The program charts which were prepared show extraordinary variations with respect
to quantities and surprising expectations as to deliveries. Thus the program for
DH-48 shows a total program on August 2, 1917, of 8,000; August 16, of 7,500; August
22, of 5,000; August 24, of 6,000; August 25, of 15,000; August 31, of 6,000; September
4, of 15,000; October 17, of 250; October 29, of 1,000, at which number it appears to
have been continued until January 1$, 1918, from which time it was increased until
4,500 appear in the program of F'ebruary 11, 1918, and 8,000 in that of February 19
and thereafter.
That is the DH-4, and that is the only machine we ever sent to
the front ?
Maj. FouLOis. That is the only American produced machine.
Mr. Frear. That is the only machine we did send there of any
kind?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fbeab. We bought machines over there. He says:
According to this program of schedule it seems to have been anticipated on August 2,
1917, that 25 DH 4's would be delivered in October, 100 in November, 425 in Decem-
ber, 750 in January, and 1,000 in February, and more in each of the succeeding months.
Even as late as September 4, 1917, the schedule shows expected deliveries of a^- ia
October, 1917; 250 in November; 1,063 in December; and in the program of November
5, 50 were scheduled for delivery in December, 100 for January, etc.
The program of September 5, 1917, for the DH 9*s calls for 2,000 of this type; that of
October 9, for 4,000; October 17, 6,750; October 25, 7,750; October 29, 7,000; at which it
was continued until January 18, 1918, when it became 7,500, to be reduced on February
1 to 6,400, and on February 12 the DH 9 schedule was canceled.
We never received any DH 9's on the fighting line, did we ?
Maj. FouLOis. No, sir.
Mr. Frear. That is the uncontradicted testimony, that we never
had a fighting plane or bombing plane on the fighting front of Ameri-
can manufacture, excepting, as claimed by certain people, that the
DH 4 could answer for bombing purposes. We have discussed that
here, and there is no need of returning to it. And that we had 213 of
those at the front on the day of the armistice. That is the machioe
which has been styled by Kickenbacker, who was in the aviation
service, as a ''flying coflBn."
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Because of the motor being at one end, psoUne tank
at the oUier, and the aviator in bet^ — ^-^ had no posswk chance o'
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354 WAB EXPENDITUBBS.
escape, according to the testimony, in case of an accident, and he
could get out neither in front nor behind; that was the objection^ was
it not ?
Maj. FouLOis. One of the objections.
Mr. Frear. Of course, Gen. Pershing sent over 60 objections,
referred to by Gen. Patrick, some material and some not material 1
Maj. FouLOis. Having instituted the investigation, I had a pretty
thorough knowledge of it.
Mr. Frear. What is your judgment of the DH 4, or do you car© to
express it?
Maj. FouLOis. The DH 4, as we received it, needed a lot of correc-
tions.
Mr. Frear. What, among others — I mean, that were most impor-
tant?
Maj. FouLOis. The most important one, of course, from the flyer's
standpoint, was the one you just brought up and, in connection with
that, the nonprotected gas tank. We had types of machines there
in France of gas tanks protected.
Mr. Frear. One of the greatest objections ui^ed by aviators, so
far as efficiency of use is concerned, is the fact that the pilot and
observer were separated so that they could not communicate with
each other readily ?
Maj. FouLOis. That is one of the practical objections in the
matter of efficient operation. There were a great many technical
and mechanical objections to the macHine.
Mr. Frear. I am speaking of the type of machine.
Maj. FouLOis. Of that type, that was one of the principal
objections.
Mr. Frear. Then, was it not true, that as an armed plane that
there was a great deal of trouble with what we call synchronizing —
the use of the gim in that respect ?
Maj. FouLOis. Without referring to the original half of them,
I presume that was one of the objections we found. I niight state
in connection with that, if you care to have a little history on it,
which might clear up a few points and would only require a few
moments
Mr. Frear. Was it straightened out afterwards?
Maj. FouLois. A great many of these faults were anticipated, and
it was purely anticipated on the basis of our experience m Mexico.
When the first machine arrived, I directed my chief engineer to
go down and inspect that plane and find everything conceivably
wrong wdth it. That was the first De HavUand plane sent over.
