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Ballistic missile defense : hearings held February 28 and March 14, 1996 online

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[H.N.S.C. No. 104-37]



Y4.SE2/1 A: 995-96/37



Ballistic flissile Defense, H.N.S.C....

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE



COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION



HEARINGS HELD
FEBRUARY 28 AND MARCH 14, 1996




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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1996



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053813-0



\



[H.N.S.C. No. 104-37]



Y4,SE2/1 A: 995-96/37

Ballistic Hissile Defense, H.N.S.C

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE



COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



HEARINGS HELD
FEBRUARY 28 AND MARCH 14, 1996




'■*/.



■s?



U.S. GOVERNME>fT PRINTING OFFICE
35-395 WASHINGTON : 1996



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053813-0



HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fourth Congress



FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman



BOB STUMP, Arizona

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio

HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

ROBERT K. DORNAN, California

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

RANDY "DUKE" CUNTS'INGHAM, California

STEVE BUYER. Indiana

PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts

TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida

JOHN M. McHUGH, New York

JAMES TALENT, Missouri

TERRY EVERETT. Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT. Maryland

HOWARD "BUCK" McKEON, California

RON LEWIS, K. ,itucky

J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

SAXBY CHAMBLISS. Georgia

VAN HILLEARY. Tennessee

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

WALTER B. JONES, JR, North Carolina

JAMES B. LONGLEY, Jr., Maine

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas

RICHARD 'DOC' HASTINGS, Washington

Andrew K. ELUS, Staff Director

David Trachtenberg. Professional Staff Member

Thomas Donnelly, Professional Staff Member

WiLUAM Marsh, Staff Assistant



RONALD V. DELLUMS, California

G.V. (SONNT) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi

PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

OWEN PICKETT. Virginia

LANE EVANS. Illinois

JOHN TANNER. Tennessee

GLEN BROWDER. Alabama

GENE TAYLOR. Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE. Hawaii

CHET EDWARDS, Texas

FRANK TEJEDA, Texas

MARTIN T. MEEHAN. Massachusetts

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam

JANE HARMAN, California

PAUL McHALE. Pennsylvania

PETE GEREN, Texas

PETE PETERSON. Florida

WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana

ROSA L. DeLAURO. Connecticut

MIKE WARD, Kentucky

PATRICK J. KENNEDY. Rhode Island



(II)



CONTENTS



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
1996

Page

Wednesday, February 28, Ballistic Missile Defense 1

Thursday, March 14, Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization 125

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Dellums, Hon. Ronald V., a Representative from California, Ranking Minority
Member, National Security Committee 3, 132

Spence, Hon. Floyd, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Na-
tional Security Committee:

Statement 1, 125

Prepared statement 127

Spratt, Hon. John M., Jr., a Representative from South Carolina, Ranking

Minority Member, Military Research and Development Subcommittee 4

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a R-^prcsentative from Pennsylvania, Chairman, Military

Research and Development Subcommittee 6

PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED EN PERSON OR SUBMITTED
WRITTEN STATEMENTS

Cooper, Richard N., Chairman, National Intelligence Council: Prepared state-
ment 112

Gaffney, Frank J., Jr., Director, Center for Security Policy:

Statement 17

Prepared statement 23

Graham, William R., former Director, White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and Science Adviser to the President:

Statement 28

Prepared statement 33

Krepon, Michael, President, Henry L. Stimson Center:

Statement 148

Prepared statement 152

Payne, Keith B., President, National Institute for Public Policy, Faculty,
Georgetown University, National Security Studies Graduate Program:

Statement 37

Prepared statement 44

Perle, Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy:

Statement 161

Prepared statement 165

Woolsey, R. James, former Director of Central Intelligence:

Statement 133

Prepared statement 139

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letters submitted for the record 7

The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 83

(III)



BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE



House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 28, 1996.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of
the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA CHAIRMAN, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

The Chairman. The meeting will please come to order.

Before commencing, I want to take care of one administrative
matter on behalf of the distinguished gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Peterson. After consulting with Mr. Dellums, I ask unanimous con-
sent that effective today, Mr. Peterson be assigned as a member of
the Subcommittee on Military Personnel in order to fill an existing
vacancy.

Is there objection?

Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.

