is working on a plan. Some Palestinians contend that it has been
working in virtual secrecy and that it is not going to produce full
and fair and free elections. What is your assessment of the steps
being taken toward free elections?
Mr. Pelletreau. There is a commission that has been working
under the direction of Arafat. It has done considerable work in con-
nection with identifying electoral districts and how voters would be
registered and that sort of thing. It has also looked at and devel-
oped some planning for local elections, as well.
Chairman Hamilton. We have had several Palestinians express
to us a skepticism about the United States wanting free and fair
elections. What is our position?
Mr. Pelletreau. That skepticism is unwarranted. The United
States does want free and fair elections. We think that hee and
fair elections will be a vital part of the Palestinian self-government
as it takes hold, and we support the extension of democratic proc-
esses into the Palestinian self-governing areas.
Chairman Hamilton. What is your assessment of Arafat's com-
mitment to fair and free elections?
Mr. Pelletrp:au. The chairman has told us, I have heard him
say it, that he supports free and fair elections.
Chairman Hamilton. There have been conversations we have
had with Palestinians here who are questioning and skeptical of
Arafat's commitment to democracy and to open governance. What
is your assessment with respect to that?
Mr. Pelletreau. We have also heard that skepticism expressed
and it probably stems from the way that Arafat has conducted his
17
responsibilities up to this point. He has great difficulty in delegat-
ing responsibility. He often tends to manipulate his advisors, and
there is, I think, some justifiable skepticism that Arafat would sub-
mit himself fully to a free and fair and democratic election.
At the same time, he has said to the Israelis and to us and to
the Palestinian people that he supports elections. He has appointed
negotiators and authorized them to open negotiations with the Is-
raelis over establishing election modalities, and we support that
process and we are following it closely.
Chairman Hamilton. So his commitment, at least appears to you
to be firm, and you are confident then they are moving toward and
election process?
Mr. Pelletreau. That is the direction that things seem to be
going and we will continue to encourage progress in that direction.
Chairman Hamilton. Are you concerned at all about the ap-
pointments that he makes to the Palestinian authority being based
more on loyalty to him than on competence?
Mr. Pelletreau. I think that the agreements that have been
worked out thus far give him the authority and the responsibility
to make those appointments, and we hear a good deal of criticism
of some of them, less criticism of others. This may be indeed the
beginning of the political process.
ARAFAT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTS
Chairman Hamilton. Are you satisfied Mr. Arafat understands
his responsibilities to prevent acts of terror in the areas under his
control and to punish violations?
Mr. Pelletreau. I think his recognition of this responsibility has
been clear. He very clearly condemned the last killing of an Israeli
soldier. And after his meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, he has
recognized the need for Palestinian police to be more assiduous in
the carrying out of their duties.
We still don't think it is enough. We think that more needs to
be done by Arafat and by the Palestinian authorities to ensure that
acts of terrorism do not take place, either within the Palestinian
self-governing areas or by people who come from the Palestinian
self-governing areas.
Chairman Hamilton. But after these attacks occur, are you per-
suaded that they are being followed up with vigorous law enforce-
ment action?
Mr. Pelletreau. No, we think it could be more vigorous. There
has been some follow-up.
Chairman Hamilton. There have been a number of cases where
detention has been very brief, and quick release.
Mr. Pelletreau. That is correct.
Chairman Hamilton. And when that happens, what is the effect
of that?
Mr. Pelletreau. The effect of that is unclear. It may have some
deterrent effect, but unless there is vigorous investigation, followed
through by a full trial and responsibilities — and punishment for
people who are guilty, we cannot say that enforcement is fully sat-
isfactory.
18
PAYMENT FOR POLICE SALARIES
Chairman Hamilton. Now, we are paying police salaries; are we
not? We just recently committed $4 million additional on top of $5
million for police salaries.
Mr. Pelletreau. That has been a contribution that we have
made to police salaries, yes, that is correct.
Chairman Hamilton. Are other donors contributing to that at
all?
Mr. Pelijctreau. Yes, they are. A number of other donors have
contributed to paying police salaries. I can cite the Norwegians, the
British, the Saudis, for example, as some that are contributing spe-
cifically to meeting these police salaries.
