within the United Nations is both patronizing to the delegates in-
volved and patronizing to the entire organization.

My question basically is this: Stipulating that we all want a
United Nations to continue here in New York, to become stronger,
from an American point of view it is critical that we build public
support for the United Nations which has eroded to such a large
extent and it seems to me that the way to build public support for
the United Nations is, (a) to bring fiscal integrity to the body, and
(b) to point out as eloquently as you have, irresponsible behavior
whenever we find it.

If my assumptions are accurate, would you agree that those of us
who would like to see some fiscal discipline within the United Na-
tions, far from attacking and undermining the United Nations, are
in fact working toward a greater degree of respect and, therefore,
support on the part of the American people for the United Nations.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Congressman Lantos. I
feel that very deeply. Let me say that I think for example, Senator
Moynihan being at the United Nations as he was during the dread-
ful season that the General Assembly adopted its sick formula, Zi-
onism is racism, was confronted very clearly with the need to
make, to combat that, that immoral act, and that immoral slogan
as effectively as he could, to call it by its own name, which is bigot-
ry and revolting, in fact.

I think that this whole process of the delegitimization of Israel
by the passage of Zionism is racism resolution, was a landmark,
has been surely one of the United Nations most dismal hours.

Unfortunately, it didn't go on for an hour; it is a process that
went on for more than a decade and which gathered both steam
and venom as it progressed.

I say that one may think you know that words don't matter and
so what, the United Nations adopts a resolution. I was very struck
by what I encountered in Burundi last year when I was there head-
ing the U.S. delegation to the celebration of Burundi's 20th anni-
versary.

They had a long parade. The parade lasted some 6 hours, in fact,
and many of the people of Burundi were present who took part in



80

the parade and I think had slogans and floats which celebrated
most of the activities and occupations in Burundi. In the midst of
this very, very constructive celebration, happy celebration of Bu-
rundi's People's Society Government, suddenly there came a large
banner, 6 foot wide, at least, and 3 or 4 feet high, which says "Zion-
ism is racism."

Here in the center of Africa, in a place, to put it mildly, where
Zionism could hardly be an item, we should say the State of Israel
should hardly be a high item in their consciousness, much less in
their hit list.

We encountered this extraordinary slogan. What was it, that is
cultural dissemination? It is simply I think that hate-filled acts like
that spread around the world and seep into the consciousness of
peoples in very remote places.

I think it is very important to face the destructiveness of hateful
rhetoric. I think it is very important to oppose U.N. actions when
they are antidemocratic, anti-West, anti-Israel.

When I first came to the United Nations, in the Security Council
more than half of our total time was spent in attacks on Israel; in
fact, both the Security Council and General Assembly. It is quite
extraordinary.

This had nothing to do, by the way, with the Lebanese action. It
was well in advance of that or any of the more controversial poli-
cies.

It was simply a major effort of the delegitimization of a member
state. There was effort to suspend Israeli participation, to expel
Israel from the institution.

Last year we launched — we, the United States undertook — a very
strong campaign against that. We had the help of other countries.
We barely defeated it.

I think it was very important for us to have talked clearly about
that problem to have faced what it was we were dealing with, to
face the extent to which it violates and perverts the United Na-
tions itself, violating the charters and perverts the organization.

I think that if we are committed to the United Nations, what we
are committed to is not a building; it is not a particular program.
What we are committed to is the charter of the United Nations
and the principles under the charter and which we affirmed in
signing that treaty and I believe that those who are uncommitted
to the United Nations will work as hard as we can to try to keep
the organization faithful to those principles.

Mr. Lantos. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like to take you
back to the Korean Airline episode and ask you what your analysis
is for the reluctance that several member states demonstrated in
being unwilling to go along with what appeared to most of us as a
very modest and reasoned statement?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes. I would begin by saying that I
think that resolution was moderate; it was a very moderate resolu-
tion which many countries felt was in fact too restrained in its
characterization of shooting down of the Korean airliner.

