tee and in the Senate Finance Committee. They were debated here
in Congress for nearly 4 years, and they were agreed to in the larg-
est conference between the two Houses of Congress in American
history.
These are the rules by which your committee and the Senate
committee and the Congress will ultimately measure whether the
agreement reached in the Uruguay round, we hope this year, is a
good agreement. The idea of an agreement being good and desir-
able is not an abstraction; it is in the United States law.
The law lays out your objectives. The law lays out our objectives.
These are our country's objectives in trade policy. We have not yet
achieved those objectives. The Uruguay round is the best, probably
the only, way to achieve them.
Now, I recognize there is concern here at home, as well as in
other countries, that the United States Government and the pri-
vate sector of the United States have lost interest in this round.
This is not true.
The round has support in this country because it means jobs,
prosperity, and more exports and sales. Expanding trade is clearly
the way to prosperity.
We have to keep our eyes on the main chance, and the main
chance for expanding jobs, for expanding exports in the United
States of goods and services is the Uruguay round.
We in the business community know what expanded exports can
mean in terms of adding more and better iobs in our economy. The
round offers the best hope of our being able to expand exports, and
the round cannot succeed without renewal of fast-track at this
time. So we support negotiating authority to enable the executive
branch to finish the round and send it to Congress for its review.
We need to keep the pressure on for that ambitious agreement.
In that regard, we in the MTN Coalition have always been there
to urge American negotiators to stay there, to stay in there pitch-
ing, to urge the Congress to give the necessary support and provide
the American public with information it needs to understand what
is going on in the most complex trade negotiations in history. We
will be there this year, too, if you renew the President's authority
on fast track.
Finally, I am aware that the whole institution of the fast track
has become an issue in Congress. However, this is not the time to
debate that issue. President Clinton is only asking for a narrow
33
window of time in which to complete work begun nearly 7 years
ago, under a mandate enacted nearly 5 years ago.
The administration has now stated it will request fast-track au-
thority to negotiate future trade agreements such as with Chile,
other areas of Latin America, and perhaps elsewhere, after Con-
gress passes the NAFTA in 1993, which I believe it will. That is
the time to give fast track a thorough review, and I believe person-
ally that it needs a thorough review. That is also the time to
rethink our future trade policy and perhaps amend the Trade Act
of 1988.
If we finish the Uruguay round this year, God willing, we should
concentrate on how best to continue the process of trade liberaliza-
tion and start attacking some of the new issues that have been put
off for a decade or more.
For example, in paragraph 16 of the Trade Act of 1988, it talks
about tax discrimination, border taxes, direct taxes versus indirect
taxes. With the administration's decision just the other day not to
file an amicus brief in the California unitary tax case, we will find
that the Europeans will have a lot of interest in getting into the
subject of tax discrimination. And we on our side of the Atlantic
have a lot of interest.
But we can't get to that kind of major issue in the Uruguay
round. We have got to finish the Uruguay round. We have got to
have fast-track authority to do that. And that is what we would
like from this committee.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement follows:]
34
America s Leadership in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF
HARRY FREEMAN
Executive Director, The MTM Coalition-/
Hearing on the President' 9 Request for Extension of
"Fast Track" Procedures for Uruguay Round Implementation
Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways & Means
Washington, D.C.
April 27, 1993
Mr. Chairman:
My message to you today may not grab headlines, but it
is nonetheless important to state as forcefully as possible: The
American business community still supports the Uruguay Round
effort . In fact, we in the MTN Coalition — representing about
14,000 businesses nationwide — believe that this is the year to
get a return on our investment of nearly seven years of work in
the Round.
I have absolutely no doubt that if the Administration's
request for a short, narrow renewal of negotiating authority is
denied, then the Round will fail. That is just a reality of this
negotiation. Therefore, the decision before this Subcommittee
today is whether to allow a last chance for the Uruguay Round to
be completed. I urge you to report favorably a bill implementing
the President's request as soon as possible.
