to that in Bogota.
There is much indignation on the Isthmus on ac-
count of the failure of the canal treaty, which is as-
cribed to the authorities at Bogota. This opinion
is believed to be shared by a majority of the Isth-
mians of all shades of political belief, and they think
it is to their best interest for a new republic to be
formed on the Isthmus, which may negotiate di-
rectly with the United States a new treaty which
will permit the digging of the Panama Canal under
favorable conditions.
In the New York "Times," under date of Sep-
tember 13, there appeared from Bogota the follow-
ing statement :
A proposal made by Sefior Perez y Sotos to ask
the Executive to appoint an anti-secessionist gov-
ernor in Panama has been approved by the Senate.
Speakers in the Senate said that Senor Obaldia, who
was recently appointed Governor of Panama, and
who is favorable to a canal treaty, was a menace to
the national integrity. Senator Marroquin protested
against the action of the Senate.
President Marroquin succeeded later in calming
the Congressmen. It appears that he was able to
give them satisfactory reasons for Governor Obal-
And State Papers 723
dia's appointment. He appears to realize the immi-
nent peril of the Isthmus of Panama declaring its
independence.
Sefior Deroux, representative for a Panama con-
stituency, recently delivered a sensational speech in
the House. Among other things he said :
"In Panama the bishops, governors, magistrates,
military chiefs, and their subordinates have been and
are foreign to the department. It seems that the
government, with surprising tenacity, wishes to ex-
clude the Isthmus from all participation in public
affairs. As regards international dangers in the
Isthmus, all I can say is that if these dangers exist
they are due to the conduct of the national govern-
ment, which is in the direction of reaction.
"If the Colombian Government will not take ac-
tion with a view to preventing disaster, the respon-
sibility will rest with it alone."
In the New York "Herald" of October 26 it was
reported that a revolutionary expedition of about
70 men had actually landed on the Isthmus. In the
Washington "Post" of October 29 it was reported
from Panama that in view of the impending trouble
on the Isthmus the Bogota Government had gath-
ered troops in sufficient numbers to at once put
down an attempt at secession. In the New York
"Herald" of October 30 it was announced from
Panama that Bogota was hurrying troops to the
Isthmus to put down the projected revolt. In the
New York "Herald" of November 2 it was an-
nounced that in Bogota the Congress had indorsed
7^4 Presidential Addresses
the energetic measures taken to meet the situation
on the Isthmus and that 6,000 men were about to
be sent thither.
Quotations hke the above could be muhipHed
indefinitely. Suffice it to say that it was notorious
that revolutionary trouble of a serious nature was
impending upon the Isthmus. But it was not nec-
essary to rely exclusively upon such general means
of information. On October 15 Commander Hub-
bard, of the navy, notified the Navy Department
that, though things were quiet on the Isthmus, a
revolution had broken out in the State of Cauca.
On October 16, at the request of Lieutenant-General
Young, I saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and Lieut.
Grayson Mallet-Prevost Murphy, who had just re-
turned from a four months' tour through the north-
ern portions of Venezuela and Colombia. They
stopped in Panama on their return in the latter part
of September. At the time they were sent down
there had been no thought of their going to Pan-
ama, and their visit to the Isthmus was but an
unpremeditated incident of their return journey; nor
had they been spoken to by any one at Washington
regarding the possibility of a revolt. Until they
landed at Colon they had no knowledge that a revo-
lution was impending, save what they had gained
from the newspapers. What they saw in Panama
so impressed them that they reported thereon to
Lieutenant-General Young, according to his memo-
randum —
that while on the Isthmus they became satisfied be-
And State Papers 725
yond question that, owing largely to the dissatisfac-
tion because of the failure of Colombia to ratify the
Hay-Herran treaty, a revolutionary party was in
course of organization having for its object the
separation of the State of Panama from Colombia,
the leader being Dr. Richard Arango, a former gov-
ernor of Panama ; that when they were on the Isth-
mus arms and ammunition were being smuggled
into the city of Colon in piano boxes, merchandise
crates, etc., the small arms received being principally
the Gras French rifle, the Remington, and the Mau-
ser; that nearly every citizen in Panama had some
sort of rifle or gun in his possession, with ammuni-
tion therefor; that in the city of Panama there had
been organized a fire brigade which was really in-
tended for a revolutionary military organization;
that there were representatives of the revolutionary
organization at all important points on the Isthmus ;
that in Panama, Colon, and the other principal places
of the Isthmus police forces had been organized
which were in reality revolutionary forces ; that the
people on the Isthmus seemed to be unanimous in
their sentiment against the Bogota Government, and
their disgust over the failure of that government to
ratify the treaty providing for the construction of
the canal, and that a revolution might be expected
immediately upon the adjournment of the Colombian
Congress without ratification of the treaty.
