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seriously by the Soviet Government. May I quote it very briefly,
some parts?

Mr. Kersten. Yes.

Dr. Padalis. The order starts :

It is established that counterrevolutionary organizations existing on the ter-
ritory of the L. S. S. R. — Lithuanian SoTiet Socialist Republic — as well as indi-
viduals among the counterrevolutionary elements, are collecting and striving to
procure weapons and cartridges in order to organize armed struggle against
Soviet rule.

Now, this order also states :

On the 5th day of Api-il this year, the theft of 500 hand grenades and some
capsules was discovered in the militia warehouse of the city board of Vilnius.

They were stolen prior to the 5th of April, but they didn't discover
it for a long time. They did arrest eight policemen.

Mr. McTiGUE. These are the 500 hand grenades over which you
had custody?

Dr. Padalis. Yes, that is correct, and they were put to use during
the revolt.

Mr. McTiGUE. Can you tell us without revealing any secrets in that
respect, how j^ou were able to conceal 500 hand grenades?


Dr. Padalis. I kept them in the most simple place, I would say.
In a high oven that was covered by large ornaments. It would be
called the heating unit in the building. I would like to say that even
my friend, my closest friend, did not know about those grenades. I
knew and those who got them. Nobody else knew, with whom I was
in contact.

Mr. Kersten. We will adjourn at this time until 2 o'clock and we
will ask Dr. Padalis to return at that time.

Dr. Padalis. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12: 25 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at
2 p. m., the same day.)


(The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., Hon. Alvin M. Bentley,

Mr. Bentley. The committee will come to order. The witness will
continue his testimony.

Dr. Padalis. I would like to bring up the order issued by the com-
missar of the State security police, Mr. Gladkov, which I would
like the committee to put in evidence and say that I saw the original
document, itself, in Lithuania, and to my best knowledge it is avail-
able in the United States.

Mr. McTigue. May I ask that this be received into evidence, Mr.
Chairman, and marked as exhibit 13 for identification.

Mr. Kersten. We will take it up later.

Mr. McTigue. Have you finished?

Dr. Padalis. I would like to add that the Soviet Government, after
it learned about the seizure of those grenades and the seizure of some
other weapons, got so scared that the same chief of the State security
police issued on the 7th of April another order, in which he states that
all the police units, all the army units, all the auxiliary police units,
should prevent any Lithuanian revolt on the 1st of May, which was
going to be celebrated in 1941.

Then I saw, myself, on the streets, the armored cars, even tanks,
patrolling the city, on the 1st of May.

Mr. McTigue. Are you through reading from the document that
has just been introduced into evidence?

Dr. Padalis. I think so.

Mr. McTigue. If you are through, we would like to have it marked.

Dr. Padalis. It is published in the Lithuanian Bulletin, July-
December 1949, page 25 through page 31.

Mr. McTigue. Just enter the pages which were referred to.

Dr. Padalis. Pages 25 through 31.

Mr. McTigue. Could you extract those pages from the bulletin?
Do you have an extra bulletin ?

Dr. Padalis. The Lithuanian Bulletin, July-December 1949, pages
25 to 31.

Mr. Machrowicz. Can you take them right out? Is that all right
with you?

Mr. BoNiN. I wonder if it would be permissible to let the reporter
co]\y tliat report and return it to you.

Dr. Padalis. That would be perfectly all right with me.

Mr-. McTigue. Then we will just make it a part of the i-ecord, no


(The document referred to is as follows :)

[Extract from Lithuanian Bulletin, vol VII, July-December 1949, Nos. 7-12]

The NKVD transmitted secret instructions to its county branch offices which
then alerted the precincts. A sample order is reproduced below :

♦ *****♦

"Strictly Secret — Very Urgent


All Chiefs of County Branches and Precincts of the NKGB of the L. S. S. R.
Chief of the City Board of the NKGB for Vilnius
Chiefs of SPO, KRO, KO
Chiefs of Investigation and Department III
In person, to comrade

in the city of

"Comrade MERKULOV, Commissar of Third Rank and People's Commissar of
State Security of the U. S. S. R., by his order No. 0038 of March 22, 1941, has
ordered that the operations waged hy our organs, in liquidating armed bandit
groups and in detaining counterrevolutionary insurgents and other members of
anti-Soviet formations, must be waged according to a predetermined plan, expe-
rienced operational collaborators must be assigned to lead the operations of
liquidating armed formations, and {armed) forces must be deployed with preci-
sion during the period of operation, etc.

