a bank, with the exclusive privileges conferred on this, ought
to purchase their charter either directly by an adequate
bonus, or indirectly by being obliged to make loans to gov-
J14. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAK. 4G<i
crnmcnt to a certain amount when required ; neither of which
was provided for in the act. The bill, being returned to the
senate with the President's objections, failed of being support-
ed by a majority of two-thirds, and was negatived.
Treasury Estimates. On the 27th of January, the secre-
tary presented another report, stating that the charges on the
treasury for the year 1814, consisting of unsatisfied appropri-
ations of the preceding year, tne sums necessary to meet the
engagement of the public debt, and the appropriations for the
year 1814, amounted to $57,694,590.70. That the ways
and means provided to meet these demands were,
Cash in the treasury on the 1st of January,
1814, Jg5,196,482
Amount of cash received for revenue, of ev-
ery description, in 1814, 11,311,353
Proceeds of loans and treasury notes in 1813,
and received in 1814, 4,662,6G5
Authority to borrow and issue treasury notes
for the service of the year 1814, 36,000,000
$57,170,500
On this statement the secretary remarks, the calls on the
treasury are positive and urgent ; the ways and means de-
pending principally on the loans as yet unobtained, are pre-
carious, and not to be relied on.
The estimates for the year 1815, he states to be,
For the civil, diplomatic, and miscellaneous
expenses, $1,979,289
Military department, 30,342,238
Naval department, 8,217,862
Pubhc debt necessary to be provided for in
1815, 15,493,145
$ 56,032,034
The ways and means for 1815 are the existing sources of
supply embracing cash in the treasury, direct tax, customs,
internal duties, and all incidental receipts, and amount to
470 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. Chap. 21-
15,125,909, leaving a deficit of more than forty millions, to
be provided for by additional internal taxes, loans, and issues
of treasury notes. This deficit of forty millions for the ser-
vice of the year 1815, together with the unobtained loans for
1814, both amounting to seventy-six millions, presented a
most unpromising aspect. After making his statement in
detail, the secretary concludes the communication by remark-
ing, that when he perceives that more than forty millions are
to be raised for the service of the year 1815, by an appeal to
public credit through the medium of loans and treasury notes,
he feels the utmost solicitude for the event. The unprom-
ising state of public credit, and the obstructed state of the
circulating medium, are sufficiently known. A liberal impo-
sition of taxes during the present session, ought to raise the
public credit, were it not for countervailing causes ; but it can
have no effect in furnishing a national circulating medium.
It remains therefore with the wisdom of Congress to decide
whether any other means can be applied to restore public
credit, re-establish a national circulating medium, and facili-
tate the anticipations of the public revenue. The opinion of
this department has been heretofore frankly expressed, and it
remains unchanged.
Military Expose, — A view of the military establishment in
prospect for the year 1815, was as unpromising as that of the
treasury. The duties of the department of war had in the
month of September been assigned to the secretary of state ;
and on the 17th of October, Mr. Monroe as acting secretary
at war, in answer to a letter from the chairman of the military
committee, gave a detailed exposition of the state of the mili-
tary department, of the force necessary for the service of the
year 1815, and of the means of obtaining it. He states that an
effective force of one hundred thousand men will be necssa.
ry for the service of the year 1815. He recommends that the
present military establishment of 62,448 men, be preserved and
filled up, and an additional permanent force of forty thousand,
be raised for the defence of the sea-board and frontiers. In
1U14. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. 471
proposing these measures, the secretary adds, " it is now ap-
parent that the object of the Britisli government, by striking
at the principal sources of prosperity, is to diminish the im-
portance, if not destroy the pohtical existence of thr United
States. Forced now to contend for our liberties and inde-
pendence, we are called upon to display all the ]jatriotism
which distinguished Americans in the first great struggle.
