the word itself. Just consider, for example, the fact that in an
enormously large number of cases, my lecturing is not disturbed
by the fact that the words which I use recall others by their
sound resemblance, that they are intimately associated with their
opposites, or arouse common associations. We might add here
the observation of the philosopher Wundt, that slips of the
tongue occur when, in consequence of bodily fatigue, the ten-
dency to association gains the upper hand over the intended
speech. This would sound very plausible if it were not con-
tradicted by experiences which proved that from one series of
cases of tongue-slips bodily stimuli were absent, and from
another, the association stimuli were absent.

However, your next question is one of particular interest to
me, namely : in what way can one establish the existence of the
two mutually antagonistic tendencies? You probably do not
suspect how significant this question is. It is true, is it not, that
one of the two tendencies, the tendency which suffers the inter-
ference, is always unmistakable? The person who commits the
error is aware of it and acknowledges it. It is the other ten-
dency, what we call the interfering tendency, which causes
doubt and hesitation. Now we have already learned, and you
have surely not forgotten, that these tendencies are, in a series
of cases, equally plain. That is indicated by the effect of the
slip, if only we have the courage to let this effect be valid in
itself. The president who said the opposite of what he meant
to say made it clear that he wanted to open the meeting, but
equally clear that he would also have liked to terminate it.
Here the meaning is so plain that there is nothing left to be
interpreted. But the other cases in which the interfering ten-
dency merely distorts the original, without bringing itself to
full expression how can one guess the interfering meaning
from the distortion ?

By a very sure and simple method, in the first series of cases,
namely, by the same method by which one establishes the



30 Introduction to Psychoanalysis

existence of the meaning interfered with. The latter is immedi-
ately supplied by the speaker, who instantly adds the originally
intended expression. "It may stake no, it may take another
month." Now we likewise ask him to express the interfering
meaning; we ask him: "Now, why did you first say staked"
He answers, ' ' I meant to say ' This is a sorry business. ' ' ' And
in the other case of the tongue slip re- filed the subject also
affirms that he meant to say "It is a fil-thy business," but then
moderated his expression and turned it into something else.
Thus the discovery of the interfering meaning was here as suc-
cessful as the discovery of the one interfered with. Nor did I
unintentionally select as examples cases which were neither re-
lated nor explained by me or by a supporter of my theories.
Yet a certain investigation was necessary in both cases in order
to obtain the solution. One had to ask the speaker why he made
this slip, what he had to say about it. Otherwise he might per-
haps have passed it by without seeking to explain it. When
questioned, however, he furnished the explanation by means of
the first thing that came to his mind. And now you see, ladies
and gentlemen, that this slight investigation and its consequence
are already a psychoanalysis, and the prototype of every
psychoanalytic investigation which we shall conduct more ex-
tensively at a later time.

Now, am I unduly suspicious if I suspect that at the same
moment in which psychoanalysis emerges before you, your re-
sistence to psychoanalysis also raises its head? Are you not
anxious to raise the objection that the information given by the
subject we questioned, and who committed the slip, is not proof
sufficient? He naturally has the desire, you say, to meet the
challenge, to explain the slip, and hence he says the first thing
he can think of if it seems relevant. But that, you say, is
no proof that this is really the way the slip happened. It might
be so, but it might just as well be otherwise, you say. Some-
thing else might have occurred to him which might have fitted
the case just as well and better.

It is remarkable how little respect, at bottom, you have for a
psychic fact! Imagine that someone has decided to undertake
the chemical analysis of a certain substance, and has secured a
sample of the substance, of a certain weight so and so many



The Psychology of Errors 31

milligrams. From this weighed sample certain definite conclu-
sions can be drawn. Do you think it would ever occur to a
chemist to discredit these conclusions by the argument that the
isolated substance might have had some other weight? Every-
one yields to the fact that it was just this weight and no other,
and confidently builds his further conclusions upon that fact.
But when you are confronted by the psychic fact that the sub-
ject, when questioned, had a certain idea, you will not accept
that as valid, but say some other idea might just as easily have
occurred to him ! The trouble is that you believe in the illusion
of psychic freedom and will not give it up. I regret that on
this point I find myself in complete opposition to your views.