The countries, the politics of the UN, I said it was like a State
legislature; the politics of the United Nations tends to be dominat-
ed by blocs. That is even true in the Security Council, and some



81

nations, many nations in fact, just vote regularly with one or the
other of blocs and very rarely deviate from them.

The countries which abstained in that case are countries which
very, very rarely vote with any position that the Western nations
take where the Soviets are taking a different position.

That is to say, they virtually never vote against the position
taken by the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc.

That is just a fact. It is unfortunate, but it is true.

I may say we have made a bit of progress in encouraging coun-
tries to consider issues on their merits and to vote issues on their
merits and not simply reflectively as members of the bloc. I would
like to say in the Security Council on this Korean airliner vote,
there are 8 members of the 15 members of the Security Council
who are also members of the nonalined caucus and 5 of those mem-
bers of the nonalined caucus voted in favor of the resolution.

Only three, in fact, either abstained or voted no.

Mr. Lantos. You mentioned the Soviet Union a minute ago.
There has been a great deal of speculation about the impact of Mr.
Gromyko's nonappearance at the current session of the United Na-
tions. In the first place, for the record, am I correct in assuming
that it was his choice not to come entirely; that we were fully pre-
pared to receive him, and in fact provided a perfectly secure and
safe and comfortable place for him to land; so he was not excluded,
is that right?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No, no, he certainly was not. We pro-
vided alternative landing facilities which were convenient and
nearby and perfectly secure.

Mr. Lantos. Would you care to speculate as to why he chose not
to come? Was it to avoid the embarrassment of the post-Korea epi-
sode?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. You know, Congressman Lantos, I
have been very interested in speculating privately, quietly, to
myself, about why he chose not to come. I think it is the most in-
teresting question of the season, so to speak. I feel sure that it was
not because he thought there would be inconvenience or lack of se-
curity for him if he came. A large Soviet delegation did come after
all.

I think maybe he thought he would be very uncomfortable and
sought to make propaganda points, turn the debate away from the
horror of the act of shooting down the airliner, some sort of conten-
tion that the United States wouldn't let him in or something.

I think it is also possible that there are interesting processes
going on inside the political elite at this point which we are not
fully aware of.

In other words, what I am saying is that I think there may be
reasons of internal Soviet politics which may have affected Secre-
tary Gromyko's decision not to come. I think that.

We also don't know why the Soviets requested a postponement of
their speech last week, the day of the President's speech, I guess
they also postponed their own speech until October 4.

We still really do not know who will deliver that speech or what
it will say. I think there are very strong indications in the wind
that suggest there are interesting machinations going on inside the
Soviet Government.



82

Mr. Lantos. I have two quick questions. The first one relates to
the quotas of the U.S. national level, representing at all levels in
appropriate numbers, what is the status of that?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. That is informal.

Mr. Lantos. I know.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. We don't think that we have as many
high level officials inside the U.N. bureaucracy as we should have.
We certainly don't have as many as we used to have. However, in
all fairness I would like to say that most other nations feel the
same way. They feel they don't have enough, as many as they de-
serve, or certainly would like to have.

It was inevitable that, as the organization grew in size, our share
of the bureaucracy should decline. We continuously work with the
Secretariat to try to increase the number of Americans at high
levels.

We are not satisfied. We will go on working on it.

Mr. Lantos. My final question relates to the office of the Secre-
tary General, not to the individual operation of that office.

A short while ago several of us had breakfast with the Secretary
General who, in response to my questions, stated that he is deter-
mined not to run for reelection.

As you know, he has stated this publicly and privately on count-
less occasions.

Leaving aside the fact of the Presidential incumbent, do you
think that there is merit in fixing the term of the Secretary Gener-
al at one term so as to obviate his need to curry favor with the
powers that basically determine whether he can be reelected or
not.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes, I would like to say that I firmly,
on constitutional grounds, oppose the one 6-year term for the presi-
dent, but I think I support one 5-year term for the Secretary Gen-
eral.

