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might have a prejudicial elTect on the proposals made by the Commission on
the questions submitted to it, and to take, as far as possible, all necessary
preventive measures to that end.

Article 9

The present Convention forms an integral part of the Treaty of Non-Aggression
and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, concluded on May 4, 1932, between Estonia
and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and shall be deemed to be rati-
fied by virtue of the ratification of that Treaty.

It shall come into force simultaneously with the Treaty in question, and shall,
remain in force during the whole period of validity of that Treaty.

Article 10

The present Convention is done at Moscow, in duplicate, in Estonian and Rus-
sian, June 16, 1932.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

[L. S.] Jul. Seljamaa. [L. S.] B. Stomonyakov.



Exhibit 4^E
[Translation i]

No. 3455

PROTOCOL RENEWING THE TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION AND PEACE-
FUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES OF MAY 4TH, 1932, BETWEEN ESTONIA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT
MOSCOW, APRIL 4TH, 1934

The President of the Estonian Republic and the Central Executive Committee
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by the desire to provide the firmest possible basis for the development
of the relations between their covmtries,

Solicitous to give each other fresh proof of the unalterable nature and solidity
of the peaceful and friendly relations happily established between them,



^ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for Information.



532 BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

Inspired by a desire to contribute to the consolidation of universal peace and to
the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern
Europe,

Having observed that the Treaty concluded on May 4th, 1932, at Moscow,
between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has exercised a
beneficial influence on the relations between the two countries and on the
solution of the problems in question.

Have decided to sign the present Protocol and have for that purpose appointed
as their Plenipotentiaries :

The President of the Estonian Republic :

M. Karl Tofer, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the
Estonian Republic in Moscow ;
The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
M. Maxime Maximovitch LitvinofE, member of the Central Executive
Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Com-
missary for Foreign Affairs ;
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have
agreed on the following provisions :

Article I

In alteration of the period of validity of the Treaty of Non-Aggression and
I'acific Settlement of Disputes concluded at Moscow on May 4th, 1932, between
Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which period is provided for
in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the said Treaty, the Treaty shall remain in force
until December 31st, 1945.

Article II

The present Protocal is drawn up in duplicate in the Estonian and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic. It shall be ratified as soon as
possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High
Contracting Parties at Tallinn.

The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, in the Estonian and Russian languages, April 4th,
1934.

[l. s.] K. Tofer. [l. s.] M. Litvinoff.



Exhibit 4-F

[Translation i]

No. 4643

PACT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SIGNED AT
MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 2Sth, 1939

The President of the Republic of Estonia, of the one part, and

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, of the other part ;

Desirous of developing the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace
of February 2nd, 1920, based on the recognition of independent political existence
and non-intervention by either Contracting Party in the internal affairs of the
other Contracting Party ;

Recognizing that the I'eace Treaty of February 2nd, 1920. and the Treaty of
Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of May 4th, 1932 are and
remain the solid foun(h\tion of their reciprocal relations and obligations ;

Convinced that it is in the interest of l)oth Contracting Parties to determine
the exact conditions for the consolidation of their mutual securit.v ;

Have deemed it necessary to conclude between themselves the Pact of Mutual



1 Translation of the Estonian Government.



BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION 533

Assistance hereunder, and have for that purpose appointed as their Pleni-
potentiaries :

The President of the Republic of Estonia :

M. Karl Selter, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;
Tlie Presidium of tlie Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics :
M. V. M. MolotofE, President of the Council of People's Commissaries and
People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs ;
Who have agreed as follows :

Article I

The two Contracting Parties under take to render each other assistance of
every kind, including military assistance, in the event of direct aggression or
threat of aggression on the part of a European Great Power against the maritime
frontiers of the Contracting Parties in the Baltic Sea, or against their land
frontiers across the territory of the Republic of Latvia, and also against the
bases provided for in Article III.

Article II

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to assist the Estonian
army on advantageous terms, with armaments or other war material.

Artecle III

The Republic of Estonia grants the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the
right to have naval bases on the Estonian islands of Saare Maa and Hiiu Maa
and in the town of Paldiski, together with a number of aerodromes for air
forces, on lease at reasonable rates. The exact sites of the bases and aero-
dromes in question shall be assigned, and the limits thereof defined, by common
accord.

With a view to the defence of the naval bases and aerodromes in question,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be entitled at its own expense to
maintain strictly limited numbers of Soviet land and air armed forces, up to
a maximum to be determined by special agreement, within the areas allotted
for the said bases and aerodromes.

Article IV

The two Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude alliances or to take
part in coalitions directed against either of the Contracting Parties.

Article V

The enforcement of the present Pact may in no way impair the sovereign
rights of the Contracting Parties or, more especially, their economic system or
political structure.

The areas allotted for the bases and aerodromes (Article III) shall remain
territory of the Republic of Estonia.

