into bombing. I think he is a man of very good judgment: I should
be very glad to take his judgment on almost any question of that
Mr. Frear. Would you say that Meissner is a man of good judg-
Col. Patrick. I do not know him.
Mr. F^ear. He was flying, and Rickenbacker refers to him quite
Cfol. Patrick. I know his name, but I do not know him personally.
I do know Rickenbacker personally.
Mr. Frear. I believe that is all.
Mr. Lea. General, how long have j'ou been in the military service ?
Col. Patrick. I entered West Point in 1882. That means I have
been nearly 37 years in the military service, sir.
Mr. Lea. And in what section of the service were you engaged at
the berinning of the war ?
Col. Patrick. I was in the Engineers. I took an Engineer regi-
ment to France.
Mr. Lea, And how long did you remain in the engineering service?
Col. Patrick. I was promoted to brigadier general a very few days
after reaching France. The commander in chief then placed me in
charge of engineering instruction in the entire Army. I kept that
for only two or three weeks when I was made what was then called
chief engineer of the lines of communication. Those are intrusted
with all of the instruction work in France. I remained in that
capacity until I was made chief of the Air Service in May, 1918.
Mr. Lea. What, if anything, have you had to do with the Air
Service before you were placed in charge in France ?
CoL Patrick. Nothing.
Mr. Lea. What date was that that you were placed in charge?
Col, Patrick. My recollection of the date is the 29th of May, 1918.
It was some time in May, and I think it was the 29th.
Mr, Lea, Now, at that time there had been no American-made
planes delivered to France?
Col. Patrick. It is possible that one De Haviland 4 may have been
received in France during the month of May.
208 WAR EXPENDITURES.
Mr. Lea. The criticisms quoted by Mr. Frear in the telegram sent
to America referred to what machines ?
Col. Patrick. To the De Haviland 4 plane and the Liberty motor.
Mr. Lea. How many had been sent over at that time ?
Col. Patrick. That was another figure I can not tell you. I have
the figures of the receipt of those planes by every week and month.
We had enough of them by the time that cable was sent, the 24th of
June, to have made a very thorough examination of those that had
been received. The precise number I can not say.
I Mr. Lea. It was a limited number, was it not?"
' Col. Patrick. A limited number.
I Mr. Lea. Had any of them been used on the front at the time the
i cablegram was sent ?
Col. Patrick. No, sir.
Mr. Lea. Now, with what success did you secure improvements of
the defects in the engine?
Col. Patrick. In the engine ? The engines subsequently; came over
to us greatly improved. I mean the minor defects to which we had
called attention had been wiped out, and the engines as received later
were in excellent condition and were a very efficient motor.
Mr. Lea. Only a limited number of engines had been sent over at
that time ?
Col. Patrick. A very limited number.
Mr. Lea. Do you know how the number of deaths among American
fliers compares with the number in the aviation services of the other
Col. Patrick. I have the figures for both French and English. I
hesitate to speak from memory about that.
Mr. Lea. Have you them here?
Col. Patrick. I am afraid not, Mr. Lea. That is such an impor-
tant question you can understand my hesitancy to give those figures
from memory ?
Mr. Lea. You can supply the figures for the record ?
Col. Patrick. I can supply the figures for the record later and tell
exactly what our losses were and exactlv what the French losses were
during the entire war. I can give you the losses of the English during
at least the five months of actual ifighting of 1918.
Mr. Lea. Then I will ask that when this record is turned over to
you that those figures be inserted at this point.
Mr. Frear. There is another question that I think might fit rijrht
in there. If I remember correctly, tlie colonel's statement is that
120 odd men were killed in actual fighting, and about 240 were killed
by accidents, and 260 odd by accidents here ?
Col. Patrick. Those figures were not correct; no, sir.
Mr. Frear. Could you furnish those figures ?
Mr. Lea. And the injuries?
Mr. Frear. I would like to have those too, yes.
Col. Patrick. I have that very completely worked up: every
casualty that happended to any one of our flying ofiicers.
Mr. Frear. Have you that worked up to show whether it occurred
throufrh a defect of the machine or the fault of the men ?
Col. Patrick. That is impossible. Some of those happened in
traininor, and there we can study the case. In other cases we can
not tell. With reference to the machuies coming do\\Ti in flames, it
is practically impossible to tell whether a machine has been struck
by an incendiary bullet or whether it has been struck by antiaircraft
bullets. It crashes sometimes far beyond the lines. An antiaircraft
explosion is so larg;e it will put any kmd of tank out of business.
aIt. Frear. Unless they get pretty high up ?
