appeared, but to prosecute the war in future by the compul-
sory service of the citizens, either in some of the methods
pointed out by the secretary at war, or in some other manner
to be devised by the wisdom of congress.
Peace, While difficulties of the most serious nature in the
military and fiscal concerns of the nation seemed to be ac-
cumulating upon the administration; and congress and the
people were looking forward w^th great anxiety to the events
of the coming year ; the long wished for but unexpected news
of peace arrived on the 13th of February, and relieved the
administration and ihe country from all embarrassment.
At no period since the darkest time of the revolutionary
war had the affairs of the United States ever assumed so un-
promising an aspect. Congress, convened over the smoking
ruins of the capitol, had before them an actual deficit of
thirtv-nine millions, and an estimate for the service of the
I»M. lIlSTOliY OF Tin: LATK WAR. Ifjl
coming year, of upwards of thirty million.^ lo he supjjlied oi»ly
by loans, without credit to borrow a doUar on any icriu.^ short
of such as indicated a Ijankruptcy 5 no s\>tem of taxation
adctinate to the payment of the interest of the moneys le-
quired: no circulating medium in which the pultfu: luid any
confidence, for the transaction of private l)u>iness, or the
collection of the revenue : the union invaded tit each ex-
tremity: eighty thousand men necessary Un- the objects of
the war, and none to be obtained but by a conscription or
compulsory draft of the same cliaracter, and enibracing as
great a proportion of citizens, as had ever been ado[)ted in
France. These circumstances prepared the people and flir
government cordially to embrace the terms of peace.
(1
CHAPTER XXII.
llnssian Mediation proposed to Mr. Adams. — Communicated totlie ArXif^
rican Government. — Accepted. — Appointment of Envoys. — Their In-
structions. — Mediation rejected by the Prince Regent. — British
Proposition for a Direct Neg-otiation. — Accepted by the United
States. — Appointment of Additional Envoys. — Their Instructions. —
Meotiiig- of tlie British and American Envoys at Ghent. — British
Propositions, and Ultimatum. — American Propositions. — British En-
voys conmiunicate vrilh their Government, and receive different In-
structions. — Their Ultimatum waived. — The Neg-otiations proceed,
and terminate in a Treaty of Peace. — Treaty ratified by both Gov-
ernments. — Proceedings at New-Orleans immediately after the
Peace. — Rejoicings throughout the United States. — President's Mes-
sage, communicating tbe subject to Congress. — Peace Establishment,
— Effects of the War on the National Character.
Russian Mediation proposed. At the period when She in-
lelligence of the war reached the emperor of Russia, his em-
]jire was invaded by a French army which was then aj.)-
proaching his capital, and threatened the subjugation of the
nation. The whole Russian population was in arms for the
defence of their territory. England was in close alliance with
Russia, and was the only European power, not under the
control of France. Russia depended on her for important
aids at this crisis. It was therefore with the deepest solici-
tude that the emperor viewed this war, which would necessa-
rily cause a powerful diversion of the English force from
their common enemy. Russia was at this time on friendly
terms with the United States, and a considerable commerce
existed between the two countries, profitable to both. Pow-
erful motives of interest induced the Russian government, to
desire a speedy termination of the Anierican war, which they
termed an episode to the European. On the 20th of Sep-
teml^er, 1813. Cownt ReRjan:^ft" tha Russian chancellor and
1814. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAK. ^y :}
secretary of stale, addressed a note to Mr. A(lam^, tlie Arnon-
can minister, requesting an interview with liini the next eve-
ning, at which, by the emperor's command, lie stated, that
having made peace and established the relations of amiiy
and commerce with Great Britain, the emperor was much
disappointed to find, that the whole benefit, which he ex-
pected his subjects to derive from that event was likely to be
defeated by this new war. That it had occurred to the em-
peror that an amicable arrangement between the f)arties
might be better accomplished, and tlie differences more easily
accommodated by an indirect, than by a direct negotiation.
