get the Secretary of War to rescind his contract with the Curtiss
people.

Mr. Frear. That was suggested to the Secretary of War by this
committee yesterday.

Mr. LaGuardia. To come back to your question, Mr. Frear, to the
inventory: I have been unable to obtain any intelligent information
as to just what the situation in that respect was. I had introduced,
as you know, sometime ago a resolution which I conferred with you
about, and it waspassed by the House yesterday. This will compel
the Secretary of War to furnish to the House an inventory showmg
the number of planes we have, where located, how many hours they
have flown, what they cost; the same as to motors, the same as to
spare parts, and the same as to material.

This inventory can be used also by the sales department in dis-
posing of our surplus supplies, so that they may have intelligent
information.

Mr. Frear. I will ask that you get a copy of your resolution and
have it inserted in the record with your statement.

Mr. LaGuardia. I will do that.

After we know what we have, I venture the prophecy that we will
find that a good many of our supplies are out of proportion, that we
have too much of one thing and not enough of sometning else.

I also desire to suggest to the committee that they go into detail
as to where our surplus of Liberty motors are stored "and the manner



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AVIATIOIT, 141

in which they are stored. We do not want these machines to go
to ruin in the course of six months, and I would advise that the best
engineering advice in the country be obtained as to the best manner
of storing these Liberties, so that we can keep them indefinitely.

If the Liberty motors are simply stored in their original boxes,
as they would be for shipment, they can not last more than a year;
they would ruin and deteriorate.

1 also want to point out to the conmiittee that they should in the
course of their investigation look into the purpose, the scope, the
necessity and the expense of the so-called Lockhart Conmiission,
which came to Paris — ^were going to do all sorts of things there.

Mr. Fbear (interposing). Was that an American conmiission?

Mr. LaGuakdia. That was an American commission, and Col.
Dun woody sits there [indicating], and he might be able to tell you
some of nis experiences with them. They came in large numbers,
splendid retinue, and so far as I can ascertain accomplished abso-
lutely nothing.

Mr. Freak. Did they remain in Paris all the time ?

Mr. LaGuardia. They remained in Paris all the time — so, they
traveled, I suppose, but they remained in Paris. Our Air Service

Quartered them and gave them all the information they wanted,
lut their purpose is worth looking into.

Mr. Frear. Who composed the commission ?

Mr. LaGuardia. This gentleman named Lockhart was the head
of it and there were several civilians.

Mr. Freak. Who was Lockhart ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Col. Dunwoody can tell you.

Col. Dunwoody. He is the member of the firm of Goodrich-
Lockhart Co., of New York.

Mr. Frear. What was their business. Colonel ?

Col. Dunwoody. I think he is a banker and broker. He is also
in the Goodrich business.

Mr. Magee. Do you mean, Congressman, that this commission
was appointed by any duly authorized authority in this country?

Mr. LaGuardia. I think it was noC.

Mr. Frear. For how long a period were they over there ?

Mr. LaGuardia. When did they arrive, Colonel — it was about
Mav, was it not ?

Col. Dunwoody. I should say they were over there four or five
months.

Mr. Frear. Do you know what their recommendations were, if
anvthing ?

Mr. LaGuardia. No; but it is a matter of official record.

Mr. Lea. In that connection, when was it they went over ?

Mr. LaGuardia. I think it was about April or May — ^may I go
baok a minute? I am sorry to give my testimony in such a dis-
jointed manner.

Mr. Frear. Colonel, when did they go over ?

Col. Dunwoody. I should say about that time.

Mr. Frear. 1918?

Col. Dunwoody. 1918.

Mr. LaGuardia. May I go back to the D. H. machines and point
out that the D. H. machines which we sent back were cased, a com-
plete machine in a box; those were sent back here.



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142 WAB EXPENDITURES.

The Chaibman. At what time ?

Mr. LaGuardia. After the war.

Mr. Frear. You sent them back ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Oh, yes; a large number, completely cased,
complete machines. I want to point that out in connection with
what I said before as to the way we shipped them here.

Mr. Frear. When were those receivea over there ?

Mr. LaGuardia. I guess we got the first over there about July.

Mr. Frear. The testimony has been taken in New York by Chair-
man Johnson's committee, at the request of this subcommittee,
showing that a large number of machines, 320, 1 believe, were burned
over there in France, and the photographs of the fire were handed to
the Secretary of War by this committee. Do you know what the
purpose of burning these machines was ?

