account the fact that the former fought almost
under the guns of an overwhelming force, and was
therefore obliged to expose herself far more than
she otherwise would have), it showed nearly as
great superiority on the side of the Americans as
the frigate actions of 181 2 did — in fact, probably
quite as much as in the case of the Java. Simi-
larly, while the Cyane and Levant did well, the Con-
stitution did better ; and Sir George Collier's ships
certainly did not distinguish themselves when in
chase of Old Ironsides. So with the Hornet in her
two encounters; no one can question the pluck
with which the Penguin was fought, but her gun-
nery was as bad as that of the Cornwallis sub-
sequently proved. And, though the skirmish
between the Peacock and Nautilus is not one to
which an American cares to look back, yet, re-
garding it purely from a fighting standpoint, there
is no question which crew was the best trained
and most skilful.
LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815
Name Rate Where Built Cost
Washington 74 Portsmouth $235,861.00
Independence 74 Boston 421,810.41
Franklin 74 Philadelphia 438,149.40
Guerrikre 44 " 306,158.56
Java 44 Baltimore 232,767.38
Fulton 30 New York 320,000.00
Torpedo — "
VOL. II.— 13
194 Naval War of i8i2
These ships first put to sea in this year. For
the first time in her history, the United States pos-
sessed hne-of-battle ships; and for the first time
in all history, the steam frigate appeared on the
navy list of a nation. The Fulton, with her clumsy
central wheel, concealed from shot by the double
hull, with such thick scantling that none but heavy
guns could harm her, and relying for offensive
weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small
calibre, but on two pivotal loo-pounder colum-
biads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on blows from her
hog snout, — the Fulton was the true prototype of
the modem steam ironclad, with its few heavy
guns and ram. Almost as significant is the pres-
ence of the Torpedo. I have not chronicled the
several efforts made by the Americans to destroy
British vessels with torpedoes; some very nearly
succeeded, and although they failed it must not
be supposed that they did no good. On the con-
trary, they made the British in many cases very
cautious about venturing into good anchorage
(especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesa-
peake) , and by the mere terror of their name pre-
vented more than one harrying expedition. The
Fulton was not got into condition to be fought
until just as the war ended ; had it continued a few
months, it is more than probable that the deeds of
the Merrimac and the havoc wrought by the Con-
federate torpedoes would have been forestalled by
Naval War of 1 812 i95
nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these
engines of war attracted much attention. For
ten or fifteen years the Fulton was the only war-
vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name
disappears from our lists. The torpedoes had
been tried in the Revolutionary War, but their
failure prevented much notice from being taken of
them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong
feeling that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up
with a powder-can concealed under the water,
though highly laudable to burn her by means of a
fire-raft floating on the water — a nice distinction
in naval ethics that has since disappeared.'
AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.
By Ocean Cruisers
Name Guns Tonnage Remarks
President 52 1.576 Captured by squadron.
52 guns, 1,576 tons.
BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.
a. — By Privateers
Name Guns Tonnage Remarks
Chasseur 12 240 By pvivat'r St. Lawrence.
b. — By Ocean Cruisers
Cyane 34 659 By Constitution.
Levant 20 500 Retaken.
Penguin 19 477 By Hornet.
85 guns, 1,876 tons.
20 500 (Subtracting Leyoni) .
65 guns, 1,376 tons.
* James fairly foams at the mouth at the mere mention of
torpedoes.
19^ Naval War of 1812
In summing up the results of the struggle on the
ocean, it is to be noticed that very little was at-
tempted, and nothing done, by the American
navy, that could materially affect the result of the
war. Commodore Rodgers's expedition after the
Jamaica Plate fleet failed ; both the efforts to get
a small squadron into the East Indian waters also
miscarried ; and otherwise the whole history of the
struggle on the ocean is, as regards the Americans,
only the record of individual cruises and fights.
