about that, Mr. Chairman, and by doing so I can show you when
my attention was first drawn to the subject. The day I came down
at Washington to be sworn in as Secretary of War, Villa, the Mexican
bandit, crossed the border into Columbus, N. Mex., so that the first
day of my secretaryship was occupied with the question that was
{â–ºresented by that invasion by a bandit force into the^ United States,
mmediately, or within a very few days at least, we were all devoting
our attention to the organization of the so-called Pershing expedition,
a force which was organized for the purpose of pursuing, and, if
possible, capturing the bandit, Villa, lliat organization took a
week to get going, to get started, and either while we were considering
that or immediately thereafter I inquired of Gen. Scott, Chief m
Staff, whether we had any airplanes, thinking that airplanes would
be a very considerable and suitable addition to the force of Gen.
Funston, who was the department commander, for the purpose of
?atrolling the border, ana perhaps a very good addition to Gen.
ershing's expeditionary forces.
I was told that we had a number of airplanes, a few of more or
less thoroughly American type, not modified by any of the experi-
ences of Europe, and I directed that they bo sent, I think from San
Diego; directed that they be sent to Gen. Funston.
My recoDection is that there was an interchange of telegrams —
though I can not be definite about this just at the moment — ^with
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AVIATION. O
Gen. Funston, in which he said he thought airplanes would bo of
no special service in that work. If it was not the view of Gen.
Funston it was the view of somebody m the War Department, but
I said the airplanes ought to go there anyway, and if they could not
be used otherwise they might certainly be used in observation service,
and that we ought to have the use of them. They were sent. After
a little while the Pershing expedition had penetrated so far south
into Mexico, and it was so difficult to maintain communication with
that expedition, that it was attempted to maintain communication
by the use of airplanes. They were off the line of raiboad, and wires
were strung by the signal corps, and were frequently cut by Indians
and others, and there were some static conditions which prevented
the use of wireless telegraphy anything Uke constantly; it was
occasionally used, but the sets that were sent there were tiuck sets,
and mule sets, instead of pennanent supports, so that there were
times when we had to maintain communication between the United
States and Gen. Pershing's headquaiters by other means.
Some of the airplanes proved unsatisfactory, and some fell, and
all of them proved inadequate in use, and as soon as the true situa-
tion in the War Department was called to my attention I took up
with all the manufacturers of airplanes in America, immediately,
the matter of producing at the highest possible speed a supply of
aircrafts, with the thought in mind of equipping Pershing's forces
at least with the most adequate means at that time
Mr. Fbeab (interposing). What time would it be about '^at that
time''?
Secretary Baker. That must have been in March, 1916.
Mr. Fuear. Go ahead.
Secretary Baker. At that time Gen. Squier was the chief siganl
officer, as ne still is — no, Gen. Scriven was the chief signal officer.
There had been quite recently, prior to that, quite a serious difficulty
in the aircraft division of the Signal Corps. It had been presided
over by Col. Reber, an officer of years of distinction, a man of great
piechanical ingenuity and decision of character, and an enthusiast
in the development of aircraft. Prior to my coming to Washington
a controversy came up about Col. Reber, that led to his being tried
by court-martial, and when I came on to Washington I found a court-
martial record of 500 or 600 pages — that is, involving a court-martial
or investigation into the aircraft section, which required me, in order
to take up the situation, to inquire into the mechanics of aircraft
construction, as I also had to inquire into the general situation. So
I sent up to the signal office and had them send down an officer who
was a ffier and who imderstood things of that sort, a man now known
as Lieut. Col. Jones. I waded through that record at night, while
I sat up waiting for communications from Gen. Funston on the border.
I sat up until 2 and 3 o^ clock at night going over the matter, and I
went into the Reber case, and found there was a very serious con-
dition of disorganization in the aircraft section of the Signal Corps.
Gen. Reber had been very impatient with Gen. Scriven, and had
* " counseled insubordination as far as Gen. Scriven was
concerned
Mr. Frear. Was that the character of the charges preferred
against Reber ? •
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WAR KXPENDITURES.
Secretary Baker. I have forgotten the charge, but that was one
of the things, certainly, that he had counseled the young men to
Say no attention to ^'the old man,'' meaning his superior officer,
ren. Scriven.
Mr. Frear. What was the result?
Secretary Baker. The result was that I detached Keber from the
aircraft section of the Signal Corps, and I do not now remember who
was put in his place, but Gen. Scriven doubtless advised who should
be put in his place ; and I directed that a very thoroguh reorganiza-
tion of the aircraft section be made. There was rather tempera-
mental behavior on the part of the young men. There was a charge
that Reber was playing favorites, and one charge was that a lot of
the men were allowed to draw extra pay for the flying service when,
as a matter of fact, they were ground men, but they were permitted
to qualify as pilots by just going up once or twice and without any
real qualifications, so as to draw flymg pay.
Mr. Frear. Rather unimportant, so far as the larger affairs were
concerned.
Secretary Baker. Rather unimportant, as far as individuals were
concerned, but showing a bad situation in the division.
Mr. Frear. What was the situation as to the aircraft program
at that time; or, how many machines did we have, and wnat was
the type of machine or machines, as far as you can recall ?
Secretary Baker. I can not recall that, but a very small number,
I think about 16 airplanes, but I may be wrong about that.
Mr. Frear. All right. I just wanted to get at the general situation.
Secretary Baker. May I add a sontc^nce or two right there in
order to fi^et at vrhat I think you want ?
Mr. Frear. Certainly.
Secretary Baker. When I came to Washington the controversy
had arisen in Congress as between two views of army reorganization.
My predecessor, Mr. Garrison, was in favor of what was coUoqually
called '^the Colonial Army plan,'' and Senator Chamberlain was in
favor of another plan, and the chairman of the House committee,
Mr. Hay, was in favor of still another plan. And there had been a
very intense controversy about the wnole subject. So that there
had been no bill passed, and when I came to Wasliington that matter
was all in the dough. I, accordingly, had to come down before the
House Committee on Military Affairs and the Senate Committee on
Military Affairs and advocate some kind of adjustment of the
outstanding differences in order to get a bill tlirou^h. The net
result of the ^^hole thing was that the so-called **IIay-Chamberlain''
bill was passed. -iVn appropriation bill was also passed, either as a
part of the Hay-Cham oerlain bill or at the same time. Gen.
Scriven, who was then the Chief Signal Officer and detailed as head
of the Air Service, came down before the House committee and
argued very earnestly in favor of a larger appropriation for aircraft.
I came after him, and as I recall the situation, though I have not
thought of it since, I supported Gen. Scriven 's views, and explained
to the committee .the newness of our general interest in this coimtry
in aircraft and the very great difficulty of getting airplanes in tlm
country. I had been in communication with every known manu-
facturer of aircraft, and none of them could promise early deliveries
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AVIATIOlSr. 7
of aircraft. I supported Gen. Scriven in his request for aircraft, but
no bill for aircraft had been passed before I came to Washington.
Mr. Frear. How many factories were manufacturing airplanes
at the time?
Secretary Baker. I can not answer that.
Mr. Frear. I mean generally, so far as you recollect, not attempting
to be exact.
Secretary Baker. I would say offhand that I saw representatives
from three or four.
Mr. Frear. And they were manufacturers of airplanes more or
less for private use, but incidentally selling to the Government,
although the Government market was not large enough to maintain
anv one of those factories; is that right?
Secretary Baker. That is entirely so. I think it is possible that
some of them had contracts with foreign Governments, out I do not
know whether that is correct or not.
Mr. Frear. That was after the war had been on in Europe about a
year and a half, from August, 1914
Secretary Baker (interposing). That was in March, 1916.
Mr. Frear (continuing). To March, 1916, which would be a little
over a year and a half. But they were furnishing to some extent
airplanes for the European service?
Secretary Baker. I think the Curtiss people had arranged large
foreign contracts. Whether others had I do not know.
Mr. Frear. What kind of planes were they furnishing?
Secretary Baker. To us ?
Mr. Frear. No; to the foreign Governments.
Secretary Baker. I do not taiow.
Mr. Frear. What kind were they furnishing to us ?
Secretary Baker. Training planes.
Mr. Frear. That was the elementary training plane ?
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. That was the kind of plane that Pershing had on the
border, if he had any to speak of?
Secretary Baker, i es, sir.
Mr. Frear. They were not of any particular value ?
Secretary Baker. Thery were 90 horsepower, I think, and the
first new ones that we got were of the same kind. The fliers com-
plained of them very particularly. They said, '* What is the use of
sending these? They are not equal to what we need." I said,
'' These are the first ones we had and I sent them."
Mr. Frear. That was in March, 1916?
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. What were the first steps taken by the War Depart-
ment for airplanes ?
Secretary Baker. I can not answer that. Gen. Squier will know
about that, but I know we got a somewhat larger appropriation
shortly after that, and got a still larger appropriation a little later,
and from then on very large appropriations; out as to the details
of the preparations we made following the additional appropriations,
thev were made in the signal or aircraft section of the department
ancl I am not sufficiently acquainted with them to give them to you.
Mr. Frear. Your attention was not called to those details after
that?
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8 WAR EXPENDITURES.
Secretary Baker. No, sir.
Secretary Baker. I can not remember, Mr. Frear.
Mr. Frear. At what time thereafter was your attention called to
this aircraft situation; how long after that?
Mr. Frear. Was it prior to our entry into the war, would you say?
That was in April, 1917; have you any recollection of it?
Secretary Baker. I have no recollection of it. I must have talked
a nimiber of times with Gen. Squiers and Gen. Scriven on the subject.
Mr. FiiEAR. But you have no definite recollection?
Secretary Baker. I have the general recollection that Gen. Scriven
and Gen. Squier talked to me very frequently of their plans, and of
airplane conditions and requirements.
Mr. Frear. That came from Gen. Squier and Gen. Scriven t
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Is Gen. Scriven in the service now?
Secretary Baker. He is a retired oflicer, available to be called.
Mr. Frear. What do you remember about aircraft production
that was first called to your attention ? At what time ana what was
the character of it ?
Secretary Baker. Do you mean for this war ? For our participa*
tion in this war ?
Mr, Frear. Yes, sir; at any time you examined into the matter.
You spoke of the developments for Gen. Pershing^s expedition into
Mexico, and I want to know what you remember about it, beginning
then. '
Secretary Baker. I am afraid I can not be definite as to the time.
Mr. Frear. I am not so particular about that; I just want an idea
of the situation.
Secretary Baker. There was perfect confusion, and everybody was
bringing in suggestions.
Mr. Frear. I realize so much was on your shoulders at that time
that it is pretty hard to remember the details.
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir. You will find that after we asked the
Congress for pretty generous appropriations, based upon our previous
experience, and got them, we started in with aircraft — the Signal
Corps, under Gen. Squier, who had succeeded Gen. Scriven as chief,
started in to develop an aircraft program. While that was going on
Mr. Howard Cofiin came to me one day with the suggestion that a
very much more smashing and pretentious aircraft program was
necessary as a part of our preparation for war.
Mr. Frear. How long after war had begun ?
Secretary Baker. I can not answer that. Mr. Coffin was a member
of the aircraft committee of the Council of National Defense. His
idea was that there ought to be a board that would have civilian
experts on it; experts in production as well as in designing, and ought
to nave a military man on the committee, because they were the men
who were to use the machines; and he laid out a pretty elaborate
scheme, involving a very large sum of mone}", which he thought ought
to be requested from tlie Congress.
Does that memorandum which Mr. Lea has give the time ?
Mr. Lea. The act of May 12, 1917, appropriated $10,800,000, and
the act of June 15, 1917, appropriated $43,450,000, and the final
appropriation was $640,000,000.
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AVIATION. 9
Secretary Baker. That is accurate, I think. My memory is a little
hazy on it now. But we got ample appropriations before we got the
$640,000,000 appropriation, to go along with the work.
Mr. Freak. What you remember about the activities in aircraft
program was when Mr. Howard Coffin spoke to you ?
Secretary Baker. That is the first I recollect about this large pro-
gram whicn we later embarked upon.
Mr. Frear. What was Mr. Coffin's position ?
Secretary Baker. Mr. Coffin was an automobile manufacturer.
Also he was a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of
National Defense, and for more than a year prior to our entry into
the war Jind prior to the organization of the Council of National
Defense under the Council of National Defense act, Mr. Co,ffin had
been expending money out of his own pocket because of his own
patriotic inspiration, getting up a catalogue of the manufacturing and
industrial facilities of the country, with a view of having at some one
place a complete exposition of the manufacturing capacity of the
Mr. Frear. That is, for all war purposes ?
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. He had had no particular experience with aircraft prior
to that time, so far as you know ?
Secretary Baker. Not that I know of.
Mr. Frear. That matter was in Gen. Squier's hands, so far as the
War Department was concerned ?
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. What occurred next, after Mr. Coffin came to see you ?
Secretary Baker. My impression is — ^and this is only an impres-
sion — that Gen. Squier came with Mr. Coffin. I am not certain of
that, however.
Mr. Frear. That was soon after our entry into the war?
Secretary Baker. Very soon. And Mr. Coffin and his associates,
those who came with him, had worked out a program involving an
expenditure of something over $600,000,000 which, as they saw it,
would produce a very immediate production of airplanes on. a
quantity basis, with some standardization of design, so that duplica-
tion would be impossible and unnecessary in the individual fabrica-
tion of machines. My recollection is that prior to speaking to me,
Mr. Coffin had been associated with members of Gen. Squier's force
and had attended a dinner in New York, given in fact by Mr. Coffin,
at which they had had a very large number of newspaper men
present, for the purpose of arousing public interest in a large aviation
program.
MT. Frear. But so far as actual aviation work is concerned, Mr.
Coffin, so far as you know, had had no experience; that is, he was
simply enthusiastic and active in helping in every way he could?
Secretary Baker. Exactlv so. Although he was a manufacturer
in large quantitT of automobiles — the Hudson automobile.
Mr. Frear. As it turned out thereafter, in the aviation program
the automobile men were the ones who took the initiative, very
largely; men who were engaged in automobile production were the
men who became enlisted in airplane production i
Secretary Baker. Yes, sir; they were manufarrturers of gas engines,
and they took the matta* up.
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10 WAR EXPENDITURES.
Mr. Frear. What did Mr. Coffin do when he came in in this ad-
visory capacity ?
Secretary Baker. After he became a member of the advisory com-
mission of the Council of National Defense he participated in a great
many things that had nothing to do with aircraft.
Mr. Frear. I mean, in regard to aircraft ?
Secretary Baker. In regard to aircraft, I do not remember whether
the advisory conunission made any recommendations or not. But
I do know from the very beginning of Mi*. Coffin's interest, and of his
activity; and he was in constant and unbroken association with
Gen. Squier and his associates in the aircraft section — ^I mean of the
Signal Corps.
^Ir. Frear. He was interested in all of the war activities in which
this country was engaged, or was he?
Secretary Baker, les; he was interested in them all as a member
of the advisory commission, but his principal interest was very
ranidly developed and he made that his chief studjr, I think.
MT. Frear. What was he known in the real active work?
Secretary Baker. As the result of the plan which was devised by
Mr. Coffin and his associates, including Gen. Squier, a commission
was appointed, known as the Aircraft Board — ana I may not have its
name exactly right — of which Mr. Coffin was chairman; and i^ter
quite a period of time that board undertook the whole business of
centralizmg the designing of aircraft, perfecting the manufacture of
airciaft, developing the Liberty engine; after sending people abroad
and getting caoles from abroad as to what aircraft we needed in
this countrv — the whole aircraft program, in other words, went
before this board, of which Mr. Coffin was the chairman.
Mr. Frear. Who made the appointments of the members of the
board; do you know?
Secretary Baker. I do not remember. The board was changed
a number of times.
Mr. Frear. Was Mr. Coffin the man who appointed the board ?
Secretary Baker. Oh, no; Mr. Coffin may have reconmiended
some of his associates, but the appointing power did not rest with
him. I can not remember where the appomting power was, whether
it was the President or myself or the Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. Frear. You discussed the names of the members ?
Secretary Baker. I remember discussing the names quite often^
and trying to get men who were needed.
Mr. Frear. Did you accept the names that Mr. Coffin suggested
or did you yom-self suggest them ?
Secretary Baker. I think we took his list, but some changes were
made in them, as I recall.
Mr. Frear. That was the initial step taken by Gen. Squier in pre-
paring for the aircraft board i
Secretary Baker. Yes; and the Navy was associated with them.
A naval officer was appointed to the board by the Secretarj* of the
Navy. Gen. Squier was a member of the board.
Mr. Frear. I was interested in a statement in your report of 1918,
on pages 50 and 51, and I assume, of course, you have no personal
knowledge of the matter, but accepted the figures as given oy some
one in your department — that is, as to the accuracy oi the figures in
regard to aircraft production.
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AVIATION. 11
Secretary Baker. Of course, that is so.
Afr. Frear. I so imagined and appreciate that that must be the
situation. On page 50 of the annual report of the Secretary of War,
1918, appears a statement of production of training planes and
engines, which says:
When war was declared, the United States possessed less than 300 training planes,
all of inferior types. Deliveries of improved models were begun as early as June,
1917. Up to November 11, 1918, over 5,300 had been produced, including 1,600 of a
type which was temporarily abandoned on account of unsatisfactory engines.
Do you know whether that information was received ?
Secretary Baker. Yes; I only know from my habit and do not
know from recollection; but in preparing to write my annual report
I asked each bureau chief or head of division to make me a report of
his service, and I abstracted such notes as I made of any service from
such report made to me.
Mr. Frear. Now, in the report of Mr. Crowell — and let me say that
I saw this for the first time on yesterday — in the report of Mr. Crowell,
in the book entitled ''America's Munitions, 1917-1918,^' on page 253,
appears a statement of aircraft production, including training planes
and the advanced training machines. In that statement it appears
that the primary training planes SJ-lj JN-J^D, and the Penguin-
reached a total of 5,952.
Secretary Baker*! In what year ?
Mr. Frear. For the year 1918. On the other hand, your report
says that up to November 11, 1918, over 5,300 had been produced,
including 1,600 of a type which was temporarily abandoned. Your
statement here is 5,300, and I am asking, if that refers to the same
statement, or do you know ?
Secretary Baker. I do not know.
Mr. Frear. That includes Penguins and all; they do not include
planes in the air.
Secretary Baker. They are so-called grass-cutting planes.
Mr. Frear. And your report says:
Planes for advanced training purposes were produced in quantity early in 1918; up
to the signing of the anniatice about 2,500 were delivered. Approximately the same
number were purchased overseas for training the units with the Expeditionary Force.
Several new modelfl to be used for training pursuit pilots are under development.
Within three months after the declaration of war extensive orders were placed for
two t> pes of elementary training engines. Quantity production was reached within
a short time. In all about 10,000 have been delivered, sufficient to constitute a satis-
factory reserve for some time to come.
Of the advanced training engines, the three im])ortant models were of foreign
design, and the success achieved in securing quantity production is a gratifying
commentary on the manufacturing ability of this country. The total production up
to N o vember 1 1 was approxim ately 5 , 200 .
Now, referring to Mr. Crowell's statement again, which is rather
more in detail, he states that the primary traming planes reached
a total of 5,952, which includes Penguins, at the end of 1918. The
history of the production was that in the last one or two months you
practically kept up the total that had been produced before, was it not ?
Secretary Baker. My recollection is that that is a fact.
Mr. Frear. So that, of course, the primary training planes were
not much more tlian half of that amount up to the time of the armis-
tice. That would be a fair conclusion, would it not ?
Secretary Baker. I do not know the facts at all. I can tell you
for your information that so far as the figures in my annual report are
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12 WAR EXPENDITURES.
concerned, they were checked up by the statistical division, under
Col. Ayres, so that every figiire in there, before I authorized it in my
report , was checked up. My impression is that Mr. Crowell's report
was submitted to the same body lor checking.
Mr. Frear. Mr. CroweU's statement is based upon aircraft pro-
duction facts which were prepared by Col. Mixter, because the figures
given are precisely the same so far as appears. If that is true not
more than one-hali of the planes named in your report, as I gather from
it, were in actual existence at the time of the signing of the armistice.
Now, Mr. Secretary, I am trying to find out whether or not that
statement is correct. In your report it states as of the time of the
signing of the armistice, and in Mr, CrowelPs statement it takes us to
the end of 1918, and the figures are approximately the same in both