372 WAB BXPENDITUBBS.
everything there was about it. It was brought up finally before the
War College, sitting as a sort of committee of the whole.
Mr. Frear. Will you state briefly to the committee â€” ^because I, at
least, have no information about it â€” ^how the War College is com-
posed? What officers is it composed of, and how large is it? Just
state that briefly.
Maj. FouLOis. I do not remember exactly. The War College was
commanded at that time, I think, by Gren. Kuhn, and consisted of
approximately 75 officers of all branches of the service except the
An* Service. As a rule, I have never known of an officer of the Air
Service being on the General Staff.
Mr. Frear. Do you remember the arguments made against the
Air Service appropriation ?
Maj- FouLOis. No, sir; there were no specific arguments. The
principal argument, I remember, was by one of the General Staff
officers, whom, I think, afterwards had a good deal to do with the
munitions board, and that argument was c3ong the line of the enor-
mous amoimt of material we were going to take out of production
for the aviation work. The argument was that the amount of ma-
terial that would have to be put into this program would affect
everything else in the United States.
Mr. Frear. Aiid they feared it would affect some other program i
Maj. FouLOis. It was along this line, that it was a great expense,
because they could not get a logical argument with which to oppos
it, and it would have to be entirely on matters of detail.
Mr. Frear. When was the bill approved by the War College ?
Maj. FouLOis. The bill was not approved by the War College.
Mr. Frear. What was their action?
Mai. FouLOis. The estimate as submitted, and also the bill which
was drawn for the purpose of creating an organization â€” ^there were
two separate items. They had two bills, one an appropriation bill
and the other an organization bill. The War College, I think, in
secret session â€” I was barred from it, although I asked to be present â€”
disapproved the organization bill.
Mr. Frear. Tell us briefly what the organization bill was.
Maj. FouLois. It provided â€” it afterwards was blended with the
appropriation bill, and came out as the ultimate bill. It provided
for the organization, for the men, and everything else in the organ-
ization, as well as for the money to carry out the program. I think
that was done in the committee here, after that,
Mr. Frear. In the House committee?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes; in the Committee on Military Affairs.
Mr* Frear. But you say the War College opposed the organization
Maj. FouLOis. The War College disapproved the organization bill.
Mr. Frear. Why?
Maj. FouLOis. I have no idea, sir.
Mr. Frear. Did they eventually oppose the granting of the
$640,000,000 appropriation ?
Maj. FouLois. In so far as I know; after this final conference I
had at the War College I returned at once to the War Department,
and I was informed oi this decision before I left down there. I was
told on the outside, was informed of the opposition of the War
College, and was told that the committee had decided to disiqiproTe
it. I proceeded to the War Department and notified the Chief Signal
OJBBcer that that action had been taken. That was rather late in
in the evening, and I heard nothing more until the next morning.
In the meantime I think some one from Congress probably had
learned something about this, and called for itâ€” called on the Secre-
tary of War for it.
Mr. Fbear. For the bill ?
Maj. FouLOis. For the bill, and all the work that had been done
on it. I was sent up with it, with Gen. Squier, and in the hearings
they took the two bills and merged them into one, which was ulti-
Mr. Freab. As a matter of fact, this question of disturbing the
industries must have been settled to their own satisfaction, or they
must have found there was nothing serious in it, by agieeing to it.
Maj. FouLOis. We worked out every detail. We were before the
War College and before the committees â€” the different committees
there. Mr. CoflBn was down there a number of times; and members
of the War Industries Board were present, and everyone who knew
anything about how this program affected the industries of the
United States was consulted in reference to that subject. I mention
that one instance as showing how one of the matters was discussed.
I have here with me my other papers, some papers in regard to some
of the discussions I had with the War College down there.
Mr. Frear. In regard to this bill ? . . . .
Maj. FouLOis. In rerard to the bill as it was originally submitted.
The greatest difficulty 1 had was the delay, the time spent in getting
Mr. Frear. That is the time of four to six weeks you speak of?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Is there anything there you think would be of value to
the committee as disclosing the condition of things at that time, as a
matter of permanent record ?