"It was decreed in the aforesaid order that in all instances where an opera-
tion had failed, a diligent investigation must be conducted in order to hold the
guilty to the strictest responsibilitij.

"Under the conditions of work of the NKGB in Lithuania, this order is of
utmost importance and every Chekist must apply himself to its execution with
exceptional seriousness.

"Under our working conditions, whenever in waging an operation we meet
with an armed enemy, the problem of preparing for the operation acquires a
signally important bearing; but, as noted in that order, our collaborators do
not apply themselves very seriously to the preparation of an operation and,
in consequence thereof, operational plenipoteniary of the NKVD of the L. S. S. R.,
Stanislavovich, was killed during the operation of October 29, 1940.

"The circular order No. 673/N/4 of March 24, 1941, promulgated by the Peo-
ple's Commissar of State Security of the U. S. S. R., concerning the problem of
conducting investigations, once more stresses the necessity of forming a well-
developed operational plan in liquidating cases, etc.

"In executing the order No. 0038 of the People's Commissar of State Security,
the NKGB of the L. S. S. R. on March 31st, 1941, by an order No. 0016, provided
for a series of practical measures to ensure the succcessful execution of

"Nevertheless, certain county branches violate the People's Commissar's order
No. 0038, the circular No. 637/N/4 and the order No. 0016 of the NKGB of the
L. S. S. R.

"In carrying out operations, they do not fix plans providing for all the measures
necessary to the successful execution of an operation; they do not sufficiently
instruct the members taking part in the operation ; they assign inexperienced
collaborators to lead the operation, etc.

"I Okder You in Person :

"1. Immediately acquaint all operational personnel (and take their acknowledg-
ment thereof in writing) with Order No. 0038 of the NKGB of the U. S. S. R.,
the circular No. 673/N/4 of the NKGB of the U. S. S. R., and the directives
indicated in my Order No. 0016 of March 31st, 1941, and discuss the same in
minutest detail at operational consultations.

"2. I forewarn once again that every operation must be conducted according
to an adequately preconceived written plan ; the plan must be approved either
by myself or my deputy and, in counties, by the Chiefs of county branches ; plans
of important operations must be submitted for approval to me or my deputy.
Only an experienced collaborator may be assigned to lead an operation, and
operational personnel must be instructed in the minutest detail regarding the

"3. Chiefs of SPO, KRO, and Investigation, in revising the materials supplied
i>y County Branches of the NKGB prior to seeking sanction [That is, a warrant.
Translator.'] for arrests, must review the plans submitted for an operation

52975 — 54— pt. 1 23


and for an inquest. In authorizing an arrest, the Chief of Department 3 must
require plans for conducting the operation from departmental chiefs.

"4. / again warn all chiefs of branches and precincts that operations must he
conducted exclusively according to a predetermined and well-thought-out opera-
tional plan, and that the operation itself must he thoroughly prepared.

"Parties guilty of violating the above orders and who irresponsibly apply
themselves to the preparation and execution of an operation, shall be callecj
to account by me.

"By the 7th of May, inform me by a special report of the results of your work
in executing tlie hereinabove order.

"People's Commissar of State Secukity of the L. S. S. R.
Senior Major of State Security /Gladkov/

"April 2nd, 1941. No. 31."

bold defiance: Russian arms seized * * *

As soon as the Russians applied themselves seriously, spurred by Comrade
Gladkov's threat of reprisals, to the surprising phenomenon of armed resistance
on the part of Lithuanian farmers defending their supply of daily bread, they
noted that they were much too preoccupied with their thankless punctilious
compilation of their "daily" and "Five Day" summaries. Something serious was
afoot — besides their own preparations for genocide. The country was refusing
to bow and was showing defiance.

Within 5 days after dispatching his threatening order No. 31, Comrade Glad-
kov was forced to dispatcii two additional top secret orders on April 7, 1941 : a
circular order to Chiefs, and a formal order read to "operational personnel."
Both of these orders dealt with the disclosure of arms seizure, and are reproduced

"Strictly Secret. Very Urgent.

All Chiefs of County Branches and Precincts of the NKGR of the L. S. S. R.

Commanders of Frontier Units.

Chiefs of KRO, SPO, Part I, Department 3 and Inquest Part.

Chiefs of Departments III of the Worker-Peasant Red Army and People's

Commissar of the Interior of the L. S. S. R.
Commanders of NKVD Railway Units and Operational Points.