Mr. LaGuardia. I read reports of that in the paper.

Mr. Frear. We had the photographs of the burning.

Mr. LaGuardia. I can not understand that, and I do not believe
that they were burned on the orders of the chief of air service.

Mr. Frear. Hiat is, you believe they were burned without any
orders from headquarters-?

Mr. LaGuardia. I can not understand how that happened, in
view of my knowledge and personal acquaintance witn the men
out there and knowing how they appreciated the value of wood
and metals, and even of linen; I do not see how that happened.

Mr. Frear. They were marked for the identification of the ma-
chines, so that, as I imderstand, they were American machines.

Mr. LaGuardia. That is something that is beyond me. I do not
know how it would happen, I believe our service men had nothing
to do with it, because nobody appreciates the value of a flyer any
more than they do.

Mr. Frear. That may be true, but when we are selling machines
as low as we are in this country, transportation and other matters
might have interfered.

Mr. LaGuardia. They could have taken that wood to Italy and
almost got its weight in gold; they could have chopped up the
motors and sold them to Germany at almost any price. It is valu-
able. You have no idea how scarce materials are m Europe to-day.
There is no explanation for it. I can not understand how it was done,

Mr. Frear. May we ask you. Major, to get back to our Italian
situation there? We interrupted you about machines that were
in service. I want to know, briefly, what was done during the war
while you were there, what machins were used and whether any
machines were furnished to the Americans.

Mr. LaGuardia. Our boys had finished the elementary training, and
were sent to France for advance training, pursuit and observation
schools, and then some were sent to schools to train for bombers.
A large number of these men were sent north in France and England
to go into bombing work, and some of us were detailed to the Italian
front. I had at the Italian front at all times about 60 men. We
kept them there training with a few machines, if we could, and then
sent them north. They would go right in squadrons. We had
none of our own machines in Italy at aU.

Mr. Frear. At no time ?



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AVIATION. 143

Mr. LaGtjardia. At no time.

Mr. Frear. At no time was an American-made machine in Italy.

Mr. LaGuardia. Never, and no machines were actually owned.

Mr. Frear. And from what time were American flyers engaged
in Italy?

Mr. LaGuardia. We went there to train in October of 1917, and
we got to the front in Jmie of 1918. At the front, inasmuch as we
had no machines of our own, or in complete squadrons, we were di-
vided and assigned to Italian squadrons. Each ItaUan squadron
had so many Americans in it and a Caproni would fly with an Amer-
ican and Italian crew.

Mr. Frear. About how many men did you have there on the front
flying?

Mr. LaGuardia. Sixty men at all times.

Mr. Frear. On the Italian front ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes, sir. I was in command there, and I would
send Col. Dunwoody down an order for 15; I would send up 15 and
take 15 out of the bombing school.

Mr. Frear. Where was Col. Dunwoody ?

Mr. LaGuardia. He was our commanding officer in Paris.

Mr. Frear. You were flying yourself during a portion of this time ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Frear. And bombing ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Frear. And used the Caproni throughout ?

Mr. LaGuardia. We used the Caproni. We took about a half ton,
or 700 pounds, of explosives at night trips.

Mr. Frear. What period of time did you sav that machine could
maintain itself in the air with the fuel supplies ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Those machines we used, four hours. But Ca-
proni had his machines rigged up for six-hour trips.

Mr. Frear. How far would tnat take you?

Mr. LaGuardia. We had a safe radius of 200 miles and back. We
never flew that far, however.

Mr. Frear. How close to the battle line were the machines
ordinarily?

Mr. LaGuardia. It would take us from 15 to 20 minutes to reach
our ceiling and get into the enemy's territory.

Mr. Frear. How long would it take the Caproni to reach his ceil-
ing — to rise up ?

MT. LaGuardia. I can give you the exact figures on that.

Mr. Frear. How long ; do you know ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Ten minutes.

Mr. Frear. The testimony here was that the De Haviland time
was 48 minutes.

Mr. LaGuardia. I can give you that exactly. We were given 10
minutes over the field, and that would take us a thousand feet up,
and WQ had to go up 14,000 feet when we went over the mountains,
and I should thmk that would take us 30 to 35 minutes.

Mr. Frear. Did those Caproni machines have a longer period of
flying?

Mr. LaGuardia. It was different type.

Mr. Frear. A heavier machine ?

Mr. LaGuardia. A heavier machine.



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144 WAR EXPBNDITURlilS.

