Thomas Reid.

The works of Thomas Reid, D.D.; now fully collected, with selections from his umpublished letters online

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CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY




DATE DUE




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.CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY




_3_1924 092 298 235




Cornell University
Library



The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

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the United States on the use of the text.



http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924092298235



THE WORKS



OP



THOMAS REII), Di).

NOW FULLY COLLECTED,
WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS UNPUBLISHED LETTERS.



PREFACE,
NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY DISSERTATIONS,

BY

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.,

ADVOCATE ; A.M. (OXON.) ; ETC. ; CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE ;

HONORARY MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES J OF THE

LATIN SOCIETY OF JENA ; ETC. ; PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.



PREFIXED,
STEWART'S ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF REID.



VOL. I.



EIGHTH EDITION.



EDINBURGH

MACLACHLAN AND STEWART.
LONDON: LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN, ROBERTS, AND GREEN.



MDCCCLXXX.






<$. 2-2-1




ON EARTH, THERE IS NOTHING GREAT BUT MAN;
IN MAN, THERE IS NOTHING GREAT BUT MIND.



TO
VICTOR COUSIN,

PEER OF FRANCE, LATE MINISTER OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,

MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY,

ETC., ETC.,

THIS EDITION OF THE WORKS OF REID

IS DEDICATED;

NOT ONLY,

IN TOKEN OF THE EDITOR'S ADMIRATION

OF

THE FIRST PHILOSOPHER OF FRANCE,

BUT,

AS A TRIBUTE, DUE APPROPRIATELY AND PRE-EMINENTLY

TO

THE STATESMAN,

THROUGH WHOM

SCOTLAND HAS BEEN AGAIN UNITED INTELLECTUALLY

TO HER OLD POLITICAL ALLY,

AND

THE AUTHOR'S WRITINGS,

(THE BEST RESULT OF SCOTTISH SPECULATION,)

MADE THE BASIS OF ACADEMICAL INSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY

THROUGHOUT THE CENTRAL NATION OF EUROPE.



CONTENTS.



Paoe
Dedication, ......

Table of Contents, ..... iii

EDITOR'S PREFACE, .... xv

DUGALD STEWART'S ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF THOMAS REID, D.D.

Section I. From Dr Reid's birth till the date of his latest publication, 3

II. Observations on the Spirit and scope of Dr Reid's philosophy, 11

III. Conclusion of the Narrative, ... 29

Notes, .... 35



RE ID'S

(I.— WRITINGS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION.)

LETTERS.

A. To Drs Andrew and David Skene, 1764 — 1770, . . 39

B To Lord Karnes, 1772—1782, . . .60

C— To Dr James Gregory, 1783—1793, ... 62

D. To the Rev. Archibald Alison, 1790, ... 89

E.— To Prof. Robison, 1792, ..... 89

F To David Hume, 1763, . • . . 91

(II.— WRITINGS INTENDED AND PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION.)

A— INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN MIND.

Dedication, . ■ 95

CHAPTER I.— Inikoduction.

Section I. The Importance of the subject, and the Means of prosecuting it, 97

II. The Impediments to our knowledge of the mind, . 98

III. The Present State of this part of philosophy. Of Des Cartes, Male-

branche, and Locke, .... 99

IV. Apology for tliose philosophers, . • 101
£ V. Of Bishop Berkeley ; the " Treatise of Human Nature " [by Humej]

and of Scepticism, .... 101

VI. Of the " Treatise of Human Nature" . . 102

VII. The system of all these authors is the same, and leads to Scepticism, 103

VIII. We ought not to despair of a better, . ■ . 103



CHAPTER II.— Or Smelling.

Section I. The Order of proceeding. Of the medium and organ of Smell, 104

II. The Sensation considered abstractly, . _. 105

III. Sensation and Remembrance, natural principles of Belief , 105

IV. Judgment and Belief in some cases precede Simple Apprehension, 106
V. Two Theories of the nature of Belief refuted. Conclusions from

what hath been said, . . • 107



vi CONTENTS.

Paob
ESSAY III._Of Memort.