The purpose of the MTN Coalition has always been, and
still is today, to provide all the support we can for the
Executive Branch and the Congress to achieve a broad and
ambitious agreement in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. What we mean when we say, "a broad and ambitious
agreement," is defined by the negotiating objectives set out by
Congress in the Trade Act of 1988.
Those 16 statutory negotiating objectives, which take
up 6 single-spaced pages of statutory text, set out the most
detailed and ambitious concept of the world trading system since
the Second World War.-/ These objectives are as valid today as
they were when enacted.
These objectives were not handed down by the White
House as holy writ to the country. They were developed here, in
the committees of the Congress. They were debated here in
Congress over a period of nearly four years, and they were agreed
to in one of the largest conferences between the two Houses of
Congress in American history. Most if not all of the MTN
The MTN Coalition was launched on May 15, 1990. Its
founding members were seventeen major American corporations.
In addition to those companies, our membership now includes
many of the major business federations in this country,
representing over 14,000 businesses in manufacturing,
agriculture, retailing, services and consumers. A copy of
the membership list of the MTN Coalition is attached to this
Statement as Exhibit 1.
A copy of Section lioi of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 is attached to this Statement as
Exhibit 2.
35
companies and trade associations worked hard for the enactr.ent ::"
the Trade Act of 1988; so did many of you.
These are your objectives, they are our objectives,
they are our country's objectives in trade . And we have not yet
achieved those objectives. The Uruguay Round is the best -
-aybe the only — way to achieve them.
Now, I recognize that there is concern here at home as
well in other countries that the United States government and the
private sector have lost interest in the Round. It is not true.
The Round has support in this country because it neans
jobs and prosperity. Expanding trade is clearly the way to
prosperity.
From 1986 onward, U.S. exports grew at an average rate
of 8 percent per year in volume terms, according to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Foreign sales contributed, on average,
more than a percentage point to growth per year during 1987 to
1992.-' Foreign sales accounted for just about all the jobs
created in the United States manufacturing sector in those five
years, ^/
That's a lot, but we must do better.
We in the business community know that expanded exports
is our best chance to add more and better jobs in this economy.
The Round offers the best hope of our being able to expand
exports, and the Round cannot succeed without the renewal of fast
track. So we support negotiating authority to enable the
Executive Branch to finish the Round.
Of course, the Round could fail, even if the President
gets the authority he needs. We certainly have said all along
that each of our member companies and trade associations is going
to reserve the right to evaluate the final deal on its merits.
But that is a question for the future. Right now, we
need to keep the pressure on for that ambitious agreement. In
that regard, we in the MTN Coalition have always been there to
urge American negotiators to stay in there pitching, to urge the
Congress to give the necessary support, and to provide the
American public with the information it needs to understand what
is going on in the most complex trade negotiations in history.
We will be there this year too, if you renew the President's
authority.
Finally, I am aware that the whole institution of the
fast track has become an issue in Congress. However, this is not
the time to debate that issue. President Clinton is only asking
for a narrow window of time in which to complete work begun
nearly seven years ago, under a mandate enacted nearly five years
ago.
In short, Mr. Chairman, we of the MTN Coalition think
President Clinton and Ambassador Kantor deserve a chance to
finish the job. We will work with you and the Administration to
get the best possible result for our country. We urge you to
support the President's request.
3. Please see, "Recent U.S. Export Performance in the
Developing World," Bruce Kasman, FRBNY Quarterly
Review/Winter 1992/93.
4. Please see "U.S. Jobs Supported by Merchandise Exports,
Lester Davis, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 1992.
EXHIBIT I
MTN COALITION MEMBERS
Chairman
William E. Brock
The Brock Group, Ltd.
Corporate Members
William W. Adams
Armstrong World Industries. Inc.