Lieutenant-General Young regarded their report
as of such importance as to make it advisable that
I should personally see these officers. They told me
what they had already reported to the Lieutenant-
7^6 Presidential Addresses
General, adding that on the Isthmus the excitement
was seething, and that the Colombian troops were
reported to be disaffected. In response to a ques-
tion of mine they informed me that it was the gen-
eral belief that the revolution might break out at
any moment, and if it did not happen before, would
doubtless take place immediately after the closing
of the Colombian Congress (at the end of October)
if the canal treaty were not ratified. They were
certain that the revolution would occur, and before
leaving the Isthmus had made their own reckoning
as to the time, which they had set down as being
probably from three to four weeks after their leav-
ing. The reason they set this as the probable inside
limit of time was that they reckoned that it would
be at least three or four weeks — say not until Octo-
ber 20 — before a sufficient quantity of arms and
munitions would have been landed.
In view of all these facts I directed the Navy
Department to issue instructions such as would en-
sure our having ships within easy reach of the
Isthmus in the event of need arising. Orders were
given on October 19 to the Boston to proceed to
^an Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; to the Dixie to pre-
pare to sail from League Island; and to the Atlanta
to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 30 the
Nashville was ordered to proceed to Colon. On
November 2, when, the Colombian Congress having
adjourned, it was evident that the outbreak was
imminent, and when it was announced that both
sides were making ready forces whose meeting
And State Papers 7-7
would mean bloodshed and disorder, the Colombian
troops having been embarked on vessels, the fol-
lowing- instructions were sent to the commanders of
the Boston, Nashville, and Dixie:
Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If in-
terruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the
line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed
force with hostile intent, either government or in-
surgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama.
Government force reported approaching the Isthmus
in vessels. Prevent their landing if, in your judg-
ment, the landing would precipitate a conflict.
These orders were delivered in pursuance of the
policy on which our Government had repeatedly
acted. This policy was exhibited in the following
orders, given under somewhat similar circumstances
last year, and the year before, and the year before
that. The first two telegrams are from the Depart-
ment of State to the consul at Panama :
July 25, 1900
You are directed to protest against any act of
hostility which may involve or imperil the safe and
peaceful transit of persons or property across the
Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment of Panama
would have this effect, and the United States must
insist upon the neutrality of the Isthmus as guaran-
teed by the treaty.
November 20, 1901
Notify all parties molesting or interfering with
free transit across the Isthmus that such interfer-
ence must cease and that the United States will pre-
728 Presidential Addresses
vent the interruption of traffic upon the railroad.
Consult with captain of the lozva, who will be in-
structed to land marines, if necessary, for the pro-
tection of the railroad, in accordance with the treaty
rights and obligations of the United States. Desir-
able to avoid bloodshed, if possible.
The next three telegrams are from and to the
Secretary of the Navy :
September 12, IQ02
Ranger, Panmna:
United States guarantees perfect neutrality of
Isthmus and that a free transit from sea to sea be
not interrupted or embarrassed. . . . Any trans-
portation of troops which might contravene these
provisions of treaty should not be sanctioned by you
nor should use of road be permitted which might
convert the Hne of transit into theatre of hostihty.
Moody.
Colon,
September 20, IQ02
Secretary Navy, Washington:
Everything is conceded. The United States
guards and guarantees traffic and the line of transit.