I directed him to go through it with a fine-tooth comb and report
on everything, with his committee, that he could find wrong. ,
Mr. Frear. Then those objections which in the Pershing cable-
gram of June 24, 1918, were based on the first De Haviland?
Maj. FouLOis. TTie first machine that arrived in France.
Mr. Frear. Were there several, or just that one ?
Maj. FouLOis. One or two came later, but the inspectiim, accord-
ing to my recollection, was made on the very first one that arrived,
and the mspection was made with the idea of immediately finding
out what was wrong, and send the information back, and have
the faults corrected, which would have necessitated us having a
manufacturing establishment in France to do that kind of work,
and that was the basis of that original cablegram.
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AVIATION. 355
Mr. Frear. Were other cablegrams sent during that same month
to the eflFect thiat it was necessary to have inspection on this side
and that repairs on any extensive scale was impossible over there ?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. So vou have knowledge of the conditions that have
been disclosed to the* committee ?
Maj. FouLois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. The committee will now take a recess imtil 2.30
o'clock this afternoon.
(Thereupon, at 12.35 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
until 2.30 o'clock this afternoon.)
AFTER RECESS.
The conmiittee resimied its session at the expiration of the recess,
at 2.30 p. m.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. B. D. FOXTLOIS— Besiuned.
Mr. Frear. When we were leaving just before dinner, Gen.
Foulois, I was trying to find out the military program that had been
determined by tne officers in authority, and you stated that three
officers had been sent over and afterwards the Boiling Commission,
and when they returned in Septernber they made certain recom-
mendations, and I believe you mentioned them. One of the recom-
mendations was that three British machines, two French and one
Italian were recommended. And now, you were connected with this
same work at that time, I understand %
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. What did you do with regard to this work ?
Maj. Foulois. Prior to the coming of the commission or about
the same time the joint Army and Navy technical committee was
appointed, of which I was made chairman.
Mr. Frear. That is in June, 1917 ?
Maj.. Foulois. Yes, sir; we started in to determine definitely the
types of machines that should be in production in this coimtry.
Mr. Frear. Who did this; you?
Maj. Foulois. The committee of which I was chairman.
Mr. Frear. What committee was that ?
Maj. Foulois. The joint Anny and Navy technical committee.
We came to practically the same conclusion that the Boiling Com-
mission carried out after they arrived in France, so far as the selection
of types was concerned. In fact, we determined on the type we
wanted here before we went over.
Mr. Frear. That was in 1917 ?
Maj. Foulois. 1917; yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Then you determined upon the types ?
Maj. Foulois. We tentatively determined upon the types here and
then the commission was sent over to select those types.
Mr. Frear. That is the Boiling Commission ?
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. I see; yes.
Maj. Foulois. To provide the work that we had tentatively
planned, and send them back to the United States.
Mr. Frear. When was that ?
147155— 19— VOL 1 24
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856 WAB BXPBNDITUBBS.
Maj. FoTJLOis. Immediately after the declaration of war, and car-
ried it all through April and May and up to the time the commission
went to France, in the latter part of June as I recollect.
Mr. Fbear. Now, this commission of which you were a member,
did they formulate any program or any policy ? .
Maj. FouLOis. We drew up as I recollect, several plans for the
production — ^first the purchase of certain types of foreign planes; I
think they are on record here somewhere. I have not the papers
here with me but I think you will find it on the records here. Cer-
tain types of which two planes each were to be purchased in Europe.
Mr. f REAR. In Europe ?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir; that was approved by both the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy, as this was a joint comniissioii.
Mr. Fbear. What is your recollection as to what those machines
were?
Maj. FouLois. I think you have it already in the record, but I am
positive that included the DH 4 and the Spad.
Mr. Frear. The Caproni ?
Mai. FouLois. I am not positive about the Capronii but I think
it included all the standard types.
Mr. Frear. Of French and EngUsh machines?
Maj. FouLois. Yes, sir; that was approved by both the Secretarv
of War and the. Secretary of the Navy, and it was the basis on whicn
the commission worked in procuring standard types for the United
States.
Mr. Frear. About what time was this ?
Maj. FouLois. All this was carried on in May and June.