Maj. FoxjLOis. There is only one thing in here that I think might
give an outline as to some of the difficulties we had to encoxmter.
That is an argument I made before the War College.
Mr. Frear. Briefly, what were the points raisea ?
Maj. FouLois. There are two or three pages here.
Mr. Frear. I was wondering what the pomts were they had raised
that you were trying to meet at that time.
Maj. FouLOis. I would rather read this over. We discussed this
organization bill, as it had been drawn up and commented on it.
Mr. Frear. WTiat was the objection to that organization bill?
Maj. FouLOis. As it was drawn?
Mr. Frear. Yes; as mentioned there. Why did they not want it?
Maj. FouLOis. They brought no particular objection actually
against it. It was more a question of detail. It was a question of
whether we had too many men, and a question of rank; in fact, every
feature about it had to be argued and iiad to be discussed.
Mr. Frear. You say the General Staff here did not approve it.
What was the situation in Europe ?
Maj. Foin.oi8. As regards
Mr. Frear (interposing). The aviation branch of the service.
Maj. FouLOis. Just how do you mean?
374 WAR EXPENDITURES.
Mr. Frear. I mean in regard to the action of the General Staff,
whether you received assistance. I do not know, and I am asking in
order to find out.
Maj. FouLOis. My experience over there â€” ^I was the responsible
officer under the conunander in chief. When all these troubles had
to be straightened out â€” ^my experience over there was that they had
to be educated to a great extent. Certain members of the General
Staff were willing to be educated, but that was a very small minority.
Other members were more or less disinterested, and a certain propor-
tion were opposed to aviation.
Mr. Frear. "WTiat was that opposition grounded on, so far as vou
Maj. FouLOis. I have never been able to find out, except here and
there. There were a great many difficulties I had over there in re^artl
to getting thin^ done; and we would hear constant complaint about
these young aviators nmnine wild all the time, and too much rank,
and a great naanv features of that kind.
Mr. Frear. Tne old question of jealousy which naturally arises in
the Army had reached that point, too.
Maj. FouLOis. In my 21 years of service I have never seen it more
prevalent than it is to-day.
Mr. Frear. But, of coiu^e, you did receive some support from our
Maj. FouLois. Gen. Pershing, in my opinion, is the best friend
aviation has in the Armv. If it had not been for him, on a great
many occasions, we would not have had any Air Service. No one
human being could have taken all the responsibility placed on the
men there. There were heads of various departments, and the heads
of the departments are the men primarily responsible, in my opinion,
for the entire working, or the failure, of anything that went on over
Mr. Frear. His judgment of you was shown by the fact that ho
allowed you to send cablegrams â€” and I am not saying this for the
purpose of drawing any answer particularly â€” he allowed you to send
the cablegram in regard to the defects on the De Haviland 4.
Maj. FouLOis. He had to absolutely depend upon my judgment
Mr. Frear. And he was willing to do so ?
Maj. FouLois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Did the opposition over there, outside of what you
spoke of in getting through the appropriation of $640,000,000 in this
coimtry, have any effect m delaymg om: aircraft program; and if so,
in what particular would vou say ?
* Maj. FouLois. One of tne most vital effects on our operations over
there I criticize the General Staff for.
Mr. Frear. What was that ?
Maj, FouLois. For the failure to get our men over there in plenty
Mr. Frear. That is, to get the people across the water?
Maj. FouLois. To get the Air Service men when needed over Hkert
in ample time to train them and to get them in shape, ready to take
the planes out.
Mr. F&EAR. That was piursuant to our promise to the Freadi Y
Maj. FouLOis. Yes, sir. Of course, that was also for our own in-
terests, to ^et our men in the service. Up to May of 1918 we had the
greatest difficulty in getting the finished material to make the French
E lanes of every description, for training purposes as well as for com-
at purposes, due to the fact that the French had contracts with us
for tne delivery of raw materials.
Mr. Frear. We were to deliver raw materials to them for the
manufacture of the air planes ?
