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328 Naval War of 1 812
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Naval War of 1 812 329
defence. Courage is only one of the many ele-
ments which go to make up the character of
a first-class commander; something more than
bravery is needed before a leader can be really
called great.
There happened to be circumstances which ren-
dered the bragging of our writers over the victory
somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with
an appearance of ^ruth that the enemy had 63
guns to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality,
as well as can be ascertained from the conflicting
evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few
men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides
had men enough to work the guns and handle the
ships, especially as the fight was in smooth water
and largely at long range. The important fact
was that, though we had nine guns less, yet, at a
broadside, they threw half as much metal again
as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our
favor it would have been a disgrace to have been
beaten. The water was too smooth for our two
brigs to show at their best ; but this very smooth-
ness rendered our gunboats more formidable than
any of the British vessels, and the British testimony
is unanimous that it was to them the defeat was
primarily due. The American fleet came into
action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the
ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry hav-
ing formed his line badly, or else to his having
.30^
Naval War of i$i2
failed to train the subordinate commanders how to
keep their places. The Niagara was not fought
well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a dis-
tance that prevented her from doing any damage
to the vessels opposed, which were battered to
pieces by the gunboats without the chance of re-
plying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels
at the rear of the line should have been closer up,
and in a position to render more effectual assist-
ance ; the attack was made in too loose order, and,
whether it was the fault of Perry or of his subor-
dinates, it fails to reflect credit on the Americans.
Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned ; but in this
instance not with very good judgment. He says
the line-of-battle was highly judicious, but this
may be doubted. The weather was peculiarly
suitable for the gunboats, with their long, heavy
guns; and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged
as to keep them in the rear, and let the brunt of
the assault fall on the Lawrence, with her short
carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steer-
ing for the head of the enemy's line, but he could
hardly have done anything else. In this battle
the firing seems to have been equally skilful on
both sides, the Detroit's long guns being peculiarly
well served ; but the British captains manoeuvred
better than their foes at first and supported one
another better, so that the disparity in damage
done on each side was not equal to the disparity
Naval War of 1 812 33^
in force. The chief merit of the American com-
mander and his followers was indomitable cour-
age and determination not to be beaten. This is
no slight merit ; but it may well be doubted if it
would have ensured victory had Barclay's force
been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a head-
long attack; his superior force, whether through
his fault or his misfortune can hardly be said,
being brought into action in such a manner that
the head of the line was crushed by the inferior
force opposed. Being literally hammered out of
his own ship. Perry brought up its powerful twin-
sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron
was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres
which marked the close of the battle, and which
ensured the capture of all the opposing ships, were
unquestionably ver\^ fine.
The British ships were fought as resolutely as
their antagonists, not being surrendered till they
were crippled and helpless, and almost all the
officers and a large proportion of the men placed
hors de combat. Captain Barclay handled his
ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible
to arrange them so as to be superior to his an-
tagonist, for the latter' s force was of such a nature
that in smooth water his gunboats gave him a
great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs
were more than a match for the whole British
squadron In short, our victory was due to our
33^ Naval War of 1812
heavy metal. As regards the honor of the affair,
in spite of the amount of boasting it has given rise
to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon
as in an equally high degree creditable to both
sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the
victory was so complete, it might be said that the
length of the contest and the trifling disparity in
loss reflected rather the most credit on the British.
Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck and
readiness to adapt himself to circumstances ; but
his claim to fame rests much less on his actual vic-
tory than on the way in which he prepared the
fleet that was to win it. Here his energy and
activity deserve all praise, not only for his success
in collecting sailors and vessels and in building the
two brigs, but above all for the manner in which
he succeeded in getting them out on the lake. On
that occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay;
indeed, the latter committed an error that the
skill and address he subsequently showed could
not retrieve. But it will always be a source of
surprise that the American public should have so
glorified Perry's victory over an inferior force, and
have paid comparatively little attention to Mac-
donough's victory, which really was won against
decided odds in ships, men, and metal.
There are always men who consider it unpatri-
otic to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flat-
tering; but, aside from the morality of the case,
Naval War of 1812 333
we never can learn how to produce a certain effect
unless we know rightly what the causes were that
produced a similar effect in times past. Lake
Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds
on our side ; Lake Champlain, that, even if they
are not, skill can still counteract them. It is
amusing to read some of the pamphlets written
"in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the
writers apparently regarding him as a kind of
traitor for hinting that the victory was not " Nel-
sonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are
stereotyped : Perry had nine fewer guns and also
fewer men than the foe. This last point is the
only one respecting which there is any doubt.
