the general idea of unreason, and then one of the two 26 !?"
proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not
desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which
the speaker justly reviled ; and the other leading us to the
right portion, in which madness lay, found another love, hav-
ing the same name, but yet divine, which he held up before
us and applauded as the author of the greatest benefits.
Phcedr. That is most true.
Soc. I am a great lover of these processes of division and
generalization ; they help me to speak and think. And if I
find any man who is able to see unity and plurality in nature,
him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a god. And
those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of
calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is
right or not. And I should like to know what name you
would give to your or Lysias' disciples, and whether this may
not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus • and
others practice ? Skillful speakers they are, and impart their
skill to any who will consent to worship them as kings and to
bring them gifts.
Phcedr. Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the
same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my
opinion, dialecticians.
[The rhetorician does not employ the " processes of division
and generalization" which Socrates praises in the art of the
dialectician. Instead of this, he relies upon a great array of
technical devices which are given imposing names and the
rules for which fill many books on rhetoric. It is true that
rhetoric has very great power in public meetings. The ora-
tor, however, does not acquire his power by a study of rules,
as the rhetoricians seem to think. Rules are only the pre-
liminaries of an art, and should not be confused with the art
itself.]
Soc. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus,
or to his father Acumenus, 49 and to say to him : " I know how
"See Rep., I., note 1. "See Protagoras, note 18.
1 66 PLATO THE TEACHER
to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling
effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that
sort of thing ; and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a
physician and a teacher of physic" — what do you suppose
that they would say ?
Phcedr. They would be sure to ask him whether he knew
" to whom " he would give them, and " when," and "how
much."
Soc. And suppose that he were to reply : " No ; I know
nothing of that ; I expect those whom I have taught all this
to do that of themselves. ' '
Phcedr. They would reply that he is a madman or a pedant
who fancies that he is a physician, because he has read some-
thing in a book, or has stumbled on a few drugs, although he
has no real understanding of the art of medicine.
Soc. And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or
Euripides n and say that he knows how to make a long speech
about a small matter, and a short speech about a great matter,
and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech,
or any other kind of speech, and in teaching this fancies that
he is teaching the art of tragedy ?
Phcedr. They too would surely laugh at him if he fancies
that tragedy is anything but the arranging of these elements
in a manner suitable to one another and to the whole.
Soc. But I do not suppose that they would be rude to him
or revile him. Would they not treat him as a musician would
treat a man who thinks that he is a harmonist because he
knows how to pitch the highest and lowest note; happening
to meet such a one he would not say to him savagely, " Fool,
you are mad ! " O, no ; he would rather say to him in a gen-
tle and musical tone of voice: "My good friend, he who
would be a harmonist must certainly know this, and yet he
may understand nothing of harmony if he has not got beyond
your stage of knowledge, for you only know the preliminaries
of harmony and not harmonies."
, Phcedr. Very true.
Soc. And would not Sophocles say to the display of
the would-be tragedian, that this was not tragedy but the
preliminaries of tragedy, and would not Acumenus say to
50 Sophocles (sofo-klez, 495-405 B.C.), Euripides (u-rip'i-dez, 480-406
B.C.}: great Athenian writers of tragedy.
PH^EDRUS 167
the would-be doctor that this was not medicine but the pre-
liminaries of medicine ?
Phcedr. Very true.
Soc. And if Adrastus 51 the mellifluous or Pericles 52 heard of
these wonderful arts, brachylogies and eikonologies M and all
the hard names which we have been endeavoring to draw into
the light of day, what would they say ? Instead of losing tem-
per and applying uncomplimentary epithets, as you and I have
been doing to the authors of such an imaginary art, their su-
perior wisdom would rather censure us, as well as them. Have
a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say, and
don't be angry with those who from some want of dialectical
skill are unable to define the nature of rhetoric, and conse-
quently suppose that they have found the art in the prelimi-
nary conditions of the art, and when they have taught these to
others, fancy that they have been teaching the whole art of
rhetoric ; but as to persuasion in detail and unity of composi-
tion, that they regard as an easy thing with which their dis-
ciples may supply themselves.
Phcedr. I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric
which these men teach and of which they write is such as you
describe — in that I agree with you. But I still want to know
where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be
acquired.