Now you will relinquish this point only to take up your re-
sistance at another place. You will continue, "We understand
that it is the peculiar technique of psychoanalysis that the solu-
tion of its problems is discovered by the analyzed subject him-
self. Let us take another example, that in which the speaker
calls upon the assembly 'to hiccough the health of their chief.'
The interfering idea in this case, you say, is the insult. It is
that which is the antagonist of the expression of conferring an
honor. But that is mere interpretation on your part, based on
observations extraneous to the slip. If in this case you question
the originator of the slip, he will not affirm that he intended an
insult, on the contrary, he will deny it energetically. Why do
you not give up your unverifiable interpretation in the face of
this plain objection?"

Yes, this time you struck a hard problem. I can imagine the
unknown speaker. He is probably an assistant to the guest of
honor, perhaps already a minor official, a young man with the
brightest prospects. I will press him as to whether he did not
after all feel conscious of something which may have worked
in opposition to the demand that he do honor to the chief. What
a fine success 111 have! He becomes impatient and suddenly
bursts out on me, "Look here, you'd better stop this cross-
examination, or I'll get unpleasant. Why, you'll spoil my whole
career with your suspicions. I simply said *aw/-gestossen' in-
stead of 'an-gestossen,' because I'd already said 'auf twice in
the same sentence. It's the thing that Meringer calls a per-
servation, and there's no other meaning that you can twist out
of it. Do you understand me? That's all." H'm, this is a



32 Introduction to Psychoanalysis

surprising reaction, a really energetic denial. I see that there
is nothing more to be obtained from the young man, but I also
remark to myself that he betrays a strong personal interest in
having his slip mean nothing. Perhaps you, too, agree that it
is not right for him immediately to become so rude over a purely
theoretical investigation, but, you will conclude, he really must
know what he did and did not mean to say.

Really? Perhaps that's open to question nevertheless.

But now you think you have me. ''So that is your tech-
nique," I hear you say. "When the person who has committed
a slip gives an explanation which fits your theory, then you
declare him the final authority on the subject. 'He says so him-
self ! ' But if what he says does not fit into your scheme, then
you suddenly assert that what he says does not count, that one
need not believe him. ' '

Yet that is certainly true. I can give you a similar case in
which the procedure is apparently just as monstrous. When a
defendant confesses to a deed, the judge believes his confession.
But if he denies it, the judge does not believe him. Were it
otherwise, there would be no way to administer the law, and
despite occasional miscarriages you must acknowledge the value
of this system.

Well, are you then the judge, and is the person who com-
mitted the slip a defendant before you ? Is a slip of the tongue
a crime ?

Perhaps we need not even decline this comparison. But just
see to what far-reaching differences we have come by penetrating
somewhat into the seemingly harmless problems of the psy-
chology of errors, differences which at this stage we do not at
all know how to reconcile. I offer you a preliminary compromise
on the basis of the analogy of the judge and the defendant. You
will grant me that the meaning of an error admits of no doubt
when the subject under analysis acknowledges it himself. I
in turn will admit that a direct proof for the suspected meaning
cannot be obtained if the subject denies us the information;
and, of course, that is also the case when the subject is not
present to give us the information. We are, then, as in the case
of the legal procedure, dependent on circumstances which make
a decision at one time seem more, and at another time, less
probable to us. At law, one has to declare a defendant guilty



The Psychology of Errors 33

on circumstantial evidence for practical reasons. We see no
such necessity; but neither are we forced to forego the use of
these circumstances. It would be a mistake to believe that a
science consists of nothing but conclusively proved theorems,
and any such demand would be unjust. Only a person with a
mania for authority, a person who must replace his religious
catechism w.ith some other, even though it be scientific, would
make such a demand. Science has but few apodeictic precepts
in its catechism; it consists chiefly of assertions which it has
developed to certain degrees of probability. It is actually a
symptom of scientific thinking if one is content with these
approximations of certainty and is able to carry on constructive
work despite the lack of the final confirmation.