The United States must relinquish no right, or perish in the
attempt. There was no middle ground to rest on. The
stronger the pressure, and the greater the danger, the more
firm and vigorous will be the resistance, and the more suc-
cessful the result. It is the avowed purpose of the enemy to
lay waste and destroy our cities and villages, and desolate 'he
country, of which numerous examples had already been af-
forded. It is evidently his intention to press the war along
the whole extent of the sea-board, and from Canada to invade
the adjoining states ; while at the same time, attempts are
made on the city of New-York and other important points, in
the vain project of dismemberment or subjugation. A part
of his scheme evidently appears to be to continue the inva-
sion of this part of the union, while a separate force attacks
the state of Louisiana in the hope of taking possession of
New-Orleans, and the mouth of the Mississippi, the great out-
let and key to the commerce of all that portion of the United
States west of the Alleghany mountains. The advantage
which a great naval superiority gives the enemy by enabling
Jiim to move his troops with celerity, from one quarter to
another, from Maine to Mississippi, along a coast of two thou-
sand miles, is very great. A small force moved in this man-
ner, for the purposes avowed by the British commander,
creates an alarm in every part. If the militia are to be relied
on as the principal defence of the coast against these preda-
tory and desolating incursions, by interfering with their or-
dinary pursuits of industry, it will be attended with serious in-
terruption and loss to them, and injury to the public. It is
'U object therefore of the highest importance to provide a
47i HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. Chap, ilh
regular force with the means of transporting it from one quar-
ter to another, thereby following the movements of the ene-
my with the greatest possible rapidity in repelling his attacks,
wherever they may be made. Three times the force in mi-
litia has been employed, the secretary stated, at our princi-
pal cities on the coast and on the frontier, and in marching to
and returning from thence, that would have been necessary in
regular troops, and the expense has been more than propor-
tionably augmented. But to bring the war to an honourable
termination, we must not be contented with merely defending
ourselves. Different feelifigs must be touched, and different
apprehensions excited in the British government. By push-
ing the war into Canada, the friendship of the Indian tribes is
secured, and their services commanded, which would be oth-
erwise turned against us. The c6ast is relieved from the
desolation threatened, and we have in our hands a safe pledge
of an honourable peace. From this view of the subject, it
will be necessary to bring into the field a regular army of one
hundred thousand effective men for the next campaign. Such
a force, aided in extraordinary emergencies by volunteers,
and militia, will remove all inquietude, as to the final result
of the contest, and secure to the United States a safe and
honourable peace."
But the great question remains, how is this force to be ob-
tained ? For the recruiting service of the last year a bounty
has been offered of one hundred and twenty-four dollars, and
one hundred and sixty acres of land to each recruit, ninety-
six dollars a year wages, and clothing during the time of
service. Recruiting rendezvous had been opened at sixty
different places in the United States, and to ensure the ac-
tivity of recruiting officers, they were allowed four dollars for
tach man obtained. Two millions of dollars had been paid
out in bounties and premiums in the recruiting service, from
January to September, 1814, and during that time, and with
these exertions, only thirteen thousand eight hundred and
ninety-eight men had been obtained : and not more than one
iSi4, HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. 473
half of that number had reached the army in season for active
service in the campaign of 1814. The army, which on pa-
per stood at 62,448 men, did not at the close of the campaign
exceed half that number of effectives. The recruiting ser-
vice for the ensuing year was still more unpromising. The
campaign of 1814 had been severe, fatiguing, and hazardous ;
that of 1815 wore a still more threatening aspect. The sol-
dier had now to expect to meet the veteran troops of Great
Britain, inured to twenty years' service in the open field.
Nearly all those who could be supposed willing, either from
motives of patriotism or interest, to pledge their lives to gov-
ernment had already been enlisted ; and it would be per-
fectly vain and illusory to attempt the raising of seventy
thousand men, the number wanted according to the secre-
tary's estimate, by voluntary enlistment.