Soc. The perfection of oratory is, or rather must be, like
the perfection of all things, partly given by nature ; but this
is assisted by art, and if you have the natural power you will
be famous as a rhetorician, if you only add knowledge and
practice, and in either you may fall short. But the art, as far
as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of
Tisias 54 or Thrasymachus.
Phcedr. But in what direction then?
Soc. I should conceive that Pericles was the most accom-
plished of rhetoricians.
Phcedr. What of that ?
Soc. All the higher arts require much discussion and lofty
contemplation of nature ; this is the source of sublimity and
51 Adrastus (a-dras'tus).
52 See Protagoras, note 37.
63 Brachylogies : brevity in speech or writing. Eikonology : figurative
speaking.
54 Tisias (tfsl-as) : a rhetorician.
1 68 PLATO THE TEACHER
perfect comprehensive power. And this, as I conceive, was
the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles ac-
quired from his happening to know Anaxagoras. 55 He
7 was imbued with the higher philosophy, and attained the
knowledge of mind and matter, which was the favorite theme of
Anaxagoras, and hence he drew what was applicable to his art.
Phcedr. Explain.
Soc. Rhetoric is like medicine.
Phcedr. How is that?
Soc. Why, because medicine has to define the nature of the
body and rhetoric of the soul — if you would proceed, not em-
pirically but scientifically, in the one case to impart health
and strength by giving medicine and food, in the other to
implant the conviction which you require by the right use of
words and principles.
Phcedr. You are probably right in that.
[The physician must study the body in whole and part that
he may understand its nature and know how it may be af-
fected at different times and in different ways. Just so must
the rhetorician study the soul that his efforts may be intel-
ligent when he seeks to produce conviction in a soul.]
Soc. Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who
7 elaborates a system of rhetoric will give an exact de-
scription of the soul ; which he will make to appear either as
single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what
we should call showing the nature of the soul.
Phcedr. Exactly.
Soc. He will next proceed to speak of the instruments by
which the soul acts or is affected in any way.
Phcedr. True.
Soc. Thirdly, having arranged men and speeches, and their
moles and affections in different classes, and fitted them into
one another he will point out the connection between them —
he will show why one is naturally persuaded by a particular
form of argument, and another not.
55 Anaxagoras (an-aks-ag'o-ras 500 (?)-420 B.C.) :a Greek philosopher;
a friend of Pericles; banished from Athens 434 B.C. on charge of athe-
ism. He attempted to explain nature partly by blindly working material
causes, and partly by the occasional intervention of mind. See Phaedo, 97,
summary.
PH^EDRUS 169
P/uedr. That will certainly be a very good way.
Soc. Yes, that is the true and only way in which any sub-
ject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in
speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at
whose feet you have sat, improperly conceal all this about the
soul which they know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our
method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write
by rules of art.
Phadr. What is our method ?
Soc. I cannot give you the exact details ; but I should like
to tell you generally, as far as I can, how a man ought to pro-
ceed according to the rules of art.
Phozdr. Let me hear.
Soc. Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and there-
fore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of
human souls — they are so many and of such a nature, and
from them come the differences between man and man — he will
then proceed to divide speeches into their different classes.
Such and such persons, he will say, are affected by this or that
kind of speech in this or that way, and he will tell you why ;
he must have a theoretical notion of them first, and then he
must see them in action, and be able to follow them with all
his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts
of his masters. But when he is able to say what persons are
persuaded by what arguments, and recognize the indi-
vidual about whom he used to theorize as actually pres- 2 7 2 "
ent to him, and say to himself, " This is he and this is
the sort of man who ought to have that argument applied to
him in order to convince him of this ; " when he has attained
the knowledge of all this, and knows also when he should speak
and when he should abstain from speaking, and when he
should make use of pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, aggravated
effects, and all the other figures of speech j when, I say, he
knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not
till then, he is perfect and a consummate master of his art ; but
if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teach-
ing or writing them, and says that he speaks by rules of art,
he who denies this has the better of him. Well, the teacher
will say, is this, Phsedrus and Socrates, your account of the
art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another ?
Phcedr. He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possi-
170 PLATO THE TEACHER
bility of another, and yet the creation of such an art is not
easy.
[Now some say that this is a long rough road to the art of
rhetoric, and that there is a shorter and easier one which
ought to be followed. Their argument is like this : Where
goodness or justice is the question at issue, the rhetorician has
no need of truth. In the law courts, for example, men care
nothing about truth, but only about conviction. Now con-
viction is based on probability, and facts ought to be with-
held. It is the business of either party to invent lies which the
other cannot refute. Therefore the orator should say good-by
to truth and give his whole attention to probability.]