Louis Gerstner
IBM Corporation
Robert E. Allen
AT&T
DwayneO Andreas
Archer Daniels Midland Company
Edwin L. Ann
The Procter <t Gamble Company
Dexter F. Baker
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.
W.L. Lyons Brown, Jr.
Brown-Forman Corporation
L. D. DeSimone
Maunce R Greenberg
A/C. /nc.
Whitney MacMillan
( VgiH. /nr
Frank P. Popoff
The Dow Chemical Company
John S. Reed
Citicorp
Harvey Golub
American Express Company
Linda Wachner
Wamacolnc.
John F. Welch. Jr.
General Electric Company
Leslie H. Wexner
The Limited Inc.
Dr. Marina v.N. Whitman
General Motors Corporation
Participating Members
Catherine Bennett
International Investment Alliance
Doreen Brown
Consumers for World Trade
Lou Clem eme
Intellectual Property Committee
Jerry Jasinowski
National Association of Manufacturers
Abraham Karz
US. Council for International Business
Frank Kioredge
National Foreign Trade Council
Dean Kkckner
American Farm Bureau Federation
Sam Maury
Business Roundtabie
Robert McNeill
Emergency Committee for American Trade
Gerald Mossmghoff
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
Barry Rogstad
American Business Conference
John Faris
National Federation of Independent Business
Margaret Wigglesworth
Coalition of Service Industries
j^
37
EXHIBIT 2
PUBLIC LAW 100-418— AUG. 23. 1988 102 STAT. 1121
Subtitle A — United States Trade Agreements
PART 1— NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF TRADE AGREEMENTS
SEC. 1101. OVERALL AND PRINCIPAL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES 10 USC 2901.
OK THE UNITED STATES.
in) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives. — The overall trade
negotiating objectives of the United States are to obtain —
i 1) more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access;
(2) the reduction or elimination of barriers and other trade-
distorting policies and practices; and
(3) a more effective system of international trading disciplines
and procedures.
(b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives. —
(1) Dispute settlement. — The principal negotiating objectives
of the United States with respect to dispute settlement are —
(A) to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute
settlement mechanisms and procedures; and
(B) to ensure that such mechanisms within the GATT and
GATT agreements provide for more effective and expedi-
tious resolution of disputes and enable better enforcement
of United States rights.
(2) Improvement of the gatt and multilateral trade nego-
tiation agreements. — The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States regarding the improvement of GATT and
multilateral trade negotiation agreements are —
(A) to enhance the status of the GATT;
(B) to improve the operation and extend the coverage of
the GATT and such agreements and arrangements to
products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately
covered; and
(C) to expand country participation in particular agree-
ments or arrangements, where appropriate.
(3) Transparency. — The principal negotiating objective of the
United States regarding transparency is to obtain broader ap-
plication of the principle of transparency and clarification of
the costs and benefits of trade policy actions through the observ-
ance of open and equitable procedures in trade matters by
Contracting Parties to the GATT.
(4) Developing countries. — The principal negotiating objec-
tives of the United States regarding developing countries are —
(A) to ensure that developing countries promote economic
development by assuming the fullest possible measure of
responsibility for achieving and maintaining an open inter-
national trading system by providing reciprocal benefits
and assuming equivalent obligations with respect to their
import and export practices; and
(B) to establish procedures for reducing nonreciprocal
trade benefits for the more advanced developing countries.
(5) Current account surpluses. — The principal negotiating
objective of the United States regarding current account sur-
pluses is to develop rules to address large and persistent global
current account imbalances of countries, including imbalances
which threaten the stability of the international trading system,
38
102 STAT. 1122 PUBLIC LAW 100-418— AUG. 23. 1088
by imposing greater responsibility on such countries to under-
take policy changes aimed at restoring current account
equilibrium, including expedited implementation of trade agree-
ments where feasible and appropriate.
