day.
Here then are three kind of majorities, i. Of the people. 2.
Of the states. 3. Of the Congress : each of which is entrusted to
a certain length.
Tho the paragraph in question be clumsily expressed, yet it
strictly ennounces it's own intentions. It defines with precision
the greater questions for which nine votes shall be requisite. To
the lesser questions it then requires a majority of the U. S. in
Congress assembled : a term indeed which will apply either to the
number seven, as being a majority of the states ; or to the number
four, as being a majority of Congress. Which of the two kinds of
majority was meant ? Clearly that which would leave a still
smaller kind for the decision of the question of adjournment.
The contrary would be absurd.
This paragraph therefore should be understood as if it had
been expressed in the following terms : " The United States in
Congress assembled shall never engage in war &c. but with the
consent of nine states : nor determine any other question but
with the consent of a majority of the whole states ; except the
question of adjournment from day to day, which may be
determined by a majority of the states actually present in
Congress."
2. How far is it permitted to bring on the reconsideration of a question,
which Congress has once determined ?
The first Congress which met being composed mostly of per-
sons who had been members of the legislatures of their respective
states, it was natural for them to adopt those rules in their pro-
ceedings to which they had been accustomed in their legislative
150 THE WRITINGS OF [1786
houses ; and the more so as these happened to be nearly the
same, as having been copied from the same original, the British
parliament. One of those rules of proceeding was, that " a ques-
tion once determined cannot be proposed a second time in the
same session." Congress, during their first session, in the autumn
of 1774, observed this rule strictly. But before their meeting in
the spring of the following year, the war had broke out. They
found themselves at the head of that war in an Executive as well
as Legislative capacity. They found that a rule, wise and neces-
sary for a Legislative body, did not suit an Executive one, which,
being governed by events, must change their purposes, as those
change. Besides their session was likely then to become of equal
duration with the war ; and a rule which should render their legis-
lation immutable during all that period could not be submitted
to. They therefore renounced it in practice, and have ever since
continued to reconsider their questions freely. The only restraint
as yet provided against the abuse of this permission to reconsider,
is that when a question has been decided, it cannot be proposed
for reconsideration but by some one who voted in favor of the
former decision, & declares that he has since changed his opinion.
I do not recollect accurately enough whether it be necessary that
his vote should have decided that of his state, and the vote of his
state have decided that of Congress.
Perhaps it might have been better when they were forming the
federal constitution, to have assimilated it as much as possible
to the particular constitutions of the states. All of these have
distributed the Legislative, executive & judiciary powers into dif-
ferent departments. In the federal constitution the judiciary
powers are separated from the others : but the legislative and
executive are both exercised by Congress. A means of amend-
ing this defect has been thought of. Congress having a power
to establish what committees of their own body they please, and
to arrange among them the distribution of their business, they
might on the first day of their annual meeting appoint an execu-
tive committee, consisting of a member from each state, and refer
to them all executive business which should occur during their
session ; confining themselves to what is of a legislative nature,
that is to say to the heads described in the gth article as of the
1786] THOMAS JEFFEJtSON. 151
competence of 9 states only, and to such other questions as
should lead to the establishment of general rules. The journal
of this committee of the preceding day might be read the next
morning in Congress, & considered as approved, unless a vote
was demanded on a particular article, & that article changed.
The sessions of Congress would then be short, & when they sepa-
rated, the Confederation authorizes the appointment of a commit-
tee of the states, which would naturally succeed to the business
of the Executive committee. The legislative business would be
better done, because the attention of the members would not be
interrupted by the details of execution ; and the executive busi-
ness would be better done, because business of this nature is
better adapted to small than great bodies. A monarchical head
should confide the execution of it's will to departments consist-
ing each of a plurality of hands, who would warp that will as
much as possible towards wisdom & moderation, the two qualities
it generally wants. But a republican head founding it's decrees
originally in these two qualities should commit them to a single
hand for execution, giving them thereby a promptitude which
republican proceedings generally want. Congress could not in-
deed confide their executive business to a smaller number than
a committee consisting of a member from each state. This is
necessary to ensure the confidence of the Union. But it would
be gaining a great deal to reduce the executive head to thirteen,
and to debarrass themselves of those details. This however has
as yet been the subject of private conversations only.