Chairman Hamilton. We have seen reports that the Palestinian
police are very under-equipped and being housed in very bad living
conditions.
Mr. Pelletreau. The Japanese have made a contribution
through UNDP to building police housing, as well. I should have
mentioned that earlier. It is very important that the Palestinian
police have the cohesiveness and take on the responsibility of en-
suring law and order in the self-governing territories.
legal structure
Chairman HAMILTON. Is there today a coherent legal structure so
that the police know what laws to enforce?
Mr. Pelletreau. There is a legal structure that is being im-
proved at the present time. But there is a legal structure, yes.
Chairman Hamilton. But there is also a Tot of random and kind
of summary justice; is there not?
Mr. Pelletreau. I wouldn't say there is a lot. There are in-
stances, yes.
Chairman Hamilton. Work is being done to try to develop a co-
herent legal structure for this area?
Mr. Pelletreau. There is an overhauling that is taking place
now because
Chairman Hamilton. Are we participating in that effort?
Mr. Pelletreau. One of the American NGO's is helping in that
respect.
Chairman Hamilton. What are the various human rights groups
saying about the behavior of the police?
Mr. Pelletreau. They have noted instances of excess, but par-
ticularly the group that is headed by Hanan Ashrawi. And in the
reports that they have submitted to the police leadership and to
the member of the Palestinian authority responsible for justice,
they feel that there has been some responsiveness and some im-
provements as a result of their reports.
KUNCTIONING TAX COLLECTION AUTHORITY
Chairman Hamilton. There has been a delay in setting up a tax
collection authority, hasn't there?
Mr. Pelletreau. Yes, there has.
Chairman Hamilton. And how long do you believe it is going to
take before you have got a functioning tax collection authority
there?
19
Mr. Pelletreau. Well, we have the beginnings of it now. And
the IMF has offered further training to Palestinians in tax collec-
tion, and the Palestinians and Israelis seem to be cooperating with
respect to the turn over of tax collection records. So we see gradual
taking on in this domain.
Chairman HAMILTON. Are taxes now being collected in Gaza and
Jericho?
Mr. Pelletreau. Some taxes are being collected, yes.
Chairman Hamilton. Are the Israelis still collecting taxes on the
West Bank?
Mr. Pelletreau. I believe they are, yes. I am not 100 percent
positive of that answer, but the early empowerment has not trans-
ferred authority in areas except for education, so I believe the Is-
raelis are continuing to exercise that responsibility.
Chairman Hamilton. And do they turn over some of the tax rev-
enue to the Palestinian authority to help finance some of this early
empowerment?
Mr. Pelletreau. That is the concept, yes.
Chairman Hamilton. OK I still have some other questions.
Mr. Lantos, welcome back.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
military sales by north KOREA
Mr. Secretary, could you describe for us in as much detail as you
have, the current military relationship between North Korea and
Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria? I would like to know exactly what
military sales are taking place between North Korea and each of
these countries and what your evaluation is of the impact of these
sales.
Mr. Pelletreau. North Korea has provided the Scud-B and
Scud-C missiles and technology to Iran and to Syria. There have
been discussions between the Iranians and the North Koreans
about the No-Dong missile, but that has not, to this point, been
provided. I am not able to give you a good answer right now on the
extent of North Korean-Libyan cooperation, but I will try to do so.
It is fair to say that North Korea is not abiding by the Missile
Technology Control Regime in these transfers. We have urged and
encouraged the North Koreans to abide by that regime, but it has
not had an effect thus far.
Mr. Lantos. Now, in the many meetings Ambassador Gallucci
has had with the North Koreans, has he made it clear to them how
seriously the Congress and our administration views the continued
supply of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea to rogue re-
gimes in the Middle East?
Mr. Pelletreau. Yes, that has been a part of our dialogue and
an important message that we have been bringing home to the
North Koreans.
Mr. Lantos. What has been the North Korean response?
Mr. Pelletreau. Their response has been unsatisfactory up to
this point.
Mr. Lantos. Could you specify what unsatisfactory means?
Mr. Pelletreau. I would prefer to do that for the record.