<<>) Trade and monetary coordination. — The principal nego-
tiating objective of the United States regarding trade and mone-
tary coordination is to develop mechanisms to assure greater
coordination, consistency, and cooperation between inter-
national trade and monetary systems and institutions.
i7) Agriculture. — The principal negotiating objectives of the
United States with respect to agriculture are to achieve, on an
expedited basis to the maximum extent feasible, more open and
fair conditions of trade in agricultural commodities by —
(A) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules for
agricultural trade, including disciplines on restrictive or
trade-distorting import and export practices:
(B) increasing United States agricultural exports by
eliminating barriers to trade (including transparent and
nontransparent barriers) and reducing or eliminating the
subsidization of agricultural production consistent with the
United States policy of agricultural stabilization in cyclical
and unpredictable markets:
(C) creating a free and more open world agricultural
trading system by resolving questions pertaining to export
and other tradendistorting subsidies, market pricing and
market access and eliminating and reducing substantially
other specific constraints to fair trade and more open
market access, such as tariffs, quotas, and other nontariff
practices, including unjustified phytosanitary and sanitary
restrictions; and
(D) seeking agreements by which the major agricultural
exporting nations agree to pursue policies to reduce exces-
sive production of agricultural commodities during periods
of oversupply, with due regard for the fact that the United
States already undertakes such policies, and without re-
course to arbitrary schemes to divide market shares among
major exporting countries.
(8) Unfair trade practices. — The principal negotiating objec-
tives of the United States with respect to unfair trade practices
are —
(A) to improve the provisions of the GATT and nontariff
measure agreements in order to define, deter, discourage
the persistent use of, and otherwise discipline unfair trade
practices having adverse trade effects, including forms of
subsidy and dumping and other practices not adequately
covered such as resource input subsidies, diversionary
dumping, dumped or subsidized inputs, and export
targeting practices:
(B) to obtain the application of similar rules to the treat-
ment of primary and nonprimary products in the Agree-
ment on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI. XVI,
and XXIII of the GAIT (relating to subsidies and counter-
vailing measures): and
(C) to obtain the enforcement of GATT rules against —
(i) state trading enterprises, and
39
PUBLIC LAW 100-418— AUG. 23. 1088
102 STAT. 1123
Copyrights
Pntents and
Irademarks.
(ii) the acta, practices, or policies of any foreign
government which, as a practical matter, unreasonably
require that —
(I) substantial direct investment in the foreign
country be made.
(II) intellectual property be licensed to the for-
eign country or to any firm of the foreign country,
or
(III) other collateral concessions be made,
as a condition for the importation of any product or
service of the United States into the foreign country or
as a condition for carrying on business in the foreign
country.
(9) Trade in services. —
(A) The principal negotiating objectives of the United
States regarding trade in services are —
(i) to reduce or to eliminate barriers to, or other
distortions of, international trade in services, including
barriers that deny national treatment and restrictions
on establishment and operation in such markets; and
(ii) to develop internationally agreed rules, including
dispute settlement procedures, which —
(I) are consistent with the commercial policies of
the United States, and
(II) will reduce or eliminate such barriers or
distortions, and help ensure fair, equitable
opportunities for foreign markets.
(B) In pursuing the negotiating objectives described in
subparagraph (A), United States negotiators shall take into
account legitimate United States domestic objectives
including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate
health or safety, essential security, environmental,
consumer or employment opportunity interests and the law
and regulations related thereto.
(10) Intellectual property.— The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding intellectual property
are —
(A) to seek the enactment and effective enforcement by
foreign countries of laws which —
(i) recognize and adequately protect intellectual prop- Computers
erty, including copyrights, patents, trademarks, semi-
conductor chip layout designs, and trade secrets, and
(ii) provide protection against unfair competition,
(B) to establish in the G ATT obligations—
(i) to implement adequate substantive standards
based on —
(I) the standards in existing international agree-
ments that provide adequate protection, and
(II) the standards in national laws if inter-
national agreement standards are inadequate or do
not exist,
(ii) to establish effective procedures to enforce, both
internally and at the border, the standards imple-
mented under clause (i), and
(iii) to implement effective dispute settlement proce-
dures thct improve on existing G ATT procedures;
(C) to recognize that the inclusion in the GATT of —
Copyrights.