To-day I permitted the exchange of Colombian
troops from Panama to Colon, about 1,000 men
each way, the troops without arms in train guarded
by American naval force in the same manner as
other passengers ; arms and ammunition in separate
train, guarded also by naval force in the same man-
ner as other freight.
McLean.
And State Papers 729
Panama,
October j, 1902
Secretary Navy,
Washington, D. C:
Have sent this communication to the American
consul at Panama :
"Inform Governor while trains running under
United States protection I must decline transporta-
tion any combatants, ammunition, arms, which
might cause interruption traffic or convert line of
transit into theatre hostilities."
Casey.
On November 3 Commander Hubbard responded
to the above-quoted telegram of November 2, 1903,
saying that before the telegram had been received
400 Colombian troops from Cartagena had landed
at Colon; that there had been no revolution on the
Isthmus, but that the situation was most critical if
the revolutionary leaders should act. On this same
date the Associated Press in Washington received
a bulletin stating that a revolutionary outbreak had
occurred. When this was brought to the attention
of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis,
he prepared the following cablegram to the consul-
general at Panama and the consul at Colon :
Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Depart-
ment promptly and fully informed.
Before this telegram was sent, however, one was
received from Consul Malmros at Colon, running
as follows :
730 Presidential Addresses
Revolution imminent. Government force on the
Isthmus about 500 men. Their official promised
support revolution. Fire department, Panama, 441,
are well organized and favor revolution. Govern-
ment vessel, Cartagena, with about 400 men, arrived
early to-day with new commander-in-chief, Tobar.
Was not expected until November 10. Tobar's ar-
rival is not probable to stop revolution.
This cablegram was received at 2.35 p.m., and
at 3.40 P.M. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram which he
had already prepared to both Panama and Colon.
Apparently, however, the consul-general at Panama
had not received the information embodied in the
Associated Press bulletin, upon which the Assistant
Secretary of State based his dispatch ; for his answer
was that there was no uprising, although the sit-
uation was critical, this answer being received at
8.15 P.M. Immediately afterward he sent another
dispatch, which was received at 9.50 p.m.,, saying
that the uprising had occurred, and had been suc-
cessful, with no bloodshed. The Colombian gun-
boat Bogota next day began to shell the city of
Panama, with the result of killing one Chinaman.
The consul-general was directed to notify her to
stop firing. Meanwhile, on November 4, Command-
er Hubbard notified the Department that he had
landed a force to protect the lives and property of
American citizens against the threats of the Co-
lombian soldiery.
Before any step whatever had been taken by the
And State Papers 731
United States troops to restore order, the com-
mander of the newly landed Colombian troops had
indulged in wanton and violent threats against
American citizens, which created serious apprehen-
sion. As Commander Hubbard reported in his let-
ter of November 5, this officer and his troops prac-
tically began war against the United States, and
only the forbearance and coolness of our officers
and men prevented bloodshed. The letter of Com-
mander Hubbard is of such interest that it deserves
quotation in full, and runs as follows:
U. S. S. Nashville, Third Rate,
Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903
Sir : Pending a complete report of the occurrences
of the last three days in Colon, Colombia, I most
respectfully invite the Department's attention to
those of the date of Wednesday, November 4, which
amounted to practically the making of war against
the United States by the officer in command of the
Colombian troops in Colon. At i o'clock p.m. on
that date I was summoned on shore by a precon-
certed signal, and on landing met the United States
consul, vice-consul, and Colonel Shaler, the general
superintendent of the Panama Railroad. The con-
sul informed me that he had received notice from
the officer coinmanding the Colombian troops. Colo-
nel Torres, through the prefect of Colon, to the ef-
fect that if the Colombian officers. Generals Tobal
and Amaya, who had been seized in Panama on the
evening of the 3d of November by the Independents
73^ Presidential Addresses
and held as prisoners, were not released by 2 o'clock
P.M., he, Torres, would open fire on the town of
Colon and kill every United States citizen in the
place, and my advice and action were requested. I
advised that all the United States citizens should
take refuge in the shed of the Panama Railroad
Company, a stone building susceptible of being put
into good state for defence, and that I would imme-
diately land such body of men, with extra arms for
arming the citizens, as the complement of the ship
would permit. This was agreed to, and I imme-
diately returned on board, arriving at 1.15 p.m.
