amenity and
relaxing influence of the soil and climate, subjected all who were to
serve as soldiers to the severest training; whence it came that better
soldiers were raised in these countries than in others by nature rugged
and barren. Such, of old, was the kingdom of the Egyptians, which,
though of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the severe training
which its laws enforced, produced most valiant soldiers, who, had their
names not been lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more
praise than Alexander the Great and many besides, whose memory is still
fresh in men's minds. And even in recent times, any one contemplating
the kingdom of the Soldan, and the military order of the Mamelukes
before they were destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, must have seen how
carefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of warlike exercise;
showing thereby how much they dreaded that indolence to which their
genial soil and climate might have disposed them, unless neutralized by
strenuous laws. I say, then, that it is a prudent choice to found your
city in a fertile region when the effects of that fertility are duly
balanced by the restraint of the laws.
When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a
city, Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build it
on Mount Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could be
handled that the city built there might present a semblance of the human
form, which would be a thing strange and striking, and worthy of so
great a monarch. But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to
live, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Whereupon,
Alexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it stood, built
Alexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of the
Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their abode.
To him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of Rome, if he assign
its beginning to Æneas, it will seem to be of those cities which were
founded by strangers if to Romulus, then of those founded by the natives
of the country. But in whichever class we place it, it will be seen to
have had its beginning in freedom, and not in subjection to another
State. It will be seen, too, as hereafter shall be noted, how strict was
the discipline which the laws instituted by Romulus, Numa, and its other
founders made compulsory upon it; so that neither its fertility, the
proximity of the sea, the number of its victories, nor the extent of its
dominion, could for many centuries corrupt it, but, on the contrary,
maintained it replete with such virtues as were never matched in any
other commonwealth.
And because the things done by Rome, and which Titus Livius has
celebrated, were effected at home or abroad by public or by private
wisdom, I shall begin by treating, and noting the consequences of those
things done at home in accordance with the public voice, which seem most
to merit attention; and to this object the whole of this first Book or
first Part of my Discourses, shall be directed.
CHAPTER II. - Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them
the Roman Commonwealth belonged.
I forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset have
been dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which from
their earliest beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign
control, being governed from the first as pleased themselves, whether as
republics or as princedoms.
These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had different
laws and institutions. For to some at their very first commencement, or
not long after, laws have been given by a single legislator, and all at
one time; like those given by Lycurgus to the Spartans; while to others
they have been given at different times, as need rose or accident
determined; as in the case of Rome. That republic, indeed, may be called
happy, whose lot has been to have a founder so prudent as to provide for
it laws under which it can continue to live securely, without need to
amend them; as we find Sparta preserving hers for eight hundred years,
without deterioration and without any dangerous disturbance. On the
other hand, some measure of unhappiness attaches to the State which,
not having yielded itself once for all into the hands of a single wise
legislator, is obliged to recast its institutions for itself; and of
such States, by far the most unhappy is that which is furthest removed
from a sound system of government, by which I mean that its institutions
lie wholly outside the path which might lead it to a true and perfect
end. For it is scarcely possible that a State in this position can ever,
by any chance, set itself to rights, whereas another whose institutions
are imperfect, if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of
its amendment, may in the course of events arrive at perfection. It is
certain, however, that such States can never be reformed without
great risk; for, as a rule, men will accept no new law altering the
institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such a change be
demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger,
the State may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is
established. In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence,
which was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence of the affair of
Arezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in consequence of the affair of Prato.
Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome,
and to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its
perfection, I say, as has been said before by many who have written of
Governments, that of these there are three forms, known by the names
Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that those who give its
institutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three,
according as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many have thought,
wiser teachers, will have it, that there are altogether six forms
of government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in
themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become
hurtful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others
dependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related,
that it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a
Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while a
Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. So that if the founder of a
State should establish any one of these three forms of Government, he
establishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he may take
can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close
resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.
These diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by
chance. For in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few
in number, for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts; but
afterwards, as they increased and multiplied, gathered themselves into
societies, and, the better to protect themselves, began to seek who
among them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom, making
him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose the knowledge of
such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to those which are
bad and shameful. For observing that when a man wronged his benefactor,
hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy for the other, and
that the ungrateful were blamed, while those who showed gratitude were
honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw done to others might
be done to themselves, to escape these they resorted to making laws and
fixing punishments against any who should transgress them; and in this
way grew the recognition of Justice. Whence it came that afterwards, in
choosing their rulers, men no longer looked about for the strongest, but
for him who was the most prudent and the most just.
But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer
elective, hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their
ancestors, and, quitting worthy courses, took up the notion that princes
had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in sumptuous
display and wantonness, and whatever else ministers to pleasure so that
the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel fear, and passing
from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon sprang up.
Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince, and plots and
conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were weak, or
afraid for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for their birth,
courage, wealth, and station, could not tolerate the shameful life of
the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these powerful men,
took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of, obeyed these
others as their liberators; who, on their part, holding in hatred the
name of sole ruler, formed themselves into a government and at first,
while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh, observed the
laws they themselves made, and postponing personal advantage to the
common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and privately with
the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government passing, afterwards,
to their descendants who, never having been taught in the school of
Adversity, knew nothing of the vicissitudes of Fortune, these not
choosing to rest content with mere civil equality, but abandoning
themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted, without respect to
civil rights what had been a government of the best into a government of
the few; and so very soon met with the same fate as the tyrant.
For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured,
in whatever way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who
with the aid of the people overthrew them. But the recollection of the
tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in
the minds of the people, who therefore felt no desire to restore
the monarchy, they had recourse to a popular government, which they
established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any place
in it. And because all governments inspire respect at the first, this