THE VOLUNTEERS
AND THE
NATIONAL DEFENCE
BY
SPENSER WILKINSON
1
FORMERLY CAPTAIN 2OTH LANCASHIRE R.V
AutJior of " Citizen Soldiers" "The Brain of an Army" etc
WESTMINSTER
ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE
& CO 1896
BUTLER & TANNER, FROME AND LONDON
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE 5
INTRODUCTION. SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE EN-
QUIRY 9
PART I.
THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE VOLUNTEER
FORCE TESTED BY THE STANDARD OF FITNESS
FOR WAR :
1. MOBILISATION 28
2. RAILWAY TRANSPORT 34
3. THE MARCH . 36
4. QUARTERS ....... 48
5. SECURITY AND EXPLORATION . . .51
6. BATTLE ........ 58
PART II.
OUTLINES OF A PROGRESSIVE METHOD DEDUCED
FROM THE STANDARD AIMED AT AND FROM THE
CONDITIONS IMPOSED :
1. THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS OF VOLUNTEER
SERVICE 94
2. ATTENDANCES, RANGES, AND MANOEUVR-
ING GROUNDS 101
3. PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THE METHOD
MUST BE BASED 106
4. DISCIPLINE, OR THE OFFICERS . . .123
5. FINANCE 143
CONCLUSION 147
PREFACE
THE following essay, along with nine others,
was published in 1891, in a volume entitled
The Volunteer Question, issued under the
auspices of the West of Scotland Tactical
Society, to whose courtesy, as well as to that
of Messrs. T. & A. Constable, of Edinburgh, I
am indebted for kind permission to publish it
as a separate volume. I trust that its appear-
ance may be opportune at a time when the
nation has been awakened to the importance of
defence, and when the appointment of a pro-
fessional soldier as Commander-in-Chief offers
a guarantee that the Volunteers will at length
receive the attention they deserve. My object
in writing was to give a true account of the
chief processes of modern war, and to show
how the Volunteer Force, without losing its
6 PREFACE
character as an army of citizens, may be fitted
to do its work of defence in the conditions of
war as it is in our day.
The text has been carefully revised with a
view to bring it up to date in essential matters.
The figures showing the cost of the Volunteer
Force, taken from the estimates for 1890-91,
have not been altered, for they illustrate as
well as those of the present year the facts and
principles set forth.
Since 1891 there has been no important
change in the character, the conditions of ser-
vice, or the quality of the Volunteer Force,
and no such change in the methods of war as
affects the account which I then gave. The
introduction of smokeless powder, and the uni-
versal .adoption of the repeating rifle have,
broadly speaking, no other effect than more
than ever to increase the premium upon good
leading, perfect discipline, and thorough prac-
tical instruction in musketry. It will, in my
opinion, be necessary to arm the Volunteers
PREFACE 7
with the same weapon as is used by the Army,
and, if possible, to communicate to them the
same skill in its use. The two changes upon
which the whole future of the Volunteer Force
depends, are the introduction of a rational
system of selection according to fitness among
the officers, with special care in the appoint-
ment of commanding officers, and the acqui-
sition, at the public expense, of sufficient and
accessible spaces for musketry practice, and for
manoeuvring.
169, OAKLEY STREET, S.W.
Feb. 12, 1896
THE VOLUNTEERS
AND THE
NATIONAL DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION,
SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE INQUIRY
" THE power of Great Britain is vulnerable in her
vast colonial possessions, in particular in India,
but a decisive struggle with a great European
Power will, not end without an attempt to land
an army upon the English coasts." *
1 Geographie Militair, par le Commandant du Ge*nie A.
Marga, deuxieme partie, tome iii. p. 263 ; cp. for the prob-
able force to be landed, p. 264. The above opinion may be
compared with that of a French naval essayist : " L'etince-
lant cuirasse de 1'empire britannique est elle sans defaut ?
Et nous est il interdit d'esperer sur quelque theatre d'opera-
tions bien choisi unisucces momentane de nos vaisseaux qui
permette a notre armee d'intervenir dans la lutte ? . . .