Mr. Lantos. In a closed session?
20
Mr. Pelletreau. I may be able to do it in an open session, but
because I, myself, was not participant in these discussions, I would
rather review the record before I make an authoritative statement
to you.
[The information referred to was subsequently supplied for the
hearing record and follows:]
Because the United States has no formal diplomatic relations with North Korea,
our opportunities for direct discussion of other issues are limited. However, we have
raisea the issue of shipments of MTCR-class missiles, including to Syria and Iran,
directly with North Korean officials and have urged them not to make such trans-
fers. We have also encouraged North Korea to adhere to the MTCR Guideline and
have asked other countries to urge North Korean officials to refrain from engaging
in such transfers. The United States attaches enormous importance to preventing
the transfer of ballistic missiles and related technologies as well as other commocf-
ities that are necessary for the development of destabilizing military systems.
IRANIAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
Mr. Lantos. This most recent spate of terrorist atrocities in Ar-
gentina, Panama and the United Kingdom seem to have had as the
support element basically Iran. Is that the judgment of the admin-
istration?
Mr. Pelletreau. There is a pattern that would point in that di-
rection, but the investigation is ongoing as we speak, and there has
not at this point, in my understanding, been clear evidence to sup-
port this supposition.
Mr. Lantos. Not long ago, a few years ago, when the PLO was
a major terrorist organization, there were disturbing reports subse-
quently verified that various European governments made a deal
with the PLO by allowing them to operate in their countries freely
if they did not engage in terrorist activities in those countries. You
remember these events?
Mr. Pelletreau. In a general way, yes.
Mr. Lantos. There are now similar reports that Iran has made
deals with a variety of European countries offering, as it were, a
diabolic quid pro quo, no terrorist activities in a specific country in
exchange for a free run of Iranian-supported terrorist in those
countries. What information do you have on this matter?
Mr. Pelletreau. I have heard similar statements, but I cannot
confirm them to you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Were we in a position to confirm these, what would
be the position of our administration?
Mr. Pelletreau. That such deals were absolutely unacceptable
to us or to the international community at large. Our position
would be that we and our allies among the democracy should be
taking a firm, solid and cohesive line against terrorism as a col-
lectivity and that it would be absolutely unacceptable for one state,
so-called, to buy its way out by making a deal with the terrorists.
Mr. Lantos. Well, since several European countries had no dif-
ficulty reconciling their collective conscience to such unacceptable
deals with the PLO some years ago, why would they now be so im-
proved in terms of their ethical standards that they wouldn't be
prepared to buy peace for themselves at such a price?
Mr. Pelletreau. I would hope that in the post-cold war world
we could achieve a closer and higher degree of cooperation on this
issue.
21
Mr. Lantos. That is based on hope, not on experience, I take it,
in view of Yugoslavia and a lot of other places.
Mr. Pelletreau. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Lantos. We would hope that something more substantive
could be offered. How quickly could Iran or Iraq assemble a nuclear
device if they could acquire enriched uranium or plutonium from
the former Soviet Union?
Mr. Peli^treau. There have been estimates made by the intel-
ligence community that go, in my recollection, in the neighborhood
of 7 to 10 years. I say that recognizing at the same time that once
we had found out exactly the extent of Iraq's development of a nu-
clear device, that we had found them to be a good deal further
along than we had thought before. But that is the current estimate
with respect to Iran.
With respect to Iraq, there is a quite extensive international
monitoring regime being put in place, and it is the clear expecta-
tion of those who are in charge of putting the monitoring regime
in place and those who are supporting it, including ourselves, that
it will prevent Iraq from moving forward to restore a nuclear weap-
ons development program.
DUAL CONTAINMENT POLICY
Mr. Lantos. You know, the administration still uses, I take it,
the phrase "dual containment" to describe our policy toward Iran
and Iraq; is that accurate?
Mr. Pelletreau. That is a phrase used frequently by members
of the administration. I tend to shy away from it myself.
Mr. Lantos. Why?