But where do we get the facts for our interpretations, the
circumstances for our proof, when the further remarks of the
subject under analysis do not themselves elucidate the meaning
of the error? From many sources. First of all, from the
analogy with phenomena extraneous to the psychology of errors ;
as, for example, when we assert that the distortion of a name as
a slip of the tongue has the same insulting significance as an
intentional name distortion. We get them also from the psychic
situation' in which the error occurred, from our knowledge of
the character of the person who committed the error, from the
impressions which that person received before making the error,
and to which he may possibly have reacted with this error.
As a rule, what happens is that we find the meaning of the error
according to general principles. It is then only a conjecture,
a suggestion as to what the meaning may be, and we then obtain
our proof from examination of the psychic situation. Sometimes,
too, it happens that we have to wait for subsequent develop-
ments, which have announced themselves, as it were, through
the error, in order to find our conjecture verified .

I cannot easily give you proof of this if I have to limit myself
to the field of tongue slips, although even here there are a few
good examples. The young man who wished to "inscort" the
lady is certainly shy ; the lady whose husband may eat and drink
whatever she wants I know to be one of those energetic women
who know how to rule in the home. Or take the following case :
A.t a general meeting of the Concordia Club, a young member
delivers a vehement speech in opposition, in the course of which
he addresses the officers of the society as: "Fellow committee



34 Introduction to Psychoanalysis

lenders." We will conjecture that some conflicting idea mili-
tated in him against his opposition, an idea which was in some
way based on a connection with money lending. As a matter
of fact, we learn from our informant that the speaker was in
constant money difficulties, and had attempted to raise a loan.
As a conflicting idea, therefore, we may safely interpolate the
idea, "Be more moderate in your opposition, these are the same
people who are to grant you the loan. ' '

But I can give you a wide selection of such circumstantial
proof if I delve into the wide field of other kinds of error.

If anyone forgets an otherwise familiar proper name, or has
difficulty in retaining it in his memory despite all efforts, then
the conclusion lies close at hand, that he has something against
the bearer of this name and does not like to think of him. Con-
sider in this connection the following revelation of the psychic
situation in which this error occurs :

"A Mr. Y. fell in love, without reciprocation, with a lady
who soon after married a Mr. X. In spite of the fact that Mr.
Y. has known Mr. X. a long time, and even has business rela-
tions with him, he forgets his name over and over again, so that
he found it necessary on several occasions to ask other people
the man's name when he wanted to write to Mr. X." 3

Mr. Y. obviously does not want to have his fortunate rival in
mind under any condition. "Let him never be thought of."

Another example: A lady makes inquiries at her doctor's
concerning a mutual acquaintance, but speaks of her by her
maiden name. She has forgotten her married name. She admits
that she was much displeased by the marriage, and could not
stand this friend's husband. 4

Later we shall have much to say in other relations about the
matter of forgetting names. At present we are predominantly
interested in the psychic situation in which the lapse of memory
occurs.

The forgetting of projects can quite commonly be traced to
an antagonistic current which does not wish to carry out the
project. "We psychoanalysts are not alone in holding this view,
but this is the general conception to which all persons sub-
scribe the daily affairs, and which they first deny in theory.

* From C. G. Jung.
4 From A. A. Brill.



