cileable with that of human accountableness ? Imma-
teriality of the soul ; Immortality of the human soul ;
Providence. It is not easj' to determine on a proper
selection ; but I will take the liberty of offering to the
reader a ^qw of the Essays.



VIRTUE.

Virtue must have some essential quality ; and with-
out this quality, it cannot be conceived to exist. The
contrary assertion appears to involve a contradiction.



222

If virtue consist — sometimes in benevolence, sometimes
in prudence, sometimes in a sense of propriety, some-
times in the good tendencj'^ of the principle whence it
springs — then must we come to one of two conclusions :
either, in the first place, that benevolence, prudence,
and utility, are the same thing ; or that the one word
Virtue is used with a variety of different significations ;
and is, in fact, little more than an ill-defined term, which
may mean any thing, or nothing, according to the will
of the individual by whom it is used.

That physical philosopher would be justly condem-
ned, who should attribute electrical and magnetic at-
traction to the general law of gravitation ; because, al-
though it is possible that these different phenomena may
have all a similar origin ; yet, as their proximate causes
are clearly distinguished from each other, and as we
are unable to go beyond the proximate causes, it would
be unphilosophical to anticipate the possible progress
of discovery, by arranging under the same head things
really so different. If a classification so improper had
already obtained, it would be the duty of a truly philo-
sophical inquirer to do all ia his power, by introducing
a more correct nomenclature, to remedy the inconsisten-
cy. Now the analogy between the physical and the
moral inquirer seems to me, in this case, to be perfect.
If the latter find that (he word virtue is used to desig-
nate things essentially different from each other — that
the quality which recommends an action to our moral
approbation — in other words, the quality which renders
an action virtuous, — is, in some cases, benevolence ; in
others, propriety ; in others again, utility — then is he



223

just as much bouud to infringe on ancient usage, and to
distinguish, by a more accurate classification, the actions
of which we approve on account of their benevolence,
from those of which we approve on account of their
propriety, as the ph3'sician is, to arrange under differ-
ent heads those phenomena of attraction, which arise
from gravitation, and those which are produced by mag-
netism or electricity. But if the moralist, on a still
further inquiry, find that propriety, benevolence, prudence,
as foundations of moral obligation, are all of them re-
solvable into utility — then is it just as much his duty,
again to reduce all virtuous actions to the same catego-
ry, as it would be the duty of the physical philosopher
to class together, as the effects of a common cause, all
the phenomena of attraction ; provided it should turn
out that magnetism, electricity, and gravitation, are all
of them ascribable to one simple but all-pervading and
ever operating principle. 1 could wish that the limits
of this exercise allowed a more extended discussion ;
in which case, I should endeavour to show the similarity
of principle which exists in relation to all those specu-
lations, which occupy the most prominent place among
the theories of virtue. At present, however, my object
will be to identify the system of propriety with that of
expediency.

Let us suppose, for a moment, propriety and expedi-
ency to be completely at variance ; — in other words, let
us suppose it to be proper for every being, whatever
may be his rank in the scale of existence, to endure
unmixed and eternal misery. Now, who is there to
whom this supposition does not appear an infinite ab-



224

surdity ? Who is able to conceive of a state orthino:s
in which evil — to each individual irremediable and un-
^productive of good in any part of the universal system
— should be consistent with the eternal fitness of things ?
I do not anticipate here an objection, 1 believe, that
every man will be ready to pronounce the very suppo-
sition an INFINITE ABSURDITY. Now, then, let me ask,
whether the same absurdity does not, in a certain de-
gree, attach itself to any system which supposes the
eternal fitness of things to be in any way chargeable
with the production of misery, or the diminution of hap-
hiness. I do not mean that the existence of misery is
inconsistent with propriety — but that universal order
cannot be productive of a quantity of happiness smaller
than would be the consequence of the reverse : be-
cause that system, which is infinitely proper, must be,
one would suppose, infinitely good ; and how can we
conceive of that, as infinitely good, which is less condu-
cive to the production of happiness than is some other
thing of the same kind with itself?

