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Baltic States investigation. [First interim report] (Volume pt. 1) online

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(1) Strengthening the protection of industrial establishments, defense instal-
lations, warehouses, railways, and other transport^ — to forestall diversion, fires,
catastrophes, etc.

(2) Ensuring and strengthening the protection of arms, combustible and poi-
sonous materials, multiplication equipment in establishments and offices, seizing
the same from unauthorized persons.

The entire operational personnel of the NKGB and the NKVD must pay special
attention to the necessity of mobilizing all of our forces for the detection of arms
and, upon encountering, the seizure of them from the counter-revolutionary

(3) All along the NKGB lines of work, ensuring the inspection of elaboration
by the agency network and of the formular files, and the liquidation of activists,
especially those involved in terrorism, espionage, and insurrection.

Along the NKVD lines of work — organizing the inspection of the passport
system and its reinforcement, especially in the frontier areas, towns, cities, etc.

Searching of hotels and overnight sleeping places in order to trap persons in

(4) Concluding arrangements with the command of military units regarding
assignment of the necessary forces for this task, and, on the eve of and during
the May Day festivities, strengthening the patrols in cities, towns, etc.

(5) Organizing night inspections of street passersby and establishments, in
order to preclude the dissemination of counter-revolutionary appeals, the raising
of flags, and the like ; for this purpose, mobilize all collaborators of the NKGB,
NKVD, and Militia, and, furthermore, the necessary number of Communists and
Komsomols to be provided by the Party committees ; also utilize tested agents.

(6) You personally should organize proper protection and order at the parades,
demonstrations, and entertainment affairs in connection with the May Day

(7) Reinforce to the maximum effort the operational work through the net-
work of agents, directed toward complete disclosure and liquidation of various
counter-revolutionary formations and individuals who carry on hostile activities
against our Party and Soviet rule.

It is necessary to discuss jointly with the NKVD all problems concerning the
protection of industry, agricultural inventories, cities, and inhabited points, and
to instruct Party Ukoms (County Committees) and county Executive Committees
to enlist Communists and non-Party aktiv (fellow travelers actively engaged in
Party work but not carried on the Party rolls of members) in performing this
A^ery important work.

According to agency data, the counter-revolutionary organizations made up
of former members of counter-revolutionary parties, former ofhcers. policemen,
officials, and manufacturers, have extended their activities for the disruption of
May Day festivities and to obstruct the participation of the working people in
the observance and organization of their revolutionary celebration.

All these enemies of the people, recruited by the clergy, are seeking accomplices
among the "have-beens" and are organizing their hostile work.

No doubt, the people's enemies will attempt during the May Day observances
to use most acute forms of struggle, such as terrorism, diversion, etc. Tliey will
attempt to disrupt, to create panic, and thereby to mar the dignified observance
of the May Day.

According to the information at our disposal, the people's enemies will attempt
to resort to terror and diversion during the ceremonial sessions in theaters, clubs,
etc., or may try to set theaters, factories, and establishments on fire, and to dis-
seminate counterrevolutionary leaflets and, if possible, to organize counterrevolu-
tionary demonstrations. Counterrevolutionary, terrorist, and spying elements
might be brought in from abroad.

The Party and the tioviet Government have placed on our organs especially
honorable and responsible duties — to safeguard state security.

We must undertake immediately all nieasures in order that the working people
may safely observe their international proletarian festival.


We must nip in the hud each and every manifestation of the people's enemies.
We shall be able to achieve this objective only if we expand and reinforce to
the maximum or agency-operational work in the direction of liquidation of the
formations of spies, terrorists, diversionists, insurgents, and various other coun-

Regarding the preparations for May Day, inform me by special reports every
three days.

Beginning with April 27th, 1941, report every two hours on each date.
People's Commissar of State Security of the LSSR
Senior Major of State Secukity/Gladkov/
"7" day of April 1941
No. 16

"mobilization for defense of the state"

Comrade Gladkov received for his approval various plans elaborated by his
apparatus in the counties. Imagining all sorts of trouble, he and his Russians
fearfully prepared for May Day — which used to be devoted to tree planting in
the former days of freedom and was to mark the observance of the revolution
brought on the Red army bayonets to a defenseless Lithuanian democracy.
With his staff busily en.i^aged in drafting daily and .5-day summaries of accounts
regarding the counterrevolutionary elements, Gladkov probably intended to use
May Day mobilization as a test of his apparatus in preparation for the first
great genocidal operation. At any rate, he scared the Russian invaders by
issuing the following order :

Strictly Secret

Order of the People's Commissar of State Security of the LSSR for Year 1941

No. 0024 Contents : Operational duty is declared for state defense during the
days of the May Day festival.

