impressions, and reason and judgment not yet strong enough
for abstract speculations. (To John Brazier, 18 19. C. VII.,

131-)

Clergy. — I observe in the same scheme of a constitution an
abridgment of the right of being elected, which after seven-
teen years more of experience and reflection I do not approve.
It is incapacitation of a clergyman from being elected. The
clergy by getting themselves established by law and ingrafted
into the machine of government have been a very formidable
engine against the civil and religious rights of man. They



158 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

are still so in many countries and even in some of these United
States. Even in 1783, we doubted the stability of our recent
measures for reducing them to the footing of other useful call-
ings. It now appears that our means were effectual. The
clergy here seem to have relinquished all pretensions to privilege
and to stand on a footing with lawyers, physicians, etc. They
ought, therefore, to possess the same rights. (To Jeremiah
Moore, 1800. F. VII., 454.)

Clergy. — The Palladium is understood to be the clerical pa-
per, and from the clergy I expect no mercy. They crucified their
Saviour, who preached that their kingdom was not of this
world; and all who practice on that precept must expect the
extreme of their wrath. The laws of the present day withhold
their hands from blood; but lies and slander still remain to
them. (To Levi Lincoln, 1801. F. VII., 84.)

Colleges. — You have now an happy opportunity of carrying
this intermediate establishment into execution without laying
a cent of tax on the people, or taking one from the treasury.
Divide the State into college districts of about eighty miles
square each. There would be about eight such districts below
the Alleghany, and two beyond it, which would be necessarily
of larger extent because of the sparseness of their population.
The only advance these colleges would call for, would be for
a dwelling house for the teacher, of about one thousand two
hundred dollars cost, and a boarding house with four or five bed
rooms, and a school room for probably about twenty or thirty
boys. The whole should cost not more than five thousand
dollars, but the funds of William and Mary would enable you
to give them ten thousand dollars each. The district might be
so laid off that the principal towns and the academies now ex-
isting might form convenient sites for their colleges; as, for
example, Williamsburg, Richmond, Fredericksburg, Hamp-
den, Sydney, Lynchburg or Lexington, Staunton, Winchester,
etc. Thus, of William and Mary, you will make ten colleges,
each as useful as she ever was, leaving one in Williamsburg
by itself, placing as good a one within a day's ride of every
man in the State and get our whole scheme of education com-



OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 159

pletely established. (To , 1824. C. VII., 385.)

Colonies. — Ancient nations considered Colonies principally
as receptacles for a too numerous population, and as natural and
useful allies in times of war; but modern nations, viewing com-
merce as an object of first importance, value Colonies chiefly
as instruments for the increase of that. (To' the Swedish Em-
bassador at Paris, 1786. F. IV., 238.)

Commerce. — Our interest will be to throw open the doors of
commerce, and to knock off all its shackles, giving perfect free-
dom to all persons for the vent of whatever they may choose
to bring into our ports and asking the same in theirs. (From
"Notes on Virginia," 1782. F. III., 279.)

Commerce. — All the world is becoming commercial. Were
it practicable to keep our new empire separated from them
we might indulge ourselves in speculating whether commerce
contributes to the happiness of mankind. But we cannot sepa-
rate ourselves from them. Our citizens have had too full a taste
of the comforts furnished by the arts and manufactures to be
debarred the use of them. We must then in our defense en-
deavor to share as large a portion as we can of this modern
source of wealth and power. (To George Washington, 1784.
F. Ill, 422.)

Commerce. — With England nothing will produce a treaty but
an enforcement of the resolutions of Congress proposing that
there should be no trade where there is no treaty. The infatu-
ation of that nation seems really preternatural. If anything
will open their eyes it will be the application to the avarice of
the merchants who are the very people who have opposed the
treaty first meditated, and who have excited the spirit of hostil-
ity at present prevailing against us. Deaf to every principle of
common sense, insensible to the feelings of men, they firmly
believe they shall be permitted by us to keep all the carrying
trade and that we shall attempt no act of retaliation because
they are pleased to think it our interest not to do so. (Written
from Paris to Jam.es Madison, 1784. F. VI., 7.)