The order for landing was immediately given, and
at 1.30 P.M. the boats left the ship with a party of
42 men under the command of Lieut. -Commander
H. M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P. Jackson as
second in command. Time being pressing I gave
verbal orders to Mr. Witzel to take the building
above referred to, to put it into the best state of de-
fence possible, and protect the lives of the citizens
assembled there — not firing unless fired upon. The
women and children took refuge on the German
steamer Marcommna and Panama Railroad steamer
City of Washington, both ready to haul out from
dock if necessary. The Nashville I got under way
and patrolled with her along the water front close
in and ready to use either small-arm or shrapnel
fire. The Colombians surrounded the building of
the railroad company almost immediately after we
had taken possession, and for about one and a half
hours their attitude was most threatening, it being
seemingly their purpose to provoke an attack. Hap-
And State Papers 733
pily our men were cool and steady, and, while the
tension was very great, no shot was fired. At al30ut
3.15 P.M. Colonel Torres came into the building for
an interview and expressed himself as most friendly
to Americans, claiming that the whole affair was a
misapprehension and that he would like to send the
alcalde of Colon to Panama to see General Tobal
and have him direct the discontinuance of the show
of force. A special train was furnished and safe
conduct guaranteed. At about 5.30 p.m. Colonel
Torres made the proposition of withdrawing his
troops to Monkey Hill, if I would withdraw the
Nashznlle's force and leave the town in possession
of the police until the return of the alcalde on the
morning of the 5th. After an interview with the
United States consul and Colonel Shaler as to the
probability of good faith in the matter, I decided to
accept the proposition and brought my men on
board, the disparity in numbers between my force
and that of the Colombians, nearly ten to one, mak-
ing me desirous of avoiding a conflict so long as the
object in view, the protection of American citizens,
was not imperiled.
I am positive that the determined attitude of our
men, their coolness and evident intention of stand-
ing their ground, had a most salutary and decisive
effect on the immediate situation, and was the initial
step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these
troops and their return to Cartagena the following
day. Lieutenant-Commander Witzel is entitled to
much praise for his admirable work in command on
the spot.
734 Presidential Addresses
I feel that I can not sufficiently strongly represent
to the Department the grossness of this outrage and
the insult to our dignity, even apart from the sav-
agery of the threat.
Very respectfully,
John Hubbard,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
In his letter of November 8 Commander Hubbard
sets forth the facts more in detail :
U. S. S. Nashville, Third Rate,
Porto Bello, U. S. Colombia, November 8, igo^
Sir : I . I have the honor to make the following
report of the occurrences which took place at Colon
and Panama in the interval between the arrival of
the Nashville at Colon on the evening of November
2, 1903, and the evening of November 5, 1903,
when by the arrival of the U. S. S. Dixie at Colon
I was relieved as senior officer by Commander F. H.
Delano, U. S. Navy.
2. At the time of the arrival of the Nashville at
Colon at 5.30 P.M. on November 2 everything on
the Isthmus was quiet. There was talk of proclaim-
ing the independence of Panama, but no definite ac-
tion had been taken and there had been no disturb-
ance of peace and order. At daylight on the morn-
ing of November 3' it was found that a vessel which
had come in during the night was the Colombian
And State Papers 735
gunboat Cartagena carrying between 400 and 500
troops. I had her boarded and learned that these
troops were for the garrison at Panama. Inasmuch
as the Independent party had not acted and the Gov-
ernment of Colombia was at the time in undisputed
control of the Province of Panama, I did not feel,
in the absence of any instructions, that I was justi-
fied in preventing the landing of these troops, and
at 8.30 o'clock they were disembarked. The com-
manding officers, Generals Amaya and Tobal, with
four others, immediately went over to Panama to
make arrangements for receiving and quartering
their troops, leaving the command in charge of an
officer whom I later learned to be Colonel Torres.