No. 0024 25th day of April 1941, Kaunas.

During the days of the 1st of May festivities, the counterrevolutionary element
in Kaunas and throughout the territory of the LSSR will attempt to stage opposi-
tion by organizing diversionist and terrorist acts, and local anti-Soviet mani-

In order to assure State Security and to provide determined operational meas-
ures in the event of necessity.

I Order :

1. The entire operational personnel of the Narkomat of the NKGB of the
LSSR and of peripheral organs is deemed mobilized as of the 29th day of April
through the 3d day of May, inclusively.

2. State Security Lieutenant comrade Ivanov. Chief of Part One of the NKGB
of tlie LSSR, to place outposts in accordance with the chart of locations approved
by me, on April 30 (the ceremonial session in the City Theater) and May 1 (the
parade and demonstration) ; the operational personnel of the Markomat (Peo-
ple's Commissariat) is to be assigned in compliance with this order.

3. Comrade Todes, Chief of SPO (Secret Political Department), and State
Security Captain comrade Chernonyobov, Chief of KRO (Counter Intelligence
Department), to provide the reinforced servicing, throughout the days of May
Day festivities, around the principal industrial and transportation installations
in conformance with order No. 0015 of March 5, 1941, of the NKGB of the
U. S. S. R. For this purpose, the SPO and the KRO are to form special op-
erational groups composed of:


1. Part chief. State Security Lieutenant — comrade Shepelv.

2. Deputy Part Chief, State Security Junior Lieutenant — Ovseyenko.

3. Operational plenipotentiary — comrade Dembo.

4. Deputy operational plenipotentiary — comrade Tselkov.



1. Part chief, State Security Lieutenant — comrade Gavrilin.

2. Deputy part chief, State Security Lieutenant — comrade Meshalkin.

3. Deputy Part chief. State Security Lieutenant — comrade Gogodukh.

4. Senior operational plenipotentiary, State Security Lieutenant — comrade


5. Chief of Secretariat, State Security Junior Lieutenant — comrade Maskin,
to provide OflScers on Duty at the Norkomat and Departments of the NKGB of
the LSSR throughout the dates of April 29 through May 3.

6. Commandant of the NKGB of the LSSR — comrade Vilimas, to place the
Kommandantura personnel on barracks status from April 29 through May 3,
after providing a reinforced guard over the Narkomat.

7. Chiefs of the City Board for Vilnius, county branches and precincts of the
NKGB of the LSSR, and commanders of railway units and operational points, in
conformance v^^ith my circular No. 16 of April 7, are to report every 2 hours re-
garding the progress of the festivities by telephoning to the responsible Officer
on Duty at the NKGB of the LSSR, dialing telephones 20432, 20763, 20773, 22857,
reporting every event without delay.

8. The following automobiles of the departments of the NKGB of the LSSR
are placed at the disposal of the responsible Officer on Duty throughout the days
of festivity :

1. Auto machine No. 0078

2. Auto machine No. 0084

3. Auto machine No. 0090

4. Auto machine No. 0089

5. Auto machine No. 0067

6. Auto machine No. 0073

7. Auto machine No. 0060

8. Auto machine No. 0085

9. Auto machine No. 0083

The location chart of operational service outposts of the NKGB of the LSSR
servicing the solemn gathering at the theater, the parade, and the roster of
Officers on Duty at the Narkomat and departments, are contained in the enclosed

Enclosure :
People's Commissar of State Security of the LSSR
Senior Major of State Sectubity /Gladkov/

Dr. Padalis. It was stated in Soviet propaganda that the revolt
was made in Germany and it was a part of the German preparation
for war.