The Secretary General is not supposed to be a political officer, a
political leader, and I do believe, unlike the President, who is sup-
posed to be a political leader, I do believe that the possibility of re-
election does tend to politicize the office and the men somewhat
and I think that the current Secretary General's position on that is
an appropriate one.

Mr. Lantos. Final question, Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Assuming
that this administration will remain in office for another 4 years,
which I fervently hope will not be the case, are you prepared to
serve for another 4 years in your present post?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No, I am not, Congressman Lantos.

Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Madam Ambassador, you mentioned WHO as a well-managed
agency. What is your view of how the Senate cut would affect abili-
ty of the World Health Organization to carry out its major respon-
sibility, especially its role in the Children's Health Revolution?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Yatron, I couldn't
answer with specific regard to a specific program like children's
health field without more investigation in fact.

But, I would say that obviously the current Senate resolution
would impose a substantial cut and a substantial cut would be felt



83

by the organization and its programs in a substantial way. I don't
have any doubt about that at all.

Mr. Yatron. One final question. If the Congress adopts the
Senate amendment, would you recommend to the President that he
veto the bill, or would you expect him to veto the bill?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman, I hope you will forgive
me but I always say I refuse to comment on my recommendations
to the President.

I think I have made clear what my position on that amendment
is and I certainly would share those views with the President.
There is no doubt about that.

Mr. Yatron. Well, we thank you, Madam Ambassador.

I have three additional questions from Mr. Wolpe, a member of
the full committee, who would like a response for the record. They
are specifically related to Africa. So we will submit those to you
and we would appreciate it if you would respond to those ques-
tions. 1

I want to say in conclusion, thank you again for testifying before
the subcommittee and also for your very generous commitment of
time. We look forward to working with you toward a constructive
solution to the U.N. budget problem.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Congressman Yatron.

Mr. Yatron. The subcommittee stands adjourned subject to the
call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to re-
convene at the call of the Chair.]



1 See appendix 6



APPENDIX 1

Kassebaum Amendment

Restrictions on assessed payments to the United Nations

Sec. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States as-

sessed payments for the calendar year 1984 to the United Nations, the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organi-
zation, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the International Labor Orga-
nization shall not exceed its assessed payments to each such organization for the
calendar year 1980. Such payments to each such organization for the calendar years
1985, 1986, and 1987 shall be no more than 90 per centum, 80 per centum, and 70
per centum, respectively, of the amount of the assessments paid to each such organi-
zation for the calendar year 1980.

(b) No payment may be made to an organization referred to in subsection (a) for
the calendar years 1985, 1986, and 1987 unless payments made pursuant to this sec-
tion are accepted by the respective organization as payment in full of the United
States assessment towards the finanicial support of such organization.

(85)



APPENDIX 2

Department of State,
Washington, D.C., October 1, 1983.
Hon. Gus Yatron,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations,
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have been asked to provide you with a statement of the
Administration's position on the Kassebaum Amendment to the Department of
State's Authorization Bill.

The Administration opposes this Amendment because it would place the United
States in breach of its international obligations in a manner that would jeopardize
United States voting rights in the affected international organizations. We support
authorization of the amounts originally requested.

While we share many of the concerns that precipitated this action and agree the
United Nations has its deficiencies, we feel the United States interests are best
served by constructive participation in the United Nations' family of organizations.
Sincerely,

Kenneth W. Dam,

Acting Secretary.

(86)



APPENDIX 3

Text of Press Release Dated September 19, 1983, by the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations Regarding Ambassador Li-
chenstein's Remarks

Ambassador Lichenstein's remarks this morning in the United Nations Host
Country Relations Committee should be understood in the broader context in which
they were made. He was responding to a hostile attack by the Soviet delegate who
charged, among other things, that the United States was not a suitable host country
for the United Nations because it was conspiring to violate its obligations to the
U.N. The same theme, it should be recalled, was touched on in the TASS statement
last Saturday which announced that Foreign Minister Gromyko would not be at-
tending in the session of the U.N. General Assembly that begins tomorrow.

