will be intercepted by the center and right,' the latter of which was
at Rome. The General commanding department requests that you
will move down your cavalry and occupy the country recently cov-
ered by Col. Minty, who will report particulars to you, and who has
been ordered to cross the river.
(Signed) T. L. CRITTENDEN,
For Maj. Gen. Commanding.
This information relieved Gen. Burnside from
all apprehension concerning Gen. Rosecrans. It
also fixed his determination to occupy all the im-
portant points above Knoxville, and if possible,
reach the Salt Works near Abingdon, Va. Suffi-
cient forces were left at Kingston and Loudon.
2 20 THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
Col. Byrd, who was stationed at Kingston, was
ordered to occupy Athens, and if possible, Cleve-
land, thus communicating with the cavalry of Gen.
Rosecrans, as requested in the above dispatch, and
as directed in another soon afterwards received
from Gen. Halleck at Washington, as follows:
Hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of the
Holston River, or some point (if there he one) to prevent access
from Virginia ; and connect with Gen. Rosecrans, at least with your
cavalry.
A heavy force under the Confederate General
Jones, was then holding points in the upper part of
East Tennessee Valley, which, by the above order,
Gen. Burnside was to occupy. Col. Foster's brig-
ade had been doing excellent service in keeping
that force in check. Gen. Hartsuff was directed
to send at once all his infantry (except Gilbert's
brigade), and also Woolford's cavalry up the val-
ley. Col. Carter's cavalry brigade was already well
advanced in that direction. On the 16th, at night,
Gen. Burnside received another dispatch from
Gen. Halleck, sent on the 13th. It read:
It is important that all the available forces at your command be
pushed forward into East Tennessee ; all your scattered forces
should be concentrated there ; move down your infantry as rapidly
as possible towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans.
Early on the morning of the 17th, Burnside sent
orders by telegraph for the Ninth corps and all
other available troops then in Kentucky, to join
him at once. He also gave instructions for all the
troops then in upper East Tennessee and not in
presence of the enemy, to retrace their steps down
the valley towards Rosecrans. The same clay he
MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN EAST TENNESSEE. 2 21
received another telegram from Halleck, dated the
14th, as follows:
There are several reasons why you should reinforce Rosecrans
with all possihle dispatch. It is helieved the enemy will concen-
trate to give him battle ; you must be there to help him.
Burnside then repeated his order concerning the
troops up the valley. Having already started to
take command of them in person, and efficiently
to promote the purpose of their movement, he
proceeded beyond Jonesboro to near the Watauga
River. When arrived at the extreme advance of
his command, he saw no way of extricating it from
its situation, except by attacking the enemy's posi-
tion at Watauga bridge. A cavalry brigade under
Col. Foster was sent around on the morning of the
23rd, to threaten the enemy's rear, who on that
night burnt the bridge and evacuated the position.
Immediately Burnside set in motion all the United
States troops, except a small portion of cavalry, on
the way to aid and relieve Rosecrans. The fol-
lowing day he returned to Knoxville.
His movements were watched from Richmond-
On the day when he received Halleck's telegram
of the 14th, a close observer at that city wrote:
u It is said the enemy is evacuating East Tennessee,
concentrating, I suspect, for battle with Bragg." *
It may easily be seen that it was impossible that
the obedience promptly given by Burnside to Hal-
leck's order, could avail in helping Rosecrans, as
intended. The United States troops, which were
in the upper country of East Tennessee, according-
* See "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital," Vol.
2, page 46.
222 THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
to instructions before given to Burnside, were from
150 to 200 miles distant from Chicamauga, where
Rosecrans was to do battle, and they could not
travel so far in the very short time before that bat-
tle began, even if they were moved towards the
spot as rapidly as possible. Afterwards, when
Rosecrans had established himself in Chattanooga,
many dispatches passed between Halleck and
Burnside, in reference to the latter's going to
strengthen and assist Rosecrans, and some mis-
understandings occurred in regard to the purport
of those dispatches. Gen. Burnside, in his report
to the War Department, gives the underlying rea-
son. He says: " I was averse to doing what would
in any way weaken our hold in East Tennessee,
and he (Halleck) was anxious lest Rosecrans
should not be able to hold Chattanooga. He
(Rosecrans) was not disturbed at Chattanooga, and
we held our ground in East Tennessee, so that
what occurred in no way affected the result."