Commerce. — Congress, by the Confederation, have no original
and inherent power over the commerce of the States. But by



l6o THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

the 9th article they are authorized to enter into treaties of
commerce. The moment these treaties are concluded the juris-
diction of Congress over the commerce springs into existence,
and that of the particular State is superseded so far as the
articles of the treaty may have taken up the subject. * * *
You see my primary object in the formation of treaties is to
take the commerce of the States out of the hands of the States,
and to place it under the superintendence of Congress so far
as the imperfect provisions of our Constitution will admit, and
until the States shall by new compact make thVm'more per-
fect. (From a letter to James Monroe from Paris, 178^. F.
IV., 56.)

Commerce. — I have heard with great pleasure that our as-
sembly have come to the resolution of giving the regulation of
commerce to the federal head. I will venture to assert that
there is not one of its opposers who, placed on this ground,
would not see the wisdom of this measure. The politics of
Europe render it indispensably necessary that with respect to
everything external we be one nation only, firmly hooped to-
gether. Interior Government is what each State should keep to
itself. If it could be seen in Europe that all our States could be
brought to concur in what the Virginia assembly has done, it
would produce a total revolution in their opinion of us, and
respect for us. And it should ever be held in mind that insult
and war are the consequences of a want of respectability in the
national character. As long as the States exercise separately
those acts of power which respect foreign nations, so long will
there continue to be irregularities committed by some one or
other of them, wdiich will constantly keep us on an ill footing
with foreign nations. (Written from Paris to James Madison,
1786. F. IV., 192.)

Commerce.' — I have laid my shoulder to the opening of the
markets of this country to our produce, and rendering its
transportation a nursery for our seamen. A maritime force is
, the only one by which we can act on Europe. Our navigation
law (if it be wise to have any) should be the reverse of that of
England. Instead of confining importations to home bottoms



OF THOMAS JEFFERSON l6l

or those of the producing nations, I think we should confine
exportations to home bottoms or to those nations having
treaties with us. Our exportations are heavy, and would nourish
a great force of our own, or be a tempting price to the nation
to whom we should offer a participation of it in exchange for
free access to all their possessions. (To George Washington,
written in Paris, 1788. F. V., 58.)

Commerce. — Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles
of regulating laws, duties and prohibitions, could it be relieved
of all its shackles in all parts of the world, could every country
be employed in producing that which nature has best fitted it
to produce, and each be free to exchange with others mutual
surpluses for mutual wants, the greatest mass possible w'ould
then be produced of those things which contribute to human
life and human happiness; the numbers of mankind would be
increased and their condition bettered.

Would even a single nation begin with the United States this
system of free commerce, it would be advisable to begin it with
that nation, since it is one by one only that it can extend to
all. Where the circumstances of either party render it ex-
pedient to levy a revenue, by way of import, on commerce, its
freedom might be modified in that particular by mutual and
equivalent measures, preserving it entire in all others. (From
a Report on the Commerce of the United States, 1793. F.
VI., 480.)

Commerce. — Where a nation imposes high duties on our
productions or prohibits them altogether, it may be proper for
us to do the same by theirs; first burdening or excluding those
productions which they bring here in competition with our own
of the same kind; selecting next such manufactures as we take
from them in greatest quantity, and which, at the same time
we could the soonest furnish to ourselves or obtain from other
countries; imposing on them duties lighter at first, but heavier
and heavier afterwards, as other channels of supply open. Such
duties having the effect of indirect encouragement to domestic
manufactures of the same kind, may induce the manufacturer
to come himself into these States, where cheaper subsistence,