Article VI

The present Pact shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the
instruments of i*atiflcation. The exchange of the instruments of ratification
shall take place at Tallinn within six days from, the date of signature of the
present Pact.

The period of validity of the pre.sent Pact shall be ten years, provided always
that, if neither of the Contracting Parties deem it necessary to denounce it one
year before the expiry, of that period, its validity shall be automatically re-
newed for a further period of five years.

Article VII

The present Pact is drawn up in duplicate originals in the Estonian and
Russian languages at Moscow, this 2Sth day of September, 1939.

September 28th, 1939.

K. Selter V. Molotoff.

52975—54 — pt. 1 35



534 BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

Exhibit 4-G

Speech bt V. Molotov on the FIfth Exteaobdinakt Session of the Supreme
Soviet on October 31, 1939

[Pravda, No. 303, of November 1, 1939]

[p. 34] I shall now pass on to our relations with the Baltic countries. As
you know important changes have taken place in this sphere as well. Relations
of the Soviet Union with [35] Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are based on the
Peace Treaties concluded with the respective countries in 1920. By these
Treaties Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became independent States, and ever
since then the Soviet Union has invariably pursued a friendly policy towards
these newly created small states. This was a reflection of the radical difference
between the policy of the Soviet Government and the policy of Tsarist Russia
which brutally oppressed the small nations, denied them every opportunity of
independent national and political development and left them with most painful
memories of itself.

It must be admitted that the experience of the past two decades of the devel-
opment of Soviet-Estonian, Soviet-Latvian, and Soviet-Lithuanian friendly
relations has created favourable conditions for the further consolidation of
political and all other relations between the U. S. S. R. and its Baltic neighbours.
This has also been revealed in the recent diplomatic negotiations with the
representatives of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and in the Treaties which
were signed in Moscow as a result of these negotiations.

As you know the Soviet Union has concluded Pacts of Mutual Assistance with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are of major political significance. The
principles underlying all these pacts are identical. They are based on mutual
assistance between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania on the other, and they include military assistance in case of any of
these countries being attacked. In view of the special geographical position of
these countries, which form a kind of approach to the U. S. S. R., particularly
from the Baltic, these Pacts allow the Soviet Union to maintain naval bases
and aerodromes at specified points of Estonia and Latvia, and in the case of
the Pact with Lithuania, provides for the defence of the Lithuanian borders
jointly with the Soviet Union.

The creation of these Soviet naval bases and aerodromes on the territory of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the stationing of a certain number of Red
Army units to protect [36] these bases and aerodromes ensure a reliable defence
base not only for the Soviet Union but also for the Baltic States themselves and
thereby contribute to the preservation of peace, which is to the interest of our
peoples. Our recent diplomatic negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
have shown that we have sufiicient confidence in each other and a proper under-
standing of the necessity of adopting these measures of military defence in the
interest both of the Soviet Union and of these States themselves. The negotia-
tions have revealed fully the anxiety of the parties concerned to preserve peace
and safeguard the security of our peoples who are engaged in i)eaceful labour.
It was all this that ensured the successful completion of the negotiations and the
conclusion of Pacts of Mutual Assistance which are of great historical importance.

The special character of these Mutual Assistance Pacts in no way implies any
interference of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania,
as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. On the contrary, all these
Pacts of Mutual Assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty
of the signatory States and the principle of non-interference in each other's
affairs. These Pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social, and
economic structure of the contracting parties and are designed to strengthen the
bases for peaceful neighbourly co-operation between our peoples. We stand for
the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the Pacts on the basis of complete
reciprocity, and we declare that all the spreading of the nonsense about Sovietiz-
ing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of enemies of our common causes,
and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

In view of the improvement in our political relations with Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania, the Soviet Union has gone a long way to meet the economic needs
of these States, and has concluded Trade Agreements with them. Thanks to
these economic agreements, trade with the Baltic countries will become several
times as great as formerly, and there are favourable prospects for its further
growth. At a time when [37] all European countries, including neutral States,
are experiencing tremendous trade difliculties, these economic agreements between



BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION 535

the U. S. S. R. and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are of great positive im-
portance to them. Thus the rapprochement between the U. S. S. R. on the one
hand and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the other will contribute to a more
rapid progress of their agriculture, industry, and transport and in general to
the national well-being of our Baltic neighbours.