The material results were not very great, at least
in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous
navy did not feel in the slightest degree the loss of
a few frigates and sloops. But, morally, the result
was of inestimable benefit to the United States.
The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast
down by the defeats on land ; practically decided
in favor of the Americans the chief question in
dispute, — Great Britain's right of search and im-
pressment, — and gave the navy, and thereby the
country, a world-wide reputation. I doubt if ever
before a nation gained so much honor by a few
single-ship duels. For there can be no question
which side came out of the war with the greatest
credit. The damage inflicted by each on the other
was not very unequal in amount, but the balance
was certainly in favor of the United States, as can
be seen by the following tables, for the details of
which reference can be made to the various years:
Naval War of 1 8 1 2 197
AMERICAN LOSS BRITISH LOSS
Caused Tonnage Guns Tonnage 'â– Guns
By Ocean Cruisers... 5,984 278 8,451 351
On the Lakes 727 37 4.159 212
By the Army 3,007 116 500 22
By Privateers ... 402 20
Total 9,718 431 13,512 605
In addition, we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting
24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and
also 25 gunboats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggre-
gate, of nearly 2000 tons. This would swell our
loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns " ; but the loss of
* The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that of
the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although
we know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one
another.
^ This diff'ers greatly from the figures given by James in his
Naval Occurrences (App. ccxv.). He makes the American
loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes, for exam-
ple, the "Growler and Hamilton, upset in carrying sail to
avoid Sir James's fleet"; it would be quite as reasonable to
put down the loss of the Royal George to the credit of the
French. Then he mentions the Julia and Growler, which
were recaptured; the Asp, which was also recaptured; the
"New York, 46, destroyed at Washington," which was not
destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was
a condemned hulk; the "Boston, 42 (in reality 32), destroyed
at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk for ten
years, and had no guns or anything else in her, and was as
much a loss to our navy as the fishing up and burning of an
old wreck would have been; and eight gunboats, whose de-
struction was either mythical, or else which were not national
vessels. By deducting all these, we reduce James's total by
120 guns, and 2600 tons; and a few more alterations (such as
iqS Naval War of 1812
the revenue-cutters and gunboats can fairly be
considered to be counterbalanced by the capture
or destruction of the various British Royal Packets
(all armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges,
etc., which would be in the aggregate of at least as
great tonnage and gun force, and with more nu-
merous crews.
excluding the swivels in the President' s tops, which he counts,
etc.), brings his number down to that given above — and also
affords a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures
and tables. The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and
10,273 tons. He omits the 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at
York, although including the frigate and corvette burnt by
Ross at Washington ; if the former is excluded the two latter
should be, which would make the balance still more in favor
of the Americans. He omits the guns of the Gloucester, be-
cause they had been taken out of her and placed in batter}'' on
the shore, but he includes those of the Adams, which had been
served in precisely the same way. He omits all reference to
the British 14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3-
and 4-gun sloops and schooners captured there, although in-
cluding the corresponding American vessels. The reason
that he so much underestimates the tonnage, especially on
the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of the rela-
tive loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that
of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the
British; but I have not tabulated this on account of the im-
possibility of getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded
in the cutting-out expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerat-
ing the prisoners taken in descents, etc. Roughly, about
2700 Americans and 3800 British were captured; the com-
parative loss in killed and wounded stood much more in our
favor.
I have excluded from the British loss the brigs Detroit and
Caledonia, and schooner Nancy (aggregating 10 guns and
Naval War of 1 812 199
But the comparative material loss gives no idea
of the comparative honor gained. The British
navy, numbering at the outset a thousand cruisers,
had accomplished less than the American, which
numbered but a dozen. Moreover, most of the
loss suffered by the former was in single fight,
while this had been but twice the case with the
Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed
by numbers. The President and Essex were both
captured by more than double their force, simply
because they were disabled before the fight began,
otherwise they would certainly have escaped.
