reverence among men : should he distribute them as the arts
are distributed ; that is to say to a favored few only, — for one
skilled individual has enough of medicine, or of any other art,
for many unskilled ones? Shall this be the manner in which
I distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give
them to all ? To all, said Zeus ; I should like them all to
have a share ; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the
virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order,
that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put
to death as a plague of the State.
And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and
mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering
or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their
deliberations : and when any one else interferes, then, as you
say, they object, if he be not of the favored few, and that, as
I say, is very natural. But when they come to deliberate
42 Hermes (her'mez) : messenger of the gods, corresponding to the Roman
Mercury.
84 PLATO THE TEACHER
about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice
and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks
of them, as is also natural, because they think that
every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that
states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have ex-
plained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.
And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in
thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of
justice and every other political virtue, let me give you a
further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware,
if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful in any
other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him
or are angry with mm, and his relations think that he is mad
and go and admonish him ; but when honesty is in question,
or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is
dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells
the truth about his dishonesty, in this case they deem that to
be madness which in the other case was held by them to be
good sense. They say that men ought to profess honesty
whether they are honest or not, and that a man is mad who
does not make such a profession. Their notion is, that a
man must have some degree of honesty ; and that if he has
none at all he ought not to be in the world.
I have been showing that they are right in admitting every
man as a counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of
opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now
endeavor further to show that they regard this virtue, not as
•gfveilby nature, or growing spontaneously, but as capable of
being learned and acquired by study. For injustice is pun-
ished, whereas no one would instruct, or rebuke, or be angry at
those whose calamities they suppose to come to them either by
nature or chance; they do not try to alter them, they do but
pity them. Who would be so foolish as to chastise or instruct
the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble ? And for this
reason ; they know, I imagine, that this sort of good and evil
comes to them by nature and chance ; whereas if a man is
wanting in those good qualities which come to men from
study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary
evil qualities, men are angry with him, and punish him and
reprove him. And one of those evil qualities is impiety and
injustice, and they may be described generally as the oppo-
PROTAGORAS 85
site of political virtue. When this is the case, any man will
be angry with another, and reprimand him, — clearly under
the impression that by study and learning the virtue in
which he is deficient may be acquired. For if you will 32 *
think, Socrates, of the effect which punishment has on evil-
doers, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind
virtue may be acquired ; for no one punishes the evil-doer
under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,
— only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that way.
But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not
retaliate for a past wrong, for that which is done cannot be
undone, but he has regard to the future, and is desirous that
the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished,
may be deterred from doing wrong again. And he implies
that virtue is capable of being taught ; as he undoubtedly
punishes for the sake of prevention. This is the notion of
all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly.
And the Athenians, too, like other men, retaliate on those
whom they regard as evil-doers ; and this argues them to be
of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired
and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly
enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are
right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about
politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of
being taught and acquired.
There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by
you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why
good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained
from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing
towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish
themselves ? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue
and take up the argument. Please to consider : Is there or
is there not some one quality in which all the citizens must
be partakers, if there is to be a city at all ? In the answer to
this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty;
there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this
quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the
smith, or the potter, but justice and temperance and
holiness, and, in a word, manly virtue — if this is the quality
of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very
condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he
86 PLATO THE TEACHER
who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a
grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until
by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against
instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to
death under the idea that he is incurable — if, I say, this be
true, and nevertheless good men have their sons taught other
things and not this, do consider how extraordinary would be
their conduct. For we have shown that they think virtue
capable of being taught and inculcated both in private and
public ; and yet, notwithstanding this, they teach their sons
lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the pun-
ishment of death : but those things, the ignorance of which
may cause death and exile to those who have no knowledge
or training — aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a
word, may be the ruin of families — those things, I say, they
are supposed not to teach them, not to take the utmost care
.that they should learn. That is not likely, Socrates.
Education and admonition commence in the first years of
childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse
and father and tutor are quarreling about the improvement of
the child as soon as ever he is able to understand them : he
cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him
that this is just and that is unjust ; this is honorable, that is
dishonorable ; this is holy, that is unholy ; do this and abstain
from that. And if he obeys, well and good ; if not, he is
straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of warped wood.
At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them
to see to his manners even more than to his reading and
music ; 43 and the teachers do as they are desired. And when
the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand
what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken,
they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads
6 at school ; in these are contained many admonitions, and
many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous
men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he
may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them.
Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that
their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief;
and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they intro-
duce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the
43 See Republic II., 376, and note 17.
PROTAGORAS 87
lyric poets ; and these they set to music, and make their har-
monies and rhythms quite familiar to the children, in order
that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and
rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action ; for the
life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm.
Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, 44 in order that
their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that
the weakness of their bodies may not force them to play the
coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done
by those who have the means, and those who have the means
are the rich : their children begin education soonest and leave
off latest. When they have done with masters, the State again
compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern
which they furnish, and not after their own fancies ; and just
as in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with
a stylus for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the
tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the
laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers who were of
old time ; these are given to the young man, in order to guide
him in his conduct whether as ruler or ruled ; and he who
transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called
to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but
also in many others. Now when there is all this care about
virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder
and doubt whether virtue can be taught ? Cease to wonder,
for the opposite would be far more surprising.
But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill ?
Let me explain that, — which is far from being wonderful, if, as ^
I have been saying, the very existence of the State implies that
virtue is not any man's private possession. If this be true
— and nothing can be truer — then I will ask you to im-
agine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowl-
edge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the
existence of a State. Suppose that there could be no State un-
less we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity,
and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in
private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and
openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not con-
cealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting
them— for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and
." See Republic III., 4°3> and following.
88 PLATO THE TEACHER
virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one
is ready to teach justice and the laws ; suppose, I say, that
there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teach-
ing one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that
the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good
than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons
grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to
their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a
good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son
of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be
good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and un-
acquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I
would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the
worst of those who have been brought up in laws and human-
ities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if
he were to be compared with men who had no education, or
courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which
compelled them to practice virtue — with the savages, for ex-
ample, whom the poet Pherecrates 45 exhibited on the stage at
the last year's Lenaean festival. 46 If you were living among
men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, 47 you would be only
too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, 48 and you
would sorrowfully desire the rascality of this part of the world.
And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why ? Because all
men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability,
and you say that there is no teacher. You might as well ask,
8 Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be
any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach
the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned
of their fathers ? He and his fellow- workmen have taught them
to the best of their ability, — but who will carry them further
45 Pherecrates (fe-rek'ra-tez, 5th century B.C.): an Athenian writer of
comedy.
4,f The Lenaea (le-ne'a) or Feast of Vats, was one of a series of religious
festivals celebrated in Athens in honor of Dionysus, god of wine. After a
public banquet the citizens went to the theatre, where tragedies and comedies
were presented.
47 The chorus was originally a number of persons who sang and danced
at religious festivals. The drama was developed out of the chorus of the
festivals in honor of Dionysus. Even after actors were introduced the
chorus was retained as an important element of the drama, though its place
became gradually limited and subordinate.
48 Eurybates (u-ryb'a-tez) and Phrynondas (fn-non'das) : " Notorious
villains." — Jowett.
PROTAGORAS 89
in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty,
Socrates, in finding a teacher of them ; but there would be no
difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant.
And this is true of virtue or of anything j and if a man is better
able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, that is as
much as we can expect. A teacher of this sort I believe my-
self to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge
which makes a man noble and good ; and I give my pupils
their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves con-
fess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of
payment : When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he-
pays my price, but there is no compulsion ; and if he does
not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of
the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he
declares to be their value.
Such is my apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by
which I endeavor to show that virtue may be taught, and that
this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also at-
tempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers
having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, as may be
seen in the sons of Polycleitus, who are of the same age as our
friends Paralus and Xanthippus, and who are very inferior to
their father j and this is true of many other artists. But I
ought not to say the same as yet of Paralus and Xanthippus
themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.
Protagoras ended, and in my ear —
'* So charming left his voice, that I the while
Thought him still speaking ; still stood fixed to hear."
At length when I saw that he had really finished, I gradually
recovered consciousness, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to
him : O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you
for having brought me hither ; I would not have missed the
speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine
that no human care could make men good ; but I know better
now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am
sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already
explained so much. For if a man were to go and consult 3 *£"
Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters,
he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse j but then if any one
has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can
90 PLATO THE TEACHER
neither answer nor ask j and if any one challenges the least
particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long ha-
rangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue
to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them ; whereas
our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he
has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can
answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the
answer ; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, have
a little question that I want to ask of you, and if you will only
answer me that, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying
that virtue can be taught ; that I will take upon your authority,
and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But
I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my
mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice
and reverence to men ; and several times while you were speak-
ing, justice and temperance and holiness, and all these quali-
ties, were described by you as if together they made up virtue.
Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of
which justice and temperance and holiness are parts j or whether
all these are only the names of one and the same thing : that
is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.
[Protagoras replies that the qualities which Socrates men-
tions are not different names for one and the same thing, but
are parts of a whole, just as* the features are parts of a
face, each entirely different from all the others and hav-
ing its own function. Socrates proceeds by a cross-exam-
ination of Protagoras to test the truth of this theory. First he
shows that if the parts of virtue are unlike, if, for example,
justice is not of the nature of holiness, nor holiness of the
nature of justice, then justice is unholy. Protagoras cannot
agree to this. He admits that justice bears a resemblance to
holiness, but denies that they are identical. He prefers to say
simply that they are different. The most unlike things, he
claims, can be shown to be alike from some point of view.
Socrates continues his questioning and draws Protagoras into
making statements which contradict his own theory that the
virtues are many and unlike. Protagoras asserts at one time
that folly is opposed to wisdom, and at another time that folly
is opposed to temperance ; but he has also been led to affirm
that everything has one opposite and only one. It becomes
PROTAGORAS 91
clear that he must renounce one of these statements or admit
that wisdom and temperance are the same.
Having obtained the reluctant consent of Protagoras to this
and reminding him that justice and holiness have been shown
to be nearly the same, Socrates begins a third attack which
Protagoras foresees must lead him to the admission that temper-
ance and justice are one and the same. To evade this conclu-
sion, Protagoras takes refuge in a long speech, which sounds
well but is not much to the point.]
When he had given this answer, the company cheered him.
And I said : Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and
when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember
what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and
you were going to converse with me, you would have had to
raise your voice ; so now, having such a bad memory, I will
ask you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me
with you.
What do you mean ? he said : how am I to shorten my
answers ? shall I make them too short ?
Certainly not, I said.
But short enough ? he said.
Yes, I said.
Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or
what appears to you to be short enough ?
I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to
speak about the same things at such length that words never
seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use
fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me, to
adopt the latter or more compendious method.
Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought,
and if I had followed the method of disputation which my
adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been
no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would
have been nowhere.
I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers,
and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if
he could help ; and I considered that there was no call upon
me to continue the conversation ; so I said : Protagoras, I
don't wish to force the conversation upon you if you had
rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such
92 PLATO THE TEACHER
a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now
you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are
able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as
in longer, for you are a master of wisdom ; but I cannot man-
age these long speeches : I only wish that I could. You, on
the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak
shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see
that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which
will prevent my staying to hear you at length (for I have to
be in another place), I will depart ; although I should have
liked to have heard you.
Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias
seized me by the hand, and in his left hand caught hold of
this old cloak of mine. He said : We cannot let you go,
Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our dis-
cussions : I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is
nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear
you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company
this pleasure.
Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son
of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired, and do now
heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I
would gladly comply with your request, if I could. But the
, truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an
impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with
Crison of Himera 49 when in his prime, or with some one of
the long or day course runners. 50 To that I should reply, that
I humbly make the same request to my own legs ; and they
can't comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison and
me in the same stadium, 51 you must bid him slacken his speed
to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly.
And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras
discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and
keep to the point, as he did at first ; if not, how can
there be any discussion ? For discussion is one thing, and
49 Crison (krl'son) ; Himera (him'e-ra) : a Greek city on the north coast of
Sicily.
50 It is interesting to note in this connection that in the revived Olympian
Games which took place at Athens in the summer of 1896, while American,
German, and other foreign athletes won most of the prizes, a Greek peasant
won the long race from Marathon to Athens, a distance of over twenty
miles.
61 Stadium (sta'di-iim) : Greek name for the foot-race course.
PROTAGORAS 93
making an oration is quite another, according to my way of
thinking.
But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may
fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to
speak in yours.
Here Alcibiades interposed, and said : That, Callias, is not
a fair statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits
that he cannot make a speech — in this he yields the palm to
Protagoras ; but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to
any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an
argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission,
and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative
skill, that is enough for Socrates ; but if he claims a superior-
ity in argument as well, let him ask and answer — not, when a
question is asked, having recourse to shifts and evasions, and
instead of answering, making a speech at such length that
most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Soc-
rates is likely to forget — I will be bound for that, although he
may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates
appears to me to be more in the right thau Protagoras ; that
is my opinion, and every man ought to say what he thinks.
When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one — Critias, I
believe — went on to say : O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias ap-
pears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras. And this led Al-
cibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But
we should not be partisans either of Socrates or Protagoras ;
let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up