burden having MLm on the Mother Country. Australia has, as we
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Australasian Defence. 218
know, contributed to naval defence, but it is a defence confined to
her shores ; and if she confines her exertions to defence which is
close to her shores how can she guarantee that the circulation of
which I speak will not be cut off at a distance firom her shores ? I
think I detect in the lecturer's observations a neglect to notice that
there is a sequence in the operations of naval war. He seems to
imagine that if we were unhappily engaged in a great naval war
we could at once proceed to offensive operations. So far as history
teaches us anything, it teaches us that that cannot be. No country
can immediately proceed to offensive operations against the war-
shipping of her enemies, except upon the open seft, unless she has
at the outset not merely a superiority, but an overwhelming
superiority. The first operation is that of masking the enemy's
war-ships, and no offensive operations against territory can be
undertaken until it is certain the whole of the enemy's war-forces
are masked. But when the whole of the enemy's war-forces are
masked — that is, confined within her ports, and dare not stir out
for fear of disaster — the sea is absolutely free behind the forces
which are operating against the enemy's ports, and it stands to
reason that local defence is nowhere called in question. From
another point of view, I think attention should be drawn to the
value of fortified ports in two relations. Fortified ports are of the
greatest value to the inferior force, but they have never shown them*
selves of any value to the superior naval force, and when you speak
of the Briti^ navy sheltering itself to refit, &c., in fortified ports you
necessarily imply that that force is an inferior, and not a superior,
naval force. It has been the practice of the superior naval force in
all times, and was the practice of the French navy during the
Franco-German war, to carry out the refitting in absolutely un-
defended bases. The superior naval force requires a sheltered, but
not necessarily fortified, basis, because its superiority is itself the
defence of the base it is using. I think the lesson we should draw
from the paper — the question we should ask ourselves — is this:
Whether the Colonies could not see their way to contribute in some
measure to the general defence, which must be committed to the
Imperial Power, and whether, if they studied the matter carefully,
they would not see that by so acting they would be getting greater
protection for their money than they could possibly get by any
efforts, however strenuous, in the direction simply of local defence.
Sir John Pope Hennessy, K.C.M.Q., M.P. : I agree with my
gallant friend Admiral Colomb that it would be highly desirable if we
could induce H.M.'s Colonies to contribute to the navy of England,
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214 Atcstralasian Defence.
but there is something equally important suggested by the able paper
read to-night, and that is this : to create in this country a real
Minister of Defence. At this moment we have a " War Office," a
" Secretary of State for War." Is it not the fact that the main
defence of this Empire is a naval defence ? How does it come to
pass that the office in Pall Mall is given this exclusive title, and
that the navy is, as it were, to play a second part as compared with
the army ? The gallant officer who read the paper is right in saying
that the real defence of this Empire is a naval defence. If I might
venture to criticise one detail, I would express a slight doubt —
speaking as one,who, though not a visitor to Australia, has now and
then had the opportunity of meeting Australian statesmen— I would
express a doubt as to whether we might rely in time of war on the
Australians consenting to send their army thousands of miles away
from Australia. I understood from Sir Bevan Edwards that he
thought the stations at which the fleet is to refit and get coal might
possibly have to be defended by troops from Australia. Now, we
have a body of men in the British service, perhaps better fitted than
the Australian troops would be for the defence of those, stations
and for concentrated attack on the enemies' stations. I refer to the
Boyal Marine force. It is no doubt at present a comparatively
small force—about 14,000 men ; but it could be easily raised to a
sufficient degree to defend our forts and coaling-stations, and to be
transferred in H.M.'s ships from place to place as required. Of
course, my Lord, nobody knows better than yourself that in every
other country in the world the forts, coaling-stations, and coast-
defences are under naval, and not military, control. Take our own
coaling-stations. They are intended solely for naval purposes, and
the only attack that will ever be made on them is a naval attack ;
nevertheless, they are garrisoned entirely by troops under military
control. The Colonial Office is not to blame for this. The War
Office and Admiralty share the blame of maintaining a system
condemned by practical men. The time has come when this dan-
gerous anomaly should cease. We have in the chair one of the
most eminent authorities on the navy, and we are fortunate in
having here also— and I hope he wiU take part in the discussion —
Sir Charles Dilke, a distinguished civilian who, on everything con-
nected with miHtary matters, is probably the highest authority in
this realm. I have no doubt we shall hear from them their views
on the subject, and I venture to express my belief that they will
endorse that which was the theme of the paper — namely, that the
defence of the British Empire should be mainly a naval defence.