That his majosty had directed hicn to inquire if the American
ambassador was aware of any difficulty on the part of the
United States, if he should offer his mediation for the jjujipose
of effecting a pacification.
Mr Adams replied, that it was impossible for him to speak
on the subject otherwise, than from the general knowledge
he had of the sentiments of his government. That so far
from knowing what their ideas were as to the continuance of
the war, he had not at that moment received any official in-
formation of its declaration. But that he well knew it was
with reluctance that they engaged in the war, and he was very
sure that whatever determination they might form upon the
proposal of the emperor's mediation, they would consider his
proposal as a new evidence of the emperor's friendship for
the United States ; and he knew of no obstacle or difficulty
which would occasion them to decline it. The American
minister proceeded to remark, that he knew the war must
affect unfavourably the interests of Russia, be highly injuri-
ous both to the United States and England, and no good
likely to result from it to any one.
The Count replied, that he had considered it altdgelhcr in
the same light, and so had the emperor, who had himself con-
ceived the idea of authorizing this mediation. He iliought
that an indirect negotiation conducted at Feter^bnrgh, aided
by the conciliatory wishes of a friend to both parties might
484 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. Chap 2il-
smooth down difTicultics, which in a direct discussion between
the princij.als, might be lound insuperable. To a mutual
friend, each party might exhibit all its claims and complaints,
without danger of exciting irritation, or raising impediments.
The part of Russia would be to liear both sides, and use her
best endeavours to conciliate them.*
On the 8th of March, 1813, Mr. Daschkofi', the Russian
minister to the United States, by order of the emperor, commu-
nicated his ofler of mediation to the American goyprnment; ob-
serving that his imperial majesty foresees with great regret
the shackles which this new ep'sode opposes to the commer-
cial prosperity of nations. The love of humanity, and what
the emperor owes to his suVjjects, whose commerce has al-
ready sufficiently suffered, command him to do every thing
in his power to remove the evils which this war is preparing
for those nations who will not take part in it. His majesty is
convinced that America has done all she could to prevent,
this rupture. In a direct discussion, every thing would tend
to excite the prejudices and asperities of the parties ; to pre-
vent this, his majesty, gratified at being able to give a proof
of his friendship alike to the king of Great Britian and the
United States offers them his mediation; and should be
highly gratified if a like disposition on the part of the United
States should have the effect of stopping the progress of this
new war, and of extinguishing it in its origin.
Accepted by the United States, This ofi'er of mediation
was readily accepted on the part of the United States; and
on the 11th of March, the secretary of state answered the
note of Mr. Daschkofi" by observing, that the President was
highly gratified with these strong proofs of that humane and
enlightened policy which had characterized the reign of the
emperor of Russia; and saw in the overture, and in the cir-
cumstances attending it, the friendly interest which his impe-
rial majesty takes in the welfare of the United States. A war
* Mr. Adauis to the secretary of state.
iai4. }tlsrOR\ OF THE LATE WAR. 4U.)
between Great Britain and the United States, njust materially
aOcct the commerce of Russia ; and it was worthy of the
high character of a prince, distinguished by his attachment to
the interests of his subjects, to interpose his good oflkcs for
the restoration of peace. The United States, conscious that
they were not the aggressors in the contest, but on the con-
trary, had })orne wrongs for a series of years before they
appealed to arms in defence of their rights, are ready to lay
them down as soon as Great Britain ceases to violate them.
Many inconveniences attending a direct communication be-
teen the parties, may be avoided by the mediation of a third
power, possessing the entire confidence of both belligerents^
To the claim of Russia to that distinguished consideration, the
President, in behalf of the United States, expresses his full
acknowledgment; and in the personal qualities and high
character of the emperor, the President finds a sacred pledge
for the justice and impartiality which may be expected Irom
his decision. Under these impressions, the President will-
ingly accepts the mediation of the emperor to promote peace
between the United States and Great Britain ; and such
arrangements will be made without delay, as will atlbrd his
imperial majesty the opportunity he has invited to interpose
his good offices for the accomplishment of so desirable an
event.*
Commissioners appointed. In conformity with diese views,
and without Avaiting to know whether Great Britain woukl
accept the proposed mediation, the President, in the recess of
the senate, immediately appointed Albert Gallatin, and James
A. Bayard, in conjunction with Mr. Adams, the American
minister at Petersburgh, jointly and severally, to negotiate a
peace with Great Britain, under the mediation of Russia :
the two former to proceed directly from the United State.>
* Correspondence between Mr. Daschkoffnml tl>o secretary of Ptnl«»
of Mav 8th and 17th. Ifiin.