Patents and
trademarks.
40
124 PUBLIC LAW 100-418— AUG. 23. 1988
(i) adequate and effective substantive norms and
standards for the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, and
(ii) dispute settlement provisions and enforcement
procedures,
is without prejudice to other complementary initiatives
undertaken in other international organizations: and
(D) to supplement and strengthen standards for protec-
tion and enforcement in existing international intellectual
property conventions administered by other international
organizations, including their expansion to cover new and
emerging technologies and elimination of discrimination or
unreasonable exceptions or preconditions to protection.
(11) Foreign direct investment. —
(A) The principal negotiating objectives of the United
States regarding foreign direct investment are —
(i) to reduce or to eliminate artificial or trade-distort-
ing barriers to foreign direct investment, to expand the
principle of national treatment, and to reduce un-
reasonable barriers to establishment; and
(ii) to develop internationally agreed rules, including
dispute settlement procedures, which —
(I) will help ensure a free flow of foreign direct
investment, and
(II) will reduce or eliminate the trade distortive
effects of certain trade-related investment
measures.
(B) In pursuing the negotiating objectives described in
subparagraph (A), United States negotiators shall take into
account legitimate United States domestic objectives
including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate
health or safety, essential security, environmental,
consumer or employment opportunity interests and the law
and regulations related thereto.
(12) Safeguards. — The principal negotiating objectives of the
United States regarding safeguards are —
(A) to improve and expand rules and procedures covering
safeguard measures;
(B) to ensure that safeguard measures are —
(i) transparent,
(ii) temporary,
(iii) degressive, and
(iv) subject to review and termination when no longer
necessary to remedy injury and to facilitate adjust-
ment; and
(C) to require notification of, and to monitor the use by,
GATT Contracting Parties of import relief actions for their
domestic industries.
(13) Specific barriers. — The principal negotiating objective of
the United States regarding specific barriers is to obtain
competitive opportunities for United States exports in foreign
markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportuni-
ties afforded foreign exports to United States markets, includ-
ing the reduction or elimination of specific tariff and nontariff
trade barriers, particularly —
41
PUBLIC LAW 100-418— AUG. 23. 1988
102 STAT. 1125
(A) measures identified in the annual report prepared
under section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2241);
and
(B) foreign tariffs and nontariff barriers on competitive
United States exports when like or similar products enter
the United States at low rates of duty or are duty-free, and
other tarifT disparities that impede access to particular
export markets.
(14) Worker rights. — The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States regarding worker rights are —
(A) to promote respect for worker rights;
(B) to secure a review of the relationship of worker rights
to G ATT articles, objectives, and related instruments with a
view to ensuring that the benefits of the trading system are
available to all workers; and
(O to adopt, as a principle of the G ATT, that the denial of
worker rights should not be a means for a country or its
industries to gain competitive advantage in international
trade.
( 15) Access to high technology. —
(A) The principal negotiating objective of the United
States regarding access to high technology is to obtain the
elimination or reduction of foreign barriers to, and acts,
policies, or practices by foreign governments which limit,
equitable access by United States persons to foreign-
developed technology, including barriers, acts, policies, or
practices which have the effect of —
(i) restricting the participation of United States
persons in government-supported research and develop-
ment projects;
(it) denying equitable access by United States persons
to government-held patents;
(iii) requiring the approval or agreement of govern-
ment entities, or imposing other forms of government
interventions, as a condition for the granting of li-
censes to United States persons by foreign persons
(except for approval or agreement which may be nec-
essary for national security purposes to control the
export of critical military technology); and
(iv) otherwise denying equitable access by United
States persons to foreign-developed technology or
contributing to the inequitable flow of technology be-