The Department's message addressed to the care of
the United States consul I received at 10.30 a.m. ;
it was delivered to one of the ship's boats while I
was at the consul's and not to the consul as ad-
dressed. The message was said to have been re-
ceived at the cable office at 9.30 a.m. Immediately
on deciphering the message I went on shore to see
what arrangements the railroad company had made
for the transportation of these troops to Panama,
and learned that the company would not transport
them except on request of the Governor of Panama,
and that the prefect at Colon and the officer left in
command of the troops had been so notified by the
general superintendent of the Panama Railroad
Company. I remained at the company's office until
it was sure that no action on my part would be
needed to prevent the transportation of the troops
that afternoon, when I returned on board and cabled
73^ Presidential Addresses
the Department the situation of affairs. At about
5.30 P.M. I again went on shore, and received notice
from the general superintendent of the railroad that
he had received the request for the transportation of
the troops and that they would leave on the 8 a.m.
train on the following day. I immediately went to
see the general superintendent, and learned that it
had just been announced that a provisional govern-
ment had been established at Panama — that Gen-
erals Amaya and Tobal, the Governor of Panama,
and four officers, who had gone to Panama in the
morning, had been seized and were held as prison-
ers ; that they had an organized force of 1,500
troops and wished the government troops in Colon
to be sent over. This I declined to permit, and
verbally prohibited the general superintendent
from giving transportation to the troops of either
party.
It being then late in the evening, I sent early in
the morning of November 4 written notification to
the general superintendent of the Panama Railroad,
to the prefect of Colon, and to the officer left in
command of the Colombian troops, later ascertained
to be Colonel Torres, that I had prohibited the trans-
portation of troops in either direction, in order to
preserve the free and uninterrupted transit of the
Isthmus. Copies of these letters are hereto ap-
pended ; also copy of my notification to the consul.
Except to a few people, nothing was known in Colon
of the proceedings in Panama until the arrival of
the train at 10.45 on the morning of the 4th. Some
propositions were, I was later told, made to Colonel
And State Papers 737
Torres by the representatives of the new Govern-
ment at Colon, with a view to inducing him to re-
embark in the Cartagena and return to the port of
Cartagena, and it was in answer to this proposition
that Colonel Torres made the threat and took the
action reported in my letter No. 96, of November
5, 1903. The Cartagena left the port just after the
threat was made, and I did not deem it expedient
to attempt to detain her, as such action would cer-
tainly, in the then state of affairs, have precipitated
a conflict on shore which I was not prepared to meet.
It is my understanding that she returned to Carta-
gena. After the withdrawal of the Colombian
troops on the evening of November 4, and the re-
turn of the Nashville's force on board, as reported
in my letter No. 96, there was no disturbance on
shore, and the night passed quietly. On the morn-
ing of the 5th I discovered that the commander of
the Colombian troops had not withdrawn so far
from the town as he had agreed, but was occupying
buildings near the outskirts of the town. I imme-
diately inquired into the matter and learned that he
had some trivial excuse for not carrying out his
agreement, and also that it was his intention to oc-
cupy Colon again on the arrival of the alcalde due
at 10.45 A.M., unless General Tobal sent word by
the alcalde that he. Colonel Torres, should with-
draw. That General Tobal had declined to give
any instructions I was cognizant of, and the situa-
tion at once became quite as serious as on the day
previous. I immediately landed an armed force,
reoccupied the same building; also landed two i-
15— Vol. XIV
73^ Presidential Addresses
pounders and mounted them on platform cars behind
protection of cotton bales, and then in company
with the United States consul had an interview with
Colonel Torres, in the course of which I informed
him that I had relanded my men because he had not
kept his agreement ; that I had no interest in the af-
fairs of either party; that my attitude was strictly
neutral; that the troops of neither side should be
transported; that my sole purpose in landing was
to protect the lives and property of American citi-
zens if threatened, as they had been threatened, and
to maintain the free and uninterrupted transit of the
Isthmus, and that purpose I should maintain by
force if necessary. I also strongly advised that in
the interests of peace, and to prevent the possibility
of a conflict that could not but be regrettable, he
should carry out his agreement of the previous even-