Plan of the Secretary at War for filling the Ranks of the
Army, With these views, the secretary, who was not a man
to propose an object without adequate means to accomplish
it, was induced to abandon the system of voluntary enhst-
ment, and propose one of compulsory service. His report
embraced four plans ; but the first and the one which he
strongly recommended, was by far the most simple, energetic,
and effectual. He proposed that the free male population of
the United States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-
five, and which according to the census of eighteen hundred
and ten, amounted to between nine and ten hundred thousand*
should be formed into classes of one hundred men each, by
local precincts, with a view to the equal distribution of prop-
erty among the several classes ; and that each class furnish
their proportion of men required within thirty days after the
classification, and replace them in case of casualty: all the
taxable property within the precinct of each class to be taxed
to pay an extra bounty to the recruits. The men want-
ed were to be designated by draft, if volunteers did not offer.
Estimating the whole number of citizens of the requisite ago
at a million, and the number wanted at seventy thous'ancf,
60
474 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. Chap. 21,
-^vould give seven men to each class. The recruits to be
delivered over to the recruiting officer of the district, and
marched to such place of general rendezvous as should be
designated by the secretary at war. Particular persons in
each county to be appointed by the President to carry this
system into execution.
The secretary, aware that this was bringing the war home
to the feelings of congress and their constituents, and that
there probably might be strong objections to the plan, assigns
his reasons for the measure. That it will be efiectual, can-
not, he observes, be doubted ; the men contemplated will
soon be raised, and there can be no well grounded constitu-
tional objections. Congress have a right to declare war and
to raise regular armies without restriction. It is intended
that this plan should operate on all alike ; none are exempt-
ed but. the chief magistrate of the United States, and the gov-
ernors of the several states. It would be absurd to suppose
that congress could not carry this power into effect, otherwise
than by accepting the voluntary services of individuals. It
might happen that an army could not be raised in that mode :
the power then would have been granted in vain. The
safety of the state might depend upon such an army, and be
jeopardized by delay. Long continued invasions, conducted
by regular and well diciplined troops, can best be repelled
. by troops of the same character. Courage is in a great de-
gree mechanical. A small body, well trained, accustomed to
action, and gallantly led on, often breaks down three or four
times the number of more respectable and brave, but raw
and undiciplincd troops. The sense of danger is diminished
by frequent exposure without harm; and confidence inspired
by a knowledge that reliance may be placed on others : this
knowledge is obtained in no other way but by actual service
together. The power granted to congress to raise armies,
was made with a knowledge of all these circumstances. The
framers of the constitution, and the states who ratified it. knew
W14. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. 47.:^
the advantage which an enemy might have by regular forces,
and intended to place their country on an equal footing.
The idea that Congress cannot raise an army in any other
mode than by accepting the voluntary services of inrlividuals.
the secretary observes, is repugnant to the uniform construc-
tion of all grants of power, and to the first principles and
leading objects of the constitution. An uncjualified grant of
power gives the necessary means of carrying it into effect.
This is a universal law of construction that admits of no ex-
ception. The conservation of the state is a duty paramount
to all others. The commonwealth has a right to the ser-
vices of all its citizens ; or rather the citizens composing the
commonwealth have a riglit to the services of each other to
repel any danger which may be threatened. In what man-
ner this service is to be apportioned among the citizens is ihe
object of legislation. All that is to be dreaded in such cases
is the abuse of power, and the constitution has provided- am-
ple security against that evil. In su])port of the position thai
congress have a right to compel the military services of indi-
viduals, the militia laws are a conclusive proof and a striking
example. That whole system is founded on compulsii^n ;
ihe militia man is enrolled at the age of eighteen, discij)lincd,
called into active service, and subject to martial law, uiiliDUt
his consent. The militia service calls from home, for long
terms, whole districts of country ; none can elude the call ; few
can avoid the service ; and those who do are compelled to pay
great sums for substitutes. The plan proposed fixes upon no
one personally, and opens to all a chance of declining the ser-
vice. It is the principal object of this plan to engage in defence
of the state, the unmarried and youthful, who can best be spared,
and tosecure to them an ade(iuate compensation, from.the vol.-
untary contributions of the more wealthy of every class. Great
confidence is entertained that such contribution will be made
in time to avoid a draft. The secretary finally adduced in
support of his plan, the example of the revolutionary war.
