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Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty doc. 103-21) : hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, March 22, April 13, May 13 and 17, June 9 and 23, 1994 online

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I think that is something which we do need to continue to pursue
through separate channels, and I think that that is something we
need to continue to place priority on in terms of our relations with
Russia, to insure that they do, indeed, continue vigorously to pur-
sue their own destruction program.

Senator Lugar. I appreciate that short answer and, likewise,
your willingness to coordinate a more extensive answer. I would
nope it would incorporate material that speaks to the skepticism of
many observers who believe that it will be difficult to get the ap-
propriations required for the U.S. Army or for others to do the job
within the 10-year period. In this country, that destruction cost, at
least estimates of it, seems to mount as more hearings and public
knowledge occur and political sentiment at the local levels rever-
berates around these issues.

Now the questions with regard to the Russian ability to destroy
chemical stocks are even more prodigious because the job is enor-
mous and the resources are limited. As a practical measure, is it
conceivable that in 10 years time, the Russian stockpile could be
destroyed, even with vast effort by the United States and/or other
nations that might find it in their interests to cooperate in that re-
spect.

I think this issue has to be addressed, even though it is outside
the purview of the treaty, simply in terms of general common
sense. Given the existence of these huge stockpiles, the common-



85

sense question of many people will be: Is it conceivable that, within
the Convention's timeframe and given the resources required, and
what we know of the difficulties of the Russian economy, that these
stocks can be destroyed, even assuming good will on the part of all
CWC signatories?

I suppose the Russians, in looking at our debates, can ask a simi-
lar questions: Is it likely that in 10 years, the U.S. stockpile can
be eliminated?

General Landry. Senator, we will be discussing those issues with
you a little bit later in closed session.

Senator Lugar. All right.

General Landry. As you are well aware, those same debates are
currently raging in the former Soviet Union, in Russia.

Senator Lugar. Yes, they are.

The CHAmMAN. Excuse me. I would hope that your reply to Sen-
ator Lugar would be as complete and as unclassified as possible be-
cause this is the ammunition we will need on the floor. If the ques-
tion is whether this should be classified or not, try to veer on the
side of unclassified.

Senator Lugar. Finally, I will ask, Mr. Chairman, later on, when
we are in closed session, about the specific elements of verification
and reliability.

I understand that the witness will be addressing the Intelligence
Committee later in this day in another hearing. That committee
will also arrive at an independent judgment on the merits or de-
merits of this treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Now we will recess and will move up to room S-407.

[Whereupon, the committee recessed, to reconvene in closed ses-
sion and reconvened in open session at 10:15 a.m., on June 9,
1994.]



CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (TREATY

DOC. 103-21)



THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1994

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room
SD^419, the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Lugar, and Helms.

Senator Lugar [presiding]. Chairman Pell has been detained
temporarily. He has asked me to proceed so that we can expedite
hearing our witnesses and raising questions this morning.

I have an opening comment. I just simply want to thank the
chairman for calling this hearing. I am pleased to join him in wel-
coming the panelists.

To date, the committee has heard, primarily, from government
witnesses on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Today, we will
hear testimony from public witnesses, former officials from the pre-
vious two administrations, analysts from think tanks and the na-
tional laboratories and from representatives of the chemical indus-
try.

The committee will then hold several more hearings on the Con-
vention before seeking to produce a report for the Senate, and to
render a judgment as to whether this Convention furthers the na-
tional interest of the United States.

I want to commend the chairman for his willingness to convene
as many hearings as necessary. He has been thoughtful and accom-
modating in that respect in order that we might clarify provisions
and obligations contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In those circumstances where the responses of previous witnesses
have not been as complete or satisfactory as the committee might
wish, the chairman has been willing to recall witnesses for further
elaboration or to pose additional questions for more detailed writ-
ten responses.

For its part, the administration has responded in a timely fash-
ion to our request for written responses to written questions.

I am looking forward to hearings over the next few weeks where-
in the committee will focus, again, on the ability of the intelligence
committee to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Con-
vention.

We will concentrate, as well, on the will and the capabilities of
our military establishment to identify and to respond to militarily
significant violations of the Convention's provisions and obligations.

(87)



88

This committee will not be rushed as it probes the strengths and
weaknesses of the Convention.

By the same token, we recognize that actions taken by the Unit-
ed States with respect to the CWC will have a significant bearing
on the pace and the scope of activities by other current and poten-
tial signatories to the Convention.

I am confident that, at the end of the hearing process, we will
be able to present our colleagues in the Senate with a balanced as-
sessment of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

And now, it is my privilege to call upon our distinguished wit-
nesses. And may I ask that you testify in this order. First of all,
Mr. Carpenter, then Ms. Hoeber, Dr. Meselson, and Mr. Moodie.