By the 30th of September, the whole of the
Ninth army corps arrived, numbering about 6,000
men. Previous to that date, Gen. White's division
had been sent to Loudon, Col. Woolford's cavalry
had reinforced Col. Byrd, and they were instructed
to connect with Rosecrans' cavalry; Gen. Carter
held Bull's Gap, which was then the most ad-
vanced position of the United States troops up the
valley, and Col. Haskell was in support at Morris-
town. Many of the men were suffering from want
of clothing, for there was great difficulty in getting
sufficient supplies across the mountains, and the
FIGHT AT BLUE SPRINGS. 223
temperature of the air was frosty. On October
5th, Gen. Wilcox arrived at Cumberland Gap with
four new regiments of Indiana troops. He was
ordered to Morristown, and thence to Bull's Gap,
and to him Col. Haskin's brigade was directed to
report from Morristown. Gen. Burnside had de-
termined to push his advance farther up the valley,
and with this purpose he sent the Ninth corps,
under Brig. Gen., R. B. Potter, in that direction,
together with all the cavalry under Gen. Shackel-
ford, except Byrd's and Woolford's brigades. A
junction of all these forces was made at Bull's
Gap, where Gen. Burnside arrived in person on
the 9th, and on the following morning an advance
movement was ordered. At Blue Springs, be-
tween Bull's Gap and Greeneville, the enemy
was found in heavy force and in a strong posi-
tion between the wagon road and the railway
to Greeneville. The United States cavalry occu-
pied him in skirmishing until late in the afternoon.
Col. Foster was sent, with instructions to establish
his brigade in the rear of the enemy, on the line
over which the latter would be obliged to cross in
retreating, and at a point near Rheatown. An
attack from the front was delayed until sufficient
time had passed, probably for those instructions
to be fulfilled. After 5 p.m , Gen. Ferrero's division
of Gen. Potter's command, moved forward in the
most dashing manner, driving the enemy from his
first line, and compelled him to retreat that night.
Gen. Burnside pursued early in the morning, driv-
ing his foes again beyond the Watauga River,
224 THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
where he directed the United States cavalry to
hold them. Col. Foster's brigade met with serious
difficulties upon its special errand, chiefly in rough
roads, and did not reach its intended point of estab-
lishment in the rear ground and check the enemy
in his retreat by night on the 9th, but it joined the
pursuing forces next morning.* The cavalry was
left in the advance, supported by Col. Haskin's
brigade of infantry at Jonesboro, Gen. Wilcox was
left at Greeneville, and the Ninth corps returned
to Knoxville.
Nothing of importance occurred in the region
of this fight until the 1st of November, when the
outposts at Kingsport and Blountville were driven
in, and in consequence the road from Kingsport
to Rogersville was left unguarded. A heavy
force of the enemy under Gen. S. Jones moved
down that road, surprised a brigade of United
States cavalry under Col. K. Garrard at Rogers-
ville, and completely routed it. Col. Garrard, with
his shattered forces, retreated to Morristown, and
as the strength of the force which attacked him
was unknown to Gen. Burnside, he prudently di-
rected Gen. Wilcox to fall back to Bull's Gap and
hold that position. From that time until the 17th
of the month, operations were confined to cavalry
fighting, skirmishing and foraging.
West of Knoxville, on the south side of the
Tennessee River, below Loudon, the enemy were
* Note. — The Comte de Paris charges '"guilty neglect" upon Foster: that while
he halted his column under the pretext of allowing his men time to rest, he sent on
the road to Henderson's Mill the Fifth Indiana Regiment, through which the Con-
federate troops easily opened a way. — The Civil War in America, Vol. U.
AFFAIRS AT AND NEAR LOUDON. 225
very active during the early part of October. On
the 19th of that month, Gen. Burnside had direc-
tions to report to Gen. Grant, commanding Division
of Mississippi, concerning the situation and opera-
tions of his forces. This he did, and at the same
time sent a flag of truce through Col. Woolford's
lines, whose headquarters were at Philadelphia,
Tenn. The enemy's cavalry took advantage of
the flag, made an attack upon Col. Woolford, and
captured from 300 to 400 of his men and some
mountain howitzers. On the 28th, the forces at
Loudon were moved to the north side of the Ten-
nesee River, and the pontoon bridge was taken up
and transported to Knoxville. There it was thrown
across the Tennessee, and proved of immense ser-
vice during the siege. The indications at that date
were that Bragg was sending a considerable force
against Burnside. The latter reinforced Kingston
with Col. Mott's brigade of infantry, left Gen.