I want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for being with
us this afternoon. The committee is beginning a 5- week stretch of
hearings leading up to the Easter break in April. While the full
committee and the subcommittees will address a range of topics in
the weeks ahead, the topic of today's hearing, ballistic missile de-
fense, will once again be an issue of great interest and focus.

As everyone knows, the President vetoed the defense authoriza-
tion bill last December, due primarily to the legislation's direction
that a national missile defense system be deployed by the year
2003. As I commented in the veto override debate, on a political
level the veto did serve to more clearly define the stark differences
between the Clinton administration and this Congress on key na-
tional security issues, such as ballistic missile defense.

It is unfortunate that an issue as fundamentally important as
whether or not the American people should be defended against the
threat of ballistic missiles in the decade ahead has become so con-
troversial. But that is where we find ourselves.

Adding further to the controversy, the Department of Defense
announced last week that they do not intend to spend all of the
funding appropriated for national missile defense programs this fis-
cal year, as well as the surprising decision to delay several of the
most promising theater missile defense programs, an area in which
I did not believe there was much controversy until now.

The combination of the President's strong opposition to deploying
a national missile defense and now an apparently conscious deci-

(1)



sion to scale back theater missile defense programs leaves us plen-
ty to begin sorting through. This committee has a responsibility to
raise the visibility of a important security issue and, through dis-
cussion, debate, and even disagreement, to hopefully inform and
educate the citizens of this country. Citizens who, interestingly
enough, the polling data indicates believe that this country already
has a defense against ballistic missiles.

One of the principal reasonings behind the President's veto was
his assertion that there was not a significant enough threat to the
United States in the next decade to warrant deployment of a na-
tional missile defense system. This afternoon's hearing is intended
to explore this very issue of the threat in more detail. I would also
note, having read through our witnesses' statements, there is some
interest in the issue of whether or not the intelligence community
has downgraded the threat in a more recent national intelligence
estimate completed last year.

Because this is a complex issue involving highly classified analy-
sis, and the question of politicization has been raised, the commit-
tee will have to address it in a more comprehensive and detailed
fashion in the future. To assist the committee in its analysis of this
issue, I have written to GAO and asked for their independent as-
sessment of the recent NIE in comparison to both the past intel-
ligence assessments as well as relative to the broader body of au-
thoritative unclassified analysis. Once GAO has completed its
work, the committee will be in a stronger position to pursue the
issue of intelligence estimates in more depth.

I would also like to say I welcome the remarkable speed with
which the intelligence community had declassified much of the re-
cent NIE for the purposes of Mr. Cooper's testimony later this
afternoon. Last year, I wrote to then active CIA Director, Admiral
Studeman, and urged greater efforts to provide declassified analy-
ses on issues such as proliferation, weapons of mass destruction,
and missile delivery systems. While polite, the response I received
about the sensitivity of information of sources and the lack of sub-
sequent unclassified analysis speaks for itself.

So now, almost 1 year later, the essence of the most recent classi-
fied NIE has been suddenly declassified for testimony today. It is
not enough to permit comprehensive or comparative analysis in an
unclassified forum, but knowing how willing the intelligence com-
munity have apparently become to declassif3dng heretofore sen-
sitive analysis is encouraging.

Accordingly, let me introduce our panel of witnesses for today:
Mr. Frank Gaffney, director. Center for Security Policy; Dr. Wil-
liam Graham, the former Director of the White House Office of
Science and Technology; and Keith Payne, president of the Na-
tional Institute for Public Policy.

Following our first panel today and the testimony and the Mem-
bers' questions, the committee will next hear from Mr. Richard
Cooper, chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Before turning it over to our witnesses, let me recognize the gen-
tleman from California, the ranking Democrat, Mr. Dellums, for
any comments he would like to make, and due to the interest and
involvement of the R&D Subcommittee on this issue, following Mr.
Dellums, I would invite Mr. Spratt, the subcommittee's ranking



Democrat, followed by Mr. Weldon, the subcommittee's chairman,
to make whatever brief opening remarks they would Hke to make'
Mr. Dellums.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM CALIFORNLV, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

Mr. Dellums. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman and mem-
bers of the committee and distinguished panelists.