Taking sick and well together, the Americans un-
questionably had the greatest number in crew;
but a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting
these, they were still, in all probability, more
numerous than their foes.
But it is really not a point of much consequence,
as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the
guns and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after
there are enough hands for those purposes, addi-
tional ones are not of so much advantage. I have
in all my accounts summed up as accurately as
possible the contending forces, because it is so
customary with British writers to follow James's
minute and inaccurate statements, that I thought
it best to give everything exactly; but it was
334 Naval War of 1 812
really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is impos-
sible to compare forces numerically. Aside from
a few exceptional cases, the number of men, after
a certain point was reached, made little difference.
For example, the Java would fight just as effectu-
ally with 377 men, the number James gives her, as
with 426, the number I think she really had.
Again, my figures make the Wasp slightly supe-
rior in force to the Frolic, as she had twenty -five
men the most ; but, in reality, as the battle was
fought under very short sail, and decided purely
by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was
not of the least consequence. The Hornet had
nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be
absurd to say that this gave her much advantage.
In both the latter cases, the forces were practically
equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds
were in favor of the Americans. The exact re-
verse is the case in the last action of the Constitu-
tion. Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men
they required, and threw a heavier broadside
than their foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds
against them were not great, but numbers could
not express the fact that carronades were opposed
to long guns, and two small ships to one big one.
Again, though in the action on Lake Champlain
numbers do show a slight advantage both in
weight of metal and number of men on the British
side, they do not make the advantage as great as
Naval War of 1 812 335
it really was, for they do not show that the British
possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of
24-pounders, which was equal to the two chief
vessels of the Americans, exactly as the Constitu-
tion was superior to the Cyane and Levants And
on the same principles I think that every fair-
minded man must admit the great superiority of
Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage
was greater in carronades than in long guns.
But to admit this, by no means precludes us
* It must always be remembered that these rules cut both
ways. British writers are very eloquent about the disad-
vantage in which carronades placed the Cyane and Levant,
but do not hint that the Essex suffered from a precisely similar
cause, in addition to her other misfortunes; either they
should give the Constitution more credit or the Phcebe less.
So the Confiance, throwing 480 pounds of metal at a broad-
side, was really equal to both the Eagle and Saratoga, who
jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 pounds;
from her carronades, 96. Their long guns threw 168; their
carronades, 510. Now, the 32-pound carronade, mounted on
the spar-deck of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less
formidable than the long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it
probably ranked more nearly with a long 12, in the ordinary
chances of war (and it must be remembered that Downie was
the attacking party and chose his own position, so far as
Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him). So
that, in comparing the forces, the carronades should not be
reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and
we get, as a mere approximation, 3844-48 = 432, against
168 + 255 = 423. At any rate, British writers, as well as
Americans, should remember that if the Constitution was.
greatly superior to her two foes, then the Confiance was cer-
tainly equal to the Eagle and Saratoga; and vice versa.
1
36 Naval War of 1812
from taking credit for the victory. Almost all
the victories gained by the English over the Dutch
in the seventeenth century were due purely to
great superiority in force. The cases have a curi-
ous analogy to this lake battle. Perry won with
54 guns against Barclay's 63 ; but the odds were
largely in his favor. Blake won a doubtful vic-
tory on the 1 8th of February, 1653, with 80 ships
against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were
twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men
and weight of metal greatly their superior. The
English were excellent fighters, but no better than
the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that
period deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again,
the great victory of La Hogue was won over a very
much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard
fighting, which resulted in the capture of one ves-
sel ! This victory was most exultingly chronicled,
yet it was precisely as if Perry had fought Barclay
all day and only succeeded in capturing the Little
Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were cer-
tainly won against heavy odds by his great genius
and the daring skill of the captains who served
under him ; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as
the fighting went, reflected as much honor on the
defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief who
conquered them. Many a much- vaunted victory,
both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit
on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie did on
Naval War of 1 8 1 2 2,z7
the Americans. And it must always be remem-
bered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a
weaker foe, does reflect credit on the nation by
whom it is gained. It was creditable to us as a
nation that our ships were better made and better
armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was >•
creditable to them that a few years before their
vessels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch
ships.' It was greatly to our credit that w^ had
been enterprising enough to fit out such an effec-
tive little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry
Reserves the highest praise.^
Before leaving the subject it is worth while
making a few observations on the men who com-
posed the crews. James, who despised a Cana-
dian as much as he hated an American, gives, as
one excuse for the defeat, the fact that most of Bar-
clay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers to
be "sorry substitutes." On each side the regular
' After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown , James
chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships
were such poor craft as not to be of as much value as so many-
French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch sailors
must have done well to have made such a bloody and
obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they had. Ac-
cording to his own statements the loss was about propor-
tional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to
Perry's victory.
* Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant ap-
probation, to which the answer must be that a history is not
a panegyric.
vol.. I.— 22
•^ ->
sS Naval War of 1 812
sailors, from the seaboard, were not numerous
enough to permit the battle to be fought purely
by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of
the regular army, and Perry a number of militia,
aboard ; the former had a few Indian sharp-
shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A
great many men in each fleet were lake sailors,
frontiersmen, and these were the especial objects
of James's contempt; but it may be doubted if
they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation,
used to contests with Indians and whites, natu-
rally forced to be good sailors and skilful in the use
of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by
good men and on their own waters, the very best
possible material. Certainly, the battle of Lake
Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was better con-
tested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainl>'
by British.
The difference between the American and Brit-
ish seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the
lakes what little there was disappeared. A New
Englander and an Old Englander differed little
enough, but they differed more than a frontiers-
man born north of the line did from one south of
it. These last two resembled one another more
nearly than either did the parent. There had
been no long-established naval school on the lakes,
and the British sailors that came up there were
the btst of their kind: so the combatants were
Naval War of 1812 339
really so evenly matched in courage, skill, and all
other fighting qualities, as to make it impossible
to award the palm to either for these attributes.
The dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful fir-
ing and manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness
with which cutting-out expeditions were planned
and executed, were as marked on one side as on
the other. The only un-English element in the
contest was the presence among the Canadian
English of some of the descendants of the Latin
race from whom they had conquered the country.
Otherwise, the men were equally matched, but the
Americans owed their success — for the balance of
success was largely on their side — to the fact that
their officers had been trained in the best and
most practical, although the smallest, navy of the
day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good
as our own, but no better. None of their com-
manders compare with Macdonough.
Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which
he got his fleet ready; his victory over Barclay
was precisely similar to the quasi-victories of
Blake over the Dutch, which have given that ad-
miral such renown. Blake's success in attacking
Spanish and Algerian forts is his true title to fame.
In his engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well
as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is
no greater and no less than Perry's. Each made
a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage,
340 Naval War of 1812
and by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a
greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place
on February 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried
but 34 guns,' and yet with it he captured the
Prosperous of 54; which vessel was stronger than
any in the Dutch fleet. The fact that Blake's
battles were generally so indecisive must be
ascribed to the fact that his opponents were,
though inferior in force, superior in skill. No de-
cisive defeat was inflicted on the Dutch until
Tromp's death. Perry's operations were on a
very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale ; but
whereas Perry left no antagonists to question his
claim to victory, Blake's successes were suffi-
ciently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in
almost every instance claiming that they had won,
or else that it was a draw. Of course, it is absurd
to put Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked
with a fleet forty times the strength of the other's
flotilla ; but the way in which the work was done
was very similar. And it must always be remem-
bered that when Perry fought this battle he was
but twenty-seven years old ; and the commanders
of his other vessels were younger still.
^ La Vie et Les Actions Alemorables de Lt.-Amiral Michel
De Ruyter (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is
Tromp always called Van Tromp by English writers? It
would be (juite as correct for a Frenchman to speak of Mac-
Nelson.
Naval War of 1 812 341
CHAMPLAIN
The commander on this lake at this time was
Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had super-
ceded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney
Smith, whose name was a curious commentary on
the close inter-relationship of the two contest-
ing peoples. The American naval force now con-
sisted of two sloops, the Growler and Eagle, each
mounting eleven guns, and six gallies, mount-
ing one gun each. Lieutenant Smith was sent
down with his two sloops to harass the British
gunboats, which were stationed round the head of
Sorel River, the outlet to Lake Champlain. On
June 3d he chased three gunboats into the river,
the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort
of Isle aux Noix. A strong British land-force,
under Major-General Taylor, now came up both
banks of the narrow stream, and joined the three
gunboats in attacking the sloops. The latter tried
to beat up the stream, but the current was so
strong and the wind so light that no headway could
be made. The gunboats kept out of range of the
sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from
their long 24's, to which no reply could be made;
but the galling fire of the infantry who lined the
banks was responded to by showers of grape.