Maj. FouLOis. We were to deliver raw materials to them, replacing
the emiipment we would take from them, and that was the crux of
the wnole situation all through the early months, the winter and
early spring of 1918. We had to have the raw materials over there,
and we had to get the raw materials to the French in order to get our
share of what they were going to utilize there.
Mr. Frear. In exchange ?
Maj. FouLOis. Yes.
Mr. Frear. Did you get them over there ?
Maj. FoxjLOis. It was not imtil May, 1918, that we got sufficient
raw materials over there, about 85 per cent, to give me enough of a
club to go to them and say, ''You have got to deliver the goods to
us." We finally got a new contract, through this club, to the effect
that the^ would turn over to us the necessary aviation equipment,
plus the increased amoimt necessary in accordance with the size of
our divisions, which were practically, or approximately, twice the
size of their divisions, and the new contract was to the effect that
they would turn over to us sufficient equipment â€” that is, aviation,
equipmentâ€” ^for every division that we would put into the line.
They were living up to that and the time came when we could have
gotten airplanes in addition to what we got from the French, but
we did not have the men to command them and to man them.
Mr. Frear. That was the failure on this side ?
Maj. FouLOis. It may have been the failure on this side, but it
was incidentally the failure on the other side, in view of the fact that
I continually poimded, month after month, to get our men over
there, in advance of this period when I knew we would get planes and
get them into our shops and depots and training schools, so that
they could have sufficient training in France before we could turn
the planes over to them. The French said, '*You have not got your
men here. We want to use these planfes." They knew we did not
have the men ready to take hold of them. That is why I tell you of
the lack of getting our enlisted men over there and training them
and getting them into squadrons, so that they could go wherever
they were to be used. I fought and fought and fought for months
witn one section of the General Staff that had to do with the shipping
of personnel to get men over, without results.
Mr. Frear. Did they finally permit you to get them?
Maj. F0UI.018. The time I wanted them most was before the
spring offensive. Everyone knew there was going to be an attack.
It was pretty well known that when the Germans did make the big
attack, whicn they ultimately made, everything would have to be
thrown into combat troops on the ground, and during November,
December, January, and February I was pleading for men and trying
to get them over there, to get them trained to meet the program,
378 WAB EXPENDITURES.
Mr. Fbear. The contract was renewed for 1,000 Spads, but a long
time afterwards, and he speaks of it here in his report, " after a delay
of six months."
Maj. FouLois. I can probably rive you a little light on that. It
was several months before I foimd out in France that the Spad con-
tract had been canceled. I immediately, I think, along in â€” ^probably
around about May, took steps to organize a board of officers over
there to investigate aU the latest types of planes and to try to deter-
mine what our probable program woidd b6 for 1919. We knew all
the types that were in use then woidd probably stay in use through-
out 1918; but we wanted to see what the Alhes were doing in con-
nection with the new types. About that time the board started its
investigation, when we learned of the cancellation of the Spads in
the United States; I think that was on a cablegram I sent some time
in April or May â€” I am not certain of the time, but I am positive
I sent a cablegram recommending that they build a thousana
Mr. Freab (interposing). Let me read here a brief reference which
I think is of interest in regard to the Spad contract. Judge Hughes,
under the heading ^* Suspension of the program of the single-seater
pursuit planes'' â€” that is what the Spad is?
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. Judge Hughes says:
It should be noted that virtually all the cables of advice sent by our miUtaiy repre-
sentatives abroad are signed "Pershing," but doubtless they most frequently come
from subordinate officers, and with respect to the subject under consideration, from
those in chaige of the Air Service overseas: In a cablegram received here on Octo-
ber 5, 1917, the following appears:
"If U. S. A. 8 cylinder heavier than Hispano Suiza pounds per horsepower, build
no monoplane pursuit airplanes with U. S. A. 8 cylinder engines. Machine will
be useless by time it arrives here. Increase number DH-4*8 or DH-9'8 by number
monoplane pursuit airplanes. This is necessary provided U. S. A. 12 is success."
I suppose that refers to the Liberty engine ?