3. Calculating the federal debts by the interest they pay, their
principal would be much more than is stated under the 3d. of the
former queries. The reason for this is that there is a part of the
money put into the loan office which was borrowed under a
special contract that whatever depreciation might take place on
the principal, the interest should be paid in hard money on the
nominal amount, Congress only reserving to itself the right, when-
ever they should pay off the principal, to pay it according to it's
true value, without regard to it's nominal one. The amount of
this part of the debt is 3,459.200 dollars. From the best docu-
ments in my possession I estimate the capital of the federal debt
as follows.
152 THE WRITINGS OF [1786
Dollars
Spanish loan
ft
Farmers general of France 846,710-5 156.798
Individuals in France 250.000
H
Crown of France, in it's own right.. . . 24.000.000. . . .4.444.444
To Holland, guarantied by France. . . 10.000.000. . . .1.851.851
Dutch loan of 5 million of florins 2.020.207
Dutch loan of 2 million of florins. . 808.080
9-75.375
Domestic debt as stated in Apr. 1783, since which there is no
better state.
Loan office debt 11.463.802
Credits in the treasury books 638.042
Army debt 5.635.618
Unliquidated debt estimated at 8.000.000
Commutation to the army 5.000.000
Bounty due to Privates 500.000
Deficiencies of this estimate supposed 2.000.000
33.237.462
Whole debt foreign & domestic 42.942.837
The result as to the foreign debt is considerably more than in
the estimate I made before. That was taken on the state of the
Dutch loans as known to Congress in 1784. The new estimate
of 1785 however (lately come to hand) shews those loans to be
completed up to 7 millions of florins, which is much more than
their amount in the preceding statements. The domestic debt
too is made somewhat higher than in the preceding answer to the
3d. query. I had in that taken the statement of 1783 for my
basis, and had endeavored to correct that by the subsequent liqui-
dation of 1784. & 1785. On considering more maturely those
means of correction, I apprehend they will be more likely to lead
to error ; and that, upon the whole, the statement of 1783, is the
surest we can have recourse to. I have therefore adopted it
literally.
1786] THOMAS JEFFERSON. 153
3. A succinct account of paper money.
Previous to the late revolution, most of the states were in the
habit, whenever they had occasion for more money than could
be raised immediately by taxes, to issue paper notes or bills in
the name of the state, wherein they promised to pay to the
bearer the sum named in the note or bill. In some of the states
no time of paiment was fixed, nor tax laid to enable paiment.