For instance — it is consistent with the relations and ,
fitness of things, that the planets move in their orbits of
peace and glory — and wholly inconsistent with these re-
lations, that the heavenly bodies be propelled against
each other, with such violence as to produce universal
tumult. But, suppose, for a moment, (how wild soever
the supposition may appear) that the universe were
repeopled with creatures, so constituted as to derive
their satisfaction, and comfort, if not their support, from
the tumult of conflicting systems, and from what we
should, under existing circumstances, call the ruin of



225

the universe. Should we not, in this case, contemplate,
with exactly those feeUngs of satisfaction, that proprie-
ty is calculated to produce the eccentric movennents of
clashing worlds ? Even in this case, I admit that there
is the adaptation of means to the end in view ; and this
adaptation we may, if we please, call propriety : but
as the end in view is the production of happiness, that
very propriety or adaptation of which we approve, is
only utility with a less intelligible name.

The question seems to resolve itself into this: Do
we approve of propriety, without any regard to utility ;
— in other words, do we approve of the adaptation of
means to ends, where those ends are not themselves
such as a wise and benevolent being would propose to
himself? I admit that we sometimes admire this adapta-
tion, as a manifestation of wisdom : but then as wis-
dom is, in its general tendency, highly beneficial, the
approbation it is calculated to excite may be accounted
for on the principle for which we are contending, viz.
THAT OF EXPEDIENCY. If, howcvep, wc take away that
pleasure which arises from a perception of excellence
in the object, and that which is produced by the other
cause to which 1 have just referred — I cannot imagine
to what sentiment of deligiil, the perception of adapta-
tion, or propriety, would give rise.

If, however, the advocates of propriety insist on the
existence of an absolute fitness, differing from that
kind of adaptation, which consists in the tendency of
means to produce a certain end ; — then do 1 feel myself
entitled to ask, what this moral fitness is ? — and then —
what renders it so desirable, or so obligatory ? If I am
19



226

pointed to the duties of piety, as examples of that for
which I am seeking — as consequences of a rehition and
specimens of an obligation, of which I have questioned
the existence — I am necessitated to confess, that even
in these duties I see an infinite propriety, only because
I find in them a tendency to produce the most extensive
benefits.

Before I proceed with this inquiry, I would just re-
mark, that, on whatever principle our reasonings in
other respects proceed — one thing must be admitted,
viz. that no action is either virtuous or vicious, except
as the manifestation of a principle. When, therefore, I
say, that I approve of a virtuous action, on account of
its beneficial tendency, I do, in fact, say, that I approve
of it, because the principles from which it springs would,
if generally diffused, and carried out into action, pro-
duce universal happiness. Or taking the other theory,
when I say, that 1 approve of an action, because it is
proper; I do, in fact, assert, that I approve of that
sense of propriety which would, if generally diffused,
and carried out into action, produce universal order.
Otherwise, I should be giving moral approbation to an
action which, apart from an intelligent agent, is a mere
abstraction ; not possessing, evidently, the powers of
consciousness, volition, judgment, &c.

The rule which has just been stated is evidently cor-
rect with regard to the duties of piety ; since these du-
ties, unlike some apparently virtuous actions, which are
beneficial independently of the principle whence they
spring — have really scarcely any intrinsic value. It is a
remark of Dr Paley's, that a virtue is to be estimated.



227

according- to the effect which would result from its ex-
emplification in the conduct of every intelligent being,
who is susceptible to the influence of the principle from
which it springs. The duties of piety, then, are only
manifestations of a principle, which is directly and indi-
rectly productive of effects the most various, and the
most important. The principle to which I refer, is

ATTACFIMENT AND A CONSEQUENT DESIRE OF CONFORMITY TO
A BEING, THE ESSENCE OF WHOSE CHARACTER IS INFINITE
BENEVOLENCE, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF INFINITE WISDOM.