I tried to listen carefully to your opening remarks, Mr. Chair-
man. First, I want to join with you on behalf of my colleagues on
this side of the aisle in welcoming our witnesses today. To the de-
gree that they are able to shed light on the factual and policy is-
sues before us, they would help us to understand the timing of any
emerging missile threats to the United States and its forces and
the best policies and programs we might pursue to discourage
deter, or defeat those threats.

I will save my substantive questions, Mr. Chairman, until after
our witnesses have given their presentations, but I feel compelled
at the outset to raise a concern and to attempt to put this hearing
in a context that in this gentleman's humble opinion has not yet
been properly established. It is just weeks since we have completed
the conference on the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill
One of the principal points of contention in that bill was the con-
flict over the need, the scope, and the scale of missile defenses and
the relative priority as between theater and national missile de-
fense. No small part of that debate, Mr. Chairman, was played out
between those who wanted to break out of the ABM Treaty and
those who believe it remains a useful agreement in pursuit of U.S.
national security interests, and one which allows for deployment of
an effective national missile defense system that is, indeed treaty
compliant.

There I speak to the comments made by the distinguished gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, and the distinguished gen-
tleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt, who come to this point
from different vantage points, but both attempt to move toward a
deployment of a treaty compliant system.

While reasonable people may disagree on these matters, the
issue unfortunately became unduly politicized as well, and by start-
mg out as we are today, it is my opinion that, and I fear that the
issue will become even more politicized.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as all of you re-
call, last year I requested that the committee receive an intel-
ligence briefing on the threat issue, an unconstrained intelligence
briefing where we could have a significant back and forth on the
issue of the intelligence threat. We all understand the difference
between classified and unclassified. I think to the maximum extent
that we can unclassify material so that American people under-
stand what we are dealing with, that is significant and it is impor-
tant. It IS also true that in the real world, in a classified briefing,
there are subtleties and nuances that also need to be understood
if we are, indeed, to carry out our responsibihties in these signifi-
cant matters.



However, despite that request, I am unaware of any such brief-
ing. If we are serious about investigating this matter, and this is
in no way meant as disrespect to our distinguished panelists who
are obviously learned and significantly involved in this issue, this
is the logical place from which to start. It would have given the
committee a chance to hear from the intelligence community and
to question the range of their analysis and its underpinnings and
conclusions. There certainly is a role for outside witnesses, and I
would underscore including those who differ in their analysis from
the members of the panel before us today, but in my opinion their
testimony is better received after a classified briefing from the in-
telligence community on this issue. This is why I am somewhat dis-
turbed at the format that we are engaged in — that we are pursuing
at this point.

Whatever our partisan differences, and we have a right to have
partisan differences, that is the nature of the beast, we have had
a long-standing common interest on this committee, however, in
avoiding actions that needlessly hamper our ability to develop ef-
fective bipartisan legislation to meet our national security require-
ments. We cannot do so when the committee does not operate from
the same information base.

I am a firm believer that we should all be operating from the
same information base and beginning from the same page. From
there we can spring to our different partisan perspectives, different
intellectual differences on the issue, but it seems to me we should
spring from the same information base, developed and critiqued by
the intelligence professionals and other national security profes-
sionals who toil every day in their service on behalf of the country.

We cannot do so in legislation, for example, if it is in advance
of the briefings and hearings, and without any input from the mi-
nority. It puts the cart before the horse. It allows obvious questions
with respect to whether there is a real commitment to develop
some good faith effective bipartisan effort in this regard when you
have already fashioned the legislation. We cannot do so when the
regular order of committee business is so inverted.

So while I welcome today's witnesses and will look forward to
their testimony, and listen with rapt attention, it is my fervent
hope, Mr. Chairman, that these other elements of the committee
process will fall into place as well. And with those opening re-
marks, I am appreciative of the time granted me, and I yield back
the balance of my time.

The Chairman. Mr. Spratt.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, RANKING MINORITY MEM-
BER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUB-
COMMITTEE

Mr. Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to open the hearing.

This hearing comes first, even ahead of the fiscal year 1997
budget, which is normally our first order of business, and I suppose
that is prompted by the presentation last week of the ballistic mis-
sile defense plan, both theater missile defense and national missile
defense, which Secretary Perry and Secretary Kaminski laid out. I



had hoped that the proposal they made, which did not go as far as
I myself would have gone, would not have become a bone of conten-
tion between us on different sides of the aisle and between the
Congress and the administration. Because I think what they have
laid out is an evolutionary plan and a basis for cooperation that we
ought to be willing to work with.

