— How much of a threat to national security is posed by
— How did the Greek government use the information
contained in the documents?
ANSWER 2: The FBI and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security are
still conducting investigations on the Lalas case, and we are
unable to comment further at this time.
I refer you to the FBI
for its views.
(2) 0.8. Assistance
The Fiscal Year 1994 military request for Greece is $350
million in FHF concessional loans.
— How did you determine your military request for Greece?
What Greek military requirements will the $350 million
go to fulfill?
ANSWER: The Fiscal Year 1994 request of $315 million in FMF
concessional loans for Greece was based on a combination of the
o obligation of the United States under the 1990
Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement to assist
Greece in the modernization of its defense ;
o the requirements and priorities of the Greek
military modernization program, as stated by the
Hellenic National Defense Staff;
o the Department of Defense's assessment of Greece's
o the judgement that it is in the interest of the
United States to assist Greece, which, inter alia,
is located geostrategically between Europe and the
Middle East, and is a frontline state in the
current Balkan unrest;
Congress' 7:10 ratio of FMF for Greece and Turkey,
o available U.S. budgetary resources.
The requested $315 million in concessional loans for FY 1994
would be used for a multitude of programs aimed at the on-going
modernization of Greek defenses, particularly for new F-16s, MLRS
and helicopter assets, and sustaining existing programs of the
Greek Army, Navy and Air Force.
(1) General Questions
Turkey recently announced that it wants to renegotiate the
U.S. -Turkish DECA. Had it so chosen, Ankara could simply have
chosen to renew the standing DECA, as it has done annually the
past several years.
Is it correct that the initiative for renegotiation
came from the Turkish side, not the U.S. side?
Has Turkey indicated wh^ it chose to renegotiate this
What are Turkey's main goals in seeking a new DECA?
ANSWER 1: The Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA)
between the U.S. and Turkey has been rolled over twice since its
second five-year term ended in September 1990. However, the GOT
advised us at the last extension that it would seek changes to
reflect present conditions. The GOT has proposed changes to the
DECA, which, in our view, are substantive rather than technical.
The U.S. believes that minor amendments to the DECA are
appropriate to reflect reductions and adjustments of our military
presence in Turkey. Talks are now underway in Ankara between the
GOT and our Embassy.
Turkey's human rights record remains a serious
disappointment. Despite repeated promises by the Turkish
government — most of the long-standing human rights problems
continue, and several new ones have arisen. The most recent State
[Jepartment Human Rights Report says Turkey's primary human rights
o limits on freedom of expression and association;
o political killings; disappearances, mainly of
Kurdish activists; and,
o "mystery killings," in which murders of Kurdish
activists have not been investigated and leads
suggesting possible involvement by Turkish
security forces have been ignored.
We have gone back and forth with your predecessors, Mr.
Oxman, on this issue. The fact is that there are always some
small steps the State Department can come up here and point to
say that there has been progress. But, the fundamental
situation has remained the same or deteriorated.
— What is your assessment of the problems we face in this
area in Turkey?
— How do you intend to approach this issue, given all the
other issues we also have on the plate with Turkey —
most importantly perhaps. Operation Provide Comfort?
Is it a fact of life that we must satisfy ourselves
that we are unable to change this situation, so long as
we have other important issues on our agenda with
ANSWER 2: While there is not doubt that progress in the
area of human rights in Turkey has not been as wide or deep as we
all would have preferred, I do not believe the GOT has made some
effort to improve its record on human rights, despite having to
deal with urban terrorism and an on-going separatist terrorist
campaign. When then-Prime Minister Demirel's government first
came to power over a year ago, there was great hope that
substantial improvements would occur in Turkey's human rights
problems. Unfortunately, this has not yet happened. We will
continue to work with Turkey to further the goal of encouraging
political reform and eliminating human rights abuses.
Having identified Turkey's human rights problems, what sort
of dialogue has the U.S. established with Turkey to try to
eliminate these abuses?
