[( ^ THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA
M.F 76/1: AN 4/5
fhe Quest for Peace Ir Angola* 103-. . . re the
ISUBUUMIVHTTEE ON AFRICA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
NOVEMBER 16, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
> «-* y
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-781 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402
THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN ANGOU
I 4.F 76/1; AN 4/5
he fiuest for Peace la Angola; 103-.. . re the
ISUBCUMMITTEE ON AFRICA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
NOVEMBER 16, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign AfTairs
U.S. GOVERNME.NT PRINTING OFFICE
80-781 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. MCKLNNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
Michael H. Van Dusen, Chief of Staff
Deborah Hickey, Staff Associate
HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
Subcommittee on Africa
HARRY L. JOHNSTON, Florida, Chairman
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey DAN BURTON, Indiana
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
DON EDWARDS, California (Vacancy)
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
Clifford KUPCHAN, Staff Director
GiLEAD KaPEN, Republican Professional Staff Member
ANNE-MaREA Griffin, Professional Staff Member
Ted DagNE, Professional Staff Member
David F. Gordon, Professional Staff Member
The Honorable George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Department of State 3
Mr. James Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs,
Department of Defense 5
Chester Crocker, landegger distinguished research professor of diplomacy,
Georgetown University, former Assistant Secretary of State for African
Gerald J. Bender, professor, school of international relations. University of
Southern California 21
Douglas Coutts, senior program officer/North American Office, United Nations
World Food Program, the United Nations 24
Hon. Alcee Hastings, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida,
opening statement 41
The Honorable George Moose 42
Chester Crocker, witn attached article 45
Gerald J. Bender 51
Douglas Coutts, with attachment 56
THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1993
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Africa,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m. in room
2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry L. Johnston
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Johnston. This afternoon we meet to discuss the very dire
crisis in Angola. This beleaguered country has suffered from nearly
30 years of almost continuous civil war.
In 1992, it appeared that peace would finally come to Angola. In
September, elections were held which were deemed free and fair by
international observers. Very soon thereafter, however, civil war
was reignited, and now the short-lived peace is no more.
Instead, war and hunger threaten the lives of 10 million Ango-
lans. Observers estimate that about 1,000 Angolans are dying daily
from the effects of the civil war. The United Nations has called An-
gola a tragedy of catastrophic proportions.
Moreover, the U.N. estimates that Angolans suffer the worst fa-
tality rate of any conflict in the world, surpassing even Somalia,
Bosnia, and Cambodia.
I have called a hearing today because of this very bleak situa-
tion. During the cold war, the United States was an active protago-
nist in the Angolan civil war. Today, the United States must be in
the forefront of the quest for peace in Angola. The role that the
United States has played in Angola's tortured history necessitates
a commitment to help the Angolan people find a lasting peace.
Angola is potentially a rich nation and is already one of the Unit-
ed States' leading partners in Africa. We have a significant stake
in the peace process in Angola. And I applaud the President for
naming Ambassador Paul Hare to be the U.S. Special Representa-
tive to the peace negotiations in Angola. I had the pleasure of
meeting Ambassador Hare last week and had the opportunity to
personally wish him well.
But the real test is what will happen next. We need to impress
on both the MPLA and UNITA that the U.S. Government is com-
mitted to the long-term implementation of peace in Angola. Most
importantly, the United States must demonstrate its willingness to
bolster efforts by the United Nations to bring about political rec-
onciliation. And in the event of a settlement, to facilitate the demo-
bilization of the warring sides.
Today, witnesses will explore the prospects of peace in Angola.
On the first panel of public witnesses, we will hear from Ambas-
sador George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and
Mr. Jim Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa.
On the second panel of private witnesses we will hear testimony
from Dr. Chester Crocker, Former Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs and now a distinguished Professor at Georgetown Univer-
We will also hear from Dr. Gerald Bender of the University of
Southern California, and Mr. Douglas Coutts of the United Nation
World Food Program.
Before I call upon our witnesses, I am going to ask Mr. Payne
for an opening statement.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first of all congratulate you for continuing on with the
many problems that we have in Africa. And I also would like to ex-
press my appreciation for bringing H.Res. 128 on Zaire and
H. Con. Res. 151 on Nigeria to markup today later in the hearing.
Mr. Johnston. When we get a quorum.
Mr. Payne. I will say more about those bills when we get a
quorum. But I think it is very important that we are dealing with
the issue of Angola.