Col. Patrick. Well, even then.
I would like to say that I have been very careful in getting all of
this data together, and I have those statistics that you asked for very
fully worked out.
Mr. Lea. We shall be very glad to get them.
(The data referred to will be printed hereafter.)
Mr. Lea. How about the experiences of our allies compared with
ours with reference to the difiiculty of finding a satisfactory machine
and imsatisfactory conditions of both aeroplanes and engines ?
Col. Patrick. The allies themselves from the verjr beginning of
hostilities in 1914 had met with a series of difficulties and disap-
pointments in the development of their aviation programs. In
general their difficulties and failures were in many respects similar
to those of the United States. A complete knowledge of the con-
ditions and capabilities of the aeronautical factories was for a long
time not available to the respective governments. There was not
adequate and definite government supervision of manufacture.
When we remember oiu* own experiences with the Liberty engine
and all other aviation equipment produced in the United States, it is
not surprising to note that a number of like circumstances occurred
during the development of allied aviation from the meager foundation
existing in 1914.
I am quoting from my own report to Gen. Pershing.
Mr. Lea. Haveyou anything more s})ecific on that ?
CoL Patrick. Tne difficulties which we encountered in our attempt
to develop night bombing are curiously paralleled by those of tne
French, British, and Italian air services. It follows that the air
programs of any two nations will show a remarkable similarity until
more fundamental and precise knowledge of the science of aviation
is available. The mistakes made can not be considered unusual nor
avoidable. Each disappointment and each failure of judgment might
have been, and in many instances was, duplicated in the case of
every warring nation.
Mr. Lea. When the United States entered the war what, if any,
effort was made on behalf of our Army to take advantage of the ex-
periences of our allies in the war with reference to aviation ?
Col. Patrick. The best answer to that is, I think, the statement
that very shortly after the war started this mission headed by Col.
BoUing was sent abroad to ascertain everything that it could pos-
sibly discover concerning the developments in aviation and to make
recommendations to the United States based i)urely upon the ex])er-
ences of those who were our allies in the war.
Mr, Lea. What was the nature of the work of the Boiling Com-
mission ? What was accomplished, if anything ? What was done ?
Col. Patrick. May' I say that the Boiling mission never finished
its work. Poor Col. Boiling's life ended before I becani,e connected
with the Air Service. Col. Gorrell here probably can answer that
question better than I. He can give you an answer from his personal
knowledge if vou wiU permit him to answer it.
Mr. Lea. Very well.
210 WAR EXPENDITURES.
STATEMENT OF COL. Â£. S. GORREII, AVIATIOK COBPS.
Col. GoRRELL. The BoUinff Mission sailed from the United States
on the 7tn of June, 1917, and went to England, arriving at Liverpool
June 26. They immediately went to London. The mission, let
me state, was made up of naval and Army members and civilian
experts, and about 93 or 06 mechanics whom we took over with a
view to placing them in European factories for the purpose of obtain-
ing such knowledge as is not found on their drawings. The drawings
pertaining to European aircratt are very hazy, yevy defective, and
very insufficient. Most of the knowledge is found in the heads of
workmen â€” certain tolerances, certain clearances, and certain prin-
ciples, etc., they do not commit to writing. That is why we took
these men over, for the purpose ofputting them into the factories.
We landed in England, and Col. Boiling and myself and Mr.
Marmon immediately got in touch with the political side of aviation
in England. The rest of our mission went out to the fields and the
factones and investigated the factories and the fljnng fields. They
talked to the flyers and everybody else, and in the evenings we would
all get together with the fivers.
]n that way, between the 26th of June and the morning of the
2d of July, we covered, the question of what was going on in England.
We received excellent help in every way from the English. They
turned over to us everything we asked for, and we started a shipment
of those things to the United States on the 4th day of July. So
they worked pretty fast.
Mr. Lea. What kind of material was that ?
Col. GoRRELL. I can't remember exactly what was in all the boxes.
Mr. Lea. Right in that connection, so that we will understand : Was
it the idea to send over to America inventions founded on British
experience for the use of our mechanics ?