With the exceptions of the Chesapeake and Argus
(both of which were taken fairly, because their an-
tagonists, though of only equal force, were better
fighters) , the remaining loss of the Americans was
due to the small cruisers stumbling from time to
time across the path of some one of the innu-
merable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional
forethought been sufficiently great to have allowed
a few line-of -battle ships to have been in readiness
some time previous to the war, results of weight
about 500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I
hardly know whether they could be considered national ves-
sels; the schooner Highflyer, of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons,
taken by Rodgers, because she seems to have been merely a
tender; and the Dominica, 15, of 77 men and 270 tons, be-
cause her captor, the privateer Decatur, though nominally an
American, was really a French vessel. Of course, both tables
are only approximately exact; but at any rate the balance of
damage and loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor.
200 Naval War of 1 8 1 2
might have been accompHshed. But the only ac-
tivity ever exhibited by Congress, in materially in-
creasing the navy previous to the war, had been in
partially carrying out President Jefferson's ideas
of having an enormous force of very worthless
gunboats — a scheme whose wisdom was about on
a par with some of that statesman's political and
military theories.
Of the twelve ' single-ship actions, two (those
of the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubtedly re-
dounded most to the credit of the British, in two
(that of the Wasp with the Reindeer, and that of
the Enterprise with the Boxer), the honors were
nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority
of the Americans was very manifest. In three
actions (those with the Penguin, Frolic, and
Shannon) the combatants were about equal in
strength, the Americans having slightly the ad-
vantage; in all the others but two, the victors
combined superiority of force with superiority of
skill. In but two cases, those of the Argus and
Epervier, could any lack of courage be imputed to
^ Not counting the last action of the Constitution, the
President's action, or the capture of the Essex, on account of
the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit due to
each side. In both the first actions, however, the American
ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their
antagonists, and, taking into account the overwhelming dis-
advantages under which the Essex labored, her defence dis-
played more desperate bravery than did that of any other
ship during the war.
Naval War of 1 812 201
the vanquished. The second year alone showed
to the advantage of the British; the various en-
counters otherwise were as creditable to the
Americans at the end as at the beginning of the
war. This is worth attending to, because many-
authors speak as if the successes of the Americans
were confined to the first year. It is true that no
frigate was taken after the first year, but this was
partly because the strictness of the blockade kept
the American frigates more in port, while the
sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly be-
cause after that year the British i8-pounder
frigates either cruised in couples, or, when single,
invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admi-
ralty, an encounter with a 24-pounder; and though
much of the American success was unquestionably
to be attributed to more men and heavier guns,
yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us
two instances in which defeat was owing solely, it
may be said, to inferiority of force — courage and
skill being equal. The Wasp was far heavier than
the Reindeer, and, there being nothing to choose
between them in anything else, the damage done
was about proportionate to this difference. It
follows, as a matter of course, that the very much
greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the
Avon, Epervier, etc., where the disproportion in
force was much less (they mounting 32's instead
of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class),
202 Naval War of 1 812
is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on
the part of the vanquished. These remarks apply
just as much to the Argus. The Reindeer, with
her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a par
with her, and yet would have taken her with even
greater ease than the Peacock did with her 32's.
In other words, the only effect of our superiority
in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase some-
what the disparity in loss. Had the Congress and
Constellation, instead of the United States and Con-
stitution, encountered the Macedonian and Java,
the difference in execution would have been less
than it was, but the result would have been un-
changed, and would have been precisely such as
ensued when the Wasp met the Frolic, or the Hor-
net the Penguin. On the other hand, had the
Shannon-met the Constitution there would have
been a repetition of the fight between the Wasp
and Reindeer; for it is but fair to remember that
great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no
more than that due to Manners.