Cuapxer I. Things obvious and certain with regard to Memory, . 339

IF. Memory an original faculty, . ■ ■ 340

III. Of Duration, ..... 342

IV. Of Identity, . . . . 344
V. Mr Locke's account of the Origin of our Ideas, and particularly

of the idea of Duration, . . • 346

VI. Mr Locke's account of our Personal Identity, . 350

VII. Theories concerning Memory, . . • 353



ESSAY IV Of Conception.

Chapter I. Of Conception, or Simple Apprehension in general, . 360

II. Tlieories concerning Conception, . . 368

III. Mistakes concerning Conception, . . . 375

IV. Of the Train of Thought in the mind, . . 379



ESSAY V.— Of Abstraction.

Chapter I. Of General Words, .... 389

II. Of General Conceptions, . . . 391

III. Of general conceptions formed by Analysing objects, . 394

IV. Of general conceptions formed by Combination, . 39S
V. Observations concerning the Names given to our general notions, 403

VI. Opinion of philosophers about Universals, . . 405



ESSAY VI Of Judgment.

Chapter I. Of Judgment in general, . . .413

II. Of Common Sense, .... 421

III. Sentiments of philosophers concerning Judgment, . 426

IV. Of First Principles in general, • . . 434
V. The first principles of Contingent Truths. [On Consciousness,] 441

VI. First principles of Necessary Truths, . . 452

VII. Opinions, ancient and modern, about First Principles, . 462

VIII. Of Prejudices, the causes of error, . . 468



ESSAY VII.— Of Reasoning.

Chapter I. Of Reasoning in general, and of Demonstration, . 475

II. Whether Morality be capable of demonstration, . 478

III. Of Probable Reasoning, .... 481

IV. Of Mr Hume's Scepticism with regard to Reason, , 484



ESSAY VIII.— Of Taste.

Chapter I. Of Taste in general, .

II. Of the Objects of taste, and first of Novelty, . 493

III. Of Grandeur, .... 404

IV, Of Beauty, . • • . 498



490



CONTENTS. Vll

C— ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN

MIND.

Introduction, ...... 51]

ESSAY I. — Of Active Power in General.

Chapter I. Of the Notion of Active Power, . . . 512

II. The same subject, .... 515

III. Of Mr Locke's account of our Idea of Power, . 518

IV. Of Mr Hume's opinion of the Idea of Power, . . 520

V. Whether beings that have no Will nor Understanding may have

Active Power ? . . . . 522

V I. Of the Efficient Causes of the phenomena of nature, . 525

VII. Of the Extent of Human Power, . 527



ESSAY II.— Of the Will.

Chapter I. Observations concerning the Will, . . . 530

II. Of the influence of Incitements and Motives upon the Will, 533

III. Of operations of mind which may be called Voluntary, 537

IV. Corollaries, . . . 541



ESSAY III. — Of the Principles of Action,
PART I.- — Op tue Mechanical Principles of Action.



Chapter I. Of the Principles of Action in general,
II. Of Instinct,
III. Of Habit,



543
545

550



PART II Of the Animal Principles of Action

Chapter I. Of Appetites, . . . . 551

II. Of Desires, . . . 554

III. Of Benevolent Affection in general . . 558

IV. Of the particular Benevolent Affections, . . 560
V. Of Malevolent Affections, . . . 566

VI. Of Passion, ..... 570
VII. Of Disposition, . . . 575

VIII. Of Opinion, ..... 577

PART III Of the Rational Principles of Action.

Chapter I. There are Rational Principles of action in man, . 579

II. Of regard to our Good upon the Whole, . 580

III. The Tendency of this Principle, . . 582

IV. Defects of this Principle, .... 584
V. Of the notion of Duty, Rectitude, Moral Obligation, . 588

VI. Of the Sense of Duty, . ... 589

VII. Of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation, . 592
VIII. Observations concerning Conscience, . . • 594



ESSAY IV Of the Liberty of Moral Agents.

Chapter I. The notions of Moral Liberty and Necessity stated, . 599

II. Of the words, Cause and Effect, Adion, and Aclive Power, 603



vnf

ClIAJ



!R III. Causes of the Ambiguity of those word:
IV. Of the influence of Motives,
V. Liberty consistent with Government,
VI. First Argument for Liberty,
VII. Second Argument,
VIII. Third Argument,
IX. Of Arguments for Necessity,
X. The same subject,
XI. Of the Permission of Evil,



605

608
613
61S
020
022
024
620
632



ESSAY V— Of Morals.