After three hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound
shot from one of the gallies struck the Eagle under
342 Naval War of 1 812
her starboard quarter, and ripped out a whole
plank under water. She sank at once, but it was
in such shoal water that she did not settle entirely,
and none of the men were drowned. Soon after-
ward the Growler had her forestay and main-boom
shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran
ashore and was also captured. The Growler had
I killed and 8 wounded, the Eagle 1 1 wounded ;
their united crews, including 34 volunteers,
amounted to 1 12 men. The British gunboats suf-
fered no loss; of the troops on shore three were
wounded, one dangerously, by grape.' Lieuten-
ant Smith had certainly made a very plucky fight,
but it was a great mistake to get cooped up in a
narrow channel, with wind and current dead
against him. It was a very creditable success to
the British, and showed the effectiveness of well-
handled gunboats under certain circumstances.
The possession of these two sloops gave the com-
mand of the lake to the British. Macdonough at
once set about building others, but, with all his
energy, the materials at hand were so deficient
that he could not get them finished in time. On
July 31st, 1000 British troops, under Colonel J.
Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard,
' Letter from Major-General Taylor (British) to Major-
General Stone, June 3, 18 13. Lossing says the loss of the
British was "probably at least one hundred," — on what au-
thority, if any, I do not know.
Naval War of 1 812 343
with the sloops Chubb and Finch (late Growler and
Eagle) and three gunboats, landed at Plattsburg
and destroyed all the barracks and stores both
there and at Saranac. For some reason, Colonel
Murray left so precipitately that he overlooked a
picket of twenty of his men, who were captured ;
then he made descents on two or three other
places and returned to the head of the lake by
August 3d. Three days afterward, on August
6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the
President, Moiit<^onicry, and Preble, of seven guns
each, and also six gunboats ; which force enabled
him to prevent any more plundering expeditions
taking place that summer, and to convoy Hamp-
ton's troops when they made an abortive effort to
penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River on Sep-
tember 2 1 St.
BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813
Name Tons Guns Remarks
Ship 600 24 Burnt on stocks.
Gloucesier. '.'. 180 10 Taken at York.
Mary 80 3 Burnt.
Drmnmond 80 3 Captured.
Lady Gore 80 3 ^_
Schooner 80 3 _^
Detroit 49° ^9
Queen Charlotte 400 ^7
Lady Prevost 230 13 ^^
Hunter 180 10
Chippeway 7° ^ ,,
Little Belt ,,,,,,,. 90 3
12 vessels 2560 109
344 Naval War of 1812
AMERICAN LOSS ^
Name Tons Guns Remarks
Growler 112 11 Captured.
Eagle no 11
2 vessels 222 22
' Excluding the Growler and Julia, which were recaptured.
END OF VOLUME I.
NEW LIBRARY HDITIQN
THE
NAVAL WAR OF 1812
OR THE
History of the United States Navy during the last
WAR with Great Britain, to which is appended
an account of the Battle of New Orleans
BY
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
two volumes in one
PART 11
G. p. PUTNAM'S SONS
new YORK AND LONDON
ttbe "Rnlcherbocftcc press
Copyright, iSSa
by
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
Copyright, 1910
BY
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
(In renewal of copyright originally registered in 1882.)
Made in the United States of America
AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN
CHAPTER IV
Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20
vols. London, 1852.
Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the
Morning of January 8, 181 5.
Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, Memoir of , by Lady Bour-
chier. London, 1873.
Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals Dis-
tinguished During the Peninsular War. London, 1856.
Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official
Report.
Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the
British .Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans.
Philadelphia, 1821.
Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W. G.
Sumner. Boston, 1882.
Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters.
James, William. Alilitary Occurrences of the Late War. 2
vols. London, 18 18.
Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 18 14.
Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 18 15.
Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the
War in West Florida and Louisiana. Translated from the
F'rench by H. P. Nugent. Philadelphia, 1816.
Lossing, Benson J. Field- Book of the War of 181 2. New-
York, 1859.
Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, December 20, 1814,
and January 13, 1815.
Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. Gilman.
i6mo. Boston, 1883.
Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in
the Peninsula. 5 vols. New York, 1882.
Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself. 2 vols. New