In these the bills depreciated. But others of the states named
in the bill the day when it should be paid, laid taxes to bring in
money enough for that purpose, & paid the bills punctually on
or before the day named. In these states, paper money was in
as high estimation as gold & silver. On the commencement
of the late revolution, Congress had no money. The external
commerce of the states being suppressed, the farmer could not
sell his produce, & of course could not pay a tax. Congress
had no resource then but in paper money. Not being able to lay
a tax for it's redemption they could only promise that taxes should
be laid for that purpose so as to redeem the bills by a certain
day. They did not foresee the long continuance of the war, the
almost total suppression of their exports, and other events, which
rendered the performance of their engagement impossible. The
paper money continued for a twelvemonth equal to gold & sil-
ver. But the quantities which they were obliged to emit for the
purpose of the war exceeded what had been the usual quantity
of the circulating medium. It began therefore to become
cheaper, or as we expressed it, it depreciated, as gold & silver
would have done, had they been thrown into circulation in equal
quantities. But not having, like them, an intrinsic value, it's de-
preciation was more rapid & greater than could ever have hap-
pened with them. In two years it had fallen to two dollars of
paper for one of silver, in three years to 4 for i. in 9 months
more it fell to 10 for i. and in the six months following, that is
to say, by Sep. 1779. it had fallen to 20 for i. Congress, alarmed
at the consequences which were to be apprehended should they
lose this resource altogether, thought it necessary to make a vigor-
ous effort to stop its further depreciation. They therefore deter-
mined in the first place, that their emissions should not exceed
154 THE WRITINGS OF [1786
200 millions of dollars, to which term they were then nearly
arrived ; and tho' they knew that twenty dollars of what they were
then issuing would buy no more for their army than one silver
dollar would buy, yet they thought it would be worth while to
submit to the sacrifice of 19. out of 20. dollars, if they could
thereby stop further depreciation. They therefore published an
address to their constituents in which they renewed their original
declarations that this paper money should be redeemed at dollar
for dollar. They proved the ability of the states to do this, and
that their liberty would be cheaply bought at that price. ' The
declaration was ineffectual. No man received the money at a
better rate ; on the contrary in 6. months more that is by March,
1780 it had fallen to 40 for i. Congress then tried an experi-
ment of a different kind. Considering their former offers to
redeem this money at par, as relinquished by the general refusal
to take it but in progressive depreciation, they required the whole
to be brought in, declared it should be redeemed at it's present
value of 40 for i. and that they would give to the holders new
bills reduced in their denomination to the sum of gold or silver
which was actually to be paid for them. This would reduce the
nominal sum of the mass in circulation to the present worth of
that mass, which was 5. millions, a sum not too great for the cir-
culation of the states, and which they therefore hoped would not
depreciate further, as they continued firm in their purpose of
emitting no more. This effort was as unavailing as the former.
Very little of the money was brought in. It continued to circu-
late & to depreciate till the end of 1780, when it had fallen to 75
for one, and the money circulated from the French army being by
that time sensible in all the states north of the Patowmac, the
paper ceased it's circulation altogether, in those states. In Vir-
ginia & N. Carolina it continued a year longer, within which time
it fell to 1000 for i. and then expired, as it had done in the other
states, without a single groan. Not a murmur was heard on this
occasion among the people. On the contrary universal congratu-
lations took place on their seeing this gigantic mass, whose dis-
solution had threatened convulsions which should shake their
infant confederacy to it's center, quietly interred in it's grave.
Foreigners indeed who do not, like the natives, feel indulgence
1786] THOMAS JEFFERSON. 155
for it's memory, as of a being which has vindicated their liberties
and fallen in the moment of victory, have been loud & still are
loud. A few of them have reason but the most noisy are not the
best of them. They are persons who have become bankrupt by
unskilful attempts at commerce with America. That they may
have, some pretext to offer to their creditors, they have bought up
great masses of this dead money in America, where it is to be
had at 5000 for i, & they show the certificates of their paper
possessions as if they had all died in their hands, and had been
the cause of their bankruptcy. Justice will be done to all, by
paying to all persons what this money actually cost them, with
an interest of 6. per cent from the time they received it. If diffi-
culties present themselves in the ascertaining the epoch of the
receipt, it has been thought better that the state should lose by
admitting easy proofs, than that individuals & especially for-
eigners should, by being held to such as would be difficult,,
perhaps impossible.
5. Virginia certainly owed two millions sterling to Great
Britain at the conclusion of the war. Some have conjectured
the debt as high as three millions. I think that state owned near
as much as all the rest put together. This is to be ascribed to
peculiarities in the tobacco trade. The advantages made by the
British merchants on the tobaccos consigned to them were so enor-
mous that they spared no means of increasing those consign-
ments. A powerful engine for this purpose was the giving good
prices & credit to the planter till they got him more immersed in
debt than he could pay without selling his lands or slaves. They
then reduced the prices given for his tobacco, so that, let his ship-
ments be ever so great, and his demand of necessaries ever so-
economical, they never permitted him to clear off his debt. These
debts had become hereditary from father to son for many genera-
tions, so that the planters were a species of property annexed
to certain mercantile houses in London.