l62 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

equal laws, and a vent of his wares free of duty may ensure hirri
the highest profits from his skill and industr}\ And here it
would be in the power of the State Governments to co-operate
essentially by opening the resources of encouragement which
are under their control, extending them liberally to artists in
those particular branches of manufacture for which their soil,
climate, population, and other circumstances have matured
them, and fostering the precious efiforts and progress of house-
hold manufacture by some patronage suited to the nature of
its objects, guided by the local informations they possess, and
guarded against abuse by their presence and attentions. The
oppressions on our agriculture in foreign ports would thus be
made the occasion of relieving it from a dependence on the
councils and conduct of others, and of prom.oting arts, manufac-
tures and population at home. (From a Report on the Com-
merce of the United States, 1793. F. VI., 481.)

Commerce. — What a glorious exchange it would be could we
persuade our navigating fellow citizens to embark their cap-
ital in the internal commerce of our country, excluding foreign-
ers from that and let them take the carrying trade in exchange;
abolish the diplomatic establishments and never suffer an armed
vessel of any nation to enter our ports. (To Edmund Pendle-
ton, 1799. F. VII., 326.)

Commerce. — I hope with you that the policy of our country
will settle down with as much navigation and commerce only
as our own exchanges will require, and that the disadvantage
will be seen of our undertaking to carry on that of other nations.
This, indeed, may bring gain to a few individuals, and enable
them to call off from our farms more laborers to be converted
into lackeys and grooms for them, but it will bring nothing to
our country but wars, debt and dilapidation. (To J. B. Stuart,
1817. C. VII., 64.)

Common Law. — Of all the doctrines which have ever been
broached by the Federal Government the novel one of the com-
mon law being in force and cognizable as an existing law in their
courts is to me the most formidable. All their other assump-
tions of un-given powers have been in the detail. The bank



OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 163

law, the treaty doctrine, the sedition act, ahen act * * *
have been soHtary, unconsequential, timid things, in compari-
son with the audacious, barefaced and sweeping pretension
to a system of law for the United States without the adoption
of their legislature, and so infinitely beyond their power to
adopt. If this assumption be yielded to, the State courts may
be shut up, as there will then be nothing to hinder citizens of
the same State suing each other in the Federal courts in every
case, as on a bond for instance, because the common law obliges
payment of it, and the common law^ they say is their law. (To
Edmund Randolph, 1799. F. VII., 384.)

Compromise. — A government held together by the bands of
reason only, requires much compromise of opinion; that things
even salutary should not be crammed down the throats of
dissenting brethren, especially when they may be put into a form
to be willingly swallowed, and that a great deal of indulgence
is necessary to strengthen habits of harmony and fraternity.
(To Edward Livingston, 1824. C. VII., 343.)

Confederacies. — Whether we remain in one Confederacy, or
form into Atlantic and Mississippi Confederacies, I believe not
very important to the happiness of either part. Those of the
Western Confederacy will be as much children and descendants
as those of the Eastern, and I feel myself as much identified
with that country, in future time, as with this; and did I now
foresee a separation at some future day, yet I should feel the
duty and the desire to promote the Western interests as zeal-
ously as the Eastern, doing ah the good for both portions of
our future family which should fall within my power. (To
Joseph Priestly, 1804. F. VIII., 295.)

Confederation. — The power of declaring war and concluding
peace, of contracting ahiances, of issuing letters of marque and
reprisal, of raising and introducing armed forces, of building
armed vessels, forts or strongholds, of coining money or regu-
lating its value, of regulating weights and measures, we leave to
be exercised under the authority of the Confederation; but in
all cases respecting them which are out of the said Confedera-
tion, they shall be exercised by the Governor under the regu-



l64 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

lation of such laws as the legislature may think it expedient
to pass. (From a proposed Constitution for Virginia, 1783.