The United Nations reports that 1,000 people are dying each day
in the renewed war between UNITA and the Government of An-
gola. This is more deaths than any current conflict in the entire
world. Yet the Angola story is not getting to the American people
or in the mass media, probably due to the more politically juicy sto-
ries, I guess, like Somalia.
The Subcommittee on Africa has been most attentive to this
issue. H. Con. Res. 75, sponsored by Mr. Johnston, was introduced
and, subsequently, the administration has followed through with
the diplomatic recognition of the Government of Angola and the ap-
pointment of a special envoy.
Letters have been sent to President Clinton, and the response
was always positive. Yet UNITA continued to ignore the May 31
Bicesse accords to disarm.
I know you have heard me mention before the many countries of
Africa in which today's problems are products of our previous cold
war policies. But none exceeds the damage done to the country of
Angola, where the cold war was fought on Angolan soil between the
United States supported UNITA and the Soviet supported Govern-
ment of Angola, which we recognize today.
I sincerely hope today's hearing will provide some insight on how
we can stop the current suffering in places like the besieged city
of Cuito, where 25,000 perished, of which a majority of these
25,000 people were children.
I understand the United Nations is holding a closed meeting for
the second day in Lusaka, with UNITA officials there, with the
hope of developing a conducive atmosphere to bring the Govern-
ment of Angola into the meeting soon.
Should we consider this a sign of hope or just another public re-
lations ploy by UNITA since similar rounds were held last month
in Zambia but did not bring about a face-to-face meeting between
This is an extremely serious situation, and I hope that we can
come up with a resolution in the near future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnston. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE MOOSE, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPART-
MENT OF STATE
Mr. Moose. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Payne. I welcome this opportunity to participate in this afternoon's
hearings on Angola. I would like to express our appreciation to the
subcommittee for the interest they have brought to this issue.
We appreciate very much the attention that the subcommittee
has brought do this issue, and I look forward to continuing our
close working relationship on this important political and humani-
We have arrived, I believe, at yet another very critical juncture
in Angola's recent history. After the prolonged fighting of the past
year, Angola is again at a crossroads. Following intense diplomatic
efforts by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr.
Alioune Blondin Beye, and by the United States, I am pleased to
report that peace negotiations are, once again, under way. These
negotiations offer the promise of achieving the comprehensive
peace settlement that eluded us in Abidjan earlier this year.
We believe this new round of talks will test the seriousness of
both the Angolan Government and UNITA to achieve peace. Clear-
ly, the two sides are separated by an enormous psychological divide
of mistrust and suspicion; and serious divisive issues remain to be
However, both sides appear to understand that the Angolan con-
flict cannot be resolved by military means and that the only path
to peace lies in national reconciliation through a comprehensive
Despite this realization, we expect that both sides will continue
to be tempted to strengthen their negotiating positions through tac-
tical gains on the battlefield. The peace process remains extremely
vulnerable to miscalculations and subversion.
Therefore, if the negotiations are to stand a chance of success,
both sides must be urged to refrain from actions that might derail
the fragile peace process.
Since January, the administration has spared no effort to
reenergize the search for peace. We played what I believe was a
key role in persuading both parties to resume discussions in
Abidjan in April.
My visit to Luanda in June was part of a continuing effort to
break the negotiation's impasse. In August and September, we sent
two special diplomatic missions to meet with key people on both
sides. We have also sought to maintain direct contact with UNITA
and its leader. Dr. Savimbi, insisting that he facilitate humani-
tarian relief efforts and engage fully in the peace negotiations.
These efforts contributed, in my view, significantly to UNITA's
September 20 decision to declare a unilateral cease-fire.
To bring the full weight and infiuence of the United States to
bear on the peace process, we named Ambassador Paul Hare as our
own special envoy to the Angolan peace talks. I believe the appoint-
ment of this able and experienced diplomat has strengthened our
credibility with both sides and underscored our commitment to
bringing peace to the people of Angola. And I was pleased, Mr.
Chairman, that you were able to meet with Ambassador Hare last
A fundamental aspect of our initiative has been to support the
central role of the United Nations in Angola. We have forged a very
close and productive working relationship with the U.N. and in
particular with the Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr.
Blondin Beye, who succeeded another very able U.N. Representa-
tive, Ms. Margaret Anstee, in July. Mr. Beye has brought renewed
energy to the negotiations since taking up his duties.
