ing and withdraw to Monkey Hill.
Colonel Torres's only reply was that it was un-
healthy at Monkey Hill, a reiteration of his love of
Americans, and persistence in his intention to occu-
py Colon, should General Tobal not give him direc-
tions to the contrary.
On the return of the alcalde at about ii a.m. the
Colombian troops marched into Colon, but did not
assume the threatening demeanor of the previous
day. The American women and children again went
on board the Marcomania and City of Washington,
and through the British vice-consul I offered protec-
tion to British subjects as directed in the Depart-
ment's cablegram. A copy of the British vice-con-
sul's acknowledgment is hereto appended. The
And State Papers 739
Nashville I got under way as on the previous day
and moved close in to protect the water front. Dur-
ing the afternoon several propositions were made to
Colonel Torres by the representatives of the new
government, and he was finally persuaded by them
to embark on the Royal Mail steamer Orinoco with
all his troops and return to Cartagena. The Orin-
oco left her dock with the troops — 474 all told — at
7.35 P.M. The Dixie arrived and anchored at 7.05
P.M., when I went on board and acquainted the com-
manding officer with the situation. A portion of
the marine battalion was landed and the Nashville's
force withdrawn.
3. On the evening of November 4 Major William
M. Black and Lieut. Mark Brooke, Corps of Engi-
neers, U. S. Army, came to Colon from Culebra and
volunteered their services, which were accepted, and
they rendered very efficient help on the following
day.
4. I beg to assure the Department that I had no
part whatever in the negotiations that were carried
on between Colonel Torres and the representatives
of the provisional government; that I landed an
armed force only when the lives of American citi-
zens were threatened, and Avithdrew this force as
soon as there seemed to be no grounds for further
apprehension of injury to American Hves or prop-
erty ; that I relanded an armed force because of the
failure of Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement
to withdraw and announced intention of returning,
and that my attitude throughout was strictly neutral
as between the two parties, my only purpose being
740 Presidential Addresses
to protect the lives and property of American citizens
and to preserve the free and uninterrupted transit of
the Isthmus.
Very respectfully,
(Signed) John Hubbard,
Commander, U. S. Naz'y, Commanding.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
This plain official account of the occurrences of
November 4 shows that, instead of there having
been too much prevision by the American Govern-
ment for the maintenance of order and the protec-
tion of life and property on the Isthmus, the orders
for the movement of the American w^arships had
been too long delayed ; so long, in fact, that there
were but forty-two marines and sailors available to
land and protect the lives of American men and
women. It was only the coolness and gallantry with
which this little band of men wearing the American
uniform faced ten times their number of armed foes,
bent on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Co-
lombian commander, that prevented a murderous
catastrophe. At Panama, when the revolution broke
out, there was no American man-of-war and no
American troops or sailprs. At Colon, Commander
Hubbard acted with entire impartiality toward both
sides, preventing any movement, whether by the
Colombians or the Panamans, which would tend to
produce bloodshed. On November 9 he prevented
a body of the revolutionists from landing at Colon.
And State Papers 741
Throughout he behaved in the most creditable man-
ner. In the New York "Evening Post," under date
of Panama, December 8, there is an article from a
special correspondent, which sets forth in detail the
unbearable oppression of the Colombian Government
in Panama. In this article is an interesting inter-
view with a native Panaman, which runs in part as
follows :
. . . We looked upon the building of the canal
as a matter of life or death to us. We wanted that
because it meant, with the United States in control
of it, peace and prosperity for us. President Marro-
quin appointed an Isthmian to be governor of Pan-
ama; and we looked upon that as of happy augury.
Soon we heard that the canal treaty was not likely
to be approved at Bogota; next we heard that our
Isthmian Governor, Obaldia, who had scarcely as-
sumed power, was to be superseded by a soldier
from Bogota. . . .
Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained
us of in the way of revenues, she did not bridge for
us a single river, nor make a single roadway, nor
erect a single college where our children could be
educated, nor do anything at all to advance our in-
dustries. . . . Well, when the new generals came
we seized them, arrested them, and the town of
Panama was in joy. Not a protest was made, ex-
cept the shots fired from the Colombian gunboat
Bogota, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed.
We were willing to encounter the Colombian troops
at Colon and fight it out ; but the commander of the
United States cruiser Nashville forbade Superin-
74'i Presidential Addresses
tendent Shaler to allow the railroad to transport
troops for either party. That is our story.