6. The members of Congress are differently paid by different
states. Some are on fixed allowances, from 4. to 8. dollars a day.
Others have their expenses paid & a surplus for their time. This
surplus is of two, three, or four dollars a day.
7. I do not believe there has ever been a moment when a
156 THE WRITINGS OF [1786
single whig in any one state would not have shuddered at the very
idea of a separation of their state from the Confederacy. The
tories would at all times have been glad to see the Confederacy
dissolved even by particles at a time, in hopes of their attaching
themselves again to Great Britain.
8. The nth article of Confederation admits Canada to accede
to the Confederation at its own will ; but adds that " no other
colony shall be admitted to the same, unless such admission be
agreed to by nine states." When the plan of April, 1784, for
establishing new states was on the carpet, the committee who
framed the report of that plan, had inserted this clause, " pro-
vided nine states agree to such admission, according to the reser-
vation of the nth of the articles of Confederation." It was ob-
jected i. That the words of the confederation " no other colony "
could only refer to the residuary possessions of Gr. Britain, as
the two Floridas, Nova Scotia, &c. not being already parts of the
Union ; that the law for " admitting " a new member into the
union could not be applied to a territory which was already in
the Union, as making part of a state which was a member of it.
2. That it would be improper to allow " nine " states to receive a
new member, because the same reasons which rendered that num-
ber proper now would render a greater one proper when the
number composing the Union should be increased. They there-
fore struck out this paragraph, and inserted a proviso that " the
consent of so many states, in Congress, shall be first obtained as
may at the time be competent," thus leaving the question whether
the nth article applies to the admission of new states ? to be de-
cided when that admission shall be asked. See the Journ of
Congress of Apr 20, 1784. Another doubt was started in this
debate, viz. : whether the agreement of the nine states required
by the Confederation was to be made by their legislatures or by
their delegates in Congress ? The expression adopted viz. : " so
many states in Congress is first obtained " shew what was their
sense in this matter. If it be agreed that the nth article of the
Confederation is not to be applied to the admission of these new
states, then it is contended that their admission comes within the
i3th article, which forbids "any alteration unless agreed to in a
Congress of the U S, and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures
1786] THOMAS JEFFERSON. 157
of every state. The independence of the new states of Kentucke"
and Frankland will soon bring on the ultimate decision of all
these questions.
9. Particular instances whereby the General assembly of Vir-
ginia have shewn that they considered the ordinance, called their
Constitution as every other ordinance or act of the legislature,
subject to be altered by the legislature for the time being. The
convention which formed that Constitution declared themselves
to be the house of delegates during the term for which they were
originally elected, and in the autumn of the year, met the Senate
elected under the new constitution, & did legislative business with
them. At this time there were malefactors in the public jail, and
there was as yet no court established for their trial. They passed
a law appointing certain members by name, who were then mem-
bers of the Executive council, to be a court for the trial of these
malefactors, tho' the constitution had said, in it's first clause, that
' no person should exercise the powers of more than one of the
three departments, legislative, executive & judiciary, at the same
time.' This proves that the very men who had made that consti-
tution understood that it would be alterable by the General
assembly. This court was only for that occasion. When the
next general assembly met after the election of the ensuing year,
there was a new set of malefactors in the jail, & no court to try
them. This assembly passed a similar law to the former, ap-
pointing certain members of the Executive council to be an occa-
sional court for this particular case. Not having the journals of
assembly by me, I am unable to say whether this measure was
repealed afterwards. However they are instances of executive &
judiciary powers exercised by the same persons under the author-
ity of a law, made in contradiction to the Constitution. 2. There
was a process depending in the ordinary courts of justice, between
two individuals of the name of Robinson & Fauntleroy, who were
relations, of different descriptions, to one Robinson a British sub-
ject lately dead. Each party claimed a right to inherit the lands
of the decedent according to the laws. Their right should, by
the constitution, have been decided by the judiciary courts ; and
it was actually depending before them. One of the parties peti-
tioned the assembly (I think it was in the year 1782) who passed
158 THE WRITINGS OF [1786
a law deciding the right in his favor. In the following year, a
Frenchman, master of a vessel, entered into port without comply-
ing with the laws established in such cases, whereby he incurred
the forfeitures of the law to any person who would sue for them.