City of

"It is established that counterrevolutionary organizations existing on tlie
territory of the L. S. S. R., as well as individuals among the counterrevolutionary
elements, are collecting and striving to procure xvcapons and cartridges in
order to organize armed struggle against Soviet rule.

"Especially energetic activity in this direction has been noted recently in
connection with preparations for the First of May Day.

"The counterrevolutionary element is sending its agents to work in military
warehouses, in the People's Commissariat of the Interior, Highway Departments,
and other places where arms are to be found, in order to seize them or, at an
opportune moment, to seize the warehouses, and they also purchase weapons from
organization members and ordinary persons.

"On the fifth day of April this year, tlie theft of 500 hand grenades and as
many capsules was discovered in militia toarehonsc of the City Board of Vilnius.

"It is quite clear that this seizure of hand grenades was perpetrated in conse-
quence of criminal negligence in arms accounting and guarding by militia
workers, and because of the presence of counterrevolutionary element in the
militia prsonnel, which flagrantly perpetrated coiuiterrevolutionary activities.

"Accounting for and guarding of arms, especially in the militia, remains on a
wholly unsatisfactory level, and the enemy is taking advantage of this.

"Together with this, it must be noted that, in seizing weajions from the enemy,
the NKGB personnel does not pay proper attention to the control of arms-account-
ing and security.

"The seizure of arms from the counterrevolutionary element and from the
inhabitants in general, usually proceeds with inpei-missible tardiness, and the
results are extremely insignificant. The seizures are carried out perfunctorily
and singly.

"On the other hand, we know that the counterrevolutionary element on the
territory of the Lithuanian S. S. R. possesses large numbers of weapons.


"These anas were left during the liquidation of the former Polish Army in
Vilnius, during its internment in Lithuania, during the liquidation of anti-
Soviet organizations such as the Sauliai [The National Guard], etc. All this
oould easily have been checked and determined, both through the network of
agents in the archives.

"In the past, weapons were sold at the arsenals. The records of sales could
likewise be easily verified in the archives and the identity of persons who have
purchased such arms could be established.

"Attachhifi special importance to the prohlem of locating and recovering the
tveapons, and of safeguard iny the same,

"/ order:

'•1. You personally must estimate the extent of knowledge had by the opera-
tional personnel and the network of agents regarding arms seizures, must focus
the attention of the entire operational personnel of the NKGB and the NKVD
by personally and daily leading in this task.

"2. Through experienced agents, take measures to locate the arms stolen
in Vilnius and to apprehend the criminals, without giving publicity to the

"3. In closing any agency cases, formular cases, etc., special attention must
be paid to arms seizures, keeping firmly in mind the fact that the counter-
revolutionary element which is organizing combat against the Soviet rule is
attempting to procure and amass reserves of weapons, and that it actually pos-
sesses such arms.

•'4. Serious attention must be paid to this phase of work in conducting inter-
rogations, especially of counterrevolutionary and insurrectionist formations,
spies, terrorists, diversiouists, etc.

•'!'(. Explore all archives of police warehouses, accounting archives relative
to the issuance of arms to individuals, the surrender of arms by internees, etc.

"G. Report to me daily regarding the number of weapons seized, on the
proper forms which are supplied to yoit separately.

"In connection with the forthconiing May Day celebrations, serious attention
must be given to the problem of arms seizure, the inspection and guarding of
arsensals, increased security, the reexamination of warehouses containing com-
l)ustible materials iu the Bureau of Highways and other organs. The inspection
must l)e conducted with complete diligence and seriousness, and a proper pro-
tocol must be drawn up by you, personally.
"People's Commissar of State Security of the LSSR
"Senior Major of State Security /Gladkov/
. "Ivaunas, April 7th, 1941. The copy is authentic : / — /

• "Semyokhina, Codification Secretary."

A person who is now in the United States and who had much to do with the
"theft" of the 500 hand grenades and capsules some time prior to April 5, 1941,
informs us tliat a number of innocent I^ithuanian policemen had paid with
their lives for their "negligence." The Russians never learned of the identity
of the "counterrevolutionary elements" who had stolen into the arsenal — and
later put the hand grenades to good use. The time has not yet come to reveal
the complete story. But the second, formal order of comrade Gladkov is repro-
duced ))elow in order to illustrate the inner operations of the NKGB in similar

"Strictly Secret

"Oi!I)eu of the People's Commissar of State Security of the LSSR for 1941

"No. 0017 Contents : Concerning arms accounting and securitv in the organs

of the NKGB and NKVD.
"No. 0017 April 7th, 1941.