476 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. Chap. 21.
It then filled the ranks of the regular army, and led to a suc-
cessful termination of the contest. Should the United States
make this exertion, the war would probably soon end. It is
in their power to expel the British from the American conti-
nent. Against the united and vigorous efforts of America, the
resistance of the enemy must be feeble. Success in defeating
the schemes of the enemy, and obtaining an honourable peace,
will place the United States on higher ground in the opinion
of the world, than they have ever held at any former period.
In future European wars, their commerce will be allowed to
take its lawful range unmolested : respected abroad, and happy
at home, the United States will have accomplished the great
objects for which they have so long contended : as a nation
they will have litde to dread, as a people little to desire.*
To fill the ranks of the existing army, the secretary calcu-
lated, would require four to each class, and about the same
number to raise the proposed additional corps of forty thousand.
It was only to constitute every twelfth free male citizen of
the United States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five,
a soldier during the war, and all the brilliant objects enume-
rated in the secretary's report would probably be realized.
Three other plans were proposed as substitutes for this, but
all of them being less efficient, and equally objectionable ; the
secretary relied on this for the further prosecution of the
war.
Two objects were proposed by the raising of this army :
one, the defence of the territory ; the other, the conquest of
Canada. But his arguments were now addressed to a body
who had given up the plan of the Canadian conquest, and
whose undivided attention w^as directed to an efficient system
of defence.
The secretaries of the treasury and war, both recently ap-
pointed to those ofliices, in their reports to congress, laid open
with great faithfulness and ability the embarrassments under
* Report of the acting secretary at war, October 1814.
1S14. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. 477
which the financial and military affairs of the nation labour-
ed, and proposed remedies, bold, energetic, and ellcctual, but
such as at the commencement of the war were little antici-
pated. It was not expected that in a contest for the rights
of some thousands of American seamen, who had been gross-
ly injured, these seamen would in consequence thereof be'im-
niured in Dartmoor prison, and one hundred thousand free
citizens of the United States be compelled to fill the ranks of
the army. But war once declared, there was no resting
point ; the blood and treasure of the nation were pledged for
its support ; and that legislature who are not prepared, if the
occasion calls, to compel every citizen, capable of bearing
arms, to take their stand in the ranks of the army, and to take
.so much of the treasure of the nation as is necessary to ac-
complish the objects of the contest, even to its last cent, must
not declare war. Such, however, was not the temper of con-
gress, nor could they be brought to itby the reasonings of the
secretaries.
The plan of the secretary at war was not even honoured with
a discussion in either house of congress. No bill was ever in-
troduced embracing its principles. The measure was deem-
ed too strong, and too nearly allied to European conscrip-
tions and impressments for republican America.
As a substitute, Mr. Giles, of the military committee, in-
iroduced a bill into the senate, authorizing the President to
call upon the executives of each state, for their propor-
tion of eighty thousand militia, to serve for the term of two
years, within the limits of the United States, and confined
also to the state in which they were raised, or an atjjoining
state. This corps was to be raised by draft, on failure of
volunteers offering themselves ; and for this purpose, all per-
sons subject to militaj-y duty were to be classed, with refer-
ence also to property, in such manner, that one from each
class could supply the requisite number. Their services,
being confined within the limits of the United States, were to
be merelv of a defensive character. This bill, withliftle va-
478 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR, Chap. 21^
riation, passed both houses ; and being a substitute for the reg-
ular force contemplated by the secretary at war, manifested
an unequivocal determination to abandon the project of con-
quering the Canadas.
