your opinion about them.
I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not
even if he were one of my old enemies, the comic poets, 21 could
accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no
concern. Let us then, if you please, proceed with the in-
quiry.
[Socrates recalls an ancient doctrine that the souls of men
pass after death into the other world, whence they return and
21 See Apology, note 5. Eupolis (Q'po-lis), another comic poet of the day,
said of Socrates : " I hate Socrates, that prating beggar, who pays great at-
tention, forsooth, to all these other things, but as to how withal he shall be fed,
to this he gives no heed at all." Other instances also are known of the en-
mity of the poets for Socrates.
PIL^EDO 433
are born again into this world. This generation of the living
from the dead is analogous to other processes in nature. Just
as sleeping passes into waking and waking into sleeping,
as the greater becomes the less and the less grows into 7 °"
the greater, as all opposites pass, the one into the other,
so life passes into death and death again becomes life. To
complete the circle of nature it is necessary that death should
generate life.]
My dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to
die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death,
and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and
nothing would be alive — how could this be otherwise? For
if the living spring from any others who are not the dead, and
they die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?
There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes ; and I
think that what you say is entirely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too ; and we are
not walking in a vain imagination : but I am confident in the
belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that
the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead
are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion
than the evil.
Cebes added : Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowl-
edge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a
previous time in which we learned that which we now
recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul
was in some place before existing in the human form * ; here
then is another argument of the soul's immortality.
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias interposing, what proofs
are given of this doctrine of recollection ? I am not very sure
at this moment that I remember them.
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions.
If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give
22 <â– Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home."
— Wordsworth's " Intimations of Immortality."
28
434 PLATO THE TEACHER
a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there
were knowledge and right reason already in him ? And this
is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram 23 or to
anything of that sort.
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I
would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you
look at the matter in another way; I mean, if you are still
incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection ?
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias ; but I want to have
this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection,
and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect
and be convinced : but I should still like to hear what more
you have to say.
[Socrates gives a proof of the doctrine as follows : What we
recollect we must have known at some previous time. This
recollection is due to a power of mind called association.
73" For example, a lyre or a garment may remind us of the
person who has used the one or worn the other. Simmias
may make us think of Cebes because they are frequently in one
another's company. Likewise, the imperfect equality of two
pieces of wood or stone suggests the idea of perfect equality.
Indeed we must have the standard of perfect equality before
we can compare two things. Now where did we get our idea
of perfect equality. Surely not through our experience with
material objects in this life, for no two material objects are
absolutely alike. Their appearance is changing and they serve
only to recall the idea of absolute likeness which is ever the
same. Moreover the knowledge of perfect equality is not
given to us at birth, for all men do not possess it. It comes
to none save by a process of remembering, and what we call
learning is only recollection. Clearly then, our knowledge
of perfect equality and likewise of perfect beauty, perfect
goodness, perfect justice, and the like must have been acquired
by us before we came into this world. Therefore our souls
must have existed and had intelligence before birth.]
23 In a passage from Plato's Meno, which is often quoted in educational
journals to illustrate the Socratic method of questioning, a slave boy who
cannot read, answers "of himself," a series of simple questions about a
geometrical diagram. The boy is led in this way to see for himself the
truth of a certain geometrical proposition. Socrates argues that since the
boy has not learned these things in this life, he must be remembering them
from a former life.
PH^EDO 435
Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always
repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and es-
sence in general, and to this, which is now discovered to be
a previous condition of our being, we refer all our sensations,
and with this compare them — assuming this to have a prior
existence, then our souls must have had a prior existence, but
if not, there would be no force in the argument. There can
be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed before we were
born, then our souls must have existed before we were born,
and if not the ideas, then not the souls.
Yes, Socrates j I am convinced that there is precisely the
same necessity for the existence of the soul before birth, and
of the essence of which you are speaking : and the ar-
gument arrives at a result which happily agrees with my
own notion. For there is nothing which to my mind is so
evident as that beauty, good, and other notions of which you
were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute exist-
ence ; and I am satisfied with the proof.
Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied ? for I must convince
him too.
I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied : although he
is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is
convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that
after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven
even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling
of the many to which Cebes was referring — the feeling that
when the man dies the soul may be scattered, and that this
may be the end of her. For admitting that she may be gen-
erated and created in some other place, and may have existed
before entering the human body, why after having entered in
and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and
come to an end ?
Very true, Simmias, said Cebes ; that our soul existed be-
fore we were born was the first half of the argument, and this
appears to have been proven ; that the soul will exist after
death as well as before birth is the other half of which the
proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied.
But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given,
said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together — I mean
this and the former one, in which we admitted that every-
thing living is born of the dead. For if the soul existed be-
43^ PLATO THE TEACHER
fore birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born
only from death and dying, must she not after death continue
to exist, since she has to be born again ? surely the proof
which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect
that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument
further ; like children, you are haunted with a fear that when
the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away
and scatter her ; especially if a man should happen to die in
stormy weather and not when the sky is calm.