Every intelligent being, in the universe of God, is nat-
urally susceptible of this attachment. Temperance,
chastit}', and fortitude are, as far as we know, useful on-
ly in the present stage of our existence ; but there is
no conceivable state of rational being, in which we may
not retain faculties for loving what is infinitely lovely.
Taking all this into account, apply Dr Paley's rule.
Suppose the principle of love to God influential, wherev-
er its influence can, in the nature of things, be felt. —
Suppose every intelligent being in the universe to be
actuated by a desire of conformity to the dictates of in-
finite wisdom, pointing out the proper means of effect-
ing the ends of infinite benevolence. In this case, all
intelligent beings would be co-operating in the great
work of creating unbounded enjoyment. In the moral
world, a r'^gard to the will of the All-wise would be
the pervading principle which, like gravitation in the
system of external nature, would prevent all irregulari-
ty ; or, in other words, all deviation from that conduct,
of which the tendency is to produce universal happiness.
The duties of piety, then, derive their obligation, not



228

from any gratification which their performance can ad-
minister to Him, whose ineftable felicity can receive
neither detriment nor augmentation from any act of a
created being — nor entirely from the happiness present,
and future, which the performance of these duties pro-
duces to the pious individual — but from the good to
which the natural operation of a principle, that identi-
fies our interests vvith the plans of infinite wisdom and
benevolence, is calculated to give birth ; so that the
general beneficial tendency of piet}' is as much greater
than the general beneficial tendency of any one of the
ordinary virtues, as the rank, which the duties of reli-
gion occupy, is higher than that which is conceded to
duties of any other description. Therefore — if the
proposition, thus stated, be correct — whatever reason
we have to believe that the obligation of the ordinary
virtues consists in their utility — there is exactly the
same kind and degree of reason, why we should come to
the same conclusion with regard to piety; and, of con-
sequence, with regard to those performances which are
its natural expressions.



IMMATERIALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

We are naturally led to conceive that, besides the
(pialities of objects, there exist certain substrata, nexus,
or substances, by means of which these qualities are
bound together ; and by which they are — to use an an-
tiquated phraseology — received. All, however, wc can
rationally say of substance is, that it is an unknown



I



229

cause of the union of qualities : and if we attempt to go
any farther, we shall oniy lose ourselves in scholastic
subtleties. The system of materialism seems to me to
be founded on some confusion of ideas upo,n this subject.
We have been understood to assert, that the substance
of mind differs from that of matter ; whereas we have
never, I believe, advanced a position so untenable, be-
cause placed so entirely beyond the limits of legitimate
reasoning, as well as of philosophical investigation.

My object iu the present essay, is less to refute, than
fairly to state, the system of materialism ; convinced as
I am, that honest scepticism, in this, as in every other
case, arises from the misapprehension of the question
in dispute.

Our only notion of matter, is that of a collection of
qualities ; — our only notion of mind that of a succession
of states. Qualities are, in short, in both cases, the on-
ly'objects of our knowledge. It is really trifling, in an
argument like the present, to tell us, that qualities, now
unknown, may exist in union with the known qualities
of matter, or with the known properties of mind ; and
that these qualities, both matter and mind may possess
in common.

The total irrelevancy of such a line of argument
will appear, if we remember, that the terms matter and
mind are only used to represent certain combinations of
qualities ; and that it is absurd to suppose we employ
terms to designate qualities, with the existence of which
we are unacquainted. If those unknown qualities, which
are supposed to exist in union with the known qualities

of matter and mind, were revealed to us ; terras might,
10*



230

and doubtless would be employed to designate these
new collections of properties. Till then, however,
when we assert any thing to be material, we assert, in
other words, that it possesses those known generic qual-
ities, to the union of which we have given the name
mailer ; and when we denominate any other thing im-
material, we only, in eflfect say, that among its known
properties, those qualities, the union of which consti-
tutes what we call matter, are not to be found. If mat-
ter or mind shall appear to have any other generic
qualities, besides those witli which we are at present
acquainted, they will no longer be mind and matter ; —
that is to say, they will no longer be those combinations
of properties, to which those terms were appropriated;
but novel combinations of qualities, to which those terms
never were appropriated.