What they have essentially laid out is a three-plus-three plan, a
plan that positions the United States for deployment of a ballistic
missile defense system without finally committing us to deploy-
ment. This proposal need not protract deployment of any ground
base intercept system we would want to deploy based on the best
technology, because there is still development to be done. It will
take at least 3 or 4 years to be brought to completion and it does
not by any means preclude a decision to deploy.

It does not take us down a cul-de-sac by any means. Once we
have assessed the capability of the system that is developed under
the plan that has been proposed, taken stock of it, rigorously and
robustly tested it, then we, the Congress along with the adminis-
tration, whatever administration is then in office, can make a deci-
sion as to whether or not we want to buy it and deploy it.

For any such system to be capable, robust, not just a light de-
fense system, it will probably need to be complemented by satellite-
based sensors and low-Earth orbit, so-called Brilliant Eyes, that
will require, track, and guide the interceptors to the incoming re-
entry vehicles. That particular technology is not just money driven,
it is technology driven.

The development of the cryocoolers for the infrared focal plane is
going to take time. Ask the people developing it and they will tell
you money will only do so much. It will take time to bring them
to fruition.

So the decision laid out is partly driven by the budget. Money is
limited for defense, more so than ever before. It is partly driven by
technology. It can only be pushed so fast. And it is partly driven
by the threat. Fortunately, I think we can say that the existing
threat is diminished, receding. Certainly, will recede if we can rat-
ify START II and the Russian Duma and begin reducing the num-
ber of warheads that now constitute a threat against us from a lit-
tle over 8,000 to a little over 3,000. That single step will accomplish
more than anything we can envision ballistic missile defense doing
in the next decade, if we can get that accomplished. So that should
be the first order of business.

As to the emerging threat, we have asked Dr. Cooper, who is the
chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and his adviser from
the Central Intelligence Agency, to testify today as to what they
perceive to be the emerging threat for two purposes. One is to lay
out the threat, because I think they will produce a report that
shows it is well over the horizon; and, second, to show you that
they have come to this conclusion deliberately, objectively, and in
a disinterested manner.

I think it is a timely hearing, even though it is a little out of se-
quence with the rest of the budget. I take it this will be another
major issue this year, but I dearly hope we can reach some consen-
sus this year and go forward with this program on a stable plat-
form.



Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Weldon.

STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me begin by
thanking you for scheduhng this first in the series of hearings on
this very vital national issue, and that is how we should approach
missile defense in this country, and thanks to our witnesses.

Let me reiterate what happened last year in terms of strong bi-
partisan support in this committee and in this Congress for the sin-
gle biggest change to the Clinton administration defense budget re-
quest among any other that was made. When our bill, the plus-up
of almost $800 million in the missile defense areas, passed out of
this committee, it passed by a vote of 48 to 3. When our bill hit
the House floor with that same plus-up in priorities outlined, it
passed with 300 Members of Congress voting in favor. I have not
seen those numbers in the 10 years I have been here. That was a
very strong statement.

We carefully crafted the final authorization conference language
in light of the administration's concerns with the ABM Treaty and
we had some dog fights, but in the end we removed the obstacles
that the administration presented to us in saying our proposal for
an NMD system was, in fact, not treaty compliant. Unfortunately,
that statement was not verified publicly until after President Clin-
ton vetoed the bill using that excuse as part of his reason for the
veto. In fact, it was in the public record when General O'Neill stat-
ed, as has been stated by General Gamer in the Army and General
Linhard in the Air Force, that we have two variants that can pro-
vide for us a single site national missile capability that is, in fact,
treaty compliant, yet that was the reason the administration first
said they would veto the defense authorization bill.

We fought that battle. We did not have the votes to override the
President's veto, but our goal this year was to work with the ad-
ministration and with our good friends on the other side, many in
the missile defense debate. We wrote letters as you know, Mr.
Chairman, to Dr. Kaminski, to General O'Neill, and to Secretary
Perry asking to be brought in as decisions were made about a mis-
sile defense program for this year. We did that in good faith. We
sent those letters, which I have copies of and will submit for the
record, in an earnest attempt to work with the administration.

[The information follows:]



COMMITTEE ON SCIEN



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