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Australasian Defence. 215
Major-General the Bight Hon. Sir Bbdvebs Bulleb, V.C,
E.G.B., E.G.M.G. : There is no subject that ought to require
more oareful consideration than the defence of our Empire, and
though I ought not to pose as an authority before this Institute and
those who have had greater means than I have had of finding out
what really ought to be the assistance which AustraUa and the
Colonies generally would give to the Imperial forces in defending the
Empire, yet, as I have been asked, a few remarks from me may not
be out of place at this moment. You have just been addressed by
a Colonial official, who said (what must be admitted by everybody)
that the defence of our Empire must be a naval defence. He added
that all the nations of the world, except ourselves, had placed their
coaling-stations and fortresses in the hands of their navy to defend,
and from this he argued that we should do likewise. It is on this
point I think I am entitled to speak. When we see such a differ-
ence, there must be a reason for it. Is it not this ? Other nations
expect their navy will be compelled to retire to their coaUng-stations
and sea-fortresses, while every Englishman, on the other hand, and
every Cdonist, believes that when there is a big war the EngUsh
navy will hold and sweep the sea ; and when the EngUsh navy is at
sea somebody — certainly not the navy — must look after the coaling-
stations and fortresses. There is another argument. In all nations,
except ours, the first line of defence is the army. Look at Germany,
France, Bussia, or any great Continental nation : the thing they look
to is their frontier, which is a land-frontier, and there they place
their first line of defence. Consequently they leave, as a secondary
consideration, the defence of their coaling-stations and sea-fortresses
to their navy — to, that is, their second line of defence. I main-
tain that in this question of Imperial defence it must be con-
sidered that we stand alone, and that no other nation can be taken
as a direct example of what we ought to do. I don't wish to go
into any disputatious matter, but, speaking with a full knowledge of
what is being done now and of the arrangements that have been
made to pull the army and navy together, I may say that I believe
that at no time in the history of this country has there been so
great an approach between the authorities of the British navy and
the authorities of the British army as there is at this moment ; and
never has there been — I will not say a more perfect, because no-
thing is perfect — but a more earnest effort to establish a complete
system for the defence of this great Empire, nor a truer recognition
of the relative values of the two lines of defence — the first line the
navy, the second line the army — than there is at the present time.
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216 Austraiasian Defence.
The Earl of Bblmobb, O.C.M.G. : I have listened with great
interest to the very able paper which has been read this evening,
and also to the remarks of those who have taken part in the dis-
cussion. There are matters dealt with in the paper as to which I
feel I have no right to express an opinion, but there are one or two
points on which I would like to say a few words. It so happens
that the question of Colonial defence first arose when I was
Governor of New South Wales, that is about twenty-two years ago.