F. III., 326.)

Confederation. — It has often been said that the decisions of
Congress are impotent because the Confederation provides no
compulsory power. But when two or more nations enter into
compact it is not usual for them to say what shall be done
to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this, and it is un-
necessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion natur-
ally results to the party injured by the breach. When any one
State in the American Union refuses obedience to the Confeder-
ation by \vhich they have bound themselves, the rest have a
natural right to compel them to obedience. Congress would
probably exercise long patience before they would recur to
force; but if the case ultimately required it, they would use
that recurrence. (From Answers propounded by M. de Meus-
nier, 1786. F. IV., 140.)

Confederation. — The Confederation is a wonderfully perfect
instrument considering the circumstances under which it was
formed. There are, however, some alterations which experience
proves to be wanting. (From answers to questions propounded
by M. de Meusnier, 1786. F. IV., 141.)

Confederation. — It has been so often said as to be generally
believed, that Congress have no power by the Confederation to
enforce anything, for example, contributions of money. It
was not necessary to give them that power expressly; they
have it by the law of nature. When two parties make a compact,
there results to each a power of compelling the other to execute
it. Compulsion was never so easy as in our case, where a single
frigate would soon levy on the commerce of any State the de-
ficiency of its contributions; nor more safe than in the hands of
Congress which has always shown that it w^ould wait, as it
ought to do, to the last extremities before it would execute
any of its powers which are disagreeable. (To Edward Carring-
ton, written in Paris, 1781. F. IV., 424.)

Confidence. — It would be a dangerous delusion were a con-
fidence in the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety



OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165

cf our rights; confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism
— free Government is founded on jealousy, and not in confi-
dence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited
Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to
trust with power; our Constitution has accordingly fixed the
limits to which, and no further, our confidence may go; and
let the honest advocate of confidence read the Alien and Sedi-
tion acts and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing
limits to the government it created, and whether we should be
wise in destroying those limits. In questions of power, then,
let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down
from mischief by the chains of the Constitution. (From "Ken-
tucky Resolutions," 1798. F. VII., 304.)

Congress. — Resolved unanimously that this Assembly of Vir-
ginia will not listen to any proposition or suffer any nego-
tiation inconsistent with their national faith and Federal union,
and that a proposition from the enemy for treating with any
Assembly or body of men in America other than the Congress
of these United States is insidious and inadmissible. (Resolu-
tions concerning peace with England, 1778. F. II., 160.)

Congress. — The negative proposed to be given Congress on
all the acts of the several legislatures is now for the first time
suggested to my mind. Prima facie I do not like it. It fails in
an essential character that the hole and the patch should be
commensurate. But this proposes to mend a small hole by
covering the whole garment. Not more than one out of one
hundred State acts concern the Confederacy. This proposition,
then, in order to give them one degree of power which they
ought to have, gives them 99 more which they ought not to
have, upon a presumption that they will not exercise the 99.
* * * Would not an appeal from the State judicatures to a
Federal court in all cases where the act of Confederation con-
trolled the question be as effectual a remedy and exactly com-
mensurate to the defect? A British creditor, for example, sues
for his debt in Virginia; the defendant pleads an act of the State
excluding him from their courts; the plaintiff urges the Con-
federation and the treaty made under that, as controlling the



l66 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

State law; the judges are weak enough to decide according to
the views of their legislature. An appeal to a Federal court sets
all to rights. It will be said that this court may encroach on
the jurisdiction of the State courts. It may. But there will
be a power, towit, Congress, to watch and restrain them. But
place the same authority in Congress itself, and there will be
no power above them to perform the same office. They will
restrain within due bounds a jurisdiction exercised by others
more rigorously than if exercised by themselves. (To James
Madison, written from Paris, 1787. F. IV., 391. j

Conquest. — It is an established principle that conquest gives
inchoate right, which does not become perfect till confirmed by
the treaty of peace, and by a renunciation or abandonment by
the former proprietor. (From a Report on the Negotiation
with Spain, 1792. F. V., 463.)