I call especial attention to the concluding portion
of this interview, which states the willingness of
the Panama people to fight the Colombian troops and
the refusal of Commander Hubbard to permit them
to use the railroad and therefore to get into a posi-
tion where the fight could take place. It thus clearly
appears that the fact that there was no bloodshed
on the Isthmus was directly due — and only due — to
the prompt and firm enforcement by the United
States of its traditional policy. During the past
forty years revolutions and attempts at revolution
have succeeded one another with monotonous regu-
larity on the Isthmus, and again and again United
States sailors and marines have been landed as they
were landed in this instance and under similar in-
structions to protect the transit. One of these revo-
lutions resulted in three years of warfare; and the
aggregate O'f bloodshed and misery caused by them
has been incalculable. The fact that in this last revo-
lution not a life was lost, save that of the man killed
by the shells of the Colombian gunboat, and no prop-
erty destroyed, was due to the action which I have
described. We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in the
interest of its inhabitants and of our own national
needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world.
Failure to act as the Administration acted would
have meant great waste of life, great suffering, great
destruction of property ; all of which was avoided by
And State Papers 743
the firmness and prudence with which Commander
Hubbard carried out his orders and prevented either
party from attacking the other. Our action was for
the peace both of Colombia and of Panama. It is
earnestly to be hoped that there will be no unwise
conduct on our part which may encourage Colombia
to embark on a war which can not result in her re-
gaining control of the Isthmus, but which may cause
much bloodshed and suffering.
I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations
which have been made of complicity by this govern-
ment in the revolutionary movement in Panama.
They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety.
The only excuse for my mentioning them is the fear
lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquies-
cence the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper
to say, therefore, that no one connected with this
Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or
encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of
Panama, and that save from the reports of our mili-
tary and naval officers, given above, no one con-
nected with this Government had any previous
knowledge of the revolution except such as was ac-
cessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who
read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaint-
ance with public affairs.
By the unanimous action of its people, without the
firing of a shot — with a unanimity hardly before re-
corded in any similar case — the people of Panama
declared themselves an independent republic. Their
recognition by this Government was based upon a
744 Presidential Addresses
state of facts in no way dependent for its justification
upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not de-
nied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or
the propriety of the general rule that a new state
should not be recognized as independent till it has
shown its ability to maintain its independence. This
rule is derived from the principle of non-interven-
tion, and as a corollary of that principle has general-
ly been observed by the United States. But, like the
principle from which it is deduced, the rule is sub-
ject to exceptions; and there are in my opinion clear
and imperative reasons why a departure from it was
justified and even required in the present instance.
These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; sec-
ond, our national interests and safety ; and, third, the
interests of collective civilization.
I have already adverted to the treaty of 1846, by
the thirty-fifth article of which the United States se-
cured the right to a free and open transit across the
Isthmus of Panama, and tO' that end agreed to guar-
antee to New Granada her rights of sovereignty and
property over that territory. This article is some-
times discussed as if the latter guarantee constituted
its sole object and bound the United States to pro-
tect the sovereignty of New Granada against domes-
tic revolution. Nothing, however, could be more er-
roneous than this supposition. That our wise and
patriotic ancestors, with all their dread of entangling
alliances, would have entered into a treaty with New
Granada solely or even primarily for the purpose of
enabling that remnant of the original Republic of
And State Papers 745
Colombia, then resolved into the States of New
Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador, to continue from
Bogota to rule over the Isthmus of Panama, is a
conception that would in itself be incredible, even if
the contrary did not clearly appear. It is true that
since the treaty was made the United States has
again and again been obliged forcibly to intervene
for the preservation of order and the maintenance of
an open transit, and that this intervention has usu-
ally operated to the advantage of the titular Gov-
ernment of Colombia, but it is equally true that the
United States in intervening with or without Colom-
bia's consent, for the protection of the transit, has
disclaimed any duty to defend the Colombian Gov-
ernment against domestic insurrection or against
the erection of an independent government on the
Isthmus of Panama. The attacks against which the
United States engaged to protect New Granadian
soivereignty were those of foreign powers ; but this
engagement was only a means to the accomplish-
ment of a yet more important end. The great de-
sign of the article was to assure the dedication of the
Isthmus to the purposes of free and unobstructed
interoceanic transit, the consummation of which
would be found in an interoceanic canal. To the
accomplishment of this object the Government of
the United States had for years directed its diplo-
macy. It occupied a place in the instructions to our
delegates to the Panama Congress during the Ad-
ministration of John Ouincy Adams. It formed the
subject O'f a resolution of the Senate in 1835, and
74^ Presidential Addresses
of the House of Representatives in 1839. In 1846
its importance had become still more apparent by
reason of the Mexican war. If the treaty of 1846
did not in terms bind New Granada to grant reason-
able concessions for the construction of means of in-
teroceanic communication, it was only because it was
not imagined that such concessions would ever be
withheld. As it was expressly agreed that the United
States, in consideration of its onerous guarantee of
New Granadian sovereignty, should possess the right
of free and open transit on any modes of communi-
cation that might be constructed, the obvious intent
of the treaty rendered it unnecessary, if not super-
fluous, in terms to stipulate that permission for the
construction of such modes of communication should
not be denied.