Chapter I. Of the First Principles of Morals, . ■ . 637

II. Of Systems of Morals, "... 640

III. Of Systims of Natural Jurisprudence, . . 643

IV. Whether an action deserving Moral Approbation, must be done

with the Belief of its being Morally Good, . 646

V. Wlielher Justice be a Natural, or an Artificial Virtue, . 651

VI. Of the nature and obligation of a Contract, 662

VII. That Moral Approbation implies a real Judgment, . 670



D ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC.

CHAPTER I.— Of the First Three Treatises.

Section I. Of the Author, ....

II. Of the Porphyry's Introduction,

III. Of the Categories,

IV. Of the book Concerning Interpretation,



681
083
683
685



CHAPTER II.— Remarks.

Section I. On the Five Predicables,

II. On tlie Ten Categories, and on Divisions in genera/,

III. On Distinctions,

IV. On Definitions,

V. On tlie structure of Speech,
VI- On Propositions,



685
6S7
689
^90
691
092



CHAPTER III. — Account of the First Analytics.

Section I. Of the Conversion of Propositions, . , (593

II. Of the Figures < nd Modes of Pure Syllogisms, . 694

III. Of tlie Invention [Discovery} of a Middle- Term, . 695

IV. Of the remaining part of the First Book, . 695
V. Of the Second Book of tlie First Analytics, , 695



CHAPTER IV Remarks.

Section I. Of the Conversion of Propositions,



«9(i



CONTENTS. IX

Section IT. On Additions made to Aristotle's Theory, . 697

III. On Examples used to illustrate this Theory, . . 698

IV. On the Demonstration of the Theory, . . G99
V. On this Theory considered as an Engine of Science, . 701

VI. On Modal Syllogisms, . , . 702

VII. On Syllogisms that do not belong to Figure and Mode, . 704



CHAPTER V. — Account of the Remaining Books of the Okganon.

Section I. Of the Last Analytics, .... 705

II. Of the Topics, ' . . . 70f>

III. Of 'he booh concerning Sophisms, . . . 707



CHAPTER VI. — Reflections on tub Utii.itt op Logic, and tub Means of
its Improvement.

Section T. Of the Utility of Logic, . 703

II. Of the Improvement of Logic, 711



E — ESSAY ON QUANTITY.



[Occasion and grounds of the Discussion,] 715

Of the Newtonian Measure of Force, . 717

Of the Leibnilzian Measure of Force, . . 718

Reflections on this Controversy, . . 719



F.— ACCOUNT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

Introduction, ...... 721

I. History of the University before the Reformation, . 721

II. Ancient Constitution, . . . 722

III. History after the Reformation, . . 727

IV. Modern Constitution, . . . 729
V. Donations, . . . 730

VI. Present State, . . 732

VII. Conclusion, . . 738



3 EDITOR'S SUPPLEMENTARY DISSERTATIONS.

5;A.)— ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE; OR, OUR PRIMARY
''BELIEFS CONSIDERED AS THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH.

Section I. The Meaning of the Doctrine, and Purport of the Argument, of

Common Sense, .... 742

II. The Conditions of the Legitimacy, and legitimate application, of

the argument, . . . 749

III. That it is one strictly Philosophical and scientific, . 751

* IV. The Essential diameters by which our primary beliefs, or the

principles of Common Sense, are discriminated, . 754

V- The Nomenclature, that is, the various appellations by which these

have been designated, . . 7f>.">



CONTENTS,



Section VJ. The Universality of tlus philosophy of Common Sense ; or its general
recognition, in reality and in name, shown by a chronological
series of Testimonies from llie dawn of speculation to the pre-
sent day, ■ ■ i '"



(B.)— OF PRESENTATIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE.

Section I. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive or Immediate, and of
Representative or Mediate cognition ; with the various signifi-
cations of the term Object, its conjugates and correlatives, 804

Section II. Errors of Reid and other Philosophers, in reference to the preced-
ing distinctions, .... 812



(C.)— ON THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

Section I. Systematic Schemes, from different points of view, of the various
theories of the relation of External Perception to its Object ;
and of the various systems of Philosophy founded thereon, 816

II. What is the character, in this respect, of Reid's doctrine of Percep-
tion? . . . . .819



(D.)— DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES

OF BODY.