These and others like them are the precepts of the doctors
of the art. Am I not right, Phsedrus?
Phcedr. Certainly.
Soc. I cannot help feeling that this is a wonderfully myste-
rious art which Tisias has discovered, or whoever the gentleman
was, or whatever his name or country may have been, who
was the discoverer. Shall we say a word to him or not ?
Phcedr. What shall we say to him ?
Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I
were saying that probability was engendered in the minds of
the many by the likeness of the truth, and were setting forth
that he who knew the truth would always know how best to
discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything fur-
ther to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear
him j but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless
a man estimates the various characters of his hearers and is
able to divide existences into classes and to sum them up in
single ideas, he will never be a skillful rhetorician even within
the limits of human power. And this art he will not attain
without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to
undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men,
but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to
God and in all things to act acceptably to him as far as in
him lies ; for there is a saying of wiser men than our-
' selves, that a man of sense should not try to please his
fellow-servants (at least this should not be his principal ob-
ject) but his good and noble masters, so that, if the way is
PH.ftDRUS 171
long and circuitous, marvel not at this ; for, where the end is
great, there the way may be permitted to be long, but not for
lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tis-
ias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair
beginning in this.
Phcedr. I think, Socrates, that this is admirable, if only
practicable.
Soc. But even to fail in an honorable object is honorable.
Phcedr. True.
Soc. I think that enough has been said of a true and false
art of speaking.
Phcedr. Certainly.
Soc. But there is something yet to be said of propriety
and impropriety of writing.
Phcedr. Yes.
Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhet-
oric in a manner which will be acceptable to God ?
Phcedr. No, indeed. Do you ?
Soc. I have heard a tradition of antiquity, whether true
or not, antiquity only knows. If we had the truth ourselves,
do you think that we should care much about the opinions of
men ?
Phcedr. That is a question which needs no answer ; but I
wish that you would tell me what you say that you have
heard.
Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, 56 there was a famous
old god, whose name was Theuth 57 ; the bird which is called
the Ibis was sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many
arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and as-
tronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was
the use of letters. Now in those days Thamus 58 was the king
of the whole of Upper Egypt, which is the district surround-
ing that great city which is called by the Hellenes Egyptian
Thebes, 59 and they call the god himself Ammon. To him
came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the
other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them ;
he went through them, and Thamus inquired about their sev-
88 Naucratis (nau-kra'tis) : a city in the Delta of Egypt, on a branch of the
Nile.
"Theuth (thuth).
88 Thamus (tha'mus).
89 Thebes (thebz) : the ancient capital of Upper Egypt.
172 PLATO THE TEACHER
eral uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he
approved or disapproved of them. There would be no use in
repeating all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame
of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said
Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better
memories ; for this is the cure of forgetfulness and of folly.
Thamus replied : O most ingenious Theuth, he who has the
gift of invention is not always the best judge of the utility or
inutility of his own inventions to the users of them.
JO And in this instance a paternal love of your own child
has led you to say what is not the fact ; for this invention of
yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because
they will not use their memories ; they will trust to the exter-
nal written characters and not remember of themselves. You
have found a specific, not for memory but for reminiscence,
and you give your disciples only the pretence of wisdom ; they
will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing ;
they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know
nothing ; they will be tiresome, having the reputation of
knowledge without the reality.
Phcedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of
Egypt, or of any other country that you like.
Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona w that
oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of that day,
unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if
they heard the truth even from " oak or rock," that was
enough for them ; whereas, you seem to think not of the
truth but of the speaker, and of the country from which the
truth comes.
Phcedr. I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke; and I
think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.
Soc. He would be a simple person, and quite without un-
derstanding of the oracles Thamus and Amnion, who should
leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea
that the written word would be intelligible or certain ; or
who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge
and recollection of the same matters.
Phcedr. That is most true.
60 Dodona (do-do'na') : a city in Epirus (epi'rus), a country of ancient
Greece. Dodona was the seat of a very ancient and celebrated oracle of
the same name. Responses were said to be given in the rustling of leaves.
PH7EDRUS 173
Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfort-
unately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the
attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they pre-
serve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches.