Our revolt was organized and initiated entirely by our underground
movement. We had no contact in any way with the German Gov-
ernment. On the contrary, when through spies, the German Govern-
ment learned that we were going to revolt, the German spies announced
to the NKVD our leading members.

Then, the second thing, we couldn't control our groups in the more
remote areas of the country, and they started revolting on the l7th of
June, when the mass deportations from Lithuania began.

In several towns and cities they revolted. Quite a few of them were
killed and some escaped to the forests, and quite a few NKVD men
were killed.

Our government, which was formed in secrecy in April, already,
it was my task to contact the respective members of the provisional
government in the case our revolt succeeded. It was a complete sur-
prise to the German Government and the German Government or-
dered the military commandant of Lithuania not to have any rela-
tions with our provisional government. Secondly, not to help in any
way the operations of the provisional government, but on the con-
trary, to restrict our activities as much as possible.


Our government, in which I served as Deputy Secretary of Com-


Mr, McTiGUE. This is in the provisional government ?

Dr. Padalis. In the provisional government; yes. (continuing)
Was suppressed by the German Government on the 5th of August 1941.

Before that, the German authorities tried to persuade us to remain
in office as the occupational administration of Lithuanian under Ger-
man control. We refused to be quislings, and then the government,
against its will, was suppressed by the German occupational authori-
ties, by the German General Commissar in Lithuania.

Then after that, we went into the underground against the Nazis
and we continued fighting against their occupation, against their ef-
forts to mobilize our youth during the German occupation, until the
Russians came back.

Mr. McTiGUE. Were you ever on the Gestapo blacklist ?

Dr. Padalis. Oh, yes ; I was.

Mr. McTiGUE. How did you know that ?

Dr. Padalis. We had our spies in the Gestapo, or our agents in the
Gestapo. Otherwise, the underground can't act. Always there is
counterspying on the part of the underground movement.

I was informed that I was on the list of persons to be arrested by
the Gestapo, and that I was No. 1 to be arrested in Vilnius.

Wlien they came to arrest me, I was not in my apartment.

Mr. McTigup:. You got advance warning?

Dr. Padalis. Yes ; I had advance warning. I had three addresses.
That is the practice of the underground people, to have as many ad-
dresses as you can. One address was in Kaunas. They came to
arrest me in Kaunas, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the 16th of March
1943. One of the guerrillas came on a motorcycle to Vilnius and
warned me.

I left my apartment at 8 o'clock at night and three Gestapo men
came at 12 o'clock, exactly at midnight. I was in the same building,
but in a different apartment. I saw when they came to arrest me.
They didn't find me, but they did find one student who was living
in my apartment, a young man. He didn't tell them w^iere I was
and they took him, together with 72 other persons arrested in the
same night, to the concentration camp of Stutthof, near Danzig.

In the first 2 weeks, 10 of them were executed in camp. Some sur-
vived and this man was taken to that camp, instead of me, and today
he is in tlie T'nited States safe and with his family. He is living in
Rochester, N. Y.

Mr. Kersten. This would certainly seem to completely dispose of
the Communist charge that your underground resistance was Nazi-
inspired in any way.

Dr. Padalis. That is what I wanted to make clear. It was against
the Nazis, too.

What we wanted, we wanted to confront the invading Germans
with a sovereign government of the independent Government of
Lithuania. We did succeed, and since they were at war against the
Soviet Union, they didn't want to touch us immediately and they
wanted us to collaborate with them. We refused, and then we went
into the underground, because they wanted to mobilize SS legions — •
infamous SS legions. We refused, and they didn't succeed.


They arrested 72 leaders that night and continued arresting more
people and deporting them to the concentration camps in Germany.

Mr. McTiGUE. Then the underground resisted the German impress-
ment scheme. That is the involuntar}^ servitude of Lithuanian men
in the German Army.

Dr. Padalis, That is correct.

Mr. McTiGUE. Was that the first bone of your contention with the
Germans ?

Dr. Padalis. I don't understand.

Mr. McTiGUE. Was that the first difficulty that you had with the
Germans ?

Dr. Padalis. The first one, but not the only one. The provisional
government attempted to liquidate all the collective farms established
by the Soviet Government during the first occupation. Then the
Communist cooperative organizations and all the Communist eco-
nomic institutions — the Germans didn't let us execute this order or
decision of the (.Tovernment. All the establishments and organiza-
tions set up by the Soviet Government remained intact.