The question, therefore, divested of much of its
complexity, resolves itself into a form comparatively
simple. W'e do not inquire, whether mind and matter
are in substance one ; — that is, in more intelligible lan-
guage, whether the cause of the union of properties be,
in both cases, the same. Nor do we endeavour to as-
certain the existence of some unknown common proper-
ly, in union with those collections of known properties,
to which the names mind and matter have been assign-
ed. Our only question is, whether, among those con-
nected properties, to which we give the generic appel-
lation of mind ; those properties to which, existing in a
state of union, we give the appellation of matter, are to
be fo\md. If the reply be in the negative, then are we
justitied in decidedly pronouncing the soul immaterial —



231

that is — in decidedly asserting-, that the known qualilic'^
to which — and to which alone, we give the nr«me of mat-
ter, do not constitute or form part of thai number of
known properties, to which, and to which alone, we
give the name of mind.

Before we proceed any farther, however, a question
of considerable delicacy presents itself. What is that
combination of qualities which we intend to denote,
when we use the word matter ? It is not, however, ne-
cessary for us to be very particular in our enumeration,
because if we can prove that any one of the qualities of
matter is not possessed by mind ; we shall have proved
the latter to be a collection of qualities different from
the former ; and shall, therefore, as we have before
shown, have a right to conclude that it is immaterial.
I do not, indeed, wish to have recourse to a defective
enumeration : I only mean to apologize for the want of
extreme accuracy, should that want be found to exist.
A late celebrated professor* of a sister University, de-
fines our notion of matter to consist of the ideas of " out-
ness, extension, and resistance ;" or, as he has more ful-
ly explained his meaning, " matter is that which is with-
out us — which has parts — which resists our efforts to
compress it." If the first of these be one of the essen-
tial qualities of matter, the question is at once and for-
ever set at rest. That it is so, an analysis of the pro-
cess by which our notions of externality are acquired,
would, perhaps, lead us to imagine. As I do not, how-

* See Dr. Brown's Physiology of the Mind, i 11. Chap. t. pa-
ges 106, 110.



232

ever, wish to g-round my argument on what maj^ by
some be considered a petilio principi, 1 will endeavour
to select a definition, or more properly, an enumeration,
which, if less comprehensive, is, perhaps, less exposed
to the objections of our opponents. The essential qual-
ities of matter, then, I conceive to be solidity, and exten-
sion ; and I attach to these terms the same meaning
which was attached to them by the metaphysician to
whom we have just referred. If any man, who calls
himself a materialist, doubt the propriety of this enu-
meration, and assert of either of these qualities, that its
existence is not, according to his ideas, essential to the
existence of matter, — I have only to say, that my con-
troversy is not with him — that, as he and I attach differ-
ent meanings to the term, matter, so do we, of conse-
quence, to the term, materialism ; and that every argu-
ment must, therefore, in such a case, resolve itself into
a mere logomachy.

The only idea we affix to the term mind is that of a
variety of feelings or succession of states, which follow
each other according to tixed laws, and which we, there-
fore, consider as reciprocally causes and effects. The
materialist, therefore, before he can carry the point at
which he is aiming, must show these feelings or states
to be possessed of solidity and extension. The materi-
alist, therefore, must be understood to assert, that ideas
and emotions have parts, and are capable of resisting our
efforts to compress them. If the man, who professes
materialism, only intend that ideas and emotions arise
from material changes, he in fact gives up the very
point for which he affects to be contending. If our on-



233

ly notion of mltid be that of a succession of states, — in
other word?, of ideas and emotions ; and if these ideas
and emotions, though, in some way, dependent on a ma-
terial process, be themselves entirely dis-tinct from the
matter employed in that process, and from any other
matter whatsoever; — then lyiind has nothing in common
with matter — the soul is immaterial.