I understand the State Department internally developed
a "strategy paper" for trying to improve the human
rights situation in Turkey.
Is this accurate?
What can you tell us about this paper?
Have you shared it yet with the Turks?
If so, what was there reaction?
What type of measures would this strategy involved?
Does it focus largely on training and judicial reform
By what standards do we plan to assess Turkey's
progress in implementing this strategy?
ANSWER 3; We are in the process of finalizing a strategy
paper to address the human rights situation in Turkey, which we
will share with Turkey as soon as it is completed. The paper
pinpoints various areas where we would like to work with Turkey
towards improvement — for example, full implementation of the
judicial reform law, which outlines the rights of suspects in
various criminal procedures. We hope to be able to assist Turkey
by training relevant officials, and assisting in
institutionalizing judicial reform procedures. The strategy
paper will have benchmarks to allow us better to gauge progress
being made in this area.
Since 1983, Turkey has been facing armed attacks by the
Kurdish terrorists and insurgents (PKK) for the past several
years. Over 5,000 people have died since 1984, most of them in
the past two years. Two months ago, the leader of the PKK
terrorists, Mr. Ocalan, announced a ceasefire in PKK activities
What is the status of this PKK ceasefire?
What is our assessment of Mr. Ocalan' s sincerity in
offering a permanent ceasefire in return for a number
of Turkish steps, such as ending emergency rule in the
southeastern provinces and granting a general amnesty
to individual suspected of collaborating with the PKK?
— How has the Turkish government reacted to the PKK
— Have Turkish security forces in the area changed
their activities at all since the ceasefire was
— What, if any, good will gestures has Turkey made
in response to the ceasefire?
What have we said to Turkey about this development?
Is it your assessment that they are taking it as a
serious opportunity to end the warfare in the
How do you react to criticisms that the Western
Europeans have openly embraced this development as
a chance for peace and urged Turkey to do the
same, but the U.S. has been silent?
Is this the case? If so, why?
— Don't we have an interest in seeing this issue
diffused and the killing stopped?
ANSWER 4: More than 30 unarmed soldiers and civilians died
on May 24 in a PKK ambush. We strongly condemned this attack
which came just as Ankara had approved a limited amnesty for PKK
fighters. PKK leader Ocalan claimed the attack was a warning,
but he also claims the ceasefire is still in place. Turks, not
surprisingly, doubt his sincerity.
We understand that Turkish security forces continued to
carry out small-unit operations during the ceasefire to preclude
any PKK terrorist incidents.
Before the May 24 attack, we noted that the ceasefire
presented an opportunity to make progress in solving the problems
in Turkey's Southeast. Ankara had promised to consider lifting
the state-of-emergency regime over ten southeastern provinces
which have a majority Kurdish population.
I understand Turkey has not agreed to apply the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, to U.S., U.K., and French troops on
Operation Provide Comfort.
Why has Turkey taken that position?
Are we discussing that matter with the Turks?
Have our troops been hindered or suffered in any way
because of the non-application of the SOFA?
Have our troops' training opportunities been limited
because of non-application of the SOFA?
— In general, how would you characterize cooperation
between the U.S. and Turkish militaries on Operation
ANSWER 5: There is a difference in interpretation on the
applicability of the SOFA among the U.S., the UK, France and
Turkey. We believe that members of the armed forces of a NATO
country are covered by the SOFA when they are there for NATO
purposes or otherwise. We believe the negotiating history of the.
SOFA, which predates Turkey's entry into the alliance, supports
this conclusion. We have discussed this issue with the Turkish
Government, thus far without resolution. The disagreement on
this issue has not hindered Provide Comfort operations. An
earlier problem over training was not related to the SOFA, but
rather involved identifying and establishing operating
procedures. Cooperation between the U.S. and Turkish security
forces on Operation Provide Comfort has been excellent.