If you can, please confine your remarks to about 6 minutes. And
then we will proceed to questioning on the part of the chairman,
as he returns, and others that may join us. We greet you, Dr. Car-
penter.

STATEMENT OF WILL B. CARPENTER, CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
CONSULTANT, SALT LAKE CITY, UT

Dr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the
opportunity to be here again today on behalf of the Chemical Man-
ufacturers Association [CMA] and give you our strong support for
the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In CMA's view, the Chemical Weapons Convention will be the
critical tool in the global effort to eliminate the threat of chemical
weapons.

This is the third time that I have appeared before this committee
to discuss the Chemical Weapons Convention and its effect on com-
mercial chemical industry.

I can tell you that each time, the commercial chemical industry,
in that time period, made a strong, positive contribution to bring-
ing the chemical weapon talks to the conclusion that they are now,
a contribution that we are prepared to continue.

We have nearly 15 years of experience with the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention. I, personally, have been involved for all of that
time as chairman of the CMA's chemical weapons work group.

I would like to spend just a few moments highlighting what the
industry and the international community has achieved in those
years through negotiation.

There are several significant reasons why the chemical industry
supports the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. chemical
manufacturers do not make chemical weapons. Our industry does
produce commercial chemicals which can be illegally converted to
weapons.

An effective treaty could have the effect of liberalizing existing
export controls on our industry's products and technologies for le-
gitimate uses.

The hallmark of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the degree
to which the private sector is included in the effort to ban CW pro-
duction, storage, and use.

International inspection teams will have unprecedented access to
chemical plants, access which our industry promoted as the best
single way to assure our compliance with the Convention.



89

In our view, a verifiable ban on chemical weapons must include
commercial chemical facilities. And that requires a degree of intru-
sion into those plants.

As we see it, a challenge throughout the negotiations, and in the
implementation process, is to assure maximum verifiability with a
minimum of burden on the chemical industry.

I am pleased to note that the administration and the Organiza-
tion for Prevention of Chemical Weapons, the international organi-
zation, are headed in the right direction. But let me make it clear,
however, there will be costs associated with the industry's compli-
ance with the CWC.

There will be reporting requirements, inspection of our facilities,
new domestic and international regulations, and the risk of loosing
proprietary information.

The OPCW Preparatory Commission has been hard at work de-
veloping the processes and procedures needed to implement the
CWC. And in general, the industry's views have been taken into
consideration in the work at the Hague.

The PrepCom has begun work on the measures necessary to pro-
tect against wrongful disclosure of confidential business informa-
tion. CMA believes that these measures, and reasonable inspection
procedures should, and I underline should, provide significant pro-
tection for chemical companies.

The PrepCom has also recognized that an increased burden on
the chemical industry also means a substantial administrative bur-
den for the OPCW. Following a small test of revised formats by
some 25 U.S. companies, the reporting burden should be manage-
able.

Please note that I said that it should be protected, and it should
be manageable. The fact is that the regulatory decisions taken in
the Hague still require implementation in the United States.

CMA is unequivocal in our desire to ensure that the CWC regu-
latory regime remains an arms control matter. The CWC should
not be seen as an opportunity to regulate our industry for other
policy reasons.

The administration delivered draft CWC implementing legisla-
tion to Congress early last week. The draft recognizes some con-
cerns identified by the chemical industry and attempts to resolve
them.

If the final regulatory package reflects the general intent behind
much of the legislation, we believe that the potential regulatory
burden on, and intrusion in commercial facilities should be mini-
mal.

There are areas of considerable uncertainty, however, in that the
CWC regulatory efforts will be lodged in several agencies in the
U.S. Government. At the present, there is no provision to assure
consistency in the regulatory efforts of these agencies.

And perhaps more to the point, there are no provisions requiring
that the U.S. Government adopt the regulatory mechanisms being
developed in the Hague.

Another area of uncertainty arises from the likelihood that the
Department of Commerce will be responsible for CWC compliance
for industry. Conceptually, we have no problem with Commerce de-



90

veloping regulations affecting the industry's CWC-related require-
ments.

However, unless the Department of Commerce is given the ap-
propriate budget and manpower resources, U.S. CWC compliance
will fall short of the goal.

Beyond that, there are a host of other issues developing in this
that merit attention. They include some definitions, such as the
definition of toxic chemicals and what happens to hydrocarbon and
polymer production as is the possible criminalization of civil viola-
tions.

The international community has met a series of challenges in
the Chemical Weapons Convention. It met the challenge of develop-
ing an appropriate verification regime.

It met the challenge of monitoring those facilities that could be
diverted to CW production. And it met the challenge of protecting
sensitive commercial information.