An individual instituted a legal process to recover these forfeit-
ures according to the law of the land. The Frenchman petitioned
the assembly, who passed a law deciding the question of forfeit-
ure in his favor. These acts are occasional repeals of that part
of the constitution which forbids the same persons to exercise
legislative & judiciary powers at the same time. 3. The assem-
,bly is in the habitual exercise during their sessions of directing
the Executive what to do. There are few pages of their journals
which do not show proofs of this, & consequently instances of
the legislative & executive powers exercised by the same persons
at the same time. These things prove that it has been the unin-
terrupted opinion of every assembly, from that which passed the
ordinance called the Constitution down to the present day, that
their acts may controul that ordinance, & of course that the state
of Virginia has no fixed Constitution at all.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE ARTICLE ETATS-UNIS PREPARED
FOR THE ENCYCLOPEDIE. 1 j. M ss.
[June 22, 1786.]
i. II. 17. 29. Pa 8. The Malefactors sent to America were
not sufficient in number to merit enumeration as one class out of
three which peopled America. It was at a late period of their
history that this practice began. I have no book by me which
enables me to point out the date of it's commencement. But I do
not think the whole number sent would amount to 2000 & being
principally men, eaten up with disease, they married seldom &
1 In preparing an article for the Encydoptdie Politique, M. Meusnier applied
to Jefferson for information (cf. ante p. 138). On the proofs of that article,
Jefferson prepared the above notes. This article was separately printed, and
for Jefferson's comments upon it, see his letters of August 25 and 27, 1786,
post.
iy86j THOMAS JEFFERSON. 159
propagated little. I do not suppose that themselves & their de-
scendants are at present 4000, which is little more than one
thousandth part of the whole inhabitants.
Indented servants formed a considerable supply. These were
poor Europeans who went to America to settle themselves. If
they could pay their passage it was well. If not, they must find
means of paying it. They were at liberty therefore to make an
agreement with any person they chose, to serve him such a length
of time as they agreed on, on condition that he would repay to
the master of the vessel the expenses of their passage. If being
foreigners unable to speak the language, they did not know how
to make a bargain for themselves the captain of the vessel con-
tracted for them with such persons as he could. This contract
was by deed indented, which occasioned them to be called in-
dented servants. Sometimes they were called Redemptioners,
because by their agreement with the master of the vessel they
could redeem themselves from his power by paying their passage,
which they frequently effected by hiring themselves on their
arrival as is before mentioned. In some states I know that these
people had a right of marrying themselves without their master's
leave, & I did suppose they had that right everywhere. I did not
know that in any of the states they demanded so much as a week
for every day's absence without leave. I suspect this must have
been at a very early period while the governments were, in the
hands of the first emigrants, who being mostly labourers, were
narrow-minded and severe. I know that in Virginia the laws
allowed their servitude to be protracted only two days for every
one they were absent without leave. So mild was this kind of
servitude, that it was very frequent for foreigners who carried to
America money enough, not only to pay their passage, but to buy
themselves a farm, it was common I say for them to indent them-
selves to a master for three years, for a certain sum of money,
with a view to learn the husbandry of the country. I will here
make a general observation. So desirous are the poor of Europe
to get to America, where they may better their condition, that,
being unable to pay their passage, they will agree to serve two or
three years on their arrival there, rather than not go. During the