White and his command at Loudon, and posted
Gen. Potter with the Ninth corps at Lenoir's,
about five miles east of Loudon. All the available
cavalry force at Knoxville was thrown on the
south side of the Tennessee River, with instruc-
tions to guard it down to the junction of Little
Tennessee and Tennessee rivers opposite Lenoir's.
And in order to enable the United States forces to
communicate with each other, Gen. Potter was
instructed to build a pontoon bridge over the Ten-
nessee just above the mouth of the Little Tennes-
see. That was done with great expedition, under
superintendence of Col. O. E. Babcock. Some
2 26 THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
correspondence was carried on between Generals
Grant, Halleck and Burnside as to the proper
points to be occupied in East Tennessee, and a
visit to Burnside's headquarters followed from Col.
Wilson, of Grant's staff, by order of his chief, ac-
companied by Hon. Chas. A. Dana, Assistant Sec-
retary of War. Burnside gave them his reasons
in full for desiring to hold Knoxville in preference
to Kingston. They concurred with him in that
conclusion. They all agreed it would be proper
to recommend that both places be held, if possible,
but certainly Knoxville. At that date it was defi-
nitely known that Longstreet was moving against
Burnside.
Sometime before, Gen. Shackelford had been
ordered to report from upper East Tennessee at
Knoxville, to take command there of all the United
States cavalry, and on the approach of Longstreet,
Haskin's brigade was ordered to that place. This
left Gen. Wilcox, with his new division, with some
newly recruited North Carolinians, and also Fos-
ter's division of cavalry, composed of Graham's
and Garrard's brigades, in the country above
Knoxville. The whole command in that region,
though it consisted of good men, was in bad con-
dition, for want of almost everything that was
needful. Burnside, when he learned certainly that
Longstreet was advancing towards him, directed
Wilcox to arrange for the march of his command
to Cumberland Gap, in the event telegraphic com-
munication between him and Gen. Burnside's
headquarters should be broken. On that night,
LONGSTREET SENT TO CAPTURE BURNSIDE. 227
November 16, it was cut off, at the same time that
the siege of Knoxville was about to begin.
The United States Army under Gen. Rosecrans
had been saved on the 20th of September by the
firmness of Gen. Thomas. It was then shut up in
Chattanooga by Gen. Bragg, who reported to
Richmond that he expected its " speedy evacua-
tion" of that place, "for want of food and forage."
Whether Bragg thought that, as he said, he held his
enemy at his mercy, and therefore could weaken
his own force for a distant purpose, or whether^
as Gen. Grant thought probable, the movement of
troops to that end was ordered by Jefferson Davis,
in default of his endeavor to reconcile a serious
difference between Bragg and Longstreet, a heavy
force, including cavalry, was detached from Bragg's
army and sent under Longstreet to capture Burn-
side.*
The United States General who was the intended
victim of that undertaking was not blind to the
possibility that his military occupation of East
Tennessee would shortly be brought to an end by
a hostile force from the southwest. The bare
thought of such an event deeply grieved him, not
only as a disaster to the Federal Government, but
also as a great calamity to the Union people of
East Tennessee. A short time before Longstreet's
march upon Knoxville began, Burnside in private
conversation with a citizen-friend, spoke with
* Gen. Grant, in his "Personal Memoirs' 1 (see Vol. II., page 49) puts the force
with which Longstreet left Chattanooga "to go against Burnside at about fifteen
thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand men." For Longstreet's
mind as to the situation, see Appendix, Note R.
228
THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
strong feeling of the possibility that he would not
be able to continue to those people his protection.
Had they known that not without reason he
thought such a contingency existed, they would
have been as deeply pained as he was, at the idea
of his departure. He had been among them only
about ten weeks, but in that brief time he had won
their hearts. He had made good use of his oppor-
tunities to establish the military supremacy of the
United States, to extend its area in East Tennes-
see and to hold it in possession against enemies.