Section I. Historically considered, . . . 825

II. Critically considered. Three classes (Primary, Secundo-Primary,

and Secondary Qualities,) established, . 845



(D *.)— PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER.

Section I. Principal momenta of the Editor's doctrine of Perception, (A) in
itself, and (B) in contrast to that of Reid, Stewart, Royer
Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish School, 876

II. Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Perception proper

and Sensation proper, ■ . . 886



(D **.) CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE

OF MENTAL SUGGESTION OR ASSOCIATION, 889



(D ***.)— OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF MENTAL REPRODUCTION,
SUGGESTION OR ASSOCIATION.

Section I. Laws of Mental Succession, as General. — (A.) Not of Reproduc-
tion proper, uniform — (B.) Of Reproduction proper, not
uniform : as possible ; as actual ; as direct, — Abstract or
Primary law of Repetition ; as indirect, — Abstract or Primary
law of Redintegration, Concrete or Secondary law of Pre-
ference, ..... 910

II. Laws of Mental Succession, as SjieciaL — Of Reproduction : (A.)

Abstract or Primary,— modes of the laws of Repetition and
Redintegration, one or both ; — (B.) Concrete or Secondary,—
modes of the law of Preference.



CONTENTS. XI

(E.)-ON THE CORRELATIVE APPREHENSIONS OF COLOUR,
AND OF EXTENSION AND FIGURE.

Section I. On the Cm-relation of Colour with Extension and Figure in visual

Perception and Imagination, . . . 917

II. On the Philosophy of the Point, the Line, and the Surface : in illus-
tration of the reality, nature, and visual perception of breadth-
less lines, . . . 921



(F.)— ON LOCKE'S NOTION OF THE CREATION OF MATTER, 924



(G.)— ON THE HISTORY OF THE WORD IDEA, . 925



(H.)-ON CONSCIOUSNESS.

Section I. ReicVs reduction of Consciousness to a special faculty shewn to be
inaccurate. Consciousness the fundamental condition of all our
mental energies and affections, . . . 929

II. Conditions and Limitations of Consciousness. General Laws of
Variety and Succession. Special characteristics of Conscious-
ness. Philosophy of the Conditioned in relation to the notions
of Substance and Cause, . . .932

[III.] Historical references — i. On the conditions of Consciousness ; ii. On

acts of mind beyond the sphere of Consciousness, . 938



(I.) -ON THE HISTORY OF THE TERMS CONSCIOUSNESS, ATTENTION,
AND REFLECTION.

Section I. Extracts explanatory of Sir W. Hamilton's view of the distinction
between Consciousness, Attention, and Reflection, with special
reference to the opinions of Reid and Stewart, . . 940

II. Historical notices of the use of the terms Consciousness, Attention,

and Reflection, . . 942



(K.)— THAT THE TERMS IMAGE, IMPRESSION, TYPE, &c, IN PHILO-
SOPHICAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION, ARE NOT TO BE
TAKEN LITERALLY, . ... 948



(L.)— ON THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION, . 950



1M.)— ON THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIES, AS HELD BY ARISTOTLE
AND THE ARISTOTELIANS.



[Section I.] Origin of -the theory as a metaphysical and physical hypothesis — i
opinion of Aristotle — of the Schoolmen — theory of intentional
species, impressed and expressed, sensible and, intelligible —
various opinions on the whole hypothesis, . . 951



Xli CONTENTS.

Paob
[Section II.] Translations of passages exhibiting the nominalist doctrine of

species, . ■ ■ "57



(N.V - THE CARTESIAN THEORY OF PERCEPTION AND IDEAS, , 961



(0.)— LOCKE'S OPINION ABOUT IDEAS,



(P.)— ON MALEBRANCHE'S THEORY,



96fi



(Q.)-ON HUME'S ASSERTION ABOUT THE IDEAS OF POWER AND

CAUSE, AND BROWN'S CRITICISM OF REID, . 968



(R.)— ON THE CARTESIAN DOUBT, . . 969



(S.)— ON REID'S BORROWING FROM GASSENDI THE OPINION OF

ALEXANDER AND THE NOMINALISTS, . 970



(T\)-ON THE QUALITY OF NECESSITY AS A CRITERION OF THE

ORIGINALITY OF A COGNITION, 971



(U.)-ON THE ARGUMENT FROM PRESCIENCE AGAINST LIBERTY.