Consolidation. — This will contain matters not intended for
the public eye. I see as you do, and with the deepest affliction,
the rapid strides with which the Federal branch of our govern-
ment is advancing toward the usurpation of all the rights reserved
to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers for-
eign and domestic; and that too by constructions which, if
legitimate, have no limits to their power. Take together the
decisions of the Federal court, the decision of the President
and the misconstructions of the Constitutional compact acted
on by the legislators of the Federal branch, and it is but too
evident that the three ruling branches of that department are in
combination to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of
the powers reserved by them and to exercise themselves all func-
tions, foreign and domestic. Under the power to regulate
commerce they assume indefinitely that also over agriculture
and manufacture and call it regulation to take the earnings of
one of these branches of industry, and that too the most de-
pressed, and put them into the pockets of the other, the most
flourishing of all. Under the authority to establish post-roads
they claim that of cutting down mountains for the construction
of roads, of digging canals, and aided by a little sophistry on
the words "general welfare;" a right to do not only the acts



OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 167

to effect that which are specifically enumerated and permitted,
but whatever they shall think or pretend will be for the general
welfare. And what is our resource for the preservation of the
Constitution? Reason and argument? You might as well rea-
son and argue with the marble columns encircling them. They
are joined in the combination, some from incorrect views of
government, some from corrupt ones, sufficient voting together
to out-number the sound parts, and with majorities of only one,
two or three bold enough to go forward in defiance. Are we
then to stand to our arms with the hot-headed Georgian? No.
That must be the last resource, not to be thought of until much
longer and greater sufferings. If every infraction of a compact
of so many parties is to be resisted at once as a dissolution of
it none can ever be formed which would last one year. We must
have patience and longer endurance, then, with our brethren
while under delusion; give them time for reflection and exper-
ience of consequences; keep ourselves in a situation to profit
by the chapter of accidents; and separate from our companies
only when the sole alternatives left are the dissolution of our
union with them, or submission to a government without limi-
tation of powers. Between these two evils, when we must take
a choice, there can be no hesitation. But in the meanwhile,
the States should be watchful tO' note every material usurpa-
tion on their rights, to denounce them as they occur in the most
peremptory terms; to protest against them as wrongs to which
our present submission shall be considered not as acknowledg-
ments or precedents of right but as a temporary yielding to the
lesser evil until their accumulation shall overweigh that of
separation. (To William Giles, 1825. C. VII., 426.)

The Constitution. — I answer that constitutio, constituHim,
statiim, lex are convertible terms. The term constitution has
many significations in physics and politics; but in jurisprudence,
whenever it is applied to any act of the legislature, it invariably,
means a statute, law, or ordinance. * * * Yq gg^ ^.j^^ qJ
the magic supposed to be in the word constitution, let us trans-
late it into its definition as given by those who think it above
the power of the law ; and let us suppose the convention, [of Vir-



l68 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

ginia] instead of saying, "We, the ordinary Legislature, estab-
lish a Constitution," had said, "We, the ordinary Legislature,
establish an act above the power of the ordinary Legislature."
(From "Notes on Virginia," 1782. F. III., 228.)

The Constitution. — I find by the public papers that your
Commercial Convention failed in point of representation. If it
should produce a full meeting in May, 1787, and a broader
reformation it will still be well. To make us one nation as to
foreign concerns, and keep us distinct in domestic ones, gives
the outlines of the proper division of power between the general
and the particular governments. But to enable the Federal
head to exercise the power given it, to best advantage, it
should be organized, as the particular ones are into Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary. When last with Congress I often
proposed to members to do this by making of the committee
of the States, an executive committee during its sessions to
appoint a committee to receive and despatch all executive busi-
ness, so that Congress itself should meddle only with what
should be legislative. But I question if any Congress (much
less all successively) can have self-denial enough to go through
this distribution. The distribution should be imposed on them.
(To James Madison, written in Paris, 1786. F. IV., S23-)

The Constitution.— I like the power given to the legislature
to levy taxes, and for that reason solely approve of the greater
House being chosen by the people directly. For though I think
a House chosen by them will be very illy qualified to legislate