In the last days of Mr. Disraeli's first Administration, and shortly
after the close of the New Zealand war, a similar despatch was sent
out by the Secretary of State — the Duke of Buckingham, I think —
to the Governors of the AustraUan Colonies, pointing out the
necessity of some fresh arrangement between the Colonies and the
Mother Country with regard to the expense of the Imperial troops,
and suggesting that the Governors of the difEerent Colonies should
correspond on the subject — of course, after consultation with their
Ministers. In New South Wales, the Prime Minister (Sir Charles
Cowper) took a different view from that indicated in the oireular,
and said to me that the Intercolonial Conference was likely soon to
meet and the matter could be dealt with there. I am not sure that
the Conference did meet soon, but, at any rate, nothing was done
immediately, and before anything was done the Home Government
{ue.f Mr. Gladstone's Administration) decided that the troops should
be removed altogether. The troops were removed in 1870, and then
the Colonies came to see that something must be done. As far as
my own Colony was concerned, steps were taken to fortify Sydney
and also to raise some Colonial troops. I may mention that there were
Volunteers before. I believe that when Sir William Jervois and Sir
Peter Scratchley went out, a few years afterwards, they pointed out
certain mistakes made in regard to th^ fortifications, and probably,
by this time, considerable alterations have been made. But there
was one thing which struck me as the weak point of the whole case,
and that was that no provision had been made for any 'one person
taking command of the local forces in the event of war. I gather that
that state of things still continues, but I am glad to learn that the
subject is engaging the attention of the Australasian Convention now
sitting in Sydney. I have always been of opinion — and I expressed the
opinion even when there — that something in the direction of Federa-
tion was very desirable ; and I am glad to find that that idea has
taken so firm a hold on the public mind. With regard to Imperial
Federation, I confess that I never took very much interest in that
question. I did not see how Imperial Federation would work.
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^Australasian Defence. 217
Bat I think I do see how Intercolonial Federation might work, and
I Edncerelj hope that the negotiations now going on will be carried
to a successfol issue. I also trust with regard to the question of the
military command and the employment of the forces of one Colony
in anodier Colony, that some general law affecting the whole group
may be carried into effect.
The Bt. Hon. Sir Chablbs Dilee, Bart. : Time does not allow
to-night of going into first principles on the subject of Imperial
defence, and I will only say that the outcome both of the paper and
of the speeches of Sir William Jervois, Admiral Colomb, Sir John
Pope Hennessy, and of Sir Bedvers BuUer, is to reinforce the con-
clusion laid down by the lecturer himself that the problem of Imperial
defence cannot be considered piecemeal, and that there ought to be
a joint consideration of the naval and of the military side of the
question. I was very glad to hear Sir Bedvers BuUer's extremely
encouraging words on this matter, because when he tells us that
never at any time were the army and the navy working so closely
together in connection with Imperial defence, and that great progress
has been made in the consideration of the problem during the last
two or three years — ^when he, speaking from the position he occupies,
so prominently puts forward the naval side of the problem, I feel
sure there must be real &ct behind, and that serious and important
progress is being made. However, I have the less excuse for dis-
cussing these questions now, because I lately had the opportunity
of expressing my views on the occasion alluded to by the lecturer.
General Edwards, in his most excellent paper, has not raised any
points of sharp issue or controversy between himself and those who
at the time he made his separate reports, Colony by Colony, to some
extent fell foul of his conclusions. He has, perhaps, come a Uttle
way towards his critics ; his critics may have come a long way
towards him. I am sure there is nothing which could be objected
to by those who found some fault originally with his separate plans,
Colony by Colony, as if he had contemplated a more serious naval
attack upon AustraUa than in the general opinion was probable, and
I think all his conclusions with regard to the nature of any attack
which the Australians may apprehend — so long as they remain
connected with the Empire — ^would receive general acceptance. If
Australia set up as an independent Power, the whole position would,
of course, be entirely revolutionised. It is rather outside the
problem of Australian defence, strictly so called, to discuss all those
questions of trade-routes and coaling-stations which have been
raised ; but, still, they are connected with the matter of the defence
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218 Anstraiasian Defence.