[Section I.] Liberty vindicated by the Philosophy of the Conditioned, . 97?,
[II.] Impossibility of reconciling Liberty and Prescience — various

theories mi this point, . . . 970

[III.] Extracts from A quinas and Cajetanus, . . 970



(U*.)— ON SCIENTIA MEDIA, . . .OS!



(V.)— ARISTOTLE'S MERITS AS A LOGICIAN : HIS OWN AND KANT'S

TESTIMONY, ..... 982



(W.)— THE SCIENCES OF OBSERVATION TO BE STUDIED BEFORE

THOSE OF REFLECTION, . 9S5 ■



CONTENTS. X1U

Pagb
(X.)— ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONCEPTIONS (BEGRIFFE)

AND INTUITIONS (ANSCHAUUNGEN), . . 986



(Y.)— ON EGOISM 988



ADDENDA, . . . . 989*



POSTSCRIPT, .... 989

INDICES, 991



MEMORANDA FOR PREFACE.



[From the Advertisement prefixed to this work, it appears that Sir William
Hamilton's contributions as Editor were intended to include, in addition to the
Foot-Notes and Supplementary Dissertations, a General Preface to the whole. This
Preface was never written, and its plan can only be conjectured from a few memo-
randa marked as intended for it, and some fragments apparently designed to be
incorporated with it. The principal of these have been printed below. — Ed.]



[Of the Scottish Philosophy in General.]

Results of Locke's philosophy — Col-
lins, &c, see Cousin in Vacherot, [Cours
de 1819-20, partie2,Leconl.*] Berkeley,
Hume — adopted at first by Scottish
school; Reid's reaction.

Hume's scepticism proceeds in two
momenta.

1°, In shewing that the notions of
Cause and Effect, Substance and Accident,
which he wishes to make merely subjec-
tive, have no genuine necessity; (under
and after this, but not developed, that
even if the necessity be not a bastard
one — from custom — it is at best only a
legitimate subjective one, and without
objective validity.)

2°, In shewing that the mind is not con-
scious of any real existence in perception ;
that its representations are no guarantee
for anything represented (Idealism. )

Now Kant and Reid both combated
Hume. Kant applied himself to the
causal nexus ; Reid to the idealism.

Shew how both were equally intent on
shewing that causality is a real neces-
sity of mind. Though both only subjective,
Kant more articulate.

How, in regard to idealism, Kant con-
firmed Hume, giving his premises, whereas
Reid's doctrine, though confused and
vacillating, was a real refutation.

[These memoranda have been partly
worked out in a paper printed in the
Appendix to the Lectures on Metaphysics,
vol. i., p. 392 sq. Another aspect of the
Scottish Philosophy, in relation to that of
Germany, is indicated in the following
fragment, which is apparently related to
the reference above, p. 793. — Ed.]



* Sec also M. Cousin's own edition of these
Lectures, LeQon 2. — Ed.



It was Jacobi who first in Germany at-
tacked the mediate and demonstrating
philosophy of the Leibuitians, and shewed
the necessity of immediate knowledge.
This he took from Reid. — See Prancke,
p. 227 sq. Schulze, another great pro-
moter of this. — Ibid., p. 230.

[The purport of this memorandum is
explained by the following extracts,
translated from Francke's work, Das
selbststaendige und reine Leben des
Gefuehls, als des Geistes urspruenglichen
Urtheils, u.s.w. Leipzig, 1838 : —

" The union of the English and French
empiricism with the German logical ra-
tionalism produced that maxim of the
philosophy of reflection, which maintains
that nothing can be admitted as truth
which cannot be proved, or logically de-
duced, from the perceptions of sense ; a
position which leads, as a natural conse-
quence, to the scepticism of Hume. On
the other hand, Reid, Beattie, and Oswald,
advocating the hitherto obscured element
of Feeling, maintained that the human
mind possesses immediately in conscious-
ness principles of knowledge independent
of experience; and a more cautious at-
tempt was made by Richard Price to
shew that the Understanding, or Faculty of
Thought, as distinguished from the deduc-
tive faculty, is essentially different from
the faculty of- sense, and is a source of
special representations distinct from those
of the senses. Yet, on the whole, all
these writers, as regards the scientific
vindication of their teaching, were com-
pelled to place the foundation of the
immediate cognition of the higher truths
of reason in a Common Sense ; and the
assumption of this protended source ne-
cessarily involved suspicion and doubt
ns regards the truth of the cognitions
derived from it. And so also Jacobi, if