He had also, without putting aside the dignity be-
coming his official position, manifested the kindly
sympathy he sincerely felt for the Union people
who had suffered for more than two years under
Confederate rule, he had permitted a healthy free-
dom of approach to his presence, had listened
when at leisure to their griefs and wrongs, had
now and then, as his public duties permitted, par-
taken of their hospitalities, and in a word, had in
various ways showed that he was their friend.
Everywhere he was looked upon with respect
and affection. Even among citizens, at heart
hostile to the flag he defended, were some who
admired and liked him. They could not well be
otherwise than content v/ith him, for he visited
them with no needless severities and his judgments
were reasonable. His native magnanimity of soul
would have lifted him above seeking revenge for
his private wrongs suffered from the conflict, but
he had no such wrongs. The bitterness and ani-
mosities which he found the war had produced
BURNSIDE AND THE PEOPLE. 229
among neighbors in East Tennessee, met with no
favorable response from his own heart. He could
not fully understand them, and spoke of their
existence with mingled surprise and regret.
In the same connection he related that in his
recent march from Kentucky, he pitched his
tent at the base of the mountain on the Ten-
nessee side. By and by, a number of the moun-
taineer Unionists gathered not far off, and soon,
a few of them stepped out from the com-
pany and approached the General as a com-
mittee. They said to him, "General, we want
you to give us authority to go down here into
the valley, and carry off the hogs and cattle
we find there." This request the General re-
fused in few words. "But," they said, "that is
the way they have treated us. And we will
not make any mistakes. We will carry off only
the cattle and hogs of the rebels." The General
replied, "That is not my way of carrying on
war;" and the petitioners withdrew very much
disappointed.
General Burnside was buoyant with hope that
the Union of the States would not only be pre-
served, but be stronger and better from the tri-
umphant conclusion of the war in its behalf. He
once expressed an opinion, which did not show
great sagacity as a worldly-wise politician. It was
the reflection, at the moment, of his own generous,
magnanimous spirit, rather than a deliberate con-
clusion of his judgment from careful weighing of
future possibilities. In conversation with a few
230 THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
friends concerning the ruinous losses by citizens
generally of personal property, he ventured the
prediction that "when the war is over, everybody
will be paid."
Business at head-quarters was necessarily alive
and active. Gen. Samuel P. Carter was Provost
Marshal General. His office was a place of many
affairs, and was visited by various applicants and
their friends. There were citizens from near at
hand and from a distance, who wanted to take the
oath of allegiance to the United States, some of
whom had been before of doubtful loyalty,
and who desired, when they had passed through
that process of political purgation, to carry home
with them an official certificate of their title to the
protection by the United States Government, of
their persons and property. There were men from
town and country who wanted to "go North" 1 ' on
business, or to get away from the strife, its tur-
moils, uncertainties and troubles, or to leave for
Europe. There were men under arrest to be dealt
with, or recusant citizens to be allowed the free-
dom of the town on parole or to be held as host-
ages, and others still who invited by their belliger-
ent and dangerous speech a compulsory trip for
themselves to Camp Chase or preferably into the
Confederate lines. Then there were men of known
loyalty, who had complaints to make, or claims to
be adjusted, or this, that or something else done or
prevented or remedied. Citizens who had influ-
ence with the military authorities, were kept bus) 7
in the service of their Confederate friends and
BUSINESS AT HEADQUARTERS: AN ALARM. 23 1
neighbors. To some of such workers it was a
labor of love, but probably not to all. Instances
occurred, if rumor were true, of ten dollars each
being charged for introducing people to General
Carter. There were also orders to issue, official
reports to receive, and troops to be sent here and
there. Sometimes Union citizens, overflowing
with patriotic zeal, had news to tell at headquar-
ters, which they thought to be important. If now
and then their zeal outstripped their discretion, it
was little wonder that the information they carried
should be lacking in accuracy. No doubt such
instances of unintentional but hurtful mistakes
were rare, for military life and discipline forbade
their repetition even by civilians. One case was
visited with a reprimand to the offender that was
justly severe upon him and amusing to others.
Late one night a strong partisan interrupted the
serenity at headquarters with the exciting statement
that the Confederates had marched upon Maryville,
in Blount County, 17 miles distant, where were
only a few United States soldiers. Quickly a suffi-
cient body of cavalry were summoned from their
beds into their saddles and dispatched to repel the
invading force. The alarm proved to be false; no
Confederate troops were found in or near Mary-
ville. The next day, General Burnside, on meet-
ing his deceived and deceiving informant, said to
him, "Mr. , you bring me a great deal of news.