We fully respect and support U.N.'s leading role in forging a
peace accord and in implementing an eventual peace settlement.
Mr. Beye has asked for our discretion in discussing the ongoing
peace talks, and we will of course respect his wishes.
However, let me state that many divisive issues remain to be set-
tled in future rounds of negotiations — issues of national reconcili-
ation, of security, demobilization, the creation of a new unified
army, and other national institutions such as the police.
As I stated earlier, achieving agreement on these issues and
building the trust necessary promises to be exceedingly difficult.
My optimism that peace can be achieved in Angola is therefore
tempered by a sense of realism. I do think, however, that there is
a qualitative difference about the current negotiating atmosphere.
I think that the efforts and the actions taken particularly in the
context of the U.N. Security Council in September and more re-
cently on the first of November have brought home to both parties
the forceful concern of the international community that they en-
gage seriously in a negotiation.
I am convinced, for example, that the U.N. actions contributed
significantly to UNITA's decision to reengage in the negotiations.
The condemnation by the international community clearly caught
UNITA's attention. On October 6, UNITA issued a communique
that, despite certain ambiguities, contained enough positive ele-
ments to provide a basis for initiating the talks.
Accordingly, the U.N. Special Representative convoked both sides
to Lusaka on the 25th of October for an exploratory session.
I am pleased to report that the progress achieved in that session
in this initial round has opened the way to the resumption of full-
I cannot conclude my discussion of Angola without drawing spe-
cial attention to the terrible suffering that this renewed civil war
has brought to the Angolan people.
Human rights and humanitarian relief experts all agree that the
fighting over the past year has matched the worst levels of destruc-
tion reached over the past two decades of war.
I might add that it has only been within the last few weeks, with
the cessation of hostilities, that we have been able to gauge the full
impact and magnitude of that suffering. We have all been shocked
by the stories that have been emerging.
Certainly the siege of the city of Cuito has left tens of thousands
of civilians dead from hunger and war-related injuries.
Throughout the country, tens of thousands of Angolans have
been maimed and killed by land mines laid in agricultural fields
to prevent the famished from finding or cultivating food. It is
chilling to note that women and children make up a disproportion-
ate number of those victims.
Today's partial cease-fire has allowed the U.N. to resume deliv-
eries of relief supplies to most of the cities of Angola's interior. The
U.S. Government, for its part, has contributed almost $59 million
to relief in Angola during the past fiscal year and is continuing to
provide additional funds and support for this effort.
These efforts, important as they are, can only be a stop gap. The
key to relieving the humanitarian crisis and ending the suffering
of the Angolan people is peace and national reconciliation. And only
then will Angolans have a chance to realize their aspirations for a
better life and will Angola have a chance to realize its vast eco-
Let me add that our hopes for a new economic prosperity for the
entire southern African region hinge very much on the successful
outcome of the efforts now under way with respect to Angola. We
are witnessing a tremendous historic development in South Africa,
one that promises to bring an end to decades of apartheid and
promises more than that, to open the way to a new prosperity for
the whole of the southern African region.
Similarly, we are in the midst, in Mozambique, of a peace process
which, thus far, has been highly successful. But those important
and impressive developments will not be complete unless we can
find a way to resolve the one remaining conflict in the southern Af-
rican region, namely the conflict in Angola.
And as the administration confronts these challenges, the bipar-
tisan support that has been granted to our initiatives has been a
source of great strength.
Indeed, I believe that thanks to this congressional support, both
the Angolan Government and UNITA clearly understand that the
U.S. Government is unanimous in its purpose on this issue.
I look forward to continuing our collaboration on this issue, and
I would be happy to take any questions that the subcommittee may
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moose appears in the appendix. 1
Mr. Johnston. Mr. Torricelli, any opening statement?
Mr. Torricelli. No thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnston. Judge Hastings?
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, I do have a prepared statement,
and I will submit it for the record and ask unanimous consent.
Mr. Johnston. OK.
[The prepared statement of the Hon. Alcee Hastings appears in
Mr. Woods, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES WOODS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
Mr. Woods. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me here today to testify at this important hearing.
I do not have a formal statement, but I am prepared to address
all of the questions which were raised in the Chairman's letter,
speaking informally from my notes.
I must emphasize these are my own views since I did not have
time to get my comments formally cleared within the Department
of Defense and the interagency.
Time is limited, so let me proceed directly to those eight ques-
First question, what is your assessment of the military situation
in the Angolan civil war?