Enlistment of Minors. Another bill was also introduced
from the same committee m aid of the recruiting service, in-
creasing the land bounty to 320 acres, and providing that
persons under the age of twenty-one years may be enlisted
without the consent of their parents, guardians, or masters.
The last provision was opposed as impolitic, tending to se-
duce and corrupt the morals of the American youth ; to take
them from the wise and wholesome restraint of their parents
and guardians, and expose them to the seduction and licen-
tiousness of the camp, before they had arrived to years of
discretion : that it was clothing them with the power of bind-
ing themselves by their contracts in a most important pointy
when by the laws of all the states they were deemed incapa-
ble of making contracts : that it was unconstitutional, as it
impaired and defeated the existing obligations of a lawful
contract between the minor apprentice and his master. These
objections however, were overruled, and the bill with this
provision passed, on the ground that persons of this age
ever constituted an important part of the military national
force : that such persons usually made the best soldiers,
would more easily learn, and readily submit to the discipline
of the camp, and that a nation at war, was entitled to the
services of all its citizens capable of bearing arms for its de-
fence.
Repi^t of the Secretary of the .'N'avy, The secretary of
the nal'y, in his report of the 15th of November, in a mild,
qualified, and cautious manner, recommended the impressment
of American seamen for the supply of the navy. His propo-
sition was thet some regular system be established, by which
the voluntary enlistments for the navy may derive occasional
reinforcement from the service of those seamen, who, pursu-
ing their own private occupations, are exempt from public
1814; HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. 479
service of any kind ; and that, for this purpose, descriptive
registers be kept in each district, of all the seamen belong-
ing to the United States; and that provision be made by law
for classing them, and calling into public service, in succession,
for reasonable stated periods, such portions or classes as tho
public service might recjuire. He also recommended the es-
tablishment of a board of navy inspectors, to have the gene-
ral superintendence and direction of the afiairs of the navy,
and authority over all the officers and agents employed in
that department: that naval stations be designated within
the United States by convenient boundaries, and an officer
of rank and confidence should reside in each, who should,
under the instructions of the navy board, superintend and
control the officers of the navy within his district.
In the senate, Mr. Tait, from the committee of naval afiairs.
reported a resolution for the appointment of admirals. In
congress, the project of the secretary for registering and
classing the seamen, and calling or impressing them into
public service, was rejected, more on account of the popular
odium attached to the idea of impressment or compulsory
service, than any intrinsic objection to the plan. Experience
has demonstrated that a navy is the cheapest, and only ade-
quate mode of defence. Should the United States ever be
engaged in another war, it must be of a maritime character.
Government has done much for its sea-faring. citizens : the
present war is carried on, and nearly a hundred million of
dollars has been expended, in vindication of their rights.
Their brethren on land have marched to the Canadian bor-
der, endured every hardship, and laid down their lives by
thousands in support of their cause. The government then
have an unquestionable right to their services when required
to man its navy. The most desirable mode is voluntary en-
listment ; but in times of great danger this source may fail,
and resort must be had to compulsion. Here two plans only
present themselves; one the English mode of sending out
press gangs, seizing sailors wherever they can bf> found, anrl
^80 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. CHAp.^if
dragging them on board the ships of war; the other, the one
pointed out by the secretary; of the two, no American can
dotfbt which is the most ehgible. The proposition of the naval
committee for the appointment of admirals, was also injected v
congress however, in pursuance of the secretary's plan, es-
tablished a board of commissioners for the naval service, to
consist of three officers of rank, not under that of post cap-
lain. This board was attached to the office of the secretary,
and under his superintendence, to discharge many of the im-
portant duties assigned to it, relative to the procurement of
naval stores, and materials for the construction and arma-
ment of ships of war, relative to their employment, and to
all matters connected with the naval establishment of the
United States.
At an early period of the session, communications were
received, and laid before congress from the American envoys
at Ghent, which precluded all reasonable expectations of
peace. They contained what was then declared to be the
British ultimatum, and which was such as none but a con-
quered country would accept. No alternative therefore