Cebes answered with a smile : Then, Socrates, you must
argue us out of our fears — and yet, strictly speaking, they are
not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is
a sort of hobgoblin ; him too we must persuade not to be
afraid when he is alone with him in the dark.
Socrates said : Let the voice of the charmer 24 be applied
daily until you have charmed him away.
And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Soc-
rates, when you are gone ?
Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many
good men, and there are barbarous races not a few : seek for
« him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains
nor money ; for there is no better way of using your
money. And you must not forget to seek for him among
yourselves too ; for he is nowhere more likely to be found.
The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And
now, if you please, let us return to the point of the argument
at which we digressed.
[Socrates leads the discussion. Another argument against
the dissolution of the soul at death is found in the nature of
the soul itself. Only those things which are compound
^ " or composite, like the objects of sense, are naturally
capable of being dissolved and changed. But the soul,
not being compound is indivisible and therefore indestructi-
ble. It belongs to that class of unchanging things which are
also invisible like the essence of beauty or equality. It is only
when the soul makes use of the senses that she is dragged by
the body down into the region of changeable things.]
24 As incantations are employed against hobgoblins, wise words must be
the charm against foolish fears. In another dialogue Plato speaks of the
soul being healed by the charm of fair words.
PHJEVO 437
But when returning into herself she reflects ; then she passes
into the realm of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and
unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she
ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered ;
then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in commun-
ion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the
soul is called wisdom ?
[Again when we compare the functions of the soul and body
we find that the soul is akin to the divine and the body to the
mortal. For the soul rules and governs, the body obeys and
serves.]
The soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and im-
mortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and
unchangeable ; and the body is in the very likeness of the
human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and multiform, and
dissoluble, and changeable.
[Even the body may be preserved almost entire for ages by
the embalmer's art.]
And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in
passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure,
and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, 25
whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go, — that the
soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away
and perishes immediately on quitting the body, as the many
say ? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The
truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing draws
after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had con-
nection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself
gathered into herself (for such abstraction has been the study
of her life). And what does this mean but that she has been
a true disciple of philosophy, and has practiced how to die
easily ? And is not philosophy the practice of death ? a
Certainly. 8l
That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible
world, — to the divine and immortal and rational : thither ar-
riving, she lives in bliss and is released from the error and folly
38 " And the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" — Eccl. xii. 7.
43$ PLATO THE TEACHER
of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills,
and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company
with the gods ? Is not this true, Cebes ?
Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.
But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the
time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the
body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body
and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led
to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a
man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of
his lusts, — the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and
avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is
dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ;
do you suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure and
unalloyed ?
That is impossible, he replied.
She is engrossed by the corporeal, which the continual as-
sociation and constant care of the body have made natural to
her.
[The souls of the wicked, loath to leave the body and fearful
of the world below, must wander about tombs 26 until
g^" they are imprisoned in another body. And some enter
the bodies of birds or animals which have natures like
their own. Others which are less evil pass again into the
forms of men.]
But he who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is en-
tirely pure at departing, is alone permitted to reach the gods. 27
And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true
votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and endure
and refuse to give themselves up to them, — not because they
fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of
98 " The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp
Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres
Lingering and sitting by a new-made grave
As loath to leave the body that it loved,
And linked itself by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state."
— Milton s "Comus."
87 Compare Phsedrus, 249.
PrLEDO 439
money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of
power and honor, because they dread the dishonor or disgrace
of evil deeds.
No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.
No indeed, he replied ; and therefore they who have a care
of their souls, and do not merely live in the fashions of the
body, say farewell to all this ; they will not walk in the ways
of the blind : and when Philosophy offers them purification
and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist
her influence, and to her they incline, and whither she leads
they follow her.
What do you mean, Socrates?
I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are con-
scious that their souls, when philosophy receives them, are
simply fastened and glued to their bodies : the soul is only able
to view existence through the bars of a prison, 28 and not in
her own nature ; she is wallowing in the mire of all ignorance ;
and philosophy, seeing the terrible nature of her confinement,
and that the captive through desire is led to conspire in „
her own captivity (for the lovers of knowledge are aware
that this was the original state of the soul, and that when she
was in this state philosophy received and gently counseled
her, and wanted to release her, pointing out to her that the
eye is full of deceit, and also the ear and the other senses, and
persuading her to retire from them in all but the necessary
use of them, and to be gathered up and collected into herself,
and to trust only to herself and her own intuitions of absolute
existence, and mistrust that which comes to her through others
and is subject to vicissitude) — philosophy shows her that this
is visible and tangible, but that what she sees in her own
nature is intellectual and invisible. And the soul of the true
philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance,
and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains
and fears, as far as she is able ; reflecting that when a man has
great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them,
not the sort of evil which might be anticipated — as for exam-
ple, the loss of his health or properly which he has sacrificed
to his lusts — but he has suffered an evil greater far, which is the
greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.