Mr. Pelletreau. Because we have a policy toward Iran that is
designed to meet Iran's circumstances and toward Iraq that is de-
signed to meet Iraq's circumstances, and it is not identical in each
case. In other words, it is not duplicate containment, and that is
why I think that just using the shorthand phrase "dual contain-
ment" without having an opportunity to explain that we have a
rather careful and well-developed policy toward each country,
sometimes leads to misimpressions.
Mr. Lantos. Well, I agree with you that there are differences in
the two approaches, as there should be. But what I am concerned
with is that the trend globally is in the direction of diminished dual
containment. And I am reminded to some extent of the meetings
we had with one of your predecessors. Secretary Kelly, with respect
to this same issue as far as Iraq was concerned, where he ex-
pressed hope and optimism not long before the invasion of Kuwait
took place.
Now, I don't anticipate an invasion imminently, but what I do
anticipate is the continued chipping away by Iraq of the policy of
sanctions, encouraged and supported bv countries such as France
and Russia, and our inability to stop tnis development. And if, in
fact, the forces that move toward lifting the sanctions prevail and
Iraq again will be able to sell oil on a large scale, one does not need
to be a nuclear scientist to understand uiat they will go headlong
for rebuilding their weapons of mass destruction.
Is the administration aware of the relative importance of this
issue to, for instance, the issue of Haiti in terms of the range of
22
resources brought to bear on infinitely more important items? The
development of weapons of mass destruction by Iran and Iraq are
infinitely more dangerous for the peace and security of the world
than whatever is going on in Haiti.
And there seems to oe, to me, a disconnect between resource allo-
cation and the rational analysis of global threats. I know Haiti is
not in your bailiwick, but the issue has to be in somebody's baili-
wick, because there is a disconnect between resource allocation,
both intellectual and political and diplomatic and other, to far more
important items, such as the growing danger from Iran and also
from Iraq and far less significant items.
Mr. Pelletreau. I share completely your reference to the dan-
gers from Iraq and Iran, and there is a similarity between the two
that is worth pointing out. You just referred to it in that there is
no question that Iran wants to rearm as fast as it can and acquire
weapons of mass destruction. There is no question in my mind that
Iraq, except for the U.N. sanctions, would be rearming as fast as
it could and acquiring weapons of mass destruction. This is proof
that the area of the Gulf is an inherently unstable area that re-
quires the continued vigilance and close attention of the United
States and the world community.
Mr. Lantos. Well, would you go beyond and make a reference to
my comment with respect to our Caribbean involvement and the
sort of casual and lackadaisical approach with which we seem to
be approaching our allies from Germany, Japan, concerning the
supplying of weapons of mass destruction to both Iran and soon
Iraq once the sanctions are lifted? Because dual containment cer-
tainly is not present since Iran currently is able to buy practically
everything, everything.
Mr. Pelletreau. Dual containment is a phrase of U.S. policy
that aims at an objective that is not fully realized. You are right
that up to this point, we have not been able to prevent fully the
supply of components and weaponry that would support building or
rebuilding a weapons of mass destruction program, and we do need
to give this effort a high priority, and I believe we are doing so.
But I certainly agree with you that we should not shirk and should
not neglect this very important area.
Mr. Lantos. Well, I see that I am not succeeding in getting you
to make a cross-area reference. So let me just say for myself, look-
ing ahead 10, 15 years, I view both Iran and Iraq as potentially in-
finitely more dangerous for U.S. national interests than the par-
ticulars of the Haiti internal situation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Schumer.
Mr. ScKUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I guess my questions — let me go over them and if they have been
asked, please tell me and I will just look at the record and see your
answers.
status of JERUSALEM
First, one relates to Jerusalem. Yasser Arafat and the PLO have
made control over Jerusalem a major political issue despite the fact
that the Declaration of Principles leaves Jerusalem as a final sta-
23
tus issue and they have tried actively to create symbols of sov-
ereignty over Jerusalem. They have done so by coordinating PLO
activity from Jerusalem, and telling them to hold official meetings
with foreign diplomats, and it is my view that we should not do
anything to legitimatize that status in any way.
So what I would like to ask you is, since U.S. law prohibits offi-
cial meetings in Jerusalem between Palestinians and U.S. officials
and prohibits the administration from building U.S. Grovernment
offices in Jerusalem to distribute aid to the West Bank and Gaza,
does the Clinton administration support this law? That is the first
question.