The Republic of the United States owed a great
deal to the excellent make and armament of its
ships, but it owed still more to the men who were
in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of
Old Ironsides would have availed but little had it
not been for her able commanders and crews. Of
all the excellent single-ship captains, British or
American, produced by the war, the palm should
Naval War of 1812 20^,
J
be awarded to Hull.' The deed of no other man
(excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from
Broke's five ships, or surpassed his half-hour's
conflict with the Guerriere. After him, almost
all the American captains deserve high praise —
Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Law-
rence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Por-
ter. It is no small glory to a country to have had
such men upholding the honor of its flag. On a
par with the best of them are Broke, Manners, and
also Byron and Blythe. It must be but a poor-
spirited American whose veins do not tingle with
pride when he reads of the cruises and fights of the
sea-captains, and their grim prowess, which kept
the old Yankee flag floating over the waters of the
Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the might-
iest naval power the world has ever seen ; but it is
equally impossible not to admire Broke's chivalric
challenge and successful fight, or the heroic death
of the captain of the Reindeer.
Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by
any one who does not bear in mind that the com-
batants were men of the same stock, who far more
nearly resembled each other than either resembled
any other nation. I honestly believe that the
American sailor offered rather better material for
a man-of-war's man than the British, because the
^ See Naval Tactics, by Commander J. H. Ward, and Life
of Commodore Tatnall, by Charles C. Jones, Jr.
204 Naval War of 1812
freer institutions of his country (as compared with
the Britain of the drunken Prince Regent and his
dotard father — a very different land from the
present free England) and the peculiar exigencies
of his life tended to make him more intelligent and
self-reliant; but the difference, when there was
any, was very small, and disappeared entirely
when his opponents had been drilled for any
length of time by men like Broke or Manners. The
advantage consisted in the fact that our average
commander was equal to the best, and higher than
the average, of the opposing captains; and this
held good throughout the various grades of the
officers. The American officers knew they had re-
doubtable foes to contend with, and made every
preparation accordingly. Owing their rank to
their own exertions, trained by practical experi-
ence and with large liberty of action, they made
every effort to have their crews in the most perfect
state of skill and discipline. In Commodore Tat-
nall's biography (p. 15) it is mentioned that the
blockaded Constellation had her men well trained
at the guns and at target practice, though still
lying in the river, so as to be at once able to meet
a foe when she put out to sea. The British captain,
often owing his command to his social standing or
to favoritism, hampered by red tape,' and accus-
tomed, by twenty years' almost uninterrupted
' For instance, James mentions that they were forbidden
Naval War of 1 812 205
success, to regard the British arms as invincible,
was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring,' and scorned
to prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the
old British " pluck and luck " to carry him through.
So, gradually, he forgot how to manoeuvre or to
prepare. The Java had been at sea six weeks be-
fore she was captured, yet during that time the
entire exercise of her crew at the guns had been
confined to the discharge of six broadsides of blank
cartridges (James, vi., 184); the Constitution, like
the Java, had shipped an entirely new and raw crew
previous to her first cruise, and was at sea but five
weeks before she met the G iter Here, and yet her
men had been trained to perfection. This is a
sufficient comment on the comparative merits of
Captain Hull and Captain Lambert. The Amer-
ican prepared himself in every possible way; the
Briton tried to cope with courage alone against
courage united to skill. His bad gunnery had
not been felt in contending with European foes ^
as unskilful as himself. Says Lord Howard Doug-
lass (p. 3) : " We entered with too much confidence
into a war with a marine much more expert than
to use more than so many shot in practice, and that Captain
Broke utterly disregarded this command.
' Lord Howard Douglass, Naval Gunnery, states this in
various places : "Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring."
2 Lord Howard Douglass; he seems to think that in 1812
the British had fallen off absolutely, though not relatively to
their European foes.
2o6 Naval War of 1812
any of our European enemies. . . . there was
inferiority of gunnery as well as of force," etc.
Admiral Codrington, commenting on the Eper-
viefs loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to
his being chosen purely for merit, the American
captain was an over-match for the British, unless
" he encountered our best officers on equal
terms."