Col. GoRRELL. Not exactly. We were sent to England to pick up
that which should be built in the United States, and the recommenda-
tions of that board were supposed to be the thinp that would be
built in the United States. After we had been in Englan<l for some
time we had an idea what we would pick if there was no place on the
face of the earth except England, and no material to choose from
but English stuft*, and it came down to half a dozen machines, differ-
ent types of engines, methods of mounting guns, and synchronizing
guns, etc. in order not to lose time in cai-e we should later dwicle
that was what we should pick, we asl;od the English to ship that Â«^tuff
to the L^nited States, and, the C'uestion of royalties being involved,
we pledged our word that the United States would not open those
boxes until they received our final decision, 'n that way we got
advance shipments to the United States of things that we might
Then we went over to Paris, some of us going by boat, and some
by air, and got in touch with the French Ministry of Aviation and
tfie French fiyers. We went all through the factories there thoroughly
and then came to a conclusion as to what we would pick if there were
( nly the British and the French machines to choose from. Then
we asked the French to ship to the United States the things that we
wanted for our men. Those shipments were somewhat delaye<l. for
various reasons, which I will explain if you wish.
AVIAXTON^ l2 1 1
Mr. Lea. I wish voa would.
Col. GoRRExx. 'fhe qaestion Mr*s one of ix>yaltic8. Tl^o t^^noh
wanted money for what they had developed/ Tlie British tur!\ed
their nLaterialoTer to us and said, **we will talk about the money
after the war," but the French wanted money* and we i\\\\ ftnatly
have to pay them a certain sum later on. '
We went from France to Italy and mi in touch, likewiBo, with
the Italian Air Minister and went oyer the problems with them, and
then went to the Itahan front, getting in touch with the flyers and
people in command. . Coming back from Italy some representativew
went to the French front, and also to the English front. Col. Clark
and myself went to the English front and saw the big tlrivo in the
summer of 1917, and the use of aviation in that drive.
In that way we had covered the throe countries from tlie point of
view of their air ministers, from the point of view of tlnm' factories,
from the point of view of what they could produce, and then from
thepoint of view of what they were doing on the front.
Tne following fall we got together in Paris with British representa-
tives, whom they picked from their front and from their inmlstry so
they could see what was being done at the front and what was capa-
ble of being done in the factories. We got togothf^r with the Frefu^h
ministry at the front and the Italian re]>resentfttives, in what was
later called an interallied aircraft committee on convfrntioru W(9
asked them for su^estions, and those three nations agreed with tis
on the sdection ofwhat should be built in the Tnited 8tat^, In
addition to those men under Col. Boiling there had gone Uy Europe
with Gen. Pershmg when he sailerl, an air service ofncer t/> )ye upon
his staff with CoL Boiling. His name wa<i Col, DfKlge.
Mr. Lea. Would this be a convenient time for you tr> tell what was
CoL GoKBEu:^ /ust one second. The men who were on (>en,
Pershing's staff were aviators whom he had picked U} go with him,
whom he had got from the schools, and f)en, Fershing'j* men agreed,
imd the opinion of our mission phis the opinion of the men with
Gen. Persnmg^ plus the opinion of the three other nations was
agreed to without dissention; and an f remember it, tryin<y tr> think
back about 24 months, the agreement was that w(> \ronld take them
up by classes first. First, as M the ohservation rlass an<i the day
boml^ing (dass we eliminated t*xt*ry rÂ»lass of marhine nntjl wf> r^ame
down to two, the Braenette. a French plan**, and the fh* ff>)v;land i
an F"gfiÂ«^ plane. The Frenrh aijreed x*Â» narl hetr^r h^uM the De
Havilandy an<l that was also r,he ne^v;)omr of our mission. So yon
have the De Haviland ;Â»Â« heinsr the univor^al n*rnmn\endation of
our allies, plus those of us who w^re ^^nt ov^r to -^oe vliat to hnild.
Mir. Lha. On what Â«late W}*Â« rliat .tgr<Â»pmpnr %Â»fÂ»rhefl '
CoL GoBRBLL. That w^w .n -he irtst nilf of .h\\y i'.MT.