Mr. P^EAR. But the De Ha viland 4 is spoken of as the machine we
eventually furnished.

Mr. LaGuardia. It was not fit for fighting.

Mr. Frear. It was not fit for fighting? It was not equipped for
bombing, when it took 48 minutes to roach the ceiling?

Mr. LaGuardia. It would not be an answer. It took 48 minutes
for it to reach its altitude on our own territory, and then go across
at the 14,000 feet. I think the De Haviland 4 coidd be used as a
day bomber at that time.

Mr. Frear. The testimony of Col. Clark and of others who were
using it, as I understand, was that it was not qualified for bombing,
and they gave this as an objection; that is the testimony put into the
record.

Mr. LaGuardia. When we went out with Capronis in the daytime
we went out with squadrons, with machines all around us.

Mr. Frear. You had a long time you could spend in the air. The
DeHaviland 4's could only cany for two hours, and three-fourths
of the time was expended in riding to the ceiling.

Mr. LaGuardia. We would generally take out with us two and
a half hours of fuel, and load up the rest with bombs, and in the day-
time we had the pursuit fleet with us, and when we were attacked
the pursuit fleet would take care of them, and we had two gunners,
one front and one rear, in case of emergency.

Mr. Magee. The De Haviland 9 has been spoken of as a machine
that was eventually being prepared and as a Dombing machine and
fighting machine. That is a heavier machine ?

Mr. LaGuardia. That is a heavier machine.

Mr. Magee. It was claimed that it was being placed in production
at the conclusion of the war.

Mr. LaGuardia. We did not get any, did we, Colonel?

Col. DuNWOODY. One machine. We got an English machine that
had been shipped over and which was lost on its way.

Mr. Frear. May I ask on what front it was eventually used in
fighting?

Col. DuNWOODY. It never got on the front.

Mr. Frear. As a matter of fact, we never had anything better than
the De Haviland 4 ?

Mr. LaGuardia. The number I gave you. But we had the best
men in the world.

Mr. Frear. And were those men supplied — the men who did fly —
with what machines we did supply ?

Mr. LaGuardia. They had Spads and Newports and Sampsons
and anything; and I want to say in this connection that if we did
have any men at the front, if we did not get any machines — and
sometimes we did not get as good machines as we ought to have got —
that was due to the ingenuity and the policy and other skill of Col.
Dunwoody, who is right here. How we got them, we do not know.
I would hate to find out.

Mr. Frear. You did not get them through the ordinary red-ta{>e
procedure with which we are all familiar. 1 do not know whether it
IS material or not, but I thought what Gen. Mitchell said was of
interest about the steel contract.

Will you state what the steel contract was — ^first, was there any-
thing about this suggestion which has been made that you over there



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AVIATION. 145

endeavored to cut red tape where ever necessary and supply the
needs of the service ?

Mr. LaGuakdia. In this instance we had promised Italy to furnish
a cei tain amount of raw materials.

Mr. Fbeab. That is, this Government?

Mr. LaGuardia. This Government. And owing to shortage in
tonnage, of course, we could not deliver; and owing, also, to the fact
that alter the retreat in October, 1917, Italy was entirely without
food. So some of that tonnage had to be usea to get wheat and flour
over. The Italian Government knew they could get some steel and
hardwoods from Maine and also copper. But they coidd not buy
it, because their exchange was shot to pieces, and it made the price
prohibitive. I heard about this, and I went to the air nrinister, and
told him that if I could arrange to get that stuff for him, if he would
credit the United States for that amount, thereby cutting down
the amount of raw material which we had to send from the United
States and reducing our tonnage. He was tickled to death. The
necessity and the logic and the usefulness of this was plain. I went
with my little idea to Paris, and I knew that if I went against any of
the "hard-boiled'' Army regulations there I was done for. So Col.
Dunwoody and I went into conference and we got hold of McFadden,
who was a United States Treasury man, a busmess man, and he had
all sorts of regulations over him. But he saw the necessity for this,
and he said, "You go down there and get this steel, and we wiU find
out to pay for it later." We drew up a contract, which was s^ed by
Col. Dunwoody, and I also signed it, and the Italian official signed it,
arranging to take the food. We paid for all of this stuff, and they
credited us that much.

Mr. Fbeab. This was steel ?

Mr. LaGuabdia. Steel, and anything I could buy^teel, copper,
and hardwood, and mark you, this was not to be paid for in bonds;
this must be deducted cash, and we had to pay Italy.