MEMORANDA FOR PREFACE.



we except the negative, polemical side of
his teaching, wherein he certainly accom-
plished much, has advanced little or
nothing beyond his English predecessors
in laying a firm scientific foundation for
his own view ; though he was the first
among ourselves who, in the controversy
with the disciples of Wolf and other cog-
nate schools, by the employment of the
terms feeling and belief, directed attention
to the necessity of acknowledging the
importance of immediate cognition and
its consciousness

"Although Jacobi's system, on account
of its vacillating language, and still more
on account of its intuitive narrowness and
subjective character, was not fitted to bene-
fit philosophy immediately, it had, not-
withstanding, a foundation of truth, which
could not long fail of producing its effect.
Many soon became clearly convinced that
the Kantian philosophy also was liable to
the charge of onesidedness, and failed to
satisfy the requirements of the entire man :
they acknowledged that Jacobi, notwith-
standing the enthusiastic vehemence of his
decisions, had seized and brought to light
a principle of our mental life hitherto
marvellously overlooked, the discovery of
which would henceforth fill up a great
void in the culture of the age, and the
recognition of which was indispensable to
the preservation and progress of philoso-
phy. Even men who could not directly
be classed as belonging to the school of
Jacobi, the clearest and most cautious
thinkers, acknowledged the importance of
the distinction between mediate and im-
mediate knowledge, and between the
mediate and immediate consciousness of
it ; and although they would not concede
to Feeling an independent significance,
and were unable to assign to it a sure
psychological position, they at least saw
clearly, and proved conclusively, that the
power and efficacy of this Feeling must
be a necessary condition of knowledge
antecedent to all determinate conceptions
and reasonings. Among these men may
be especially mentioned the so - called
sceptic, (who in his later writings is a
natural realist,) G-. E. Schulze,* Bouter-
wek,t and Gerlach.f

' ' Schulze, indeed, regards the Feelings as
the most obscure and variable phase of the



* Psyoh. Anthropol. ed. 2, § 161, pp. 259, 260 :
Encycl. der philos. Wissensch. §§ 39, 115 ; Kritik
dor theor. Philos. i. p. 702-720; Ueber dio
mensohl. Erkenntniss, § 45-50, pp. 155-174.

t Lehrb. der philos. Wissensch. Apod. p.
16-8(5.

t Lclu-b. der philos. "Wissensch. i. § 48, p. 48.



mental life : he holds them to be incapable
of establishing or proclaiming anything ob-
jective, and hence to be useless as princi-
ples for the demonstration of truth ; but
he repeatedly asserts the existence in the
human consciousness of certain funda-
mental assumptions, of which, by the con-
stitution of our nature, we are unable arbi-
trarily to divest ourselves, and which have
a place in all natural science and in moral
and religious convictions. It is true that
Schulze did not penetrate to a complete
insight into the nature of demonstrative
knowledge and transcendental idealism ;
and hence, from the position of his natural
objective realism, he is unable to discover
that our ideal convictions can attain to an
equal certainty with the natural conviction
of knowledge based on intuition. Bouter-
wek, adhering more closely to Jacobi's
doctrine, speaks of the consciousness of
the original feeling of truth as the first
witness of certainty in all human convic-
tion ; but, like Jacobi, he seems to believe
in a perceptive power of the internal
sense, by which even demonstrative phi-
losophical cognitions may be realised in

consciousness Fries is the

first who, by opening a new path of
anthropologico-critical inquiry, has com-
pletely and fully succeeded in organi-
cally uniting the immediate products of
Jacobi's philosophy with the results of the
Kantian criticism, and thus in exhibiting



Online LibraryThomas ReidThe works of Thomas Reid, D.D.; now fully collected, with selections from his umpublished letters → online text (page 1 of 114)