How will it be implemented? What steps has the administration
taken to prevent the Palestinian authority from conducting busi-
ness in Jerusalem?
Did you answer all those questions already?
Mr. Pelletreau. I answered some of them but not quite in the
way in which you ask them. But I would like to assure you that
in our implementation of our assistance program to the Palestin-
ians, we are ensuring that we do not have contacts with the Pal-
estinian authority or meetings with the Palestinian authority in Je-
rusalem for that purpose, nor have we established any separate aid
offices in Jerusalem for that purpose.
We note, and I have noted for the record that Israel has had
meetings with the Palestinian authority in Jerusalem and we don't
feel that we should interfere with what the two parties decide to
do. But we, ourselves, are going to observe fully the provisions of
the Declaration of Principles that makes Jerusalem a final status
issue for negotiation between the two.
Mr. ScHUMER. Would it be administration policy to convey to the
Palestinians that these kinds of symbols of sovereignty are not
helpful to the peace process?
Mr. Pelletreau. We have done so in the — both in our refusing
to have meetings with them and in discussions of certain aspects
of the ongoing negotiations.
PROGRESS ON ARAB BOYCOTT
Mr. ScHUMER. Saturday, I was heartened to see the progress
that had been made on the Arab boycott. To me, and I probably
have been one of the members more skeptical of the whole peace
process, frankly, because I doubted the intent of the Arab world in
making peace with Israel. The announcement made a real dif-
ference because we always knew that some of the governments do
unilaterally take action to end the boycott.
It always stuck in my craw that the Kuwaitis and the Saudis,
after Operation Desert Storm, were still boycotting American com-
panies because they did business with Israel. And now they have
said, as I understand the press reports, that the Saudis and the
Gulf States, on their own, will unilaterally end the secondary boy-
cott and urge the Arab League to end the entire boycott. Is that
a correct reading?
Mr. Pelletreau. That is the intent and direction of their state-
ment. What they said exactly was that they, as the six countries,
were lifting the secondary and tertiary boycotts and that they
24
would support action within the Arab League to end the boycott en-
tirely.
Mr. ScHUMEU. Can you give us your prognostication of what the
likelihood is of the Arab League doing that? What nations stand in
the way? I would be particularly interested in Syria's point of view
of this issue.
Mr. Pp:lletreau. Syria has considered the boycott to be a nego-
tiation card in its hands in its negotiations with Israel and Syria,
and has tried to keep that card from slipping away or being played
too soon.
We have a completely different view of the boycott. We think the
boycott should be ended now, and ending the boycott on the part
of the Arab States would be an important confidence-building
measure with Israel. Little by Httle and steadily, the boycott is
being eroded from within. And we see in this action taken last
week, I believe, the most important single significant action that
we have seen all along in that these six states have now on their
own, without an Arab-League decision, taken the decision publicly
before the world to lift the secondary and tertiary aspects.
Mr. ScHLTMER. I think it is particularly significant that the
Saudis, who in the past have at least claimed they were trying to
nudge the Arab consensus in a more peaceful direction, have done
this on their own. And that is very significant to me.
Mr. Pelletreau. That is right. And the Saudi Foreign Minister,
Prince Saud al-Faysal was standing next to the Secretary when
they announced that.
Mr. ScHUMER. Right. I am remiss in not thanking you and the
Secretary for helping. I know that this has been a high priority of
the administration, I am glad to see it bear fruit.
Can you give us your prognostication. Do you think it is likely
first that other States will unilaterally on their own drop the sec-
ondary and tertiary boycotts? And perhaps even the primary?
I heard a rumor to the effect that one of the Arab nations, an
African-Arab nation was going to drop the entire boycott. I don't
know if that has happened yet or if it is true and I don't want you
to spill any beans.
Mr. Pelletreau. No, that is OK.
Mr. Schumer. Spill any crucial information.
Mr. Pelletreau. I can open rather openly on this subject be-
cause I think the precedent of these six countries acting is going
to lead to a number of other countries to take the same action.
Mr. Schumer. Are we urging the rest of the Arab world to do so?