18^ HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.. Chap. 22.
to join their colleague in Russia on the business of their mis-
?<ion.
At the meeting of congress in the following May, the nomi-
nation of the envoys was laid before the senate for their ap-
probation. To the appointment of Adams, and Bayard,
there were no personal objections. But the senate, impressed
with a sense of the singularity of the measure of appointing
and sending envoys to Russia, to negotiate a peace with
Great Britain, without any assurance or intimation that that
power would accede to the negotiation, hesitated to confirm
the nominations. To them it appeared that this measure,
manifesting an over-anxiety for peace, was calculated to de-
feat the object. Relying however on the wisdom of the
executive, and unwilling to take any measure which should
have the appearance of opposition to peace, the nominations
of Adams and Bayard were confirmed. Mr. Gallatin being
secretary of the treasury, and the duties of that office being
at this time of the most urgent nature, his appointment was
strenuously opposed. A resolution passed the senate, de-
claring it incompatible with the public interest to unite the
offices of secretary of the treasury and envoy to a foreign
court in the same person: and another inquiring of the
President whether the office of secretary of the treasury was
vacated by the appointment of Mr. Gallatin, and his accept-
ance of (he office of envoy ; and if not, under what authority
and by whom the duties of that office were to be discharged,
in his absence. In reply, the President stated, that the office
was not vacated, and that the duties would be discharged,
during the absence of Mr. Gallatin, by the secretary of the
navy. The senate then appointed a committee to confer
with the President upon the subject. On their waiting on
him, he observed, that he regretted that the appointment of
the envoys was made under circumstances which deprived
him of the aid and advice of the senate : he regretted also
that they had not taken the same view of the subject that he '
had done. As a co-ordinate branch of the government, he
Ifil4. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAK. /J87
could hold no conference with a coinmiuce of the senate, on
the subject of the appointment. That in relation to treaties.
and appointments to office, the President and senate were
independent of, and co-ordinate with, each other. If they
agree, the appointments are made; if they disagree, they
fail. If the senate wish for any information previous to their
fmal decision, the practice has been, ever keeping in view the
constitutional relation between the President and senate, to
request the executive to furnish it, or to refer the subject to a
committee of their body, who might communicate on the subject
with the head of the proper department. The appointment of a
committee of the senate to confer immediately with the execu-
tive himself, seems to lose sight of the co-ordinate relation
between the executive and senate, which the constitution has
established. The President added, he was entirely })er-
suaded of the purity of the intentions of the senate in the
course they had taken, and with which, according to his
view of the subject, he could not accord ; that they would be
cheerfully furnished with all the suitable information on the
subject in possession of the executive, in any mode consistent
with the principles of the constitution and the settled practice
under it. On the question to advise and consent to the ap-
pointment of Mr. Gallatin, in the senate the yeas were 17
and the nays 18.* Mr. Gallatin was, however, long before
this, under the appointment of the President in the recess of
the senate, on his way to Russia, and his appointment was
afterwards confirmed.
Their Instructions. On the 15th of April, the envoys were
furnished with their full powers, and with their instruction-
in detail from the department of state. In these it is stated,
that " the impressment of of seamen, and illegal blockades, a.-
more particularly exemplified in the orders in council are thr
principal causes of the war ; had not Great Britain ob-
stinately persisted in the. violation of these important rights.