Mr. Fbeab. Cash and the rate of exchange, and everything was
settled?

Mr. LaGuabdia. So, the rest of the story is simple. We went
down there and got the stuff. Just how we got the stuff out is not a
matter of record. We got steel and copper, and we were on the way
toward getting wood, and that wood was sought from time to time
after that.

Mr. Fbeab. The reason for bringing that out is the question of
control by the present methods that govern the War Department,
whether or not it was tedious and became embarrassing to quick
action that is sometimes necessary in providing material for the air
service as well as other lines of service; and that is brought before
the committee by various suggestions that it be placed in another
branch of service or an independent branch of service and certain
assignments to be made of material when provided to the War
Department or Navy Department or other branches.

Mr. LaGuabdia. in that connection I want to say this, that, for
instance, the Navy seemed to have more freedom of action than we
had, although their service was much smaller; they were able to get
stuff. For mstance, nothing held them back; they even came down
to Italy and tried to overbid on machines we were buying; they were
not hampered by anything.



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146 WAR BXPBNDITURBS.

Mr. Frear. That is, we were in competition with ourselves — two
branches of service ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes, but we stopped that down there. But I
understand here, and even France where the colonel had some
trouble, they were not permitted to buy anything.

Mr. Frear. TTiat could have been avoided provided the entire
service could have been under one control so as to have made
assignments.

A&. LaGuardia. And what showing we did make at the front with
our men, whatever may be said about the machines, sometimes they
had Nieuports when they should have Spads, and sometimes they diU
not have the best Spads.

Mr. Frear. Sometimes we did not have the best Spads — ^why not ?

Mr. LaGuardia. We could not get them.

Mr. Frear. What would you get ?

Mr. LaGuardia. What we comd get in France.

Mr. Frear. Spads they were willing to let you have that they were
not using themselves ?

Mr. LaGuardia. They were not willing to let us have them. I do
not know how we got them, but it was through the efforts of Col.
Dunwoody; that is why we made the showing, because we cut the
red tape.

Mr. Frear. Were they seconds the French were using?

Mr. LaGuardia. Toward the end thev were good.

Col. Dunwoody. They were exactly the same as the French. TTie
product was at last divided, and we got about two-fifths of their
machines. The machines would come right out of the factory, and
one would go to the French and one to Ajoierica

Mr. Magee. What did we actually accomplish in the aircraft from
the time we entered the war April 6, 1917, to the date of the armistice,
1918?

Mr. LaGuardia. As far as we were concerned over there ?

Mr. Magee. As a factor in the war?

Mr. Frear. You mean in machines or men ?

Mr. Magee. I say, what did we accomplish in the aircraft service ?

Mr. Frear (interposing). Production!

Mr. Magee. He can answer the question. I mean as an efficient
arm of the service in the conduct of the war? .

Mr. LaGuardia. Well, I think, Gen. Pershing is fair to lis in his
statement that at St. Miehl we rendered very valuable service, and
were un to the mark.

Mr. Magee. In the machines of American manufacture — that is
what I am talking about; not of the personnel. But what we did
accomplish in the aircraft from the standpoint of American manu-
facture?

Mr. LaGuardia. Mv reply to that and my personal opinion is
practically nothing. We would have been just as well off without
those four squadrons of D. H. at the front as with them.

Mr. Frear. It appears as a matter of record, as I understand it,
that the personnel of the American airmen is evidence of the fact
that it was Gen. Mitchell who was in command at St. Mihiel — had
command of all the airmen

Mr. LaGuardia (interposing). Of that sector; that was our fight.

Mr. Frear. Who had command on the Italian front?



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AVIATION. 147

Mr. LaGuardia. I did, of the Americans.

Mr. Frear. He had command of both the Americans, the British,
and the French?

Mr. LaGuardia. Oh, yes; that was our fight, and he was in gen-
eral command.

Mr. Frear. So that it showed the reliance that was placed upon
our men when given positions of responsibility ?

Mr. LaGuardia. We were in command of everything — ^in command
of a division fighting there.

Mr. Frear. Bow many machines did we have there, would you
saVy in that battle?

Mr. LaGuardia. I do not know. Gen. Mitchell could tell you that.

Mr. Frear. Is there anything else that occurs to you ?

Mr. LaGuardia. No; •except I would like to reserve the privi-
l^e — ^I have not gone through all of my memoranda, as I have sev-
eral bags of it, and if I find anything of importance, I would like to
come back.