9
VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
To the perception of this truth the Volunteer
force owes its existence. It was created for the
purpose of defeating, side by side with the regular
army and the militia, or, if need be, when these
forces are only partially available, any foreign
army which may be landed upon our shores.
Is the Volunteer force in its present condition
etre maitre de la Manche pendant quelques jours ! " " La
Strategic Navale," Revue des Deux Mondes, xciv. p. 795.
The question of the possibility or probability of an invasion
is not discussed in this essay, as it is no part of the theme,
and would require for its adequate treatment a thorough
and lengthy examination into questions of policy, of naval
administration and of naval strategy. For the opinions of
English authorities on the question, see Second Report from
the Select Committee on Army and Navy Estimates \ 1887,
p. 57. Major-Gen. H. Brackenbury, C.B. : " I have not the
slightest doubt that if our Channel Fleet were to be tem-
porarily (for a period, I will say, of three weeks) made
powerless, to be removed from controlling the Channel for
a period of three weeks, a strong maritime power would be
able to place, crowding them together on board ships for the
short voyage, such a number of men that they might land,
or attempt to land, a force of from 100,000 men to 150,000
men upon these shores." The relation between the naval
and the military defence of Great Britain has been dis-
cussed by Sir Charles Dilke and me in Imperial Defence
(1892), and by me in The Command of the Sea (1894).
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE n
equal to this mission, and, if not, by what
means short of an entire change in its character
can it be adequately prepared for the work the
only work which it can be called upon to perform ?
These two questions describe in general terms
the scope of the present inquiry.
The standard by which all defensive prepara-
tions are measured is furnished by the nature
of the attack to be resisted, that is, by the
probable numbers, composition, and quality of
the enemy's forces. An invasion of England
can be attempted only by one or more of the
neighbouring Continental Great Powers. The
numbers of the invading army would depend
mainly on the possibilities of sea transport. In
1851 it was estimated that France, maintaining
at that time an army of 450,0x30 men, could
land in England, in case the opportunity of
crossing the Channel unmolested should offer it-
self, an army of 1 50,000 men. * Commandant
1 De la Defense Nationale en Angleterre^ par le Baron
P. E. Maurice. Paris, 1851, pp. 40, 81.
12 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
Marga, in the work l already quoted, gives
200,000 as a reasonable estimate of the force
required. He lays down as a condition of the
enterprise that, as only a limited number of
troops could be landed, the invader should
aim at a surprise, and should choose for his
landing a point as near as possible to his ob-
jective, i.e. to London. 2 These data have an
important bearing on the quality of the troops
that would be employed, and on the nature of the
attack. A force of 200,000 men is less than half
of that which is at all times with the colours
either in France or in Germany. 3 It could
therefore be prepared and moved off without
any previous calling out of reserves. In that
case it would be in every sense a picked force ;
its battalions would be smaller 4 and handier
1 Op. tit., p. 264. 2 Marga, ut supra, p. 263.
3 Peace strength of the German army, 491,955 ; of the
French army, 555,330. [1899.]
4 The battalion on a war footing in France and in Ger-
many is 1,000, strong. In peace it is in Germany 544, in
France 550 officers and men, [1890.]
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 13
than those usually employed in Continental war,
and it could be mobilised without the loss of
time involved in the assembling and equipment
of numerous reservists. This implies the entire
suppression of the four, five, or six days now
assigned to the process of mobilisation, for the
troops without reservists can be entrained at
any time at a few hours 1 notice. It also in-
volves a further consequence of special interest
to our inquiry. In the absence of the move-
ment among the civil population caused by the
calling in of the reserves, the whole of the pre-
parations, until the troops march from their
barracks to the railway stations, can be kept
secret. Even the march to the train, effected
by small units in many places at the same time,
would excite no immediate attention. A delay
of the diplomatic rupture until the troops were
actually entrained would therefore give the attack-
ing Power an advance in the preparations which
might even be equivalent to the arrival of the
invading troops at their ports of embarkation at
14 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
the time when in England the order for mobi-
lisation was issued.