Speech by V. Molotov at the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet on

March 29, 1940

[Pravda, No. 89, of March 30, 1940]

[p. 64] The conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Finland consummates the
task we set ourselves last year of safeguarding the security of the Soviet Union
in the direction of the Baltic. This Treaty is a necessary complement to
the three Pacts of Mutual Assistance concluded with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-
ania respectively. Our experience during the six months that have elapsed since
these Pacts of Mutual Assistance were concluded has enabled us to draw very
definite positive conclusions concerning these Treaties with the Baltic countries.
It is quite clear that the Treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania have served to strengthen the international position
both of the Soviet Union and of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

In spite of the scare raised by imperialists circles hostile to the Soviet Union,
the State and political independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has not
suffered in any way, while economic intercourse between these countries and the
Soviet Union has begun to increase markedly. The Pacts with Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania are being carried out in a satisfactory manner and this creates
premises for a further improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and
these countries.



Exhibit 4-H

[Copy]
[PoBtal telegraph cable]



New York, July 12, 19^0.



VAELISMIN
TALLINN/ESTONIA/

PRES8ITEADETEL EE8TIS VALIMISED JA VENEGA UEHINEMISE BAHVAHAELETUS 1 6 STOP
PALUN TELEORAFEEEIDA MILLINE HAEAELETUS MIS ALLUSEL JA KOBRAS

PEAKONSULAAT 847

[Translation of the above]

[Postal telegraph cable]

New York, July 12, 1940.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TALLINN /ESTONIA/

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS ON THE 15TH THERE WILL BE IN ESTONIA ELECTIONS AND
A PLEBISCITE TO JOIN RUSSIA STOP PLEASE CABLE WHAT VOTING ON WHAT BASIS AND
ORDER

CONSULATE GENERAL 847

This is to certify that the above is a true and correct copy and translation of a
cable sent by the Consulate General of Estonia in New York to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Estonia on July 12, 1940.

New York, N. Y., February 25, 1954.
Reg. No. 77.

[seal] (Signed) Johannes Kaiv,

Johannes Kaiv,
Acting Consul General of Estonia in charge of Legation.



536 BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

[Copy]

[Commercial cables]
SAATKOND

Tallinn, July IS, 1940.

KT (CONSULATE GENL ESTONIA 9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA) —

RAHVAHAEAELETUST POLE AINULT KIIGIVOLIKOGU VALIMISEU POEHISEADUSE ALUSEL
UEHINEMISE JUTLTD ALUSETA —

VAELISMIN 1393

[Translation of the above]
[Commercial cables]

Tallinn, July IS, 1940.

SAATKOND

NY (CONSULATE GENL ESTONIA 9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA) —

THERE IS NO PLEBISCITE ONLY CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ELECTIONS ON BASIS OF CONSTI-
TUTION. RUMORS ABOUT JOINING WITHOUT FOUNDATION —

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1393

This is to certify tliat the above is a true and correct copy and translation of a
cable received by the Consulate General of Estonia in New Yorli from the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, dated Tallinn July 13, 1940.

New York, February 25, 1954.
Reg. No. 78.

[seal] (Signed) Johannes Kaiv,

Johannes Kaiv,
Acting Consul General of Estonia in charge of Legation.



Exhibit 4-1

Consulate General of Estonia

9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.

This is to certify that the attached is a true and correct extract-translation
from a report by an Estonian military expert, submitted to the Consulate Gen-
eral of Estonia in New York in January, 1954 and now on file at this Consulate.

New York, N. Y., February 25, 1954.
Reg. No. 76.

[seal]

(Signed) Johannes Kaiv,
Johannes Kaiv,
Acting Consul General of Estonia in charge of Legation.

[Extract — translation — from a report by an Estonian military expert, sulimitted to the
Consulate General of Estonia in New York in January 1954]

Summary of Soviet Military Preparations in Estonia

The Soviets are trying to maintain that the reason for the annexation of the
Baltic States has been the desire to fortify the defense of the borders of the
Soviet Union. However, the Kremlin's military preparations in the north-western
part of the Soviet Union cannot, with the best of intentions, be regarded as a
defense of the borders. From Murmansk to Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) "the
borders of the Soviet Union are being protected" by three military districts and
by the navies of the Baltic and the Polar Sea.

In the north is the White Sea military district under the command of Marshal
K. A. Meretskov. It is estimated that this military district is composed of about
250,000 men. Eight divisions comprise the so-called "Polar Army". No military
expert can justify the keeping of such a large army in the far north for defense
purposes. The only possible enemy there might be Finland, but the Soviet Union
has no grounds for looking upon Finland as a future enemy, because she is being
controlled by public and secret agencies. All Soviet military preparations in



BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION 537

the north are aimed at a breakthrough to the Atlantic over Finland and Sweden.
Preparations for the execution of this plan have been carried on by the Kremlin
already for years, as has been revealed by the Swedish trials of spies for securing
information for the Soviets on the northern defenses of Sweden and especially
on Boden.

The Leningrad military district is also scheduled to take part in the conquest of
Scandinavia, and for the preparation of this operation the territory of Estonia
has been subordinated to it.