Then, we opposed it, too.

The third thing, we did oppose the extermination of the Jews, which
they started at the very beginning, after the Germans invaded our
country. We sent a memorandum, protesting against the extermina-
tion of the Jews in Lithuania, and they then felt very deeply hurt by
this protest which they didn't accept, that we protested against the
extermination of the Jews, and we had to sign so-called political affi-
davits with the Gestapo.

The Gestapo called all the former members of the provisional gov-
ernment and ordered them to sign the affidavits, according to which
Ave had to promise not to take any part in political life any more.

We tried to refuse. The Gestapo told us definitely that if we won't
sign, then we will be immediately arrested and taken to the extermina-
tion camps.

Then, they imposed very heavy deliveries on our farms. They
began colonizing our country, throwing out the farmers from the best
farms and colonizing and putting in their German people. We op-
posed that, too. There were many reasons for our coiiflict with the
German occupational administration.

Mr. McTiGUE. Getting back to the anti-Soviet underground move-
ment, have you any further amplification of the matters you have
already told us. Professor?

Dr. Padalis. Yes.

I would like to ask also to put in evidence a detailed memorandum,
regarding underground movement in Lithuania, which was sent to
Moscow, by the secret police in Lithuania. It is also translated — I
saw the document myself, in Lithuania — and it reveals many facts,
even many details which, of course, are known to the Soviet Govern-
ment today, on the underground activities in Lithuania from April
to the day of our revolt.

Mr. Kersten. With regard to this, what you have in front of you
is an English translation?

Dr. Padalis. Yes.

Mr. Kersten. You saw the original document?

Dr. Padalis. I saw the original document.

Mr. Kersten. Can you tell us the circumstances of seeing it?


Dr. Padalis. After we revolted, the NKVD in Kaunas left immedi-
ately their headquarters. We seized the place and the documents were
not burned. Therefore, all those documents we found and we were
very much interested in iSnding out how much they knew about our
activities, and we found quite a few documents.

Mr. Kersten. Were you there on this occasion ?

Dr. Padalis. I Avas not there on this occasion, but I saw them later.

Mr. Kersten. You yourself did see them ?

Dr. Padalis. Yes.

Mr. Kersten. Where did you see them ?

Dr. Padalis. In Kaunas.

Mr. Kersten. Do you remember the occasion of your seeing them?

Dr. Padalis. It was established in the anti-Bolshevist museum by
the provisional government.

Mr. Kersten. In what language were they written?

Dr. Padalis. Russian.

Mr. Kersten. They had all the appearances of being the original
documents ?

Dr. Padalis. Oh, yes, with numbers, signatures, and everything.

Mr. Kersten. Picked up in the NKVD headquarters, when they
fled in advance of the Naxi invasion ?

Dr. Padalis. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kersten. And what you have there is a true and correct Eng-
lish translation of this Russian memorandum ?

Dr. Padalis. Yes. I was present when the translation was made,
too. It is in the Lithuanian Bulletin, vol. 5, September-October 1947,
commencing on page 6, to the end of page 24.

Mr. Kersten. That is a memorandum pertaining to what ?

Dr. Padalis. To the underground activities in Lithuania from the
14th of April — it was a report written by the secret police, sent to
Moscow, covering; underground activities between October 1940 and
the spring of 1941. That is correct, because in the beginning of this
report, it is stated

Mr. Kersten. Wliat is the title of that report in that bulletin, so
that it can be properly identified ?

Dr. Padalis. "Detailed memorandum regarding counterrevolution-
ary leaflets spreading on the territory of Lithuania SSR."

Mr. Kersten. Mr. Reporter, I think that should be handled as an
exhibit. That is my feeling on the matter, rather than incorporating

Mr. McTiGUE. I think so.

Mr. JuRGELA. I made those translations from Russian into English.
They have been in my possession for several years.

One is a memorandum by the NKGB.

The NKVD in February 1941 was split into 2 commissariats. One
was called the NKVD, the Commissariat of the Interior; the
other became NKGB, that meaning state security.

There are two reports. One is the complete report, covering the
period of October 1940 to about January or February 1941. The other
is, then, an unfinished NKGB report covering the later period. It had
never been finished.