Now, I don't want you to bring me any more, for
the average is bad /"
It has been said that all religion springs from a
232 THE LOYAL MOUNTAINEERS.
sense of dependence upon the Supreme Being.
We may doubt the truth of the postulate, but cer-
tainly all true religion includes that sense, and it
had its proper place in the mind of Gen. Burnside.
While his personal and social conduct in East Ten-
nessee was upright and blameless, he was not for-
getful of Him who "doeth according to His will
in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of
the earth," and to thoughts of whom, the respon-
sibilities of his position, its difficulties and dangers
tended to move him more actively. He once said
to a friend during that period, that he "loved some-
times to retire to his own room, there to lift up his
mind and heart to God, and to give himself to
quiet meditation." The impression made by his
conversations, his reverent participation in the
worship of God and hearing of the gospel, was
that without much knowledge of religious doc-
trine, he accepted in faith the truth of Christianity.
Immediately after his first arrival at Knoxville,
Burnside sent to a certain Christian minister, who
because of his Union sentiments had been excluded
for precisely two years from his pastoral charge, a
written invitation to fill the unoccupied pulpit of
his own church on the next Sunday. The request
was complied with — the day being the 6th of Sep-
tember. By one of those curious coincidences
which have been noticed to occur at different times
in similar religious services, when the portion of
the Psalms for that morning came to be respon-
sively read, the minister unexpectedly to himself
and to the surprised attention of some in the con-
A CO-INCIDENCE IN WORSHIP. 233
gregation who knew all the facts of the case, be-
gan, as prescribed, with the words:
"I will magnify thee, O Lord; for thou hast set
me up, and not made my foes to triumph over me."
CHAPTER XIV.
Grant at Chattanooga — Peril of Burnside
— Their Co-operation — Longstreet at
Loudon — Burnside Retreats and is Pur-
sued — Battle of Campbell's Station — Mil-
itary Conditions at Knoxville — Escape
of Leading Unionists.
Once this soft turf, this rivulet's sands,
Were trampled by a hurrying crowd.
And fiery hearts and armed hands
Encountered in the battle cloud.
Ah ! never shall the land forget
How gushed the life-blood of her brave : —
Gushed, warm with hope and courage yet,
Upon the soil they sought to save."
William Cullen Bryant.
The departure of Longstreet from Bragg against
Burnside, taking with him twenty thousand men,
or more, including 5,000 cavalry under Wheeler,
occurred on the 4th of November. It was very
soon known at the United States headquarters at
Chattanooga and at the White House in Washing-
ton. Grant was eagerly desirous to extend relief
to Burnside, but it was not in his power. That
end would have been gained by inflicting a defeat
upon Bragg, against whom he could not move un-
til joined by Sherman, who was then on his way
with reinforcements from Memphis to Chattanooga.
PERIL OF BURNSIDE. 235
Before Longstreet started on his expedition, dis-
patches were constantly coming to Grant from the
alarmed authorities at Washington, urging him to
"do something for Burnside's relief;" calling atten-
tion to the importance of holding East Tennessee,
saying that the President was much concerned for
the protection of the loyal people in that section,
&c, &c. To this statement in Grant's Personal
Memoirs, he adds: "We had not at Chattanooga
animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much
less a supply train. Reinforcements could not
help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor
ammunition sufficient for them: hardly, indeed,
bread and meat for the men he had. There was
no relief possible for him, except by repelling the
enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chatta-
nooga."
After Longstreet's movements began, the AVash-
ington authorities were still more solicitous for the
safety of the United States army at Knoxville, and
were importunate by telegraph with Grant to " do
something" to succor it. He was disposed to do
all he could for that purpose. On November 7th,
he ordered Gen. Thomas to make " an attack on
the northern end of Missionary Ridge with all the
force" he could "bring to bear upon it, and when
that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if pos-
sible, the enemy's line of communication between
Dalton and Cleveland." This was with a view to
"force the return of the (Longstreet's) troops that
had gone up the valley." But Thomas with his
chief engineer, William Farrar Smith, and chief