Now, the De Havilanrt 4 ^vos onlv u\ -^^ wiilt ^<Â»nprjiilv ^Mo.lk.n<r,
as a stop gap until we *'oiihf r(*t rl.p |>/^ ;fa^- Unuf *> ,Â»Â»hI '>Â»iiIH â– /><*
De Haviland *>. Woall rerofl^mzfrf it 'h^t .fntp Mint 'hfÂ» \)^ ; 1?^ .Iftivi ')
was the machine we <lfÂ«irf*rf /Rthf^r 'hfrn â– (i#> h/* lUf^-Unr^ \ hMt, vo
realizerl. likewise, that the 'xermftn^ vould .ot ^too -^^ Â«"n- .tT>f| -v-nt
for llfl U} build the I)e HÂ«^nUruf Â» Â»t' Â»''Â».i/:i *fÂ»p â€¢f#'Â«K/i.^ roiv :v>f
f!nmpleted iit that time. ;i.tkI Â»t' rhir-i, l.^-* [\ri\'^\t h^inaoN .x^ fj/f ^nt
1471 rÂ».V- IS)- \n} ;- I.',
212 WAK EXPENDITUKES.
know all the details. In other words, the De Haviland 9 was more
desirable but it was not ready for production, and, therefore, we
were to build the De Haviland 4 until we could get the De Haviland 9
to the United States and then build a Chinese copy of it.
Mr. Lea. But it was for England to develop the De Haviland 9 ?
Col. GoRRELL. Yes; but we expected at that date that the develop-
ment would be only a matter of a month or so, to get the wings and
everything as they would finally be.
Mr. Lea. How much time did it require as it developed ?
Col. GoRRELL. I can not recollect as to the final development.
Mr. Lea. I mean before they were put into quantity production.
Col. GoRRELL. I shall have to check that up, sir. They did not
arrive in quantity on the British front, I will say, until along about
the summer of 1918, 1 think.
Mr. Lea. Can you give the specific dates as to that by looking
Col. GoRRELL. We would better get that from the British mission.
I would think.
Mr. Lea. I wish you would kindly get that, and when you do get
it, let it be inserted in the record.
Col. GoRRELL. The date the De Haviland 9 reached the British
Mr. Lea. The day it reached quantity production.
Mr. Frear. It was some time m July ?
Col. GoRRELL. No, sir; not July, 1917.
Mr. Frear. Of 1918?
Col. Gorrell. I think it was in the summer of 1918; I do not
know whether it was July or June.
(The data referred to will be printed hereafter.)
Col. Gorrell. Now, if I may go on, that brought us down to the
class of machine we wanted for daylight bombing only. What we
had in our minds at that time for observation purposes was not the
De Haviland 9; that we had in mind to get was the Bristol Fighter,
in which the seats were closer together, in which visability was better.
But you know the situation as to the Bristol Fighter better than I do.
Mr. Frear. What kind of engine did they use in the Bristol
Col. Gorrell. They at one time contemplated putting in tlie
Hispano-Suiza of the small type, like the 220, possibly. At another
time they contemplated the Hispano-Suiza 320, and finally put in
the 320 Rolls-Royce.
So the Bristol Fighter was what we recommended for observation
purposes, French and Italian and all, as being the machine we wanted
lor observation purposes.
Then the question of a two-place fighter came up, and we were
enthusiastic to get the two-place fighter â€” I mean a two-place pursuit
machine. I ought not to use that word ** fighter.'^ May I suggest
that the use of that one word '* fighter'' is causing more trouble than
anything else in the aviation world. Every machine is a fighter at
times. If you go up in the air you must fight. So I would suggest
the use of tne word *' pursuit*' machine for the machine that goes out
and looks for fights. We do not use the word ** fighter" if we can
help it. ^
Mr. Frear. It is generally used in connection with pursuit planes,
is it not?
Col. GoRRBLL. It is; yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. YiHiat did you decide on for that double-seater
Col. GrORRELL. The two-seater pursuit machine that we picked out
was the Bristol Fighter.
Then came the question of a single-seater machine. When we first
be^an to talk about a single-place machine it looked as if we were
gomg to have to build a Spad. It looked as if there should be two
types of pursuit machines, one with a fixed engine and one with a
rotary engine, the fixed-engine machine being less maneuverable at
higher altitude because of great weight, and yet it has the diving
ability. The fixed-engine machine has a pretty good ceiling and has
the ability to dive very rapidly upon an enemy whom he is trying to
shoot down. Its engine is usually but not always more reliable than
the rotary engine, and yet it has the disadvantage that it sometimes
takes longer to start it. But if you want a machine for a hi^h
ceiling and very maneuverable at that high ceiling the rotary engine
Mr. Lea. I was trying to get at the work of this Boiling Commis-
sion; that is all I wanted now. Of course, we have not called you
as a witness yet. I would like to get at the history of that
BoUing Commission, but the real thing I am after is to find out what
was done in the way of cooperation between the United States and
the Allies, and then to get back to the general's testimony.