Ambassador Lichenstein called these charges "A palpable falsehood," as indeed
they are. The United States believes that, in making arrangements for Mr. Gromy-
ko's safe and prompt arrival here, it is fully living up to both the letter and the
spirit of our obligations as Host Country. These obligations, we believe, do not
permit U.N. diplomats to fly in any time, anywhere, or by any means they choose.
They do mean that convenient, safe, normal travel to and from the U.N. should be
available. Just such travel is available to Mr. Gromyko. He is free to travel to the
U.S. by any commerical airline in the world other than Aeroflot, which other Soviet
delegates to the General Assembly will do. Or, if he prefers, he is free to arrive by
Soviet military aircraft and land at a convenient, near-by airbase. In fact, the U.S.
decision regarding Mr. Gromyko would have allowed him to enter the U.S. even
after security consideriations had led the governors of New York and New Jersey to
close civilian airports to Aeroflot planes.

The United States takes its respsonsibilities as Host Country seriously, and
worked very hard at making conditions here as secure and pleasant as possible. To
suggest, as the Soviet delegate did today, that the U.S. is unfit to be Host Country
because of Mr. Gromyko's decision not to come to this General Assembly, is in fact a
provocation— to which Ambassador Lichenstein responded accordingly. His remarks
should be understood as a response to a deliberate provocation, not as any new de-
parture in U.S. policy.

(87)



APPENDIX 4

Remarks of President Reagan to Regional Editors and Broad-
casters on September 21, 1983, Regarding Ambassador Lichen-
stein's Statement About the United Nations Leaving the
United States

Question. What about the U.N.? We have been hearing a lot about the U.N., that
it would move for (inaudible). What are your thoughts?

The President. Well, I think that the gentleman who spoke for us the other
day — we're three questions past that last question here. (Laughter.) I think the gen-
tleman who spoke the other day had the hearty approval of most people in America
in his suggestion that we weren't asking anyone to leave, but if they chose to leave,
goodby. Jeane Kirkpatrick has made an interesting suggestion also that should be
thought about. But maybe all of those delegates should have six months in the
United Nations' meetings in Moscow and then six months in New York, and it
would give them an opportunity to see two ways of life.

Question. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. And we'd permit them.

(88)





United Nat


ions




Gross


Take Home


Rank


Salary


Pay


P-l


25,629


22,595


P-2


33,551


28,512


P-3


41,734


34, 319


P-4


51,526


40,970


P-5


64,599


49,256


D-l


73,261


54,281


D-2


86,107


61,270



APPENDIX 5

Comparison of U.N. and U.S. Civil Service Salaries and Take

Home Pay

United States

Gross Take Home
Rank Salary Pay

GS- 9 20,256 17,420

GS-11 24,508 20,832

GS-12 29,374 24,234

GS-13 34,930 27,944

GS-14 41,277 32,198

GS-15 48,553 36,900

SES 63,800 47,850

SES 63,800 47,850

"Gross Salary" for the UN includes net salary at step 1 of
the grade shown for an employee with one or more dependents,
corresponding staff assessment, and post adjustment at the
level paid in New York City. "Take home pay" deducts staff
assessment from gross figures- No allowances are included in
the take home pay figures, nor are retirement contributions or
other payroll deductions. On the U.S. side, gross salary is
the amount payable for Step 1 of GS grades and level 4 of the
SES; take home pay is an average after tax figure, based on IRS
tables .

GS-9 and P-l are equivalent grades. Higher numbered P and
GS grades are nearly but not exactly comparable. The SES is an
equivalent for the UN's D grades. Take home pay is about 30
per cent greater for a P-l than a GS-9; the same advantage is
enjoyed by a D-2 compared to an SES employee.