These considerations suffice to settle in general
terms the indispensable conditions to be fulfilled
by the defensive forces. They must be able to
be ready promptly, that is, they should be in
their places with the shortest possible delay
after the order for their mobilisation ; when so
assembled they must be in every respect ready
for action, and their armament and training
must qualify them to face the picked troops of
a modern Continental army.
This general statement requires to be qualified
by an examination of the different functions to
be performed by the several portions of the de-
fending force.
It is usually, and probably rightly, assumed
that provision must be made for the garrisons
of the existing forts, and for the special local
defence of a number of harbours and coast
towns against raids from the sea. The troops
told off for these duties can hardly be counted
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 15
as available to resist an invading army. Ac-
cording to the mobilisation scheme announced
in iSB./, 1 a great portion of the Volunteers, both
artillery and infantry, come under this category,
while about half the infantry and twenty-one
corps of artillery are assigned to the army for
resisting invasion.
The dispositions to be adopted for the repulse
of an invading force present a strategical pro-
blem of which no accepted analysis by a com-
petent hand is before the public. It is generally
agreed that the invader would regard London
as his objective, but there is perhaps less unani-
mity with regard to the best way of disposing
the forces available for defence. The defensive
army might be echeloned like a great system of
outposts on a plan analogous to that adopted
by the Allies in 1815 ; or it might be concen-
trated ready to attack the invader as soon as
1 See Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,
xxxi. pp. 424 ff., and cp. the article entitled, " The Defence of
London," in the Standard of August 15, 1889.
1 6 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
the direction of his march or the point of his
principal landing should be known ; and either
of these plans might be concurrent with the
detachment of a special force for the immediate
protection of London against a sudden attack.
The mobilisation scheme appears to be based
upon such a combination. Its authors contem-
plate the assembling in positions near London
of the Volunteer infantry and artillery not told
off to garrisons or special local services. On the
south of London 60,000 men and 150 guns are
assigned to a front of 34 miles from Guildford
to Halstead, while on the north-east, a front of
24 miles is given to about 30,000 men with 80
guns. The defence of these lines must evidently
be based upon a series of prepared positions
either permanent fortifications or field-works
and upon the ready movement of supports and
reserves according to the direction of the attack
or attacks. The conditions of success in a de-
fence of this kind are, apart from the general
command, that the troops should be thoroughly
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 17
trained in shooting and in fire discipline, and
that they should be able to march punctually in
considerable bodies, that is, at the least in bri-
gades. They should also be acquainted with the
nature of field-works, and with the tactics of their
attack and defence. If the several corps were
familiar each with the particular locality in which
it would be stationed there would be an obvious
further advantage.
The mobilisation scheme, however, has hitherto
hardly been taken seriously. At least we may
infer, from the fact that no modification has
been ordered in the training of the Volunteer
infantry to suit it to the conditions of the
scheme, that the Commander-in-chief has not
definitely adopted this plan of defence. In any
case, the scheme would seem, perhaps owing to
its being only imperfectly known, to be open to
criticism in two respects.
The mobile portion of the defensive army
appears to consist of two army corps of regular
soldiers, and about one army corps of militia.
B
i8 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO
This is hardly sufficient if the enemy is able to
land five army corps 150,000 men. But an
invasion would scarcely be attempted except in
circumstances which might render the regular
army liable to calls that would remove large
portions of it from Great Britain. In that case
the two army corps would not be available at
home. This probability, and the numerical weak-
ness of the mobile force provided, are perhaps
sufficient grounds for urging that the formation
of at least one field army corps of Volunteers
would be a most desirable supplement to the
scheme.