The greatest challenge still lies ahead of us. And that is translat-
ing the obligations and responsibilities of the CWC into national
law.

The first step in meeting that challenge is for the Senate to pro-
vide its advice and consent to a ratification of the CWC. Having
that ratification will mean that the most important of the CWC ac-
tivities, that is the structure of government stockpiles and verifica-
tion of government CW production facilities, can get underway
quickly.

That focus will allow time and opportunity for the development
of reasonable, thoughtful regulations affecting the chemical indus-
try both in here and in the Hague. The CWC is the right answer
to the threat posed by chemical weapons. And we are fully support-
ive of implementation.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carpenter follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Carpenter

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Will Carpenter, and I am here today to con-
vey the strong support of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) for the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In CMA's view, the CWC will be the critical
tool in the global effort to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons.

Mr. Chairman, today is the third time I have appeared before this Committee to
discuss the CWC and its effect on the commercial chemical industry. The commer-
cial chemical industry made a strong, positive contribution to bringing the CWC
talks to a successful conclusion. It is in the spirit of that contribution that the mem-
ber companies of CMA are supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the
effort to obtain quick ratification of the agreement. It is in that spirit that the chem-
ical industry intends to continue its efforts to support CWC implementation.

CMA and its member companies have nearly 15 years of experience in the CWC
negotiation. I personally have been involved for over 12 years, for much of that time
as Chairman of CMA's Chemical Weapons Work Group. We maintained a high level
of effort, involving many chemical companies, because, as the Nation's largest export
industry (returning a trade surplus of $17 billion in 1993 alone), the CWC could
have taken a substantially more onerous approach to industry. I would like to spend
a few moments highlighting what the industry — and the international community —
achieved during those years of negotiation.

There are several significant reasons why the chemical industry supports the
CWC. U.S. chemical manufacturers do not make chemical weapons. Our industry
does produce commercial chemicals which can be illegally converted into weapons.
An effective CWC could have the positive effect of liberalizing the existing system
of export controls applicable to our industry's products, technologies and processes.

The hallmark of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the degree to which the pri-
vate sector is included in the effort to ban CW production, storage and use. In this



91

respect, the CWC is unique among arms control agreements. National governments,
ana the new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), will
build a considerable data base of information on legitimate commercial activities.
International inspection teams will have unprecedented access to chemical facili-
ties — access that our industry promoted as the single best way to assure compliance
with the convention. In our view, a verifiable ban on chemical weapons must mclude
commercial chemical facilities. And that in turn requires a degree of intrusion into
those facilities.

As we see it, the challenge throughout the negotiations and in the implementation
process is to assure maximum verifiability with a minimum of burden on the chemi-
cal industry. I am pleased to note that the Administration, and the OPCW, seem
to be headed in the right direction.

Let me make clear, though, that the CWC will have a negative impact on the U.S.
chemical industry. There are costs associated with the industry's compliance with
the convention, in the form of reporting requirements, and verification activities.
The industry will have to educate and assign personnel to address those require-
ments. We are going to have a National Authority, a new regulatory body, writing
still more regulations for a heavily-regulated industry. Commercial chemical facili-
ties will be subject to inspections by international teams on relatively short notice.
And individual chemical plants are at risk of losing proprietary information or their
standing in the community. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where a simple re-
porting error results in headlines about a company's "violation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention."

The OPCW Preparatory Commission has been hard at work developing the proc-
esses and procedures needed to implement the CWC. The industry's views have gen-
erally been taken into account in the Hague, either through industry contacts with
their national governments, or through meetings of the PrepCom experts with in-
dustry representatives. The last such meeting took place in The Hague from April
26-27, 1994.

The PrepCom has begun work on the measures necessary to protect against the
wrongful disclosure of confidential business information. Protection of proprietary
information was one of the industry's primary goals through the negotiations, par-
ticularly the data that is wholly unrelated to the industry's compliance with the
CWC. Although the Convention contains detailed provisions on the steps necessary
to protect proprietary data, more detailed requirements for the classification of data,
secrecy requirements for OPCW employees, and remedies for wrongful disclosures
are needed. CMA believes that these developments, along with the development of
reasonable inspection procedures, should provide a significant measure of protection
for chemical companies.

The PrepCom has also recognized that an increased burden on the chemical in-
dustry means a substantial administrative burden for the OPCW. We have seen
considerable progress in reducing the potential reporting burden through simplified
declaration formats, for example. At the beginning of the process, the draft declara-
tion formats were a confusing jumble of data and reporting requirements. Following
a small test of the revised formats by some 25 U.S. companies, the reporting burden
should be manageable.