28 " For now we see through a glass darkly." — i Cor. xiii. 12. Compare
Rep., VII., 514 and following.
440 PLATO THE TEACHER
And what is that, Socrates? said Cebes.
Why this : When the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul
is most intense, all of us naturally suppose that the object of
this intense feeling is then plainest and truest : but this is not
the case.
Very true.
And this is the state in which the soul is most inthralled by
the body.
How is that ?
Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail
which nails and rivets the soul to the body, and engrosses her
and makes her believe that to be true which the body affirms
to be true j and from agreeing with the body and having the
same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and
ways, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to
the world below, but is always saturated with the body ; so
that she soon sinks into another body and there germinates
and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the
divine and pure and simple.
That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.
And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowl-
edge are temperate and brave j and not for the reason which
the world gives.
g Certainly not.
4 Certainly not ! For not in that way does the soul of a
philosopher reason ; she will not ask philosophy to release her
in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to
the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be
undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's
web. 29 But she will make herself a calm of passion, and follow
Reason, and dwell in her, beholding the true and divine
(which is not matter of opinion), and thence derive nourish-
ment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death
she hopes to go to her own kindred and to be freed from hu-
man ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which
has been thus nourished and has had these pursuits, will at her
departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the
winds and be nowhere and nothing.
29 Penelope (pe-nel'6-pe) : wife of the legendary hero Odysseus. During
his absence at the Trojan War she was beset by many suitors. To put them
off, she promised to make choice as soon as she finished a web she was
weaving ; but each night she unraveled what she wove during the day.
PKLEDO 441
When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time
there was silence ; he himself and most of us appeared to be
meditating on what had been said ; only Cebes and Simmias
spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing
this asked them what they thought of the argument, and
whether there was anything wanting ? For, said he, much is
still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to
sift the matter thoroughly. If you are talking of something
else I would rather not interrupt you, but if you are still
doubtful about the argument do not hesitate to say exactly
what you think, and let us have anything better which you
can suggest ; and if I am likely to be of any use, allow me to
help you.
Simmias said : I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did
arise in our minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the
other to put the question which we wanted to have answered
and which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our impor-
tunity might be troublesome under present circumstances.
Socrates smiled, and said : O Simmias, how strange that is ;
I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not re-
gard my present situation as a misfortune, if I am unable to
persuade you, and you will keep fancying that I am at all
more troubled now than at any other time. Will you not allow
that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the
swans ? °° For they, when they perceive that they must die,
having sung all their life long, do then sing more than ~
ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go
away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because
they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the
swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that
no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the
nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe ; which are
said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe
this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But be-
cause they are sacred to Apollo and have the gift of proph-
ecy and anticipate the good things of another world, there-
fore they sing and rejoice in that day more than they ever did
before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated
30 The swan was sacred to Apollo and said to be gifted with the power of
song and of prophecy. The myth of the swan's dying song has come down
to modern times.
442 PLATO THE TEACHER
servant of the same God, and the fellow-servant of the swans,
and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of
prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of
life less merrily than the swans. Cease to mind then about
this, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the
eleven magistrates of Athens allow.
[Since Socrates is so willing to continue the discussion,
Simmias and Cebes state their difficulties, — Simmias first as
follows : One may say that harmony is invisible, in-
g^" corporeal, perfect, and divine ; yet when the lyre is
destroyed, the harmony ceases. How then can the soul
which has the same relation to the body as harmony to the
lyre, survive the body ?
Cebes also uses a figure to express his doubt. It is reason-
able to say that a man lasts longer than the garment which
he wears. And yet a wearer, though he may make and wear
out many coats is himself outlived by the last. Now the body
is the garment of the soul ; and the soul may wear out many
bodies in one life and many more in the successive lives into
which it is born. But how can we prove that the soul may
not become weary and at last utterly perish in one of its
deaths, and so be outlived by the last body?
Here Phaedo interrupts the narration of his story to say to
Echecrates :]
All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an
unpleasant feeling at hearing them say this. When we had
been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken
seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only
into the previous argument, but into any future one ; either
we were not good judges, or there were no real grounds of
belief.
Ech. There I feel with you — indeed I do, Phsedo, and when
you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same
question : What argument can I ever trust again ? For what
could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates,
which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a har-
mony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attrac-
tion for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once,
as my own original conviction. And now I must begin
VHJEVO 443
again and find another argument which will assure me that
when the man is dead the soul dies not with him. Tell me, I
beg, how did Socrates proceed ? Did he appear to share the
unpleasant feeling which you mention ? or did he receive the
interruption calmly and give a sufficient answer ? Tell us, as
exactly as you can, what passed.
Phced. Often, Echecrates, as I have admired Socrates, I
never admired him more than at that moment. That he ~
should be able to answer was nothing, but what aston-
ished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving
manner in which he regarded the words of the young men,
and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted
by the argument, and his ready application of the healing art.
He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and
broken army, urging them to follow him and return to the
field of argument.
Ech. How was that ?
Phced. You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right
hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was