An examination of the other weak point of
the scheme will show how this is possible. Its
authors assume that for garrison purposes not
the whole but only half of any Volunteer corps
would be available. This assumption appears
to rest on a grave misapprehension as to the
nature of the Volunteer service. No Volunteer
corps can be called out for actual military
service, or, to use the modern term, "mobilised,"
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 19
except in case of "actual or apprehended in-
vasion of any part of the United Kingdom.' In
the present state of military opinion at home
and abroad in the face, that is, of a universal
agreement that a war with a great European
Power will not end without an attempt at in-
vasion, and that the attempt will be in the
nature of a surprise it would seem reasonable
to interpret this to mean that the Volunteers
can be mobilised as soon as war with a great
Power is imminent. It has already been seen
that an indispensable condition of the defence is
that the forces to be used should be ready at
once in other words, that mobilisation and con-
centration must begin as soon as there is a
reasonable probability of war. The construction
here put upon the statute is absolutely necessary
to the end which Parliament had in view when
it was passed, the defence of the country, and
if there is a doubt about its interpretation the
Act should be amended. It is incredible that
any Volunteer should be supposed to object to
20 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
a change so evidently prescribed by common
sense. An explicit declaration upon this point
would perhaps contribute more than any other
measure to bring home to the public, as well as
to the Volunteers themselves, the serious nature
of their work and the real value of their services.
The mobilisation scheme, however, contemplates
mobilising half a corps at a time. "Seeing be-
fore me many distinguished Volunteer officers,"
said General Brackenbury in 1887,* "I will ask
them whether it is possible that the whole of
any one of their Volunteer corps could be main-
tained in a garrison distant by rail an hour or
two hours from the place where the men live.
Could they be taken as a body of troops, put
into a garrison, and the whole of them kept
there during the continuance of a war which
might last for many months?" "We consider
that that is practically impossible. And the
basis upon which our scheme has been worked
has been this that one-half of the Volunteers
1 R.U.S.L Journal^ xxxi. p. 425.
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 21
actually living in any seaport to be defended
may be considered always available for garrison
duty." These sentences are a puzzle to those
familiar with the nature of volunteering. The
Volunteer is essentially a man who works for
his daily bread, and receives his military training
in his spare time. Neither the officer, speaking
generally, nor the private, can leave his everyday
work for soldiering. He drills in the evening or
on a half-holiday when his work is done. He
goes into camp at holiday-time. If his Volunteer
engagements interfere with his business he gives
them up, being entitled to retire at fourteen
days' notice. But, in case the Volunteer force is
called out, his freedom is gone. He becomes a
soldier ; he must march or be a deserter ; he be-
comes entitled to a soldier's pay, and to all allow-
ances for his family which a soldier can claim.
How does General Brackenbury reach the con-
clusion that half the Volunteers living, say, in
Glasgow, are always available for garrison duty?
They are all at work, all dependent on their
22 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
work, and are scattered in hundreds of different
trades and industries and a thousand different
workshops. By what power is a commanding
officer to assemble half his corps for actual
military duty? The Act gives no power to call
out half a corps, and the commanding officer
cannot take upon himself to say that of two men,
each of whom is earning thirty shillings a week,
one must come down to a shilling a day, or be
a deserter, while the other is to go about his
work as usual. The belief universal among the
Volunteers is, that except for the great emergency
of apprehended invasion none of them can be
disturbed, and that in that emergency they must
all be called upon alike. Perhaps General
Brackenbury thinks that industry would suffer if
the whole of the Volunteers in any town were
taken from their work. But the calling of half
a battalion instead of the whole has no bearing
on this. In a large town the disappearance of
all the Volunteers would not perceptibly modify
the supply of labour. Or, perhaps the "half"
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 23
system is conceived of as a relief to employers.
But it is no such thing. Private A is a mechanic,
and Private B a bookbinder. If A is called out,
B cannot do his work for him. But A will
assuredly not go unless B has to go also. The
calculation that " half the corps " can be called
out is surely erroneous. The whole force must
be called out at once. If the views here ex-
pressed are sound, it follows that the mobilisation
scheme has under-estimated the number of Volun-
teers available, and the actual surplus above the
estimate of the scheme would probably suffice for
the creation of an army corps.
The question of the terms of service has led to
a digression from the immediate question, which
is, the specific functions to be performed by the
several portions of the defensive forces of the
country. But the digression shows that this ques-
tion cannot at present be categorically answered,
and that there is every probability of Volunteer
corps finding their place in each of the constituent
portions of the defence, in the mobile field force,
24 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
in the army for the immediate protection of Lon-
don, in garrisons, and in the work of special local
defence.