The Psychology of Errors 35

The patron who makes apologies to his protege, saying that he
has forgotten his requests, has not squared himself with his
protege. The protege immediately thinks: "There's nothing
to that; he did promise but he really doesn't want to do it."
Hence, daily life also proscribes forgetting, in certain connec-
tions, and the difference between the popular and the psycho-
analytic conception of these errors appears to be removed.
Imagine a housekeeper who receives her guest with the words:
"What, you come to-day? Why, I had totally forgotten that I
had invited you for to-day"; or the young man who might tell
his sweetheart that he had forgotten to keep the rendezvous
which they planned. He is sure not to admit it, it were better
for him to invent the most improbable excuses on the spur of the
moment, hindrances which prevented him from coming at that
time, and which made it impossible for him to communicate the
situation to her. We all know that in military matters the
excuse of having forgotten something is useless, that it protects
one from no punishment; and we must consider this attitude
justified. Here we suddenly find everyone agreed that a certain
error is significant, and everyone agrees what its meaning is.
Why are they not consistent enough to extend this insight to
the other errors, and fully to acknowledge them? Of course,
there is also an answer to this.

If the meaning of this forgetting of projects leaves room for
so little doubt among laymen, you will be less surprised to find
that poets make use of these errors in the same sense. Those
of you who have seen or read Shaw's Caesar and Cleopatra
will recall that Caesar, when departing in the last scene, i
pursued by the idea that there was something more he intended
to do, but that he had forgotten it. Finally he discovers what it
is : to take leave of Cleopatra. This small device of the author
is meant to ascribe to the great Caesar a superiority which he
did not possess, and to which he did not at all aspire. You can
learn from historical sources that Caesar had Cleopatra follow
him to Kome, and that she was staying there with her little
Caesarion when Caesar was murdered, whereupon she fled the
city.

The cases of forgetting projects are as a rule so clear that
they are of little use for our purpose, i.e., discovering in the
psychic situation circumstantial evidence of the meaning of



36 Introduction to Psychoanalysis

the error. Let us, therefore, turn to a particularly ambiguous
and untransparent error, that of losing and mislaying objects.
That we ourselves should have a purpose in losing an object, an
accident frequently so painful, will certainly seem incredible
to you. But there are many instances similar to the following :
A young man loses the pencil which he had liked very much.
The day before he had received a letter from his brother-in-law,
which concluded with the words, ' ' For the present I have neither
the inclination nor the time to be a party to your frivolity and
your idleness." 5 It so happened that the pencil had been a
present from this brother-in-law. Without this coincidence we
could not, of course, assert that the loss involved any intention
to get rid of the gift. Similar cases are numerous. Persons
lose objects when they have fallen out with the donors, and
no longer wish to be reminded of them. Or again, objects may be
lost if one no longer likes the things themselves, and wants to
supply oneself with a pretext for substituting other and better
things in their stead. Letting a thing fall and break naturally
shows the same intention toward that object. Can one consider
it accidental when a school child just before his birthday loses,
ruins or breaks his belongings, for example his school bag or
his watch ?

He who has frequently experienced the annoyance of not
being able to find something which he has himself put away,
will also be unwilling to believe there was any intent behind the
loss. And yet the examples are not at all rare in which the
attendant circumstances of the mislaying point to a tendency
temporarily or permanently to get rid of the object. Perhaps
the most beautiful example of this sort is the following: A
young man tells me : " A few years ago a misunderstanding arose
in my married life. I felt my wife was too cool and even though
1 willingly acknowledged her excellent qualities, we lived with-
out any tenderness between us. One day she brought me a book
which she had thought might interest me. I thanked her for
this attention, promised to read the book, put it in a handy
place, and couldn't find it again. Several months passed thus,
during which I occasionally remembered this mislaid book and
tried in vain to find it. About half a year later my beloved
mother, who lived at a distance from us, fell ill. My wife left

-FromB. Dattner.



The Psychology of Errors 37

the house in order to nurse her mother-in-law. The condition
of the patient became serious, and gave my wife an opportunity
of showing her best side. One evening I came home filled with
enthusiasm and gratitude toward my wife. I approached my
writing desk, opened a certain drawer with no definite intention
but as if with somnambulistic certainty, and the first thing I
found is the book so long mislaid."

With the cessation of the motive, the inability to find the
mislaid object also came to an end.