Since 1991, Turkey and Bulgaria have signed three bilateral
agreements aimed at easing tension on the border. They have
pledged increased military contacts, early notification of
military exercises, and increased mutual inspection visits. In
March, 1993 they signed an agreement on cooperation in military
science and technology, in which they raise the possibility of
joint Turkish-Bulgarian cooperation in the "development and
manufacture" of defense equipment.
— How do we view these developments in Turkish-Bulgarian
— Is it positive, or does it in any way present a
— How does Greece view these developments?
The Turkish defense minister has said that
Turkish-Bulgarian cooperation could be expanded to
include third countries. Has Greece, which shares a
border with both states, shown any interest in joining
ANSWER 6: The dramatic improvement in Bulgarian-Turkish
relations is one of the most constructive developments the
Balkans have seen in recent years. What made it possible was the
fall of Bulgaria's Communist dictatorship in late 1989, the
subsequent process of restoring civil and human rights to its
sizable ethnic Turkish minority, and the statesmanlike approach
of both countries to reconciliation and cooperation with one
another. We see it as validating one of the basic premises of
our Balkan policy: that democratic development internally can
promote cooperative regional relations, even among historic
The improvement in relations between Bulgaria and Turkey is
positive. First, it has been carried out in an open and
transparent manner. Second, both countries have taken pains to
show that their rapprochement is not directed against any third
party. Third, Bulgaria has pursued very similar policies of
military cooperation and confidence building with both Greece and
Romania. These steps, taken together, exert an effective
stabilizing effect on the region.
Greece is concerned about Turkish diplomatic moves in the
Balkans, and has countered them with Greek initiatives. On
December 4, 1992, Greece and Bulgaria concluded and agreement on
confidence-building measures and a military cooperation program
Greece declined to join in a Bulgarian initiative for a
Bulgarian-Turkish-Greek agreement on regional security issues, on
the grounds that such issues were not appropriate for trilateral
UNFICYP is reportedly about ten years behind in payments to
troop-contributing states. Why is that?
— Have source states failed to pay their pledged
How will UNFICYP make up that shortfall?
AKSWER: From its inception, UNFICYP has been supported
entirely by voluntary contributions of troops and funds.
Contributed funds are used by the UN to pay its expenses related
to UNFICYP, with any balance paid to troop contributors as
reimbursement for their costs. For the past decade, voluntary
financial contributions received by the UN have not been
sufficient to provide reimbursements to troop contributors.
Those countries which have pledged contributions have paid them.
Under UN Security Council Resolution 828 (passed May 27,
1993), beginning June 15, 1993, the UN will pay all of UNFICYP's
costs, including those of troop contributors, using funds raised
through a combination of voluntary contributions and levies on UN
members under the peacekeeping scale of assessments.
III. PORTUGAL QUESTIONS
What has been accomplished so far in these negotiations?
— What are the main changes in the agreement with
Portugal that we seek?
— Are we finally moving away from a "bases for rent" to a
era of genuine mutual security cooperation with
What difficulties has this transition caused for the
ANSWER 1: The U.S. and Portugal have agreed to work
together on a broad friendship, one that reflects our countries'
historically close relationship. The Portuguese have eschewed
the old "rent for bases" approach and signalled their desire to
conclude a new agreement expeditiously.
Base negotiations were resumed in April after a hiatus of
almost 15 months. At the April round and at a subsequent round
in May, the two sides put forward ideas on a new defense and
security cooperation agreement. Substantial progress was made in
drafting a chapeau agreement. Labor and technical annexes were
broadly reviewed with a view towards identifying problem areas.
What issues do you plan to address in the upcoming round of
base negotiations with the Portuguese?
Are the major sticking points to labor and technical
Do you expect U.S. forces at Lajes to stay roughly at
their current level of 1,800 U.S. troops plus their
dependents and 1,100 local employees for the
ANSWER 2: While labor and technical annexes are long and
complicated documents, the two sides are determined to arrive at
a positive outcome consistent with their legislative requirements
pertaining to cost-sharing, salaries, hiring practices, etc. The
technical annex was reviewed by experts from both sides May 18-19
and these talks will resume in Lisbon the week of June 14. Labor
experts plan to begin their discussions in Lisbon June 2.