Mr. Frear. We would be very glad to have you and to have you
add anytiiing that occurs to you. Is there anything valuable in this
data that ought to be added in the record ? .

Mr. LaGuardia. You will get that from Gen. Mitchell. I vdll be
glad to loan it to you.

Mr. Lea. I would like to ask a few questions. Mr. LaGuardia,
when did you enter the service?

ifr. LaGuardia. I think it was August, 1917.

Mr. Lea. I understood you were commissioned lieutenant in
August.

Mr. LaGuardia. No; I think it was 1916.

Mr. Lea. And what training did you have before you were com-
missioned ?

Mr. LaGuardia. In 1915 the most of my friends went to Platts-
burg. I could not go because I was too short. So I went out to
Mineola and took a course at a private flying school and thought I
was doing some flying. I just got the rudiments of flying.

Mr. Lea. But a certain amount of training preceded your com-
mission ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. Lea. And that was a part of the requirement, that every man
has to have certain qualifications ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lea. I did not depend on time, but as soon as a man could
qualify he would be given a commission; is that the idea?

Mr. LaGuardia. On, no; I was not given a commission until after
I entered the service.

Mr. Lea. You did have training preceding your entrance into the
service ?

Mr. LaGuardia. I did have training, but not sufficient to qualify
me as a military flyer.

Mr. Lea. And then you reached France in October. Did you have
any work in England before you went to France, and how long did
you remain in "France before you went to Italy?

Mr. LaGuardia. A few days.

Mr. Lea. And you took charge of this training field in Italy ?

Mr. LaGuardia. One of the fields.

147155— 1^— VOL 1 11 J "

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148 WAR BXPENDITUBES.

Mr. Lea. What was the name of that field ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Ovest.

Mr. Magee. That was purely an American training field ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes.

Mr. Lea. And how many other American training fields were
there in Italy ?

Mr. LaGuardia. None. We had two fields in the aviation sector.

Mr. Lea. And were you in charge of both of these fields ?

Mr. LaGuardja. I was in charge of one field, and then later I was
in charge of aviation matters.

Mr. Lea. What was your position when you became in charge of
aviation matters in Italy ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Captain.

Mr. Lea. Did you have any superior offider in Italy then ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Oh, yes; I had Maj. Ryan.

Mr. Lea. What was the general line of your duties in that respect ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Well, when I first went down I was second in
command under Maj. Ryan, and then I was placed in command of
this other camp when we opened that. Then, besides that, I had
charge at all times of all production matters, so that I made several
trins to Paris, France — ^I think I made about one trip a month.

Mr. Lea. You would carry on the negotiations as to the supplies
required for the Italian sectors ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes; and I did for contracts for training.

Mr. Lea. Did the Americans have any training field where men
were being trained at the time you reached Italy?

Mr. LaGuardia. We had just got one of these fields.

Mr. Lea. You initiated this field ?

Mr. LaGuardia. No; I think there were 60 men when I got down
there.

Mr. Lea. It was at the initial stage ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Oh, yes.

Mr. Lea. There had not been anything particularly accomplishetl
up to that time?

Mr. LaGuardia. None of the boys had received wounds yet.

Mr. Lea. Had the construction work been done ?

Mr. LaGuardia. It had.

Mr. Lea. That was done on contract with America ?

Mr. LaGuardia. It was theirs. We paid so much a man for train-
ing. They desired to bill us for everytning. Then I pointed out to
the Italians we could not take away the buildings or the ground or
anything like that. So we figured a reasonable value of depreciation
of property, actual cost of fuel, actual cost of construction of all
planes, and it got down to a basis so that we paid them for each man
so much, whicn was actual cost. The Italian Government did not
make a penny off of it.

Mr. Lea. Then we did not acquire title to any fields in Italy i

Mr. LaGuardia. No. I did not want to do Ihat. They did that
in France, and I did not like the wisdom of it. They wanted to sell
me those fields, and I think would have been willing for us to buy them«
but I did not want to do it.

Mr. Lea. How far was this from the coast?

Mr. LaGuardia. We flew to the coast on our teste. I should say
it was about 30 or 40 miles.



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AVIATION. 149

Mr. Lea. When you first went over-there, all these Americans were
there for trainmg, were they not ?

Mr. LaGuardia. Yes.

Mr. Lea. There were not any trained fighters there at that time 'i