Ladies and gentlemen, I could increase this collection of ex-
amples indefinitely. But I do not wish to do so here. In my
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (first published in 1901),
you will find only too many instances for the study of errors. 6

All these examples demonstrate the same thing repeatedly:
namely, they make it seem probable that errors have a meaning,
and show how one may guess or establish that meaning from
the attendant circumstances. I limit myself to-day because we
have confined ourselves to the purpose of profiting in the prepa-
ration for psychoanalysis from the study of these phenomena.
1 must, however, still go into two additional groups of observa-
tions, into the accumulated and combined errors and into the
confirmation of our interpretations by means of subsequent
developments.

The accumulated and combined errors are surely the fine
flower of their species. If we were interested only in proving
that errors may have a meaning, we would limit ourselves to the
accumulated and combined errors in the first place, for here
the meaning is unmistakable, even to the dullest intelligence,
and can force conviction upon the most critical judgment. The
accumulation of manifestations betrays a stubbornness such as
could never come about by accident, but which fits closely the
idea of design. Finally, the interchange of certain kinds of
error with each other shows us what is the important and es-
sential element of the error, not its form or the means of which
it avails itself, but the purpose which it serves and which is to be
achieved by the most various paths. Thus I will give you a case
of repeated forgetting. Jones recounts that he once allowed a
letter to lie on his writing desk several days for reasons quite

So also in the writings of A. Maeder (French), A. A. Brill (English),
J. Starke (Dutch) and others.



38 Introduction to Psychoanalysis

unknown. Finally lie made up his mind to mail it; but it was
returned from the dead letter office, for he had forgotten to
address it. After he had addressed it he took it to the post
office, but this time without a stamp. At this point he finally
had to admit to himself his aversion against sending the letter
at all.

In another case a mistake is combined with mislaying an
object. A lady is traveling to Rome with her brother-in-law, a
famous artist. The visitor is much feted by the Germans living
in Rome, and receives as a gift, among other things, a gold medal
of ancient origin. The lady is vexed by the fact that her brother-
in-law does not sufficiently appreciate the beautiful object.
After she leaves her sister and reaches her home, she discovers
when unpacking that she has brought with her how, she does
not know the medal. She immediately informs her brother-
in-law of this fact by letter, and gives him notice that she will
send the medal back to Rome the next day. But on the follow-
ing day, the medal has been so cleverly mislaid that it can
neither be found nor sent, and at this point it begins to dawn
upon the lady that her "absent-mindedness" means, namely,
that she wants to keep the object for herself. 7

I have already given you an example of a combination of
forgetfulness and error in which someone first forgot a rendez-
vous and then, with the firm intention of not forgetting it a
second time, appeared at the wrong hour. A quite analogous
case was told me from his own experience, by a friend who pur-
sues literary interests in addition to his scientific ones. He said :
"A few years ago I accepted the election to the board of a
certain literary society, because I hoped that the society could
at some time be of use to me in helping obtain the production
of my drama, and, despite my lack of interest, I took part in
the meetings every Friday. A few months ago I received the
assurance of a production in the theatre in F., and since that
time it happens regularly that I forget the meetings of that
society. When I read your article on these things, I was
ashamed of my forgetfulness, reproached myself with the mean-
ness of staying away now that I no longer need these people
and determined to be sure not to forget next Friday. I kept
reminding myself of this resolution until I carried it out and

TromE. Eeitler.



The Psychology of Errors 39

stood before the door of the meeting room. To my astonishment,
it was closed, the meeting was already over ; for I had mistaken
the day. It was already Saturday."

It would be tempting enough to collect similar observations,
but I will go no further; I will let you glance instead upon
those cases in which our interpretation has to wait for its proof
upon future developments.

The chief condition of these cases is conceivably that the ex-
isting psychic situation is unknown to us or inaccessible to our
inquiries. At that time our interpretation has only the value
of a conjecture to which we ourselves do not wish to grant too
much weight. Later, however, something happens which shows
us how justified was our interpretation even at that time. 1