Under current plans, we do not anticipate any significant
change in U.S. troop levels and the number of local employees.
Will the following be part of the Lajes Base Agreement the
U.S. planning to sign with Portugal:
o Narcotics Cooperation Agreement?
o Terrorism Cooperation Agreement?
o Political-Military consultative council?
o Cultural Cooperation Agreement?
o Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement?
What is the status of our discussions with the
Portuguese on these cooperation agreements?
What is the Portuguese attitude to this shift in our
relationship away from "bases for rent" and to a more
mature security cooperation relationship?
ANSWER 3: The Binational Commission to be established under
the proposed agreement would have a broad mandate to facilitate
the two governments' efforts to identify and promote cooperation
in a variety of areas. The Commission may well address itself to
areas suggested above. We work cooperatively with Portugal on a
broad range of issues and we look forward to further
strengthening this relationship.
The Portuguese Government has not explicitly accepted the
end of the "bases for rent" concept and the need to move to a
broad-based partnership and mutual security cooperation.
Both sides agree that the agreement should be updated to
reflect the post-Cold War realities. The U.S. has made clear
from the outset of the negotiations that the provision of
security assistance in return for access to bases had to end.
Portugal has not explicitly accepted that "bases for rent"
is no longer a valid concept. Both sides want to broaden the
bilateral relationship and encourage an arrangement that fosters
genuine mutual security cooperation.
The Portuguese Government has had to adjust to the end of
ESF in FY 1992 and the conversion of FMF grants into loans. The
end of ESF has most directly affected the regional government of
the Azores, which was the main beneficiary of the funds and had
used the money for general budgetary support. Similarly, the
Portuguese government now has to finance the acquisition of F-16
aircraft by using FMF loans instead of relying on a U.S. grant.
As you may be aware, the Committee has had an interest for a
number of years now in the operations of the Luso-American
Foundation. There have been a number of concerns regarding the
use of the Foundation's funds and the practices of Fund managers.
— Could you please provide the Committee with an update
regarding the status of the Luso-American Foundation
and U.S. efforts to resolve these issues with the
Director and Board Members of the Foundation?
— Specifically, what progress has been made in
streamlining and tightening the Foundation's
What role does the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal play in
MISWER 4: Relations with the Embassy have improved both in
style and substance during the past year.
In the 1992 evaluation of the Luso-American Foundation
(FLAD) , the Embassy criticized the absence of an American
component in many of FLAD's programs. In 1993, a review of these
programs indicates that FLAD is now working much more closely
with American institutions in achieving its objectives.
Consistent pressure from the Embassy and from other sources
has been effective in pushing reforms within FLAD, although at a
slower pace than is desired. It is important that we persist
with efforts to continue to encourage FLAD to maintain its
altered course, while avoiding being heavy-handed (or overly
critical) about FLAD's failings, lest we give FLAD's apologists
an excuse to claim that Portuguese are victims of American
FLAD has sought outside advice on organizational management
and accounting, and noteworthy efforts are underway to reduce
costs. The improvements are tangible and all signs are that the
organization will continue to move in the directions we
The 1993 project list indicates a less scattershot approach
to programming with a clearer emphasis on science-related
projects which center on cooperation with American institutions.
Several conferences and studies were specifically designed to
capitalize on U.S. expertise. In the cultural field, exchanges
of artists and writers were highlighted in the FLAD newsletter.
The academic exchange programs with the U.S. universities are a
continuing mainstay at FLAD although selection criteria are not
The Ambassador and Embassy have put special efforts into
reinvigorating the consultative council, which had largely been
ignored by the FLAD management. (The Ambassador is a member of
the consultative council) . At the April 1993 meeting, the
consultative council presented FLAD management a strong consensus
a review of FLAD's programs to set priorities;
— a strategy for the future; and
concentration on areas that make sense in terms of
Portugal's changed circumstances since FLAD was
created, e.g. EC membership and inflow of structural
funds from Brussels.