You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you
want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the
speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they
have been once written down they are tossed about anywhere
among those who do and among those who do not understand
them. And they have no reticences or proprieties towards
different classes of persons j and, if they are unjustly assailed
or abused, their parent is needed to protect his offspring, for
they cannot protect or defend themselves.
Phcedr. That again is most true.
Soc. May we not imagine another kind of writing or
speaking far better than this is, and having far greater power,
— which is one of the same family, but lawfully begot- ,
ten? Let us see what his origin is. '
Phcedr. Who is he, and what do you mean about his
origin ?
Soc. I am speaking of an intelligent writing which is graven
in the soul of him who has learned, and can defend itself, and
knows when to speak and when to be silent.
Phcedr. You mean the word of knowledge which has a liv-
ing soul, and of which the written word is properly no more
than an image ?
Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. And I wish that
you would let me ask you a question : Would a husbandman,
who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and
which he wishes to be fruitful, and in sober earnest plant
them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis/' 1
that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing
in beauty (at least he does that, if at all, only as the show of a
festival) ; but those about which he is in earnest he sows in fit-
61 Adonis (a-do'nis) : a beautiful youth greatly beloved by Aphrodite.
Her grief was so great at his death that he was allowed to return to earth
and spend half of every year with her. His coming was attended by the
springing up of grass and flowers, and the singing ofbirds, and was symbol-
ical of the return of vegetation in spring after six months of hiding in the
ground. The Greek women celebrated yearly a festival in honor of AdonK
and for this occasion cresses and other such quick-growing herbs were grow n
jn pots. (L. and S.)
174 PLATO THE TEACHER
ting soil, and practices husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight
months they arrive at perfection ?
Phcedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in
earnest ; he will do the other, as you say, only as an amuse-
ment.
Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and
good and honorable has less understanding in reference to his
own seeds than the husbandman ?
Phcedr. Certainly not.
Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to write them in
water with pen and ink, or in dumb characters which have
not a word to say for themselves and cannot adequately ex-
press the truth ?
Phcedr. No, that is not likely.
Soc. No, that is not likely, — in the garden of letters he will
plant them only as an amusement, or he will write them down
as memorials against the forgetfulness of old age, to be treas-
ured by him and his equals when they, like him, have one foot
in the grave ; and he will rejoice in beholding their tender
growth ; and they will be his pastime while others are water-
ing the garden of their souls with banqueting and the like.
Phcedr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is igno-
ble, when a man is able to pass time merrily in the representa-
tion of justice and the like.
Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit
of the dialectician, who finds a congenial soul, and then with
knowledge engrafts and sows words which are able to help
themselves and him who planted them, and are not un-
fruitful, but have in them seeds which may bear fruit in
other natures, nurtured in other ways, — making the seed ever-
lasting and the possessors happy to the utmost extent of human
happiness.
Phcedr. Yes, indeed, that is far nobler.
Soc. And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises
we may decide about the conclusion.
Phcedr. About what conclusion?
Soc. About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writ-
ing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill
which was shown in them; for he brought us to this point.
And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the
nature of art and its opposite.
PH^EDRUS i;5
Phcedr. Yes, I think with you j but I wish that you would
repeat what was said.
Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars
of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them
as they are, and having defined them again to divide them
until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner
he is able to discern the nature of the soul and discover the
different modes of discourse which are adapted to different
natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that
the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler
nature, and the complex and composite to the complex nature
— until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to
handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nat-
ure allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose
of teaching or persuading ; that is the view which is implied
in the whole preceding argument.
Phcedr. Yes, that was our view, certainly.
Soc. Secondly, as to the justice of the censure which was
passed on speaking or writing discourses — did not our pre-
vious argument show —
Phcedr. Show what ?
Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was
or will be, whether private man or statesman, writes a political
treatise in his capacity of legislator, and fancies that there is a
great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of
his writing as he does is only a disgrace to him, whatever men
may say. For entire ignorance about the nature of justice and
injustice, and good and evil, and the inability to distinguish
the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than
disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the
whole world.
Phcedr. Certainly.
Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is
necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry
nor prose, spoken or written, are of any great value — if, g
like the compositions of the rhapsodes, 62 they are only
recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to
criticism or instruction ; and who thinks that even the best of
them are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only
« A class of wandering minstrels, who earned their living by reciting the
poems of Homer and other epics.
176 PLATO THE TEACHER
in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and
communicated orally and written in the soul, which is the true
way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness;
and that such principles are like legitimate offspring ; being,