The first reform we have to propose is that
these doubts should be cleared up. Every Volun-
teer corps should be officially told off to its place
in the scheme of defence, and its training should
be regulated solely with a view to preparing
officers and men for the war work thus assigned
to them.
Pending an official settlement of this first re-
quisite the introduction of a definite relation
between the end and the means we shall assume
that there must be Volunteer field troops, Volun-
teer garrison troops, and Volunteer troops for the
occupation of field works of a stronger character
than mere " hasty entrenchments."
In each case the highest standard of training
must be adopted, for the enemy will be a picked
and well-trained force. Even if it cannot be
attained, a high standard will lead further than
a low one. But it may be possible to show how,
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 25
without passing the bounds of what is thoroughly
practicable, a far higher degree of perfection than
has yet been realized is quite within reach of the
Volunteers.
In the absence of a clear and well-known dis-
tribution of roles to the various portions of the
Volunteer force, and of a specific and authorita-
tive description of the several functions to be
performed by the field army, the London defence
army, the local troops, and the garrisons, it is im-
practicable to examine in detail the fitness of the
different classes of Volunteers for the work that
must fall to them in war. The method here
adopted will be to assume that there must be
at least one army corps of the field army, com-
posed if not entirely, at least in part of Volun-
teers, and to ascertain how far the better corps
of Volunteer infantry are prepared for war service
in this position. For this purpose the principal
necessary operations of war will be discussed in
the natural order of their occurrence, so that a
complete view of the requirements and of the
26 THE VOLUNTEERS AND [INTRO.
sufficiency of the present system to meet them
may be obtained. The theoretical disadvantages
of this procedure are diminished by the fact that
about three-fifths of the Volunteers are infantry,
and have hitherto been trained exclusively with
the view of employment in the field. 1 The modi-
fications in this training which would be required
in the case of Volunteers otherwise employed are
not so great as might at first sight appear, and
can be pointed out incidentally.
The method to be adopted in seeking to ap-
proximate more closely to the ideal depends, how-
ever, not merely upon the standard set up, but
upon the conditions of the Volunteer service, which
set limits to the bounds of possible accomplish-
1 The great variety of local and other conditions makes
the Volunteers far from homogeneous. The writer has had
opportunities of seeing the work done by a great number of
different corps quartered in different parts of the country.
His conclusions, however, are based mainly upon the ex-
perience of a single battalion, and of the brigade of which
it forms part. It may, therefore, be well to say that the
battalion and the brigade are by universal admission among
the best in the Volunteer force.
INTRO.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 27
ment It will therefore be necessary to inquire
closely into these conditions, and to deduce from
them the principles which must guide the train-
ing and administration of Volunteers as dis-
tinguished from regular soldiers. Upon this basis
the attempt will be made to establish the outlines
of an improved Volunteer system the outlines
only ; for it would be labour thrown away to
elaborate too minutely the details of a system
until the acceptance of the principles, by which it
is determined, appears probable. A brief glance
at the financial conditions of the service will,
perhaps, be a desirable supplement to the inquiry.
PART I
THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE VOLUNTEERS
TESTED BY THE STANDARD OF FITNESS
FOR WAR
I. Mobilisation
No army can be permanently maintained on a
war footing. The first stage, therefore, of any
military operation is the passage from the peace
to the war footing, now commonly called " mobi-
lisation." * It comprehends three different pro-
cesses which are carried on as nearly as possible
simultaneously. The various corps of troops 2
1 For the process of mobilisation abroad, see Der Feld-
zug von 1866 in Deutschland Redigirt von der Kriegs-
geschichtlichen Abtheilung des Grossen Generalstabes, p.
1 6. Der Deutsch-Franzosische Krieg, 1870-1871, pp. 49 ff.
Berthaut, Principes de Strategic, pp. 34-37. Blume, Strate-
gie, pp. 65-67. Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army ',
pp. 72-74, and Citizen Soldiers ^ pp. 82-84.
2 This expression is borrowed from Major Buxton's
Elements of Military Administration^ and is used to save
the constant repetition of "battalions, batteries, regiments,
and corps."
23
PART i.] THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 29
(including those of the service of transport and
supply) are brought up to their exact war strength,