The materialist is, therefore, I think, reduced to
this alternative : he either believes that the material
process produces something else material ; and that
this something is an idea or emotion ; — or he believes
that the process — that is, the movement of organized
matter — is itself an idea or emotion. In the first case,
he must have persuaded himself that when, for instance,
he receives a blow, the pain he feels is an extended
and solid substance, which, however subtle a liuid it
may be, might, if we had instruments sufficiently fine
for the purpose, be detected, measured, and divided.
In the second, that the arrangement of the parts of a
nerve is pain, or pleasure, fancy or reasoning, emotion
or thought — that sensation is nothing more than an al-
teration produced in the relative position of certain par-
ticles, in certain situations ; and not that all the phe-
nomena of mind are the results of bodily organization ;
but that they form a part of the bodily organization
itself.

Now if I am asked, why all this may not be so ? — I
am not, perhaps, able to demonstrate any impossibility
in the case. To me, however, these propositions look,
I confess, like contradictions in terms ; and their con-
verse appears to resemble those primary truths which



234

are not susceptible of proof, because too self-evident to
need it. All who call themselves materialists do not,
perhaps, support either of these propositions ; and we
shall, indeed, before we conclude, have to notice some
opinions apparently dissimilar from those to which we
have adverted, and yet embraced b}', perhaps^, the ma-
jority of those who profess to dissent from the view we
take on the subject now under consideration. To these
propositions, however, the consistent materialist will, I
think, find that his system inevitably conducts him ; and
if he is startled at their boldness, he has good reason
to suspect, that he is yet what the world thinks him,
and what he has been pleased to denominate himself

Let us, however, examine these opinions a little
more closely, for the purpose of ascertaining in how far
they are consistent with our notions, I say not of veri-
similitude, but of possibility.

It will be, I presume, admitted, that we have no
ideas, except those which we acquire by means of sen-
sation or reflection. It will also, 1 presume, be admit-
ted, that all our knowledge of the qualities of matter is
gained in the former way ; and all our acquaintance
with the states of mind, in the latter. The only correct
idea we can attach to solidity, to extension, or to any
quality whatevej', is that which regards it, as a power
possessed by matter, in consequence of which it is able
to produce a certain change in the state of our mind —
or, more correctl}', perhaps, as a law of reciprocal in-
fluence, in consequence of which the percipient being
is affected in certain ways, when it is placed in certain
relative situations with regard to material substances.



235

Now, if thought be not an object of sensation, and, there-
fore, have not the power of producing those feelings
which are produced by the qualities called solidity and
extension .; then, surely, thought is neither solid nor ex-
tended ; since to be solid and extended, is nothing more
than to be fitted to produce these sensations. Whoev-
er, then, asserts, that thought is solid and extended, in
fact asserts, that it is merely a power of producing, in a
percipient being, the sensations of solidity and extension.
Such sensations would, on this hypothesis, be only the
same power communicated to another being ; and so on,
in infinitum. As this is absurd, and more than the wild-
est materialist would assert, we conclude, that thought
is something entirely distinct from such power or ca-
pability ; and, therefore, perfectly distinct from solidity,
extension, or any quality of matter. If thought be not
something more than a solid, extended substance, then
follows the absurdity to which we have alluded — if it
be something more than the power of producing sensa-
tions in a percipient being, then it is a something totally
different from any quality of matter ; because a quality
of matter, is only that very power from which thought is
affirmed to be so completely distinct. The moderate ma-
terialist will, therefore, perhaps, content himself with
a modified statement — only asserting, that thought is a
property of an organized substance, which organized
substance has also the qualities of solidity and extension
belonging to it ; and not that thought is itself solid or
extended; — an opinion formed, I imagine, on some anal-
ogy, Ailsely snp])Osed to exist, between thought, and
what a logician would call a secondary, or rather, per-






236

haps, an accidental quality of matter. With this conces-
sion we ought, perhaps, to rest satislied : for if we have
shown thought to be neither solid nor extended, we
have proved exactly that which we intended to estab-
lish. If those successive states, to which we give the
denomination, mind, be not themselves solid nor extend-
ed, then mind is not material.

Let us, however, for a moment, consider the modifi-
ed materialism, if indeed it be materialism at ail. I re-
marked, in the early part of this essay, that we know
nothing of substance ; and that the only information we