^ Journals of the senate, June 181P>
188 HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. Chap. 22.
-war would not have been declared. It will eease as soon
as tlieir rights are respected. The proposition made by
Mr. Russell to the British government immediately after the
war, and the answer given soon after to Admiral Warren's
letter, show the grounds on which the United Stales are will-
ing to adjust the controversy relative to impressment. This
is further evinced by the report of the committee of foreign
relations, and the act of congress in consecjuence thereof.
To accomodate this important difference, the United States arc
Avilling to exclude British seamen altogether from the Ameri-
can service. It is fairly to be presumed that if this law is
carried into effect, it will exclude all British seamen from
American vessels. As a further ground, the President is
willing to stipulate, that all native British subjects who shall
hereafter be naturalized, shall be with this condition, that they
be not employed in the American sea service.
In requiring that the stipulation to exclude British seamen
from American vessels, with the regulations for carrying it in-
to effect, be reciprocal ; it is desirable that a provision be
be made, by which the United States might dispense with the
obligation it imposes on American citizens. The liberal spi-
rit of the laws and government of the United States, is un-
friendly to restrictions on their citizens, such at least as are
imposed on British subjects to prevent their becoming mem-
l)ers of other societies. To secure the citizens of the United
States against impressment is the object ; a clear and distinct
provision must be made against this practice ; the precise form
IS not insisted on, provided the import be explicit. All that i.^
required is, that in consideration of the act to be performed on
ihe part of the United States, the British government shall
stipulate in some adequate manner to terminate or forbear
ilie practice. It has been suggested as an expedient mode
of adjusting the controversy, that British cruisers shall have
right to search American vessels for their seamen ; but that
their comnlanders shall be subject to penalties in case tfeey
make mistakes and take American citizens. Bv such an ar
1814. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR. 489
rangement, the British government would acquire the right of
search for seamen, and with it, that of impressing from Amer-
ican vessels the subjects of all other powers. By admitting
the right, the principle is given up, and the door n-pened
to every kind of abuse. The same objection is applicable
to every other arrangement, which withholds the respect due
to the American flag, by not allowing it to protect all who
sail under it.
As a necessary incident to any mode of adjustment it is ex-
pected that all American seamen who have been impressed
will be discharged, and those who have been naturalized un-
der British laws by compulsive service be permitted to with-
draw. The great object with regard to impressment is, that
ihe American flag shall protect its crew : providing for this in
a satisfactory manner, the envoys are empowered circciually
to secure Great Britain against the employment of her sea-
men in the service of the United States, and to adopt any
measures consistently w'lVa the spirit of the constitution, which
shall be likely to accomplish the object. To the exclusion of
British seamen from the American service no repugnance is
felt. It is a growing sentiment in the United States, that they
ought to depend on their own population for the supply of
their ships of war, and merchant service ; and experience
has shown that it is an abundant resource.
A strong desire has heretofore been expressed by the
British government, to obtain from the United States an ar-
rangement to prevent the detention of British seamen from
iheir vessels in American ports. It cannot be doubted
that a stipulation to that efl'ect would be highly satisfac-
tory as well as useful to Great Britain. This alone, it is
presumed, will furnish a strong inducement to enter into
a satisfactory arrangement on the subject of impress-
ment. The claim is not inadmissible, especially as the
United States have a reciprocal interest in the restoration of
deserters from American vessels in British port.>. An ai'ticle
such as has been heretofore authorized by the United
Sta-tes may be adopted, making it the duty of eacii party to
62
490 HI&TORY OP THE LATE WAR. Chap. 22.
deliver them up. On the right of the United States to be ex-
empted from the degrading practice of impressment, it is need-
less to add, the practice is uttt-rly repugnant to the law of na-
tions, supported by no treaty, nor acquiesced in by any
nation. A submission to it by the United States would be
the abandonment in favour of Great Britain of all claim to
neutral rights, and of all other rights on the ocean. The
practice is not founded on any belligerent right : the greatest
extent to which the belligerent claim has been carried over
the vessels of neutral nations, has been to board and take from
them persons employed in the land and sea service .)f an en-
emy, goods contraband of war, and enemy's property. In
all the discussions of questions on neutral rights, nothing of
the British claim of impressment is found, no acknowledg-
ment of it in any treaty, or submission to it by any power.