"On April yth of the current year, the theft of 500 hand grenades of the 'Mills'
type and of two cases of grenade capsules was detected in the arsenal of the Militia
Board of the City of Vilnius.

"It is quite clear that the seizure was perpetrated by the counter-revolutionary
elements with a view to waging armed combat against Soviet rule. This theft
took place because of the exceptionally criminal attitude of militia collaborators
toward accounting for and guarding arms. The storage place, in which the
grenades were stored, was not guarded, not sealed, and only the keeper of the
storage place and the janitor were aware of the existence of this arsenal.

"Despite numerous local instructions to put in order the system of arms
accounting and security. County Chiefs of the NKGB and militia precinct com-


manders attach no special importance to this matter. Inspection of the account-
ing and guarding of arms is entrusted to ordinary collaborators who at times
do not pay serious attention to this task.

"I Order :

"(1) Comrade State Security Major SHAKOK, Chief of the NKGB Board for
the City of Vilnius, immediately to take all measures for locating the seized
grenades and to apprehend persons who have taken them.

"In executing this task, to mobilize the maximum number of collaborators,
by releasing them from other duties, until the grenades shall have been found
and the persons who seized them apprehended.

"(2) To create a special group of operatives for the detection of these crim-
inals, made up of :

"1. State Security Major comrade — BYKOV

"2. State Securitv Major comrade — SHAKOK

"3. Department Chief comrade— GERASIMOVICH

"4. Senior Operational Plenipotentiary comrade — NOGINOV with the head
quarters in the City of Vilnius.

"Leadership in the task of detection is assigned to comrade BYKOV, who is
to relieve the indicated comrades from other duties.

"(3) Supervision of tracing throughout the republic is assigned to State
Security Captain comrade CHERNONYOBOV, Chief of the KRO [Counter-
intelligence Department].

"(4) All heads of Operational Departments of the NKGB, chiefs of NKGB
County Branches and precincts, and commanders of NKVD railway units and
operational points, shall take all necessary operational and agency network
measures for the tracing and recovery of the weapons, as specified in my directives
given at the operational consultation of April 5th, 1941.

"(5) Without delay, to conduct repeated inspections of the status of accounting
for and guarding of arms in the organs of the NKVD, NKGB and Militia. Also,
to check on the execution of my previously issued directives on this problem by
ordering the following comrades to proceed for this task to their respective posts
of assignment :

"1. To Kretinga— State Security Lieutenant comrade MILOVZOROV, senior
operational plenipotentiary of the KRO of the NKGB.

"2. To Taurage — State Security Lieutenant comrade YERMAKOV, senior
operational plenipotentiary of RO [Intelligence Department] of the NKGB.

"3. To Raseiniai — State Security Captain comrade CHECHEV, Deputy Chief
of the NKVD Prisons Department.

"4. To Siauliai — State Security Lieutenant PLOTKIN. operational plenipo-
tentiary of SPO of the NKGB.

"5. To Panevezys — State Security Sergeant comrade LOVKOV, operational
plenipotentiary of SPO of the NKGB.

"6. To Ukmerge— Comrade TODES, Chief of SPO of the NKGB.

"7. To Utena — State Security Lieutenant comrade CHVANOV, section chief
of KRO [Counter Intelligence Department] of the NKGB.

"8. To Trakai— State Security Junior Lieutenant ZAKHAROV, chief of the
Investigation Part of the Political Department of the NKVD.

"9. To Kedainiai — comrade VOLFSON, Chief of the Non-Political Prisoners
Guarding Division of the NKVD.

"10. To Vilkaviskis — State Security Lieutenant comrade STEPANIAN, opera-
tional plenipotentiary of KRO of the NKGB.

"11. To Marijampole — comrade MIRSKY, senior operational plenipotentiary
of the SPO of the NKGB.

"12. To Alytus— comrade MILVYDAS, Deputy Chief of KRO of the NKGB.

"13. To Sakiai— State Security .Tunior Lieutenant comrade KHARITONCHIK,
senior investigator of Investigation Division of the NKGB.

"14. To Lazdijai — State Secnrity Sergeant comrade YERIGO, senior opei-a-
tional plenipotentiary of KRO of the NKGB.