Maj. Foulois. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frear. The cablegram goes on:
Useful loads increasing so rapidly here that engines now in United States are not
considered powerful enough to meet requirements. Two-place pursuit airplanes con-
sidered most urgently needed airplanes next year.
Judge Hughes himself goes on to say:
The view thus set forth found support in influential quarters here. On Ort/iJier
27, 1917, Lieut. Col. Clark in a memorandum sent to Mr. Coffin expressed the opinitn
that "all fighting and bombing by day will be done in two-seaters flying in regular
formation/* And he added, "the single seater will be eliminated."
A few days later the following cablegram was receive3:
This is the very interesting one, 2 I remember rightly. It is
dated November 8, 1917, and it says:
Your 359, paragraph 7, and other cables concerning American engine prograro.
Situation here has changed much during throe months since original recommendati n*
and continues changing constantly. Following general principles appear clear lÂ»Â» v.y
First. Single-seater fighter will probably l)ecome obsolete general use next ynr,
although small numbers will always be used special purposes. Rerommend yÂ»'U
produce number already actually under contract and startwi.
That was the 3,000.
Believe we can obtain here all this typo required future alM)ve number artuallv
under contract here and America.
That was 3,000 here and then this contract for a thousand there.
Thifl applies both single-seater fighter airplanes and engines.
Second. Two-seater fighter airplane with stationary engine will supersede single
sealer. Four hundred horsepower probably sufficient next six months, after ihaX
500 horsepower necessary. Tnis summarizes cables already sent you.
And Judge Hughes says:
It will be observed that while this message recommended against further production,
it distinctly stated that the number alr^idy under contract and startea should be
produced. But this was not done.
Here was a cablegram sent in the following month, on November 8,
which told the people here to continue with the manufacture of
those Spads, ana we never manufactured a Spad that went over.
That was a very important time in the history of the war, of course)
because it would mean delay and, as I now remember it, before we
really did get down to the manufacture of the 1,000 you speak of
there was a delay of six months.
Maj. FouLOis. It meant a delay in getting fighting planes in
Mr. Frear. If we had had at that time the 3,000 Spads, we would
have been almost as well provided as the French were, with their
3,300 on the front, as Gen. Patrick testified.
You have had active participation in this aircraft work since the
very beginning, and Gen. Pershing imposed great confidence in you.
What, in your judgment, is to be recommended by this committee,
if any recommendations are made toward the strengthening of the
aircraft program for this Government, if that should de\^olve upon us ?
Maj. FouLois. You mean in connection with the future aevelop-
ment of aviation ?
Mr. Freak. In connection with the Army or in connection with
purposes of general use for the Army or the Navy, or in any way
you have to suggest.
Maj. FouLOis. In my opinion the only future for aviation in the
United States is in concentration under a separate control. Every-
thing we have, military, naval, or commercial, and any other features
in connection with aviation, ought to be put together under one
head somewhere. I do not see how it is going to Keep abreast with
any of the foreign nations unless we do that, and it is going to be
built up. In time of peace the only function for aviation is its com-
Mr. Frear. Are we ahead or behind other countries at the present
time in aviation ?
Maj. FouLOis. I consider that we are behind all the first-class
powers to-day in aviation. I had hopes when the war broke out
that we had a basis under the $640,000,000 bill, that there would be
something left for future development, and I hoped we would have
an aviation development in the United States equal to, or better than,
that of any other country.
Mr. Frear. Let me suggest something that was presented to us
before you came here this morning; that on August 29, 1916, there
was an appropriation of $13,281,660 for aviation. That was in the
fall before. On February 14, 1917, just before war was declared,
Congress appropriated a large amount for seacoast defense, and then,
coming down to May 12, 1917, and October 6, 1917, there were two
380 WAB BXPENDITUBBS.
appropriations, approximating $50,000,000, $10,800,000 at one time
and $40,000,000 at another time. Those appropriations were made
independent of the $640,000,000 appropriation, and up to October
6, 1917, we had appropriated $48,800,000, so Coneress was not
niggardly with that service. Then on June 15,191 7â€” that was b^ore
the large appropriation was made â€” Congress appropriated $43,450,000
and then, inside of six weeks from that time. Congress made the big
appropriation of $640,000,000 addition; so that within four weeKS
practically $700,000,000 was appropriated, and shortly before that
there was appropriated approximately $48,000,000. So that we
have in Congress done our part in furnishing funds. What had
other countries done ? Have they done anything better than that ?