Col. GoRRELL. As to the nature of cooperation, I must say that
Col. Boiling was a man of unusual characteristics. He made friends
everywhere he went, and coming in there as a disinterested person,
so to speak, he was able to weld the Allies together better than ever
before. From the very first day he fought for an interallied aircraft
convention, to meet at least once a month in Paris, and he succeeded
in accomplishing that, and it did meet possibly once a month, and it
produced very cordial relations, the closest cooperation, and harmony
of all kinds.
Mr. Lea. How long did that commission remain in Europe ?
Col. GoRRELL. That commission, as such, remained in Europe
until about the end of July or the 1st of August. But I must say
that on the 3d of July, 1917, when Col. Boiling went up to the front,
after having arrived on the 2d, he reported to Gen. rershing, and
from that time on he was practically a part of Gen. Pershing^s force,
and Gen. Pershing placed him almost immediately after that in
charge of the lines oi communication of the Air Service. The mis-
sion, as such, while it remained together and did its work imtil
about the end of July, left a part of its force in Europe, which carried
on as a nucleus of our air service, and started the air service in the
S. O. S. and lines of communication, while others, including the two
naval officers who were with us, and the expert civilians, went back
to the United States to carry over the important information which
we had gained.
Mr. Lea. What became of the engineers who were part of the
Col. GoRRELL. Of the engineers, the Army sent over two, CoL
Clark and myself. Col. Clanc came back, and I remained in Europe.
The two naval officers both came back. The civilian engineers came
back, with the exception of one, who remained with me.
214 WAB BXPBNDrrUBBS.
Mr. Lea. Not referring to your own activities, what was the quali-
fication, generally speaking, of those men for this proposition? On
what experience was it based ?
Col. GoRRELL. Col. Boiling was picked because he was a lawyer of
great ability, and was therefore considered able to handle interna-
tional questions which might arise and which did arise. Also he was
A flier of no mean ability. He was a pilot. Col. Clark was picked
because he was, in the opinion of all of us in the Army, our best
aeronautical engineer. I was picked because I happened to be one
of the four men who had taken the master of science degree in aero-
nautical engineering. I do not know how the two naval men were
Mr. Howard Marman everybody knows as being an expert m the
design of engines. Mr. Vail, of tne Dodge Co., is a man whom we
all recognized as bein^ .one of the best experts in this country on
producing engines, lifi*. Hurley, of the Miavale Steel Co., is one of
the best metallurgists in this country. That, in general, is the way
they were picked.
Now, the 96 mechanics who went with us were picked by the auto-
mobile industry as being then* representative shopmen, wno were to
go into the shops abroi^ and learn their methods and to return to
the shops here and put into use what they had learned.
Mr. Lea. Were they sent back here ?
Col. GrORRELL. Ycs, sir; they were sent back in small squads.
Each squad made a special study of a certain type of design. Most
of them came back. Some of them remained witn us and were com-
missioned. A total of 18 out of those 96, we wiU say, wore commis-
sioned as officers in the Airoy.
Mr. Lea. This mission kept making reports to this side, I presume t
Col. GrORRELL. Oh, yes; they became official reports oi the Air
Service of the A. E. F.
Mr. Frear. May I ask you the names of the machines you men-
tioned ? You mentioned four, did you not ?
Col. GoRRELL. I mentioned the De Haviland and Bristol fighter.
Mr. Frear. What were the two Paris machines ?
Col. GoRRELL. The Spad was the machine which we determined
upon. The Spad Monocoque was a rotary. For the night bombing,
we determinea at that time, as I recollect,*^ upon the Caproni machine.
Mr. Frear. That is the Itahan machine ?
Col. GoRRELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lea. Was there any imderstanding reached in reference to
an effort to produce the Caproni in quantity ?
Col. GoRRELL. No. If I may say this right there, Col. Clark and
myself were both very much pleased with the Caproni and the
Handley-Paige, and after he got to England he made a recommenda-
tion, apart from the commission, that the Handlev-Paigc be pro-
duced m the United States and be assembled in Ireland. That did
not come from our mission. And when the recommendation came
from us, you had the recommendation from us for the Caproni and
the recommendation from Col. Clark for the Handley-Paige. We
received an inquirv from the United States whether we advocat^l
the production of both machines, and we cabled back that only one
tyne of night bombing machine should be produced.
Mr. Frear. Well, he recommended the Caproni.