Submitted by Ambassador Kirkpatrick
(89)



32-616 0-84



APPENDIX 6

Letter Dated Dec. 2, 1983 to Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick,
Department of State, From Subcommittee Chairman Yatron

December 2, 1983

The Honorable Jeane Kirkpatrick
U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ambassador Kirkpatrick:

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for taking the time out
from your busy schedule to testify before the Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations on the United States' role in the United
Nations.

As I indicated at the end of our October 3rd hearing, I have three
additional questions for which Congressman Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Africa, would like a response.

The questions are as follows:

1. During the past two years there has developed a pattern of delayed pay-
ments of voluntary contributions (specifically Africa-related) by the U.S.
Mission to the U.N. to the U.N. Secretariat. Certain of these payments were
originally delayed due to an investigation requested and carried out by the
Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the U.S. Mission to the U.N.
If it has been completed, what were the results?

2. Do these delays, which are often 6 or more months behind their obligation,
have anything to do with the Congressional prohibition on giving funds to

the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO)? It is our understanding
that assurances have been given by the U.N. Secretariat that American con-
tributions are not going to other U.N. support funds for SWAPO. Is that your
understanding as well?

3. Recently, it has come to our attention that fiscal year 1983 funds
authorized and appropriated for the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa have
not been forwarded to the U.N. by the State Department. A good part of these
funds are used to provide adequate counsel to black South African defendants
who would not otherwise have access to appropriate representation before the
South African courts. Can you tell us why these funds' obligation has been
delayed since none of these funds are directed to SWAPO?

Again, I want to thank you for your appearance before the Subcommittee.

SyicerelyT}

Gus Yatror] ]
Chairman \J

Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations

(90)




APPENDIX 7

Questions Submitted to Ambassador Kirkpatrick From
Subcommittee Chairman Yatron, and Responses Thereto

During the past two years, there has developed a pattern of
delayed payment of voluntary contributions (specifically
Africa-related) by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. to the U.N.
Secretariat. Certain of these payments were originally
delayed due to an investigation requested and carried out
by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the
U.S. Mission to the U.N. Is this investigation still
.underway? If it has been completed, what were the results?



In the formal sense of the word, there has been no
â– investigation" of the Africa-related U.N. funds, i.e., the
U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa
(UNETPSA), the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa (UNTFSA),
and the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN).
However, we have had to delay the payment of the U.S.
voluntary contributions to these U.N. Funds, and in the
meantime, to withhold a part of the funds appropriated by
Congress for some of them, to determine how much, if any,
of the U.S. contribution would have to be held back either
as a precautionary action or permanently because of the
proportionate share reduction provisions with respect to
SWAPO in Section 203 of P.L. 97-216, and Section 154 of
P.L. 97-377.



92



Q. Do these delays, which often are 6 or more months behind

their obligation, have anything to do with the congression-
al prohibition on giving funds to the South West African
People's Organizations (SWAPO)? It is our understanding
that assurances have been given by the U.N. Secretariat
that U.S. contributions are not going to other U.N. support
funds for SWAPO. Is that your understanding as well?

A. See the previous answer. In the case of UNIN, for example,
the U.N. was not able to give a final accounting of its
SWAPO-related expenses for 1982 until mid-July 1983. We
have now identified $6,076 of "programs. . .for SWAPO" within
the overall UNIN program and, as a consequence, are with-
holding $1,288 (21.2%) from our total FY-1982 pledge of
$500,000.



Recently, it has come to our attention that fiscal year
1983 funds authorized and appropriated for the U.N. Trust
Fund for South Africa have not been forwarded to the U.N.
by the State Department. A good part of these funds are
used to provide adequate counsel to black South African
defendants who would not otherwise have access to appro-
priate representation in South African courts. Can you
tell us why these funds' obligation has been delayed, since