Long before the conclusion of the Hay-Herran
treaty the course of events had shown that a canal to
connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must be
built by the United States or not at all. Experience
had demonstrated that private enterprise was utterly
inadequate for the purpose; and a fixed policy, de-
clared by the United States on many memorable oc-
casions, and supported by the practically unanimous
voice of American opinion, had rendered it morally
impossible that the work should be undertaken by
European powers, either singly or in combination.
Such were the universally recognized conditions on
which the legislation of the Congress was based, and
on which the late negotiations with Colombia were
begun and concluded. Nevertheless, when the well-
And State Papers 747
considered agreement was rejected by Colombia and
the revolution on the Isthmus ensued, one of Colom-
bia's first acts was to invoke the intervention of the
United States ; nor does her invitation appear to have
been confined to this Government alone. By a tele-
gram from Mr. Beaupre, our minister at Bogota,
of the 7th of November last, we were informed that
General Reyes would soon leave Panama invested
with full powers ; that he had telegraphed the Presi-
dent of Mexico to ask the Government of the United
States and all countries represented at the Pan-
American Conference "to aid Colombia to preserve
her integrity"; and that he had requested that the
Government of the United States should meanwhile
"preserve the neutrality and transit of the Isthmus"
and should "not recognize the new government." In
another telegram from Mr. Beaupre, which was sent
later in the day, this Government was asked whether
it would take action "to maintain Colombian right
and sovereignty on the Isthmus in accordance with
article 35 [of] the treaty of 1846" in case the Co-
lombian Government should be "entirely unable to
suppress the secession movement there." Here was
a direct solicitation to the United States to intervene
for the purpose of suppressing, contrary to the treaty
of 1846 as this Government has uniformly construed
it, a new revolt against Colombia's authority brought
about by her own refusal to permit the fulfilment of
the great design for which that treaty was made. It
was under these circumstances that the United
States, instead of using its forces to destroy those
74^ Presidential Addresses
who sought to make the engagements of the treaty
a reality, recognized them as the proper custodians
of the sovereignty of the Isthmus.
This recognition was, in the second place, further
justified by the highest considerations of our national
interests and safety. In all the range of our inter-
national relations I do not hesitate to affirm that
there is nothing of greater or more pressing impor-
tance than the construction of an interoceanic canal.
Long acknowledged to be essential to our commer-
cial development, it has become, as the result of the
recent extension of our territorial dominion, more
than ever essential to our national self-defence. In
transmitting to the Senate the treaty of 1846, Presi-
dent Polk pointed out as the principal reason for its
ratification that the passage of the Isthmus, which it
was designed to secure, "would relieve us from a
long and dangerous navigation of more than 9,000
miles around Cape Horn, and render our coTnmuni-
cation with our own possessions on the northwest
coast of America comparatively easy and speedy."
The events of the past five years have given to this
consideration an importance immeasurably greater
than it possessed in 1846. In the light of our present
situation, the establishment of easy and speedy com-
munication by sea between the Atlantic and the Pa-
cific presents itself not simply as something to be
desired, but as an object to be positively and prompt-
ly attained. Reasons of convenience have been su-
perseded by reasons of vital necessity, which do not
admit of indefinite delays.
And State Papers 749
To such delays the rejection by Colombia of the
Hay-Herran treaty directly exposed us. As proof
of this fact I need only refer to the programme out-
lined in the report of the majority of the Panama
Canal Committee, read in the Colombian Senate on
the 14th of October last. In this report, which recom-
mended that the discussion of a law to authorize the
government to enter upon new negotiations should
be indefinitely postponed, it is proposed that the con-
sideration of the subject should be deferred till Oc-
tober 31, 1904, when the next Colombian Congress
should have met in ordinary session. By that time,
as the report goes on to say, the extension of time
granted to the New Panama Canal Company by
treaty in 1893 would have expired, and the new
Congress would be in a position to take up the ques-
tion whether the company had not, in spite of further
extensions that had been granted by legislative acts,
forfeited atl its property and rights. "When that
time arrives," the report significantly declares, "the
Republic, without any impediment, will be able to
contract, and will be in more clear, more definite,
and more advantageous possession, both legally and
materially." The naked meaning of this report is
that Colombia proposed to wait until, by the enforce-
ment of a forfeiture repugnant to the ideas of justice
which obtain in every civilized nation, the property
and rights of the New Panama Canal Company
could be confiscated.
Such is the Fcheme to which it was proposed that
the United States should be invited to become a
750 Presidential Addresses
party. The construction of the canal was to be
relegated to the indefinite future, while Colombia
was, by reason of her own delay, to be placed in
the "more advantageous" position of claiming not
merely the compensation to be paid by the United
States for the privilege of completing the canal, but
also the forty millions authorized by the act of 1902
to be paid for the property of the New Panama
Canal Company. That the attempt to carry out
.this scheme would have brought Colombia into con-
flict with the Government of France can not be
doubted; nor could the United States have counted
upon immunity from the consequences of the at-
tempt, even apart from the indefinite delays to which
the construction of the canal was to be subjected.