Mr. Chairman, please note that I said that proprietary information should be pro-
tected, and that the burden should be manageable. The fact is that the regulatory
decisions taken in the Hague still require implementation in the United States. As
you know, the U.S. chemical industry is one of the most widely and deeply regulated
industrial sectors. We have a great deal of experience with regulatory programs that
can be expanded into other, unrelated policy areas.

CMA is unequivocal in our desire to ensure that the CWC regulatory regime re-
mains an arms control matter. The CWC has not, and must not, be seen as an op-
portunity to regulate our industry for other policy reasons. The risk of such an ex-
Eansion is that the costs to industry, and the government, of CWC compliance will
e increased, while the treaty compliance effort is reduced. Ultimately, if the U.S.
government imposes a CWC regulatory regime that is significantly more onerous in
nature and scope from that adopted by other governments, there are substantial ad-
verse competitiveness implications.

The Administration delivered draft CWC implementing legislation to Congress
early last week. The Administration's draft recognizes some concerns identified by
the chemical industry, and attempts to resolve them. If the final regulatory package
reflects the general intent of the draft legislation, the potential regulatory burden
on, and intrusion into, commercial facilities should be minimal.

There are areas of considerable uncertainty, however. For example, the legislation
places regulatory responsibility for the CWC in several agencies of the U.S. govern-
ment. At present, there are no provisions to assure consistency in the regulatory ef-



92

forts of these agencies. And perhaps more to the point, there are no provisions re-
quiring the U.S. government to adopt the regulatory mechanisms being developed
in the Hague.

Another area of uncertainty arises from the likelihood that the Department of
Commerce will be responsible for CWC compliance for industry. Conceptually, CMA
has no problem with Commerce developing regulations affecting the industry's
CWC-related requirements. However, unless the Department of Commerce is given
the appropriate budget and manpower resources, U.S. regulations and administra-
tive responsibilities under the CWC compliance may fall far short of the intended
goal.

Several other areas of the implementing legislation will merit attention. These in-
clude necessary clarifications in the use of certain terms in the Convention and
under U.S. law (such as the term "toxic chemical"), the applicability of certain CWC
exemptions (such as for hydrocarbon production and polymer production), and the
criminalization of essentially civil violations. The industry is also concerned that the
U.S. government develop appropriate procedures which restrict the disclosure of pro-
prietary information to other agencies of the U.S. government, and ensure that the
disclosed information is used only for meeting U.S. obligations under the Conven-
tion. In each of these areas, there is the potential that the United States govern-
ment will go beyond the terms of the Convention to impose additional requirements,
and burdens, on the U.S. industry.

The international community met a series of challenges in the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It met the challenge of developing an appropriate verification regime.
It met the challenge of monitoring those facilities that could be diverted to CW pro-
duction. It met the challenge of protecting sensitive commercial information. The
greatest challenge still lies before us: translating the obligations and responsibilities
of the CWC into national law.

The first step in meeting that challenge is for the Senate to provide its advice and
consent to ratification of the CWC. The United States should be one of the first
sixty-five parties to the Convention, because our government has an important lead-
ership role in the Hague. Timely ratification will mean that the most important
CWC activities — the destruction of government stockpiles, and the verification of
government CW production facilities — can get underway quickly. That focus should
provide the time and opportunity for the development of reasonable, thoughtful reg-
ulations affecting the chemical industry, both here in Washington and in the Hague.
We urge the Committee to recommend ratification of the Convention by the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, the CWC is the right answer to the threat posed by chemical
weapons. And now is the right time to ratify and adopt the Convention. Thank you.

The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much. I apologize for
being in and out. But this is one of those days when we have two
markups and a hearing that are going on simultaneously.

I would like to thank Senator Lugar very much for being here
and helping out. You have heard there is a 6-minute limitation.

Ms. Hoeber. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Mrs. Hoeber.

STATEMENT OF AMORETTA HOEBER, FORMER DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ARLINGTON, VA

Ms. Hoeber. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senators. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.

I am testifying before you today as a private citizen. But I do
wish to point out that I was Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
during the Reagan administration. And in that role or capacity, I
managed all of the Army's chemical warfare, retaliatory and defen-
sive programs.

I would like the chance to — I appreciate the chance to raise some
of my concerns about the Chemical Weapons Convention here, and
to go on record recommending against ratification.

There are a number of reasons why I believe the treaty should
not be ratified that are detailed in my written submission. And I
would like to summarize them briefly in the 6 minutes that I have.



93

First, I would like to have it clearly understood by the committee
that, contrary to the statements of the proponent, this treaty will
not rid the world of chemical weapons.

This is true for a number of reasons, but the most important is
that the treaty will not be global. In fact, several countries of seri-



Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on ForeChemical Weapons Convention (Treaty doc. 103-21) : hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, March 22, April 13, May 13 and 17, June 9 and 23, 1994 → online text (page 13 of 31)