The best criticism on the war is that given by
Capitaine Jurien de la Graviere.' After speaking
of the heavier metal and greater number of men
of the American ships, he continues: "And yet
only an enormous superiority in the precision and
rapidity of their fire can explain the difference in
the losses sustained by the combatants. . . . Nor
was the skill of their gunners the only cause to
which the Americans owed their success. Their
ships were faster; the crews, composed of chosen
men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision;
their captains had that practical knowledge which
is only to be acquired by long experience of the
sea ; and it is not to be wondered at that the Cojt-
stitution, when chased during three days by a
squadron of five English frigates, succeeded in
escaping, by surpassing them in manoeuvring, and
by availing herself of every ingenious resource and
skilful expedient that maritime science could sug-
gest. . . . To a marine exalted by success,
' Guerres Maritimes, ii., 269, 272, 274 (Paris, 1847).
Naval War of 1 8i 2 207
but rendered negligent by the very habit of vic-
tory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels
and most formidable of armaments. . . ." '
It is interesting to compare the results of this
inter-Anglian warfare, waged between the Insular
and the Continental English, with the results of the
contest that the former were at the same time
carrying on with their Gallo-Roman neighbors
across the channel. For this purpose I shall rely
on Troude's Batailles Navales, which would cer-
tainly not give the English more than their due.
His account of the comparative force in each case
can be supplemented by the corresponding one
given in James. Under drawn battles I include all
such as were indecisive, in so far that neither com-
batant was captured; in almost every case each
captain claimed that the other ran away.
During the years 1812 to 1815, inclusive, there
were eight actions between French and English
ships of approximately equal force. In three of
these, the English were victorious.
In 181 2, the Victorious, 74, captured the Rivoli,
74.
' The praise should be given to the individual captains and
not to Congress, however; and none of the American ships
had picked crews. During the war the Shannon had the only
crew which could with any fairness be termed "picked," for
her men had been together seven years, and all of her " boys "
must have been well-grown young men, much older than the
boys on her antagonist.
2o8 Naval War of 1812
COMPARATIVE FORCE
Broadsides , Metal, lbs.
Troude James
Victorious 1,014 1,060
Rivoli 1,010 1,085
In 1 8 14, the Tagus captured the Ceres and the
Hebrus captured the Etoile.
Broadsides, Metal, lbs.
Troude James
Tagus 444 467
Ceres 428 463
Hebrus 467 467
Etoile 428 463
The Ceres, when she surrendered, had but one
man wounded, although she had suffered a good
deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was mur-
derous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 Eng-
lish and 400 French falling. The Hebrus lost 40
and the Etoile 120 men.
Five actions were "drawn."
In 181 2, the Swallow fought the Renard and
Garland. The former threw 262, the latter 290
pounds of shot at a broadside.
In 1815, the Pi7o^, throwing 262 pounds, fought
a draw with the Egerie, throwing 260.
In 1 81 4, two frigates of the force of the Tagus
fought a draw with two frigates of the force of the
Ceres; and the Eurotas, with 24-pounders, failed
Naval War of 1812 209
to capture the Chlorinde, which had only 18-
pounders.
In 1 81 5, the Amelia fought a draw with the ^r^-
thuse, the ships throwing, respectively, 549 and 463
pounds, according to the English, or 572 and 410,
pounds, according to the French, accounts. In
spite of being superior in force, the English ship
lost 141 men, and the French but 105. This was a
bloodier fight than even that of the Chesapeake
with the Shannon ; but the gunnery was, never-
theless, much worse than that shown by the two
combatants in the famous duel off Boston har-
bor, one battle lasting four hours and the other
fifteen minutes.
There were a number of other engagements
where the British were successful, but where it
is difficult to compare the forces. Twice a 74
captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee
performed a similar feat. An i8-gun brig, the
Weasel, fought two 16 -gun brigs till one of them
blew up.
The loss of the two navies at each other's hands
during the four years was :
English Ships French Ships
I i6-gun brig 3 line-of-battle ships
I i2-gun brig 11 frigates