of Australian trade, and of our trade with Australia. They are also
indirectly connected with the question of what may be called slight
naval attacks upon Australia. Of course, very disagreeable raids
might be made by very slight forces upon a country with such an
enormous length of shore as Australia possesses. Small undefended
ports might be attacked, and a great deal of trouble and confusion
caused by a few fast cruisers, and they can only be cut off by our
naval superiority, and by our possession of the stores of coal, &c.,
from which they might provision themselves. The lecturer has said
a great deal on the question of trade-routes and coaling-stations,
and I should like — although it is a side-issue— to place before you a
view I stated in this room some time ago, and which brought upon
me a very able attack, rhetorically, from a Canadian officer, although
his attack did not convince me. What I say is — we should do wrong
to rely too much on the route across Canada as an alternative war-
route. It is a popular thing to say, I know, that there we have a
route entirely on British soil. It may, no doubt, be a great trade-
route in time of peace, but I should be afraid to rely too much on
that route in war-time. It is a terribly exposed route, and one
which, even without our being at war with the United States, we
should find very difficult to protect against raids. The real route
is the Cape route, and that is the one to which our attention must
be directed. Sir John Pope Hennessy, in his interesting speech,
slightly questioned the probability of Australia being willing to send
AustraJian troops any distance for the defence of coaling-stations.
It is the fact, I believe — Sir Charles Mills will correct me if I am
wrong — that one or more of the AustraUan Colonies did approach
the Government of the Cape at a time when serious war was
apprehended, and asked them whether they could hold the Cape, or
whether Australian troops should be sent to assist them. That
shows how clearly the AustraUans have in view the vital importance
to their trade of holding the Cape and other stations on the way. On
this question of coaling-stations — I speak with all deference in the
presence of such high authorities — although we are on the way to
improvement, and know our needs, which, after all, is something, I
fear we have not yet reached a position of security. There is no
higher authority on this subject than our Chairman, and he will be
able to say whether we may be reassured on this matter ; but I fear
when Mr. Stanhope says we know exactly what garrisons are needed
for our stations, we are not yet in the position of having supplied
them, and I am one of those who fear that the navy will find a most
grave addition to its duties in the first days of a war — immediately
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AtcstraJasian Defence. 219
before and immediately after the outbreak of war — in having to
convoy garrisons to coaling-stations in all parts of the world. I
cannot but tiiink that we are relying too greatly in these days of
sudden wars — when they are practically over before they are
declared — upon our power to rapidly garrison these stations after
war has actually begun. Take the case of Sierra Leone. There is
a station which the navy afiSrm is necessary, and must be held ; that
it has the finest harbour on the way to the Cape, and is the only
possible station between Gibraltar and the Cape. Yet this
garrison, which is close to a French colony where there is a large
French garrison, and off whose coast there is always a considerable
squadron, is only held by a weak battalion of black troops. Unless
this garrison is strengthened, all these guns would simply taXL into
the hands of our enemy in the event of a war with France. So it
is with many another place. Garrisons have not been provided,
and to provide guns and fortifications without garrisons seems to
be a worse than useless proceeding. The lecturer has mentioned
one case of a coaling-station of importance where a similar state
of things prevails — I mean Esquimault. The question of garrison-
ing that place has not been overlooked, but it has been in dispute
so long between Canada and the Mother Country that, as a matter
of fact, nothing has been done, and the gims, I beheve, have been
sent elsewhere. I believe that on general principles we are
beginning to come to something like a general agreement. People
begin to see we must take steps in time of peace, and consider who
are to be our probable enemies in time of war. However disagree-
able it may be to talk about these things, they ought to receive the
profound consideration of the very best military minds, and with that
view there must — as has been pointed out to-night— be a joint con-
sideration of the naval and military problem.