Maj. FouLois. Not in so far as spending money is concerned, I
think, during the last year or two. Of course, if we go back in the
first 9 years of aviation, I think we got something like $1,000,000.
There used to be a fluctuating situation, where we first had no men
and then had no money.
Mr. Frear. After the European war was on, and for a year and a
half during the war that was a very important branch of the service.
Maj. FouLOis. I do not think anybody can criticise Congress since
the war for the amount of money appropriated, and I hope Congress
will go on, so we can continue to build up the service, because I
do not think anybody else will build it.
Mr. Freak. It will require some encouragement, and you are
familiar with what has been done in the past, and made the estimate
on which the big appropriation was based, and that is why I ask
what jour suggestion of a program would be.
Maj. FouLois. I would suggest this to start with: That the poor
fijmg men be given a chance to apply the new term of self-deter^
Mr. Freae. In what respect ?
Maj. FouLOis. To express their opinion, open and above board,
without the fear of incurring displeasure or any other pumshment.
Mr. Frear. Is that not permitted to-dav ?
Maj. FouLOis. It may be permitted to-day; it is being used in this
committee to-day, but it is the first time I nave ever seen it done in
Mr. Frear. The Secretary of War told us that anyone who testified
before the committee, any private or officer, was fully ex|)eotod to
tell the truth imder all circumstances, and was not to be intimidated
in any way, even by the suggestions made by an examining officer
that whatever a witness mignt say might incriminate him.
Maj. FouLOis. I make this statement in the interest of aviation,
with which I have been connected for about 1 1 years. I have devoted
my own energies, and half of my military service, and a lot of my
personal funds, to see this service built up, and I have had one ambi-
tion in all this work, to see the service built up for the use of the
Government in time of war.
Mr. Frear. Have you any suggestion to make that would be of
value to the committee ?
Maj. FouLOis. The only suggestion I have is that I hope Congress
will pass a bill which will consolidate every air service activity under
Mr. Frear. There have been two bills in the House and Senate, I
think. I believe there is at least one bill proposing that the air
service be established as a separate branch of the Government, with
its head as a member of the cabinet, and providing that assignments
be made from that branch of the service to the various departments
of the Government that would be concerned with aircraft.
Maj. FouLOis. I make this suggestion, and I earnestlv hope I will
have a chance to give mj experience in connection with it, because
it is not a particular criticism of the Army or Navy or other depart-
ments; but I have had 11 years' experience trying to build it up, and
I say frankly that the most opposition I have ever had in connection
with the buildiog up of aviation in the Army has been from the Army
Mr. Frear. You explained that you had it with the War College
here, and you had it in the General Staff there.
Maj. FouLOis. That has been my experience ever since I have been
in it, that it had to be forced and pushed and developed by actual
fighting against the rest of the departments in the Army
Mr. Frear. You are satisfied
Maj. FouLOis (interposing). In addition to that, in connection
with the Navy operations, there are certain features I have a great
deal of respect for in connection with the Navy. They know how
to get things. They are working for the Navy all the time, and they
get things done. 1 predict this: That unless you do get the differ-
ent elements of aviation in the United States together, the Navy will
be running it itself inside of the next three or four years ; and I will
be very glad to serve under them if they can handle the job.
Mr. Frear. The effect in the past has been practically competition
in many cases between the Army and the Navy in the matter of
Maj. FouLOis. We were not only in comi)etition with them, in my
opinion, but we were disorganized, disorganized in our own organiza-
tion to a great extent. I can certainly appreciate Gen. Menoher's
situation in trying to handle the Air ^rvice. I have had a lot of
experience in it, and there are as many factions in the United States
Army as there are differences of opinion on the league of nations.
Mr. Frear. In other words, you say that Gen. Menoher has fallen