UNITA now controls — I would note that the use of the word "con-
trol" is itself somewhat controversial — controls, in a loose sense,
approximately 65 to 70 percent of the territory of Angola.
In early summer, UNITA controlled approximately 75 to 80 per-
cent. Since then, more markedly in the weeks immediately follow-
ing the 20 September unilateral cease-fire announced by UNITA,
the government regained control of considerable territory.
That trend has, in turn, very much slowed over the past couple
of weeks, however.
While UNITA still controls most of the territory, up to three-
quarters of the population is located in the areas under government
control. The government controlled areas contain most of the large
cities in Angola, and the populations of those cities have also been
swollen by refugees from the combat areas.
UNITA initially enjoyed the tactical offensive advantage when
the civil war was renewed in late 1992. But by this summer the
government, buttressed with new recruits, substantial foreign
equipment, trainers and technicians, had wrested that advantage
from UNITA in several sectors.
The conflict is mainly a widespread, low-intensity conflict. But it
is punctuated by off and on intense and bitter fighting over key
cities such as Huambo, now under UNITA control, and Cuito and
Menongue, government-controlled enclaves within UNITA-con-
For the past several weeks, fighting has been at a low ebb, but
reports of troop movements by both sides continue.
Regarding relative strengths, UNITA probably has around 45 to
50,000, highly motivated and dedicated fighters, intensely loyal to
The government, after considerable shrinkage during the aborted
prior peace process, has expanded its army in the last few months
to approximately 100,000 personnel. Probably 25,000 could be con-
sidered as a trained, experienced cadre. And 50,000 have completed
rudimentary training. And perhaps another 25,000 are still in their
I believe neither side is capable of achieving outright military
victory. The more realistic leaders of both sides seem — I repeat
seem — at last to be coming around to this view.
If the fighting, nevertheless, resumes, my personal expectation is
that, over the next year or two, the tactical advantage would in-
creasingly pass to the government, which would also be capable of
substantially increasing its areas of control.
But UNITA would remain a viable, menacing guerrilla force, ca-
pable of launching punishing blows and containing control over a
significant portion, perhaps 40 to 50 percent of Angola's interior.
And, of course, the continuing endless cost to both sides and to the
populace and to the economy of Angola would be enormous.
The second question, how many casualties have there been? In
the opening statements, reference was made to the U.N. Special
Representative's estimate of up to 1,000 people a day dying daily
as a result of the fighting or the hunger and deprivations caused
by the fighting.
It was also noted this is perhaps the worst conflict in the world
in terms of current levels of casualties. International humanitarian
organizations have used a figure of perhaps half a million deaths
since this war resumed in October, 1992. Up to 2 million additional
people are at risk of starvation. I think these estimates are reason-
I must note it is very difficult to get accurate information on the
actual conditions in most of the countryside. Since, in particular,
U.N. peace accord observers have been scaled back to fewer than
80 people from the 700 that were watching and reporting 13
months ago; and since the remaining observers remain, for the
most part, confined to government-controlled cities on the coast.
We have little good data on the number of military casualties on
either side. My impression is the aggregate numbers are relatively
low, probably only a few thousand over the past year. This type of
warfare bears mainly cruelly and disproportionately on the popu-
lace, which is caught between the warring parties.
Third, how are the MPLA and UNITA acquiring their weapons?
The government is purchasing weapons on the world market. It
has spent a considerable amount of money on arms, equipment,
and training since mid-1992.
There are indications it is receiving a variety of lethal assistance,
including small arms, aircraft ordnance, ammunition, armored ve-
hicles, and technical assistance in maintaining its equipment.
Much of this is coming through international arms dealers.
If you wish, I can provide you country-specific data, but on a
Most of UNITA's current arms are those hidden during the pre-
vious demobilization period and captured from government forces
and stock piles which it seized after the fighting broke out again.
However, in 1992, UNITA seized control of most of the lucrative
diamond mining areas of northern Angola. It, therefore, has dia-
monds to sell for hard currency to purchase arms on the inter-
national market. These arms end up crossing into Angola by land
and sometimes by air from neighboring states.
For example, there have been press reports of transport planes
from South Africa's nominally independent black home lands
ferrying weapons to Zaire that eventually find their way into
Please note, I have no reason to believe that any of these arms
shipments are officially sanctioned by the governments of Angola's
neighbors. But these are long and porous borders that are not