Colonel J. F. Owen, B.A. : It is with some diffidence that I
follow the distinguished statesmen and officers who have already
addressed you, but it appears to me that the gallant lecturer's
general motive has been, in the discussion, somewhat neglected,
and the Australian soldier rather left out in the cold. If we look at
it as a whole, we shall see that the lecture leads one, from the
general principles enunciated, to a definite end and object as regards
the Australasian military forces, showing that, although the defence
of the Empire, as we all must agree, depends entirely upon the Im-
perial navy in the first instance, yet that there must be a second
line to protect the bases upon which that navy relies to supply
itself with food, in the shape of coal, &c., or to seize and hold such
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220 Australasian Defence.
as our enemy may operate from in a manner dangerous to the com-
merce of Great Britain and her Colonies. Does it necessarily follow
that, in a great war, the Imperial navy, if superior in some waters,
must be so in all waters, in every part of the globe ? Surely that
might not always be the case, and we may suppose that the neces-
sity for defending our own sea-bases, or seizing and holding those of
an enemy, by means of land-forces, in the seas approximating to
Australasia, may yet arise. It would, therefore, appear to be a
serious error to discourage our Colonies in the far South from
improving their forces, and from rendering them, by Federal action,
infinitely more efficient for such attack or defence. It has been
urged that coaling and repairing stations for the Boyal Navy should
be gcbrrisoned by naval forces, but it cqppears to me quite impossible
for that navy, in case of a great emergency, to spare for this end one
single officer or man who would be so urgently required at sea.
The danger-line of Germany, of France, is on land ; therefore for
their coast-defences and sea-bases no single land-soldier, if possible,
is used. The danger-line of our Empire is at sea, and for similar
reasons we should not tie up on land one man of our naval forces.
Let us then, I repeat, encourage our great Southern Colonies in
their t)iorough organisation of their miUtary forces on a Federal basis,
so that they may not only defend their own shores, but also take on
themselves, when necessary, for the protection of their commerce,
such duties as are pointed out in the most able lecture we have heard.
Looking at the map I see that the Island of Reunion is not shown
as having dock-accommodation, but when I was there some years
ago the French Government were spending large sums of money on
a large repairing-dock, and making every effort to render this island
a formidable sea-base. Supposing us, unfortunately, to be at war
with France, and that from this island (within measurable distance
from Australasia) the enemy were preying on our commerce,
would not every effort be made to deprive him of such base, to
seize it and to hold it ourselves ? In such case, Australasian com-
merce suffering, what would be the feelings of her people if they
felt themselves impofcent, from want of previous organisation, to
protect themselves by turning defence into attack and seizing and
holding the nest of the wasps who stung them t That with their
excellent material, their courage and noble enthusiasm, the land-
forces of Australasia would be capable of this and of much greater
deeds if required, especially if organised under one Federal control,
no person who knows them can for a moment doubt.
The Chaibman : I think the time has now arrived when we must
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Australasian Defence. 221
draw this interesting discussion to a close, and I am interpreting the
general feeling, I am sure, in moving a cordial vote of thanks to Sir
Bevan Edwards for his interesting and valuable paper. We shall
all agree that the opportunity has not been misapplied for the dis-
cussion of the important subject of Australasian defence. As one
formerly connected with the administration of the navy, I was glad
to find General Edwards recognising so folly the essential im-
portance of our maritime supremacy, as the most effective means
of defending Australasia from attack. General Edwards, indeed, is
not the only eminent military authority who has spoken with appre-
ciation of the importance — the paramount importance — of the navy
for tiie defence of the Empire. I was glad to hear Sir William
Jervois speak in the same sense, and indeed all the military men
who have spoken this evening have taken the same view. We all
know that the navy gives us the means not only of defending our
own coaling-stations, but of attacking the coaling-stations of other
Powers, should we be in conflict with them. It affords the means,
and the only means, of defending our great sea-routes. K we main-
tain our naval supremacy we may look, too, for a valuable political
result, for the more effective our navy the more valuable is the pro-
tection to the Colonies, and the more the Colonies will value their
connection with the Mother Country. Is the Mother Country doing
her duty in the development of the navy at the present time ? I
should not be prepared to say that the existing naval force is
adequate to all needs ; but this is certain, that, if you make a com-
parison between the rate of progress in the construction of ships in
this and any other country, it can scarcely be said we are not