On the first appearance of danger to Colombia, this
Government would have been summoned to inter-
pose, in order to give effect to the guarantees of the
treaty of 1846; and all this in support of a plan
w^hich, while characterized in its first stage by the
wanton disregard of our own highest interests, was
fitly to end in further injury to the citizens of a
friendly nation, whose enormous losses in their gen-
erous efforts to pierce the Isthmus have become a
matter of history.
In the third place, I confidently maintain that the
recognition of the Republic of Panama was an act
justified by the interests of collective civilization.
If ever a government could be said to have received
a mandate from civilization to effect an object the
accomplishment of which was demanded in the in-
And State Papers 751
terest of mankind, the United States holds that
position with regard to the interoceanic canal.
Since our purpose to build the canal was definitely
announced, there have come from all quarters as-
surances of approval and encouragement, in which
even Colombia herself at one time participated ; and
to general assurances were added specific acts and
declarations. In order that no obstacle might stand
in our way, Great Britain renounced important
rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and agreed,
to its abrogation, receiving in return nothing but
our honorable pledge to build the canal and protect
it as an open highway. It was in view of this
pledge, and of the proposed enactment by the Con-
gress of the United States of legislation to give
it immediate effect, that the second Pan-American
Conference, at the City of Mexico, on January 22,
1902, adopted the following resolution:
The Republics assembled at the International
Conference of Mexico applaud the purpose of the
United States Government to construct an inter-
oceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work will
not only be worthy of the greatness of the American
people, but also in the highest sense a work of civil-
ization, and to the greatest degree beneficial to the
development of commerce between the American
States and the other countries of the world.
Among those who signed this resolution on behalf
of their respective governments was General Reyes,
75^ Presidential Addresses
the delegate of Colombia. Little could it have been
foreseen that two years later the Colombian Govern-
ment, led astray by false allurements of selfish ad-
vantage, and forgetful alike of its international
obligations and of the duties and responsibilities
of sovereignty, would thwart the efforts of the
United States to enter upon and complete a work
which the nations of America, re-echoing the senti-
ment of the nations of Europe, had pronounced to
be not only ''worthy of the greatness of the Ameri-
can people," but also "in the highest sense a work
of civilization."
That our position as the mandatary of civiliza-
tion has been by no means misconceived is shown
by the promptitude with which the powers have,
one after another, followed our lead in recognizing
Panama as an independent State. Our action in
recognizing the new republic has been followed by
like recognition on the part of France, Germany,
Denmark, Russia, Sweden, and Norway, Nicaragua,
Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa Rica,
japan, and Austria-Hungary.
In view of the manifold considerations of treaty
right and obligation, of national interest and safety,
and of collective civilization, by which our Govern-
ment was constrained to act, I am at a loss to com-
prehend the attitude of those who can discern in
the recognition of the Republic of Panama only a
general approval of the principle of "revolution"
by which a given government is overturned or one
portion of a country separated from another. Only
And State Papers 753
the amplest justification can warrant a revolutionary
movement of either kind. But there is no fixed rule
which can be applied to all such movements. Each
case must be judged on its own merits. There have
been many revolutionary movements, many move-
ments for the dismemberment of countries, which
were evil, tried by any standard. But in my opinion
no disinterested and fair-minded observer acquaint-
ed with the circumstances can fail to feel that Pan-
ama had the amplest justification for separation from
Colombia under the conditions existing, and, more-
over, that its action was in the highest degree bene-
ficial to the interests of the entire civilized world
by securing the immediate opportunity for the
building of the interoceanic canal. It would be
well for those who are pessimistic as to our action
in peacefully recognizing the Republic of Panama,
while we lawfully protected the transit from inva-
sion and disturbance, to recall what has been done
in Cuba, where we intervened even by force on gen-
eral grounds of national interest and duty. When
we interfered it was freely prophesied that we in-
tended to keep Cuba and administer it for our own
interests. The result has demonstrated in singularly
conclusive fashion the falsity of these prophecies.
Cuba is now an independent republic. We governed
it in its own interests for a few years, till it was able
to stand alone, and then started it upon its career of
self-government and independence, granting it all
necessary aid. We have received from Cuba a grant
of two naval stations, so situated that they in no
754 Presidential Addresses
possible way menace the liberty of the island, and
yet serve as important defences for the Cuban peo-
ple, as well as for our own people, against possible
foreign attack. The people of Cuba have been im-
measurably benefited by our interference in their
behalf, and our own gain has been great. So will
it be with Panama. The people of the Isthmus,