In addition, we have kept in close touch with the American
members of the Board of Directors to assure that the American
viewpoint is represented at their meetings.
SDPPLEMEiniAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AMD THE MIDDLE EAST
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND RESPONSES THERETO
MAY 11, 1993 HEARING ON U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE
FOR FY 1994
The Fiscal Year 1994 military request for Greece is $350
million in FMF concessional loans.
How did you determine your military request for Greece?
VJhat Greek military requirements will the $350 million go to
ANSWER: The actual request for FY 1994 for Greece is $315
million, down from the $350 million requested in FY 1993. In
determining this request, we took into consideration the guidance
provided by the 1990 Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, the
consolidated five year plan presented by the Greek requirement,
our best estimate of what it would take to continue to maintain
and support U.S. equipment previously obtained by Greece, our
stated commitment for funding toward the F-16 aircraft purchase,
and Congressional guidance vis-a-vis Turkey. The Greek military
requirements against which the $315 million will be applied
include F-16 aircraft, AH-64 helicopters, MLRS, F-4 and A-7 jet
fighter upgrades and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft lease.
What is the military rationale for Peace Onyx II?
Why does Turkey need 240 new F-16s?
What threat are these planes required to offset?
Would you put this in the context of the regional air
threat to Turkey?
What air assets do Turkey's neighbors — Iraq and Iran
What about the potential air threat from the former
ANSWER: The Turkish Air Force (TUAF) , equipped with aging
F-104S, F-5s and F-4s, badly requires a new aircraft. In the
mid-1980s, TUAF calculated its full requirement" at 320 F-16s-, to
be co-produced with General Dynamics. Funding limitations
subsequently required the planes to be ordered in two increments
of 160 each. The first increment (Peace Onyx I) was launched in
1987 and is 75% complete as of May 1993. Turkey located
sufficient funding by March 1992 to undertake Peace Onyx II by
ordering an additional 40 F-16s and the long lead items for
another 40, for a total of 240 aircraft produced or on order. By
replacing the older and costly to support F-104s and F-5s with
the modern F-16, the TUAF can consolidate training, maintenance
and logistics and thus increase overall mission effectiveness.
Moreover, the additional 80 aircraft of Peace Onyx II are an
improved version from Peace Onyx I models.
The goal of 320 aircraft is driven by Turkey's perceived
threat from all sides of its territory. While Greece and Turkey
are both members of NATO, each country claims the other as a
potential antagonist over mutually exclusive claims in the
Aegean. Turkey is concerned with the ramifications of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the possibility of larger powers
choosing sides to fight a proxy war. Further to the north and
east, Russia dominates the geo-political landscape as the only
great power in the Central Asian region. The pressure by
Stalinist Russia on Turkey in the aftermath of World War II
contributed significantly to the origins of the Cold War.
The greatest potential threat to Turkey comes from its three
abundantly equipped southern neighbors. Iraq, Iran and Syria
possess sizable, air forces, although only Iran has the ability
currently to project air power across its border, as it does
occasionally against Iraq. Iran relies mostly on older F-4/F-5
aircraft and a few Su-24s, flown by pilots with considerable
experience from the Iran-Iraq war.
Iraq, held down by the northern no-fly-zone and UN sanctions,
cannot project serious air power against Turkey, but its large
ground forces still threaten the Kurds close to Turkey. Once the
no-fly-zone is lifted a vengeful Iraq could deploy elements of
its 350 combat aircraft (including Mirage F-ls and MiG-23s) much
closer to Turkey, if severe logistics and maintenance problems
can be solved.
Syria, possessing one of the largest air forces in the Middle
East, is postured almost solely against Israel. Few assets are
positioned in the north since Turkey is not a primary threat for
Syria. If the Middle East peace process eventually yields fruit,
Syria may choose to revive its interest in regaining the Hatay
province lost to Turkey between the world wars, but that is at
best a speculative judgement.