Analyzing the military preparations in Estonia by the Leningi*ad military dis-
trict, it is evident that they are meant for attack, and in no way can they be
attributed to a border defense. The construction of launching platforms for
long distance missiles, the concentration of landing crafts, the establishment of
large stores of ammunition, food and mobilization equipment on Estonian terri-
tory and the placement of large military concentrations in Estonia, which under
no circumstances are necessary for the protection of these shore lines, prove this
even more conclusively in view of the fact that opposite Estonia, across the
Baltic Sea, is neutral Sweden and looking from the shores of the Elbe river
Estonia is in the far rear of the Soviet state.

To the south of Estonia — the Baltic military district comprises the "Union
Republics" of Latvia and Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region, and also the
strong military concentrations located there. This district is under the com-
mand of Marshall I. H. Bagramjan who became known in the last world war by
his "breakthroughs".

On the basis of the available data it must be assumed that in case of war these
three military districts will comprise the former "North-West front" whose
purpose it will be to conquer Scandinavia in order to place the Baltic and Arctic
Sea fleets in Norwegian bases on the Atlantic.

In regard to the question of execution of the occupation of Scandinavia the
opinions of the experts differ. Some suppose that the attack upon Sweden will
be started simultaneously by Meretskov from the north and Bagramjan from the
south over the island of Gotland, and when they will have achieved already a
certain success and tied up the Swedish armies, then the Leningrad forces, with
the support of the Baltic Sea fleet, will invade central Sweden over the islands
of Hiiii and Saaremaa.

In the north a certain part of Meretskov's army group would stay to conquer
Sweden, beginning with the Boden region, and the "Polar army" would imme-
diately invade Norway and occupy the line Bodo-Narvik. At the same time the
army group of Bagramjan would occupy South-Sweden, and then the Leningrad
army group would invade Central Sweden and immediately proceed over Oslo
to the Atlantic. Bagramjan's forces would safeguard the connection of the
forces on the Atlantic shore with the motherland.

Other experts, however, think that the crossing of the Norwegian mountains
would he beyond the power of the Leningrad district and without the conquest of
Denmark and a landing from there on South Norway nothing would come of it.

How the Soviet Union would execute the Scandinavian conquest operation does
not belong in the framework of the question under analysis, but in any event the
military preparations of the Kremlin in Estonia are of an offensive and not
defensive character.



(Exhibit 5 A, Lithuanian newspaper, may be found in files of the
committee. )

Exhibit 5-B

[Translation from "Lietuvos Aidas" of June 16, 1940 — No. 281 /5490]

For the Information of All Citizens and Inhabitants of the Republic of

Lithuania

At 11 PM / our time / on June 14 of this year, the Chairman of the Council
of the People's Commissars of the Soviet Union and the Commissar for Foreign
Affairs Molotov presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania UrbSys
in Moscow an ultimatum in which it was demanded to satisfy the following
demands by 10 AM / Moscow time / of June 15 :

1. That prosecution would be immediately instituted against the Minister for
Internal Affairs Skucas and the Director of the Security Department Povilaitis



538 BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

as directly responsible for the acts of provocation committed against the Soviet
garrisons in Lithuania.

2. That a new government would be formed immediately in Lithuania which
would be capable and determined to guarantee the honorable execution of the
Mutual Assistance Pact between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, and would
determinedly suppress the enemies of the treaty.

3. That the free admittance of detachments of the Soviet army into Lithuanian
territory, to be distributed in the most important Lithuanian centers in sufficient
number to guarantee the execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the
Soviet Union and Lithuania and to prevent acts of provocation directed against
the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania, be immediately assured.

The government of the Soviet Union holds the fullfillment of these demands
as the primary condition without which the conscientious and honorable execu-
tion of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania
is impossible.

The government of the Soviet Union expects an answer from the govern-
ment of Lithuania by 10 AM of June 15th. The failure to receive an answer
from the Lithuanian government by the specified time will be considered as
a refusal to comply with the above envimerated demands.

In the beginning the ultimatum's motivation was given. The majority of
the motives are already known to our public from "Tass" communiques pub-
lished in our press regarding the disappearance of soldiers of the Soviet Union
in Lithuania and other matters.

After receiving news of this ultimatum, the government of Lithuania im-
mediately gathered in a conference presided over by the President of the Re-
public itself. The conference decided to accept all the demands of the govern-
ment of the Soviet Union and to inform it of this decision through Urbsys in
Moscow within the specified time. The government, headed by Prime Min-
ister Merkys, immediately resigned. The President of the Republic asked
General Ra.stikis to form a new government. General Rastikis immediately
proceeded to form a new government. But our minister in Moscow was in-
formed by the Chairman of the Council of tbe People's Commissars and the
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov that RaStikis is not satisfactory to the
government of the Soviet Union and that it was necessary to come to an agree-



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