Then, there is also an NKGB order of June 21, 1941, ordering infil-
tration of Lithuanian resistance units, and citing instances of resist-
ance and the blundering of NKVD troops.


Durino; the shooting, they shot their own soldiers.

That document is reproduced photostatically in Russian, and an
English translation.

Also, there are two letters on the NKVD stationery of Moscow,
with various resolutions entered by NKVD officials in Lithuania, or-
dering the deportation, and so on.

All those documents will be produced in evidence in Chicago, but
the photostatic reproductions and translations are available in this

Mr. Kersten. I don't think we should have the photostatic repro-
ductions put into the record. That is of the Russian, if the originals
are available, as I understand they will be. Is that correct?

Mr. JuRGELA. I still say the translation is here.

Mr. Kersten. I haven't referred to them. I should think the trans-
lations should follow the originals, so that one is next to the other,
don't you think so ?

Mr. McTiGUE. Let's go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Kersten. The witness can give us any authentication of these
documents here, but the documents will be furnished in Chicago.

I think when you have the originals available, they will be intro-
duced there, and then following, the translations.

Sufficient reference has been made to the translations so that they
can be picked up.

Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Dr. Padalis. Maybe I could make a final remark with regard to the
revolt : We started the revolt, the committee did. After we took over
the radio station in Kaunas on the first day of our revolt, we proclaimed
independent Lithuania, and we gave the names of the members of the
provisional government, and we appealed to people to revolt imme-
diately the same day, and the revolt spread throughout Lithuania. It
was to a great measure a spontaneous revolt by the people themselves.
That is, these were not organized in advance, at all. We had just our
points of strength throughout the country, but then all the people

Then I would like to state that the workers who w^ere supposed to be
happy under the Soviet regime did take a very active part in our revolt,
and they did defend the factories in which they worked, because the
Soviets tried to burn them down or dynamite them. The workers
defended the factories which they didn't own, and in which they
worked, for the independent Lithuania.

Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kersten^. I have just a couple of questions : You were present in
Lithuania during the entire first year of Soviet occupation?

Dr. Padalis. That is correct.

Mr. Kersten. And during the time of the so-called free elections, in
which the parliament that was claimed to have been rigged, voted the
resolution of the incorporation into the U. S. S. R.

What would you say, Doctor, as to whether or not it is true that the
Lithuanian people desired in any way to be incorporated into the
U. S. S. R.

Dr. Padalis. It is not true, Mr. Chairman. We were occupied by
the Soviet armed forces, which were followed by the Soviet police, and
the puppet government was established. The elections were announced


on tlie 5tli of July, and were held on the 16th and I7th of July, just
in about 2 weeks, I think, and I think the chairman knows very well
that there was present only one list of candidates containing exactly
the number of members to be elected. We had no choice. All the
candidates were appointed by the Communist Party, and then it was
just a mockery.

There is a fact, I think of importance : We were voting 2 days. On
the l7th of July in the morning, the Soviet official agency, Tass, in the
London Press, announced the results of the Lithuanian elections. The
polls were closed, only at 8 o'clock at night.

Mr. Kersten. In other words, they had their announcements ready
before the results were ready, is that right ?

Dr. Padalis. Before the elections w^ere finished or before the polls
were closed.

Mr. Kersten. Did you have any experience in your work with the
underground resistance in the treatment by the NKVD, or by the Rus-
sian troops, of the bodies of partisans when they were dead? That is,
for example, when they were brought into town, or any such thing?

Dr. Padalis. Not during the first occupation.

Mr. Kersten. These things occurred in the second occupation?

Dr. Padalis. In the second occupation, that is correct.

Mr. Machrow^icz. I want to congratulate Dr. Padalis. I think it
was a complete and excellent statement.

Mr. Kerstex. 1 think, Dr. Padalis, that in your present capacity as
a professor at the University of Detroit, and as an American citizen,
and as a former Lithuanian, formerly a Lithuanian citizen, I think you
have made a real contribution to the cause of freedom.

Dr. Padalis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kersten. Mr. Vitins?

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so held you God ?

Mr. Vitins. I do

Mr. Kersten. Will you tell us your full name, please?

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