This claim has forthe first time been set up against the United
States only. The claim is in fact traced to another source,
the allegiance due by British subjects to their sovereign, and
his right by virtue thereof to their service.
" Allegiance," the instructions proceed to remark, " is a
political relation between the sovereign and his people, which
binds the latter in return for the protection they receive.
These reciprocal duties have the same limit ; they are con-
fined to the dominions of the sovereign, beyond which he has
no rights, can afford no protection, and can of course claim
no allegiance. A citizen or subject of one power entering
the dominions of another, owes allegiance to the latter in re-
turn for the protection he receives. Whether the sovereign has
a right to claim the service of such of his subjects as have left
his own dominions, is a question respecting which a difference
of opinion may exist. Certain it is that no sovereign has a
right to pursue his subjects into the territory of another, be the
object what it may. Such an entry, without the consent of
the other power, would be a violation of its territory. That
the vessels of a nation are considered as a partof the territo-
ry, with the exception of (he belligerent right only, is a prin-
1314. HISTORY OF THE LATE WAK 491
ciple too well established to be brought iiUo discussion.
Each has the exclusive jurisdiction over its own vessels. Its
laws * govern in them, and offences against their laws
are punishable by its tribunals only. The Hag of a nation
protects every thing sailing under it in time of peace ; and in
time of war likewise with the exception of the belligfTcuf
right growing out of a state of war. An entry on board of
the vessels of one power by the cruisers of another, in any
other case, and the exercise of any other authority over them,
is a violation of right, and an act of hostility.
The British government, aware of the correctness of this
doctrine, now say, they do not contend that British cruisers
Iiave a right to pursue and search American vessels for their
seamen. But having a right to search them for other objects,
and being lawfully on board, and finding British seamen
there, they have a right to impress, and bring them away un-
der the claim of allegiance. When we see a systematic pur-
suit of American vessels by British cruisers, and the impress-
ment of seamen from them, not at a port of the enemy where
a regular blockade has been instituted, but on the ocean, on
the American coast and harbours, it is difficult to believe that
impressment is not the real motive, and the other only a pre-
text. The British government founds its right of impress-
ment on that of allegiance, which is a permanent right equally
applicable to peace and war; the right of impressment
therefore, from vessels of other powers, must likewise be
equally permanent; but it would not do to take this broad
ground, lest the injustice and extravagance of the pretension
should excite the astonishment and indignation of other
powers, to whom it would be equally applicable. To claim
it as a belligerent right would be equally extravagant and
absurd, no trace of it being found in the belligerent code.
The British government are therefore reduced to a very em-
barrassing dilemma : to acknowledge that they could not sup-
port the claim on either principle would be to give it up, and
yet it could rely on neither. It therefore entJeavoXired io
49^ HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR, Chap. 22.
draw some aid from both; and from two indefensible propo-
sitions to make out one that was tenablco A state of war ex-
ists which brings the parties together. Great Britain is a
belhgercnt, and the United States are a neutral power. Bri-
tish officers have now a right to board and Search American
vessels, for persons in their enemy's service, goods contra-
band of war, and enemy's property. Allegiance, which is
an attribute of sovereignty, now comes to her aid, and com-
municates all the necessary power ; the complete right and
sovereignty of the vessel, is now transferred to Great Britain.
On this foundation the British government has raised the
monstrous superstructure.
In further justification of the practice, the British ministry
remark, that they exercise no right which they are not willing
to accede to the United States. This semblance of equality
disappears on a moment's examination. It is impossible for
the United States to take advantage of it. Impressment is
not an American practice, but utterly repugnant to her con-
stitution and laws ; in offering to reciprocate it, nothing was
offered, as Great Britain well knew ; a reciprocation of the
practice would be n-' equivalent to the United States. The
exercise of a right in common at sea by two nations, each
over the vessels of the other ; the one powerful, and the
other comparatively weak, would be to place the latter com-
pletely at the mercy of the former. Great Britain, with her