"15. To Telsiai — comrade FEIGELSON, operational plenipotentiary of the

"16. To Mazeikiai— comrade KUBLUKOV, Part Chief of Department II of
the NKGB.

"17. To Zarasai— State Security Sergeant comrade LIKHVINTSEV, Part chief
■of Department II of the NKGB.

"18. To Svencioneliai and Svencionys — State Securitv Sergeant comrade
KITZMIX, Part chief of Department III of the NKGB.


"19. To Birzai — State Security Senior Lieutenant comrade BABSKY, Deputy
chief of the (\adres Department of the NKGB.

"20. To Rokiskis — State Security Lieutenant comrade VASILYEV, Part chief
of AKHO [Administrative Supply Department] of the NKVD.

"The inspection of the status of arms accounting and guarding in the City
of Kaunas is assigned to comrade KHOLEVO, Deputy Chief of the Secret
Political Department (SPO).

"The inspection of the status of arms accounting and guarding in the City
of Vilnius is assigned to comrade BYKOV.

"The inspection of the status of arms accounting and guarding must be
carried out hy the above-named comrades. Local commissions formed under
their leadership, with the participation of County Chiefs of the NKGB and
NKVD, must draft proper reports.

"(6) Comrade KHOLEVO, Deputy chief of SPO of the NKGB, must submit
his report on this matter by April 9th, 1941.

"State Security Senior Major comrade GUZEVICIUS, People's Commissar
of the Interior, mast be informed that the NKGB proposal made in February
regarding the accounting and guarding of militia weapons and regarding the
transfer of all surplus weapons to the UVS [Ordnance-Supply Administration],
has not yet been complied with by the organs of the militia.

"The NKVD is requested to authorize the Chief of URKM [Administration
of W^orker Peasant Militia] to regulat-e tliis matter without delay by trans-
ferring, within 3 days, to the UVS warehouses all surplus arms, leaving suffi-
cient weapons as specified in the cadre tallies, and providing reliable guard
and accounting, to be concentrated in the URKM.

"I warn the Chiefs of county branches and precincts of the NKGB that I shall
hold to judicial responsibility all noncompliance with my directives of March
4th and with those given at operational consultations on April 5th.

"Once again I direct the attention of chiefs of the county branches and pre-
cincts of the NKGB to the need for assuring proper control of the accounting,
guarding and use of arms in the militia organs. Board of Highways, and else-
where. You must personally inspect, without delegating the task to any one
else, and all abnormaleies must be reported to me immediately.

"Security Major comrade SHAROK, Chief of the NKGB City Board in Vilnius.—
check on how the NKVD committee appointed in February had performed its
task of arms accounting and guarding, and hold to responsibility all persons
who attend to this matter superficially.

People's Commissar of State Securitt of the LSSR
Senior Major of State Security /Gladkov/"

security for may day

On the same day, comrade Gladkov projected his security measures for the
May Day exercises. Instead of thinking that all decent Lithuanians would en-
deavor to stay home, far from the loudspeakers gushing Russian blasphemies,
his warped mind visioned trouble — he imagined that the missing 500 hand
grenades might be put to use,

"Strictly Secret. Very Uryent.

All chiefs of county branches and precincts of the NKGB of the LSSR,.
commanders of frontier units, chiefs of KRO, SPO, Part One, Department
III and Investigation, Chiefs of Departments III of the worker-peasant
Red Army, and People's Commissar of Interior of the Lithuanian SSR.
To Chiefs of NKVD Operational Units and Posts on Litliuanian railways.

To comrade

In connection with the forthcoming international proletarian festivity of the
1st of May day, it is proposed that you immediately prepare a detailed plan for
ensuring state security during the 1st of May Day festivity and tra/nsmit same
to the People's Commissariat of State Security.

For the consideration of this matter, you must call, without delay, a con-
sultation of representatives of the NKVD, Militia, Departments III of the Army,
fire prevention service, chiefs of prisons and commanders of the NKVD Troops
(where such are stationed) ; propose to the above-named organizations — to
each according to its own line of work — that they draft concrete plans and
submit the same to you by April 15th, 1941.


Upon receipt of such plans from county localities, you must draft a j^eueral
plan for the entire county.

Responsible persons must be designated by the NKVD, Militia, etc., for each
phase of the task.

The general plan must be transmitted to tise prior to April 20, 1941-

In planning operational measures for the 1st of May festivity, the following
basic problems must be borne in mind :

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