Mr. Fiui^R. That would be inunediately after the declaration of
war?
Maj. FouLois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. That is, very close after?
Maj. FouLois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Now, what did your committee further determine, if
anvthing, with regard to the program here?
Maj. FouLois. The next step in carrying out the program was to
determine what our organization and service would need, and what
would be necessary to carry it into effect?
Mr. Frear. That is, in this country?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir; that was set forth in another recommenda-
tion from the Joint Army and Navy Technical Committee, which
was also approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy, ana specified as I recollect the fundamental basic numbers
and types that we wanted to have put in production in the United
States.
Mr. Frear. Now, let me ask you have you testified before any
committee in regard to this before?
Maj. FouLOis. No, sir; this is the first testimony I have given
since 1917.
Mr. Frear. Now, will you go and tell the committee what was
done at that time, and what plans were formidated by your conunis-
sion at that time before the Boiling Commission went to Europe?
Maj. FouLois. The last statement covered practically the onlv
plans, the only important plans, that had to do with the Army Air
Service program. It also mcluded part of the — either that recom-
mendation mcluded a part of the naval program or a subsequent
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AVIATION, 357
recommendation in which we took care of the Navy at the same
time.
Based upon these latter recommendations I was given the task
of drawing up the entire program to be presented to the General
Staff, and with the ultimate idea of presenting the entire program
to Congress and the necessary organization to *put it into effect, and
that was worked out in the form of estimates for funds, and in the
form of a bill for the necessary personnel to put it into effect.
Mr. Fbear. Now, the first thing, I suppose, you would plan in a
case of that kind was what work was to be performed?
Maj. FouLois. Exactly.
Mr. Frear. The scope of it, and then what it would cost?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Now, can you give the committee a brief statement of
the general plan — ; —
M^j. FouLOis (mterposing). The general scope, to start in with
we had to draw on a verj vivid imagination; we had no experience
outside of a little in Mexico.
Mr. Frear. That is our Government had not?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir; we had to collect all the experience we
had and go to work under very difficult conditions. I had, fortu-
nately, helping me on this plan two officers of the French Army who
were memoers of Marshal Joffre's mission to the United States.
Mr. Frear. Do you remember their names
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir; Maj. Tulasne, he remamed here as the
French liaison officer; and Capt. DeGrange.
Mr. Frear. They were officers and experts of the French Aviation
Service?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir; and on Marshal Jeffreys mission, and they
remained and helped me on the plans and estimates for a program.
Mx. Frear. Now, first, will you give us the plan that was pro-
posed ? Just a summary of it.
Maj. FouLOis. Well, the plans involved — ^fundamentally we based
our whole program
Mr. Frear (interposing). Let me ask you this: I learned there
was such a plan, ana I have asked you to bring such papers as you
have relative to this plan, and I have asked that since tnis hearing
b^an.
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir; the only plan we had — that is, the funda-
mental basis in establishing our organization was based on an Army
of approximately 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 men; we had no figures; no
one Imew what our Army was going to be, what the size of it was
going to be. We had no policy that gave us any idea how to plan,
so I made a guess at it, that we would have between 2,000,000 and
3,000,000 men, and what personnel we would need to work for an
Army of that size and started off on that basis.
Mr. Frear. Now, was that estimate based on any particular
number of men, 1,000,000, 2,000,000, or was it an arbitrary estimate
of what we would need over there ?
Maj. FouLOis. I think I have the figures on that. That, I might
state, was the preliminary plan that we started to work under, and
it was changed later — that is, the relative basis of our plans was
changed later on a cablegram from the French Premier.
Mr. Frear. Give us firat what is the estimate you have there and
then tell us what the change was, if any.
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358 WAB EXFENDITX7BES.
Maj. FouLois. Based on the number of men?
Mr. Frear. Yes, sir.
Maj. FouLOis. As I recollect we based it originally on an army of
approximately 3,000,000 men.
Mr. Frear. On an army of 3,000,000 men ?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. That was, I think, the testimony of Gen. Patrick
when he was here before us.
Maj. FouLOis. Yes; I have not the figures; that is, what we based
it on, and then we used as oiu* principal argument before the General
Staff and before the Congress, a cablegram from the French Prenaier.
I happen to have a copy of it here. It has already been quoted in a
niunoer of hearings.
Mr, Frear, What is it ?
Maj. FouLois. It is from the French Premier, M. Ribot. The
French Government is anxious to know — it is a request from the
French Government, briefly, to have 5,000 pilots and 50,000 mech-
anics or men on the French front bv April, 1918.
Mr. Frear. That is, American pilots ?
Maj. FouLois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. That is, 5,000 pilots and 50,000 mechanics ?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. By what time ?
Maj. FouLois. April, 1918; by the time of the spring campaign in
1918.
Mr. Frear. What time was that cablegram received ?
Maj. FouLOis. That cablegram, as I recollect, was received from
the Premier of France on May 24, 1917. I can quote it if you wish.
Mr. Frear. Yes.
Maj. FouLOis (reading):
It is desired that in order to cooperate with the French aeronautics the American
Government should adopt the following program: The formation of a flying oorpe of
4,500 aeroplanes, personnel and material included, to T)e sent to the French mnt
during the campaign of 1918. Total number of pilots, including reserves, should he
5,000, to 50,000 mechanicians.
Mr. Frear. That was 4,500 aeroplanes of American manufacture }
Maj. FouLois. I think it was so understood.
Mr. Frear. That gave about a year in which to complete that
program ?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir. Pardon me, there was another paragraph
to that cablegram.
Two thousand planes should be constructed each month, as well as 4.000 engines, by
the American factories. That is to say, in the first six months of 1918. 16,500 planer of
the latest type and 30,000 engines will have to be built. The French Govemiaent
ifl anxious to know if the American Government accepta this proposition, which
would allow the Allies to win the supremacy of the air. Ribot.
Mr. Frear. That was a request from the French Government U»
know whether this Government would be able to furnish 5,000 pilots
and 50,000 mechanicians and 4,500 aeroplanes within the six months;
and then it speaks about the 2,000 planes each month ; what was that
reference to that 4,000 planes ?
Maj. FouLois. Ttat was the basis they figured we would need to
keep up production.
Mr. Frear. Subsequent to this supply ?
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AVIATION. 36&
Maj. FouLOis. Yes/ sir.
Mr. Frear. Of 16,500 planes and the 30,000 engines?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. I get it now. Now, what next occurred ?
Maj. FouLOis. Based upon that cablegram, and also from the ten-
tative program, the little knowledge we had of what our military
{)olicy was to be, I was directed to go ahead and draw up an estimate
or the necessary funds to cover the purchase and production of the
necessary material and all the items m connection with training sta-
tions, land, and whatever conceivable item would be possibly needed
in the carrying on of the program.
Mr. Frear. Now, what was the answer we sent to the French
nation ?
Maj. FouLois. I have never seen the answer, but I understand it
was to the effect that we accepted their proposition,
Mr. Frear. Shortly afterwards, was it ?
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir; I think shortly afterwards.
Mr. Frear. Now, what ne:it occurred ? You say you made your
plan of what the scope of this should be; what was done then?
Maj. Foulois. Based upon that plan I proceeded to get these
two French officers in comerence steadily with me, and we drew up
tentatively through their vision of what was going on over there,
of what would be needed in the line of depots, schools, and training
stations, and everything that would be needed so far as we could
visualize it, and also the estimates of what we would have to construct
over here in the line of training stations and shops.
Mr. Frear. They gave you the benefit of the expenses over thera
as well as the expenses here ?
Maj. Foulois. As far as we could get them. They, of course, did
not have much experience on expenses, because expenses did not
cut much figure; they were paying anything for anything they could
fjet. But the principal advantage to us was they could give us ibe
ront-line situation and show us what the troops had to have to
keep them operating, and we could draw a picture of the whole*
situation over there and we planned our service in France on that
line, so far as the estimates are concerned.
Mr. Frear. Now, can you give us the estimates or whatever you
have in that connection ?
Maj. Foulois. I have here a copy of the original estimates as.
they were submitted to Congress.
Mr. Frear. By your committee ?
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir; item by item.
Mr. Frear. Are you f amiUar with that ?
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir; they are all there.
Mr. Frear. Summarize it, if you can; give the totals.
Maj. Foulois. The items in connection with aeroplanes and en-
gines are — it would take a book to give them all tne way down.
The aeroplanes and engines, numbers, types, and the approximate
unit cost of each. •
Mr. Frear, Let me see how much there is in that ?
Maj. Foulois. There is our estimate. [Handing paper to Mr.
Frear.]
Mr. Frear. I think we can print the whole thing.
The paper referred to was thereupon marked ** Exhibit No. 105,.
Foulois," and is as follows:
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360
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362 WAB EXPENDITURES.
Equipment for 57 balloon squadrons (mobile anny) at $365,150 each $20, 813, 550
Maintenance, upkeep and operation of 57 balloon squadrons at $121,000
each 6,897,000
Equipment for 20 coast defense balloon companies at $58,700 each 1, 174, 000
Maintenance, upkeep and operation of 20 coast defense balloon com-
panies at $12,000 each : 240,000
Equipment for 67 training squadrons at $200,000 each 13, 400, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 67 taining squadrons at $50,000
each 3, 350, 000
Equipment for 8 oversea squadrons at $200,000 each 1, 600, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 8 oversea squadrons at $50,000
each 400,000
Equipment for 2 frontier squadrons at $200,000 each 400, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 2 jfrontier squadrons at $50,000
each 100,000
Equipment of 1 expeditionary squadron going to Famce 200, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 1 expeditionary squadron going
to France 50,000
Equipment of 266 service squadrons at $200,000 each 53, 200, OOO
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 266 service squadrons at $50,000
each 13,300,000
Equipment of 96 supply squadrons at $115,000 each 11, 040, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 96 supply squadrons at $25,000
each , 2,400,000
Equipment for 11 repair sauardons at $200,000 each 2, 200, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, ana operation of 11 repair squadrons at $50,000
each : 550, 000
Spare parts for airplanes (20 per cent of total amount for airplanes) 24, 010, 000
Spare parts for engines (30 per cent of total amount for engines) 70, 920, 000
Acquisition of land for 24 training stations 8, 250, 000
Temporary construction of 24 training stations 20, 625, 000
Base equipment for 24 training stations at $90,000 each 2, 1 60, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 24 training stations at $10,000
each 240,000
Construction, maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 3 general supply
depots at $640,800 eath ; 1, 922, 400
Temporary construction of 6 training stations in Europe (12 squadrons)
(service of the rear) at $375,000 per scjuadron 4, 500, 000
Base equipment for 6 training stations in Europe (service of the rear) at
$90,000 each 540,000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of 6 training stations in France (serv-
ice of the rear) at $10,000 each 60,000
Temporary construction of 40 aircraft parks in France (service of the
rear) at $13,600 each 544,000
Temporary construction of 4 advance depots of supply in France (service
of the rear) at $1,210,000 each 4,840,000
Temporary construction of 1 machine repair shop in France (service of
the rear) at $96,000 each 96, 000
Temporary construction of 1 complete airplane depot in France (service
of the rear) 1, 650, OOO
Temporary construction of 1 spare parts depot in France (service of the
rear) i 2,700,000
Temporary construction of 1 base depot in France (service of rear) (port
of debarkation) 3, S24, OOO
Manufacture and purchase of special aviators' clothing and equipment. . 1, 358, 440
Expenses of officers, enlisted men, civilian employees and authorized
stents on special duty abroad in connection witn technical obeerva-
tion, investigation and research work 07, TOO
For vocational training at training stations, 24 stations, at $25,000 each. 120, 000
Pay of reserves, enlisted men and civilian employees and travel expensee
of same when traveling without troops 37, 347, 862
For experimental investigation, purchase and development of new types
of airplanes, engines and other experimental equipment 2, 000, 000
Maintenance, upkeep, and operation of schools of Military Aeronautica,
including tuitions of students 1, 712, 000
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AVIATION. 363
Contiiigent expenses, office equipment, stationery, plans, drawings,
photographic material, etc |100, 000
Machine guns for service airplanes 24, 000, 000
Total 707,541,452
Deductions